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[1979] SLR (HC) 66High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1980

REPUBLIC vs. STOOL LANDS BOUNDARIES SETTLEMENT COMMISSION; EX PARTE ASAMOAH II AND ANOTHER [1980] GLR 129

22 March 1979 · SARKODEE J · ≈ 9 min read

Cite as[1979] SLR (HC) 66
Other citation styles and permanent link
OSCOLAREPUBLIC v STOOL LANDS BOUNDARIES SETTLEMENT COMMISSION; ex parte ASAMOAH II AND ANOTHER [1980] GLR 129 [1979] SLR (HC) 66
APAREPUBLIC v STOOL LANDS BOUNDARIES SETTLEMENT COMMISSION; ex parte ASAMOAH II AND ANOTHER [1980] GLR 129, [1979] SLR (HC) 66 (Ghana).
BluebookREPUBLIC v STOOL LANDS BOUNDARIES SETTLEMENT COMMISSION; ex parte ASAMOAH II AND ANOTHER [1980] GLR 129, [1979] SLR (HC) 66 (Ghana High Ct. 1979).

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CASE REFERRED TO

Dzaba III v. Tumfuor [1978] G.L.R. 18, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for an order of certiorari to quash an order of the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commission striking out an action by the applicants. The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling.

COUNSEL

James Mercer for the applicants.

Gaisie for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF SARKODEE J.

The applicants are asking this court to bring up the proceedings of the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commission held at the State House, Accra, on 11 July 1978 and to be quashed by an order of certiorari.

The proceedings were in respect of an inquiry which the High Court, Sekondi, acting under section 4 (2) of the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Decree, 1973 (N.R.C.D. 172), (hereafter referred to as the Decree) referred to the Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commission (hereafter referred to as the commission) to determine the boundaries in consolidated land suits Nos. 5, 6, 7/66 pending before that court. The applicants are the plaintiff and co-plaintiff in that suit. On 11 July 1978 when the commission sat to determine the matter referred to it, the plaintiff was absent but the co-plaintiff, the defendant and co-defendant were present. Without hearing any evidence, the commission purported to strike out the inquiry off the list and awarded ¢200 costs in favour of the co-defendants on the ground that:

“As this commission has no jurisdiction to determine boundary disputes between individuals or between individuals

[p.131] of [1980] GLR 129

and stools, and as the plaintiff here is merely an individual and the so-called co-plaintiff is a stool which has not bothered to appear or represent the stool since 18 April 1978, 20 June 1978, 4 July 1978 and today, I have no alternative in the matter and consequently strike the enquiry off the list with ¢200 costs in favour of the Nyarkrom stool. The Lower Inchaban stool is at liberty to have the enquiry relisted if it so desires.”

The applicants therefore contend that the commission struck out the proceedings without giving the plaintiff or any person the opportunity of offering any relevant evidence and that the conduct of the commissioner amounts to an error of law on the face of the record, denial of justice and that inasmuch as the commission failed to hear any or all the parties, the conduct of the commission amounted to a denial of natural justice.

I must first of all deal with the position of the commission in relation to the High Court in particular and the hierarchy of courts in this country and to clear any doubts in the mind of the chief registrar of the commission for by paragraph (9) of his affidavit in opposition to this application he stated, “That it is also a moot point whether the High Court has jurisdiction to quash the proceedings of another body with similar jurisdiction or power.”

The High Court of Justice was set up by article 112 of the Constitution, 1969, i.e. that part of the Constitution which was saved by the National Redemption Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1972, s. 4. The jurisdiction and supervisory powers of the High Court are clearly spelt out in articles 113 and 114 respectively. After the enactment of the Constitution, the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), was passed to provide for the establishment of regular courts in the country and section 20 of that Act (except that it excludes military courts or tribunals) repeats article 114 of the Constitution which makes provision for the supervisory powers of the High Court.

The powers given to the commission by N.R.C.D. 172, s. 7 are limited to the actual conduct of proceedings before the commission. There is no provision either in the Decree itself or in any other subsequent enactment which gives the commission the status of a High Court or of a superior court. Part II of the Courts Act, 1972 (Act 372), establishes inferior courts. It is significant that in this section also the commission is not even accorded a specific place but comes under section 27 (e) which provided for “Such other inferior courts as may be established by law.” The commission does not exercise similar jurisdiction as the High Court. Section 4 of N.R.C.D.

[p.132] of [1980] GLR 129

172 gives the commission exclusive jurisdiction to determine the boundaries of stool lands and to hear and determine questions or disputes relating thereto. Its jurisdiction is exercised as provided by N.R.C.D. 172, s. 5 (3). The consolidated land suit was referred to the commission under section 4 of the Decree. And section 6 (3) (a) of N.R.C.D. 172 provides:

“(3) In any enquiry or proceedings under the provisions of this Decree, the Commissioner shall— (a) hear all such relevant evidence as may be offered by any person.”

This means that the commission in exercising its jurisdiction in a matter referred to it by any of the parties or by the Commissioner for Lands shall be bound to exercise the powers as provided by section 6 (3) (a) of N.R.C.D. 172. This section cuts across the Rules of the High Court which deal with appearance of and attendance of parties. In the case of proceedings before the commission, Order 36, rr. 16-18 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), which deal with attendance of parties are subject to the overriding operation of section 6 (3) (a) of N.R.C.D. 172 and of the Stool Lands Boundary Settlement Commissioner (Conduct of Enquiry and Proceedings) Regulations, 1978 (L.I. 1176) which authorises the commission to apply rules of the High Court with such modifications as may appear to the commissioner to be just. The commissioner is therefore not bound to apply the rules of the High Court in their entirety. In any event the fact that the commission applies the High Court Rules does not alter its position. The commission is not the only body which is authorised to use the High Court Rules; the Public Accounts Committee, for instance, also uses the High Court Rules. Under the Decree a Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement Commissioner should be a person who is qualified to practice as a lawyer in the courts of Ghana and has practised as such lawyer for not less than twelve years and in the case of his deputy he should be such a lawyer who has so practised for not less than ten years. That is in the case of a commissioner the person must be qualified enough to be a justice of appeal and his deputy to be equivalent to be a High Court judge. These facts do not equate the commissioner with High Court judge. We must however distinguish the case of persons who were already judges of the superior courts of judicature before their appointment as commissioners.

It is anomalous for a case to be referred from the High Court to the commission and still more anomalous for an Appeal Court judge

[p.133] of [1980] GLR 129

to be assigned to an inferior court. But the fact that those appointed are eligible to the Bench does not transform an inferior court into a High Court. In my view the commission does not exercise similar jurisdiction as the High Court. It is an inferior court and as such is subject to the supervisory powers of the High Court of Justice. By section 20 of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372):

“20. The High Court of Justice shall have supervisory jurisdiction over all inferior Courts in Ghana and any adjudicating authority other than a military Court or tribunal and in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction shall have power to issue such directions, orders or writs including writs or orders in the nature of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and quo warranto as it may consider appropriate for the purposes of enforcing or securing the enforcement of its supervisory powers.”

Whenever parties appear before the commission the commissioner is bound to hear evidence of the party which has appeared before him. He has no authority to strike off a matter which has been referred to him by both parties simply because one side fails to appear before him. No doubt he has coercive powers which he can employ to secure attendance. Under N.R.C.D. 172, s. 6 (1) where the enquiry is between stools, the commission is bound to hear all relevant evidence offered by any person. What is before the commissioner is an enquiry; there is no plaintiff and no defendant. If one party knows of the reference but he refuses to attend, the commissioner can proceed and hear the enquiry. Since the matter before him on 11 July 1978 was an enquiry he should have proceeded to hear evidence from the Nyarkrom stool. He had no power to strike out the enquiry. If for some reason or another he could not deal with it he has to refer it back to where it had come from. If one side refuses to attend after notice or without any reasonable excuse the commissioner is bound to go on; he must take evidence and deliver his findings or decision as the case may be after due notice has been given.

The commissioner failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of N.R.C.D. 172, s. 6 (3) (a) which enjoins him to call for evidence from any person who is before him and then to determine the relevancy of such evidence after he had heard that person and to use such evidence in his findings or decision if he finds such evidence relevant. In so doing he is not restricted to any particular person or individual. Therefore when the plaintiff, the first defendant, the fourth defendant and the co-defendant in the consolidated case

[p.134] of [1980] GLR 129

appeared before him he was in duty bound to enquire from them whether they had any evidence to offer touching on the subject-matter of the enquiry. Such a situation ought to be recorded by him. This he failed to do.

In my view the conduct of the commissioner amounted to a denial of justice because at least the Nyarkrom stool which appeared before him and whose boundary with the Lower Inchaban stool was to be determined was entitled to be heard because the other party which also had interest in the enquiry had failed to appear on four consecutive occasions after due notice. In not asking the Nyarkrom stool to offer evidence of its boundary, the commissioner erred and denied justice to the Nyarkrom stool by striking out the enquiry. Certiorari will therefore lie: see Dzaba III v. Tumfuor [1978] G.L.R. 18, C.A.

Before the ex parte application for certiorari was filed on behalf of the Lower Inchaban stool the commissioner had relisted the enquiry and had fixed it for hearing on 19 January 1979, and ordered ¢50 costs. However, it is wrong to say that the order had been vacated before the ex parte application was granted. The commissioner relisted the enquiry but omitted to set aside his original order made on 11 July 1978. That order together with the costs of ¢200 stands. I hold that there is an error on the face of the record, the conduct of the commissioner amounted to a denial of natural justice. The order is bad in law and cannot be allowed to stand. I would accordingly grant the application and quash the order and costs of ¢200 made on 11 July 1978. No order as to costs.

DECISION

Application granted.

S.O.

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