TINIEYE AND ANOTHER vs. THE REPUBLIC [1980] GLR 565
15 August 1979 · TAYLOR J · ≈ 17 min read
[1979] SLR (HC) 70Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Okorie v. The Republic [1974] 2 G.L.R. 272, C.A.
(2) Republic v. Akosah [1975] 2 G.L.R. 406.
(3) R. v. Love (1651) 5 State Tr. 43.
(4) Bonham’s Case (1610) 8 Co.Rep. 114a; 77 E.R. 652.
(5) Day v. Savage (1614) Hob. 85; 80 E.R. 235.
(6) Lee v. Bude and Torrington Junction Rly. Co. (1871) L.R.6 C.P. 576; 40 L.J.C.P. 285; 24 L.T. 827;
18 W.R. 954.
(7) R. v. City of London Court Judge [1892] 1 Q.B. 273; 61 L.J. Q.B. 337; 66 L.T. 135; 40 W.R. 215;
8. T.L.R. 191; 36 S.J. 138; 7 Asp.M.L.C. 140, C.A.
(8) Mersey Docks & Harbour Board v. Turner, The Zeta [1893] A.C. 468; 63 L.J.P. 17; 69 L.T. 630;
57 J.P. 660; 9 T.L.R. 624; 7 M.L.C. 369; 1 R. 307, H.L.
(9) Magor & St. Mellons R.D.C. v. Newport Corporation [1952] A.C. 189; [1951] 2 T.L.R. 935; 115 J.P. 613; [1951] 2 All E.R. 839, H.L. affirming [1950] 2 All E.R. 1226, C.A.
(10) Gwynne v. Burnell (1840) 7 C1. & Fin. 572; 6 Bing N.C. 453; 1 Scott N.R. 711; West 342, H.L. (11) Income Tax Special Commissioners v. Pemsel [1891] A.C. 531; 61 L.J.Q.B. 265; 65 L.T. 21; 55 J.P. 805; 7 T.L.R. 657; 3 T.C. 53, H.L.
(12) River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson (1877) 2 App.Cas. 743; 47 L.J.Q.B. 193; 37 L.T. 543; 42 J.P. 244; 26 W.R. 217; 3 Asp.M.L.C. 521, H.L.
(13) State v. Anani Fiadzo [1961] G.L.R. (Pt. I) 416, C.A.
(14) Ashiagbor v. The Republic, Court of Appeal, 9 April 1972, unreported.
(15) Nyina v. Commissioner of police [1964] G.L.R. 452.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL against conviction and sentence imposed on the appellants for stealing by a circuit court. The facts are fully set out in the Judgment.
COUNSEL
L. Bimi for the appellants.
Mrs. Sophia Adenyira, State Attorney, for V. Y. Agudetse Senior State Attorney, for the Republic.
JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.
The appellants here were jointly charged with stealing farm equipment valued at ¢2,833.95; building materials valued at ¢2.789.50 and personal effects valued at ¢1,070 all to the total value of ¢6,693.45 the property of one Idana Asigri. When they were arraigned before the circuit court presided over by his Honour [p.567] of [1980] GLR 565 Judge Adadevoh, they pleaded not guilty and the prosecutor gave the following facts:
“Complainant is the elder brother of the accused persons. During October 1977, the complainant who is a farmer locked up his room and went to the farm at Waga. The first and the second accused persons went to the house of the complainant and opened his room with a duplicate key and stole the articles mentioned in the charge sheet. They sold the articles in Togo and in Ghana. Later some of the articles were traced to those who bought them from the accused persons. The accused persons were arrested and charged with the offence.”
If the prosecutor had led evidence to substantiate these facts, there would have been no difficulty at all. Unfortunately the only evidence led was that some of the articles specified in the charge sheet were sold by the first appellant to the second prosecution witness and others were sold by the second appellant to the third prosecution witness. Furthermore, the first appellant when he was in police custody and was charged made a statement in his own handwriting in which, in effect, he admitted that he found the articles in the bush and with his companion they took them and sold them. Having regard to the confession and the fact that the stolen articles were found with the accused persons soon after they had been stolen and that they were found disposing of them and were unable to offer satisfactory explanations about how they came by the articles, the learned circuit court judge found the charge proved and convicted them of the offence of stealing with which they were charged. Expressing the view that stealing was rampant in the Bawku area and therefore a deterrent sentence was called for, he sentenced the appellants to three years’ imprisonment with hard labour each. It is against these convictions and sentences that the appellants appeal to this court.
Mr. L. Bimi, counsel for the appellants, filed on their behalf four grounds of appeal which he argued very vigorously before me. The said grounds are:
“(1) The judge erred in admitting the confession statements of the accused persons and thereafter basing his findings of fact on such inadmissible statements.
(2) The failure of the prosecution to call as a witness one Adinko, mother of the first prosecution witness who in all respects was a material witness, is fatal to the case of the prosecution.
(3) The sentence is excessive having regard to the evidence and the circumstances of the appellants.
[p.568] of [1980] GLR 565
(4) The trial judge erred in law when he meted out a harsh sentence because stealing is rampant in the Bawku District.”
The appellants filed on their own behalf various grounds of appeal but counsel abandoned all as well as ground (2) above and argued grounds (1), (3) and (4). The main thrust of counsel’s argument in regard to the convictions is centred on ground (1). That ground is not formulated with clarity but in order to appreciate counsel’s argument I think it is necessary to state the complaint inherent in ground (1). The appellants’ were, after their arrest, taken to the police station and while in custody they were not given any facilities whatsoever for obtaining legal advice or making arrangements for their defence or release, nor were they informed of their constitutional right to consult counsel of their choice instead the police endeavoured to obtain and did obtain confession statements from them.
In arguing ground (1), counsel referred me to the Court of Appeal decision delivered by Azu Crabbe C.J. in Okorie v. The Republic [1974] 2 G.L.R. 272, C.A. and my judgment in Republic v. Akosah [1975] 2 G.L.R. 406. These cases decided that statements obtained in breach of the constitutional rights of accused persons to consult counsel are inadmissible in evidence. He also referred me to the Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Decree, 1975 (S.M.C.D. 3), which overruled in effect Okorie (supra) and Akosah (supra) and which clearly stated that for the avoidance of doubt article 15 (2) of the Constitution, 1969, should not render any statement inadmissible. The argument of counsel is that I should ignore S.M.C.D. 3. He said that the National Redemption Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1972, in its preamble indicated that the council took over the reins of government “in the interest of the people of Ghana” and so he submitted that if the Supreme Military Council were to come out with a law that if a person goes to a hospital with appendicitis, the appendix should be removed by an operation performed by a nurse instead of a surgeon, the law will be invalid. He gave a second hypothetical situation. He said in further submission that if the Supreme Military Council were to come out with a Decree, sharing Ghana’s foreign exchange among themselves, such a Decree will be invalid because like the first example it will not be in the interest of the people of Ghana. He submitted that the Supreme Military Council having created limits to its power by the Proclamation, 1972, its power to make laws must be confined within the limits of the said Proclamation, 1972. He pointed out that in view of his submission, the only outstanding question is who is to declare such was invalid. He submitted that the Supreme Military Council
[p.569] of [1980] GLR 565 cannot decide what is in the interest of the people of Ghana and that that question ought to be decided by the superior courts of Ghana and in this respect he drew attention to the fact that the Proclamation, 1972, saved the powers and functions of the courts. Furthermore, he submitted and I quote him in his own words:
“The judges and courts of this country will be doing the people a wealth of good if they were with apologies to Lord Denning, M.R. not to behave as timorous souls and to hold laws that are inimical to the people of this country to be invalid when cases come before them.”
He continued: “If the Supreme Military Council as the legislature makes a law that reduces by the least fraction, the liberties of the people, then such a law will be as inimical as forcing Ghanaians to be operated upon by nurses instead of surgeons.” In the circumstances, he submitted that if his submissions are upheld by this court then S.M.C.D. 3 is invalid ab initio and was an exercise in futility. If so, then he submitted that Republic v. Akosah (supra) and Okorie v. The Republic (supra) are still good law and the learned circuit judge in this case should have advised himself on the strength of these cases and should have held as inadmissible the confession statements in this case. If he had done so, he submitted the conviction could not have been supported.
These submissions are attractive and bold indeed. But I must confess though that I find it rather disturbing to be called upon to examine these textbook submissions, when I am engaged in the serious and difficult task of dealing with the mundane problem of dispensing justice in a practical manner to my unfortunate countrymen convicted of crimes. Nevertheless, I apprehend it will be cowardly to shy away from the problem. The submissions have been made. I am in duty bound to consider them.
Now we inherited our whole philosophy of statute law from the British and I would have thought the soul-writhing experience of British constitutional law within the past 400 years has settled this question of the binding force of statute beyond doubt in all crimes where the jurisprudence of the British has had a footing. Without meaning any disrespect whatsoever, I think the view of the law which is being pressed on me with such unrestrained vigour belongs to the turbulent and troublous past of British constitutional history so well known to students of British constitutional law. It is amazing that learned counsel, fresh from our university and taking his first steps in the practical problem of dispensing justice according to progressive modern notions of law, should seek to revive quaint theories of the seventeenth century. Counsel’s submissions are
[p.570] of [1980] GLR 565 indeed reminiscent of the advice and effusions of Keble J. in 1653 in the case of R. v. Love (1651) 5 State Tr. 43 at p. 172 where he said, inter alia:
“whatsoever is not consonant to the law of God in Scripture, or to right reason, which is maintained by Scripture; whatsoever is in England, be it acts of parliament, Customs, or any judicial acts of the Court, it is not the law of England, but the error of the party, which did pronounce it; and you or any man else at bar may so plead it.”
(The emphasis is mine.)
It seems to me that counsel by his submission has accepted the advice proffered so long ago by Keble J. in 1653. That advice of over three centuries ago is as old as it is obsolete. It is an echo of an eccentric view which was to be later discarded in the course of the development of English law and by 1876, at the time of the reception of English law into the body of our law, that view and its adherents had long passed away. In its early formulation it was espoused by that great champion of the common law, Lord Coke C.J. when in Bonham’s Case (1610) 8 Co.Rep. 114a at p. 118a in his inimitable way he laid it down in these terms:
“And it appears in our books, that in many cases the common law will control Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an Act of Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will control it and adjudge such Act to be void.”
Coke C.J. did not even find many supporters among his contemporaries and successors except Hobart C.J. who in Day v. Savage (1614) Hob. 85 at p. 87 reiterated the principle: “even an Act of Parliament, made against natural equity, as to make a man Judge in his own case is void in itself for Jura naturae sunt immutabilia and they are leges legum.” About 250 years later this view of Hobart C.J. was rejected specifically and in unmistakable terms by Willes J. in Lee v. Bude and Torrington Junction Rly. Co. (1871) L.R. 6 C.P. 576 at p. 582 when he disclaimed it: “It was once said . . . that, if an Act of Parliament were to create a man judge in his own case, the Court might disregard it. That dictum, however, stands as a warning, rather than an authority to be followed.”
I think the modern approach to the interpretation of statute was settled so long ago in the nineteenth century. Perhaps the locus classicus is the opinion of Lord Esher M.R. in R. v. City of London Court Judge [1892] 1 Q.B. 273 at p. 290, C.A. where the Master of the Rolls propagated the view that where by the use of clear and
[p.571] of [1980] GLR 565 unequivocal language capable of only one meaning anything is enacted by the legislature, it must be enforced even though it be absurd or mischievous. This view was approved by Lord Herschell in Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Turner, The Zeta [1893] A.C. 468 at p. 477, H.L. and it was restated in modern times by Lord Simonds in the House of Lords in Magor & St. Mellons R. D. C. v. Newport Corporation [1952] A.C. 189 at pp. 190-191, H.L. As Coleridge J. pointed out half a century before Lord Esher’s formulation in Gwynne v. Burnell (1840) 7 C1. & Fin. 572 at p. 606 H.L., the underlying principle is that the meaning and intention of a statute must be collected from the plain and unambiguous expressions used therein rather than from any notions which may be entertained by the court as to what is just or expedient.
In my view, therefore, if the Supreme Military Council, before its overthrow by the revolutionary uprising of 4 June 1979, had made the Decrees indicated in learned counsel’s hypothetical examples, those Decrees would have been perfectly valid, and it would be legal for nurses to perform the operations and the sharing of the Ghana foreign exchange by members of the council would have been lawful. If a legislative body is engaged in oppressive legislation it is no concern of the courts. Any judge who finds it abhorrent to give effect to legislation which he considers obnoxious had his remedy by resigning. The remedy of the people is to change the legislative body; but as long as the body is the institution in which the legislative powers of the state have come to rest, then its Decrees, Acts or enactments are entitled to be given full legal force by the courts.
Now the provision of article 15 (2) of the Constitution, 1969, is:
“(2). Any person who is arrested, restricted or detained shall be informed immediately, in a language that he understands, of the reasons for his arrest, restriction or detention and of his right to consult Counsel of his own choice.”
The provisions of the Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Decree, 1975 (S.M.C.D. 3) are:
“(1) Notwithstanding any enactment to the contrary, in any proceeding commenced after the first day of August 1969, no statement shall be inadmissible by reason only of the fact that the person making such a statement had not been informed of his right to consult counsel of his own choice prior to the making of such statement.
(2) For the avoidance of doubt, the provisions of Article 15 (2) of the suspended Constitution of 1969 shall not render any statement inadmissible as evidence.”
[p.572] of [1980] GLR 565
It seems to me, that although the appellants were not informed of their right to counsel, nevertheless the provisions of S.M.C.D. 3 are so clear that it is neither possible nor permissible by any process of interpretation to hold that the statements which the appellants made could be legitimately excluded as inadmissible evidence for failure to inform them of their right to consult counsel. As I have shown in this judgment, the principle which learned counsel has pressed upon me, to uphold in order to defeat the clear language of an enactment, is an old discredited principle and it is now no longer law. It could in effect convert the courts into legislative bodies and subvert their true function as interpreters of the law. As Willes J. said in Lee v. Bude and Torrington Junction Rly. Co. (supra) at p. 582:
“We sit here as servants of the Queen and the legislature. Are we to act as regents over what is done by parliament . . . I deny that any such authority exists . . . The proceedings here are judicial, not autocratic, which they would be if we could make laws instead of administering them.”
It is not a matter of timorous souls at all. It is a pure question of interpreting statutes. I concede that if the words of the enactment are ambiguous then one can consider the preamble and the expression in the preamble like “in the interests of the people of Ghana” to which counsel drew my attention can be looked at to resolve the ambiguity. In the absence of ambiguity this journey of discovery is to be deprecated for as Lord Simonds said in the Newport Corporation case (supra) it will be tantamount to “a naked usurpation of the legislative function under the thin disguise of interpretation.” By its pragmatic trial and error approach the common law has succeeded in prescribing the true function of an interpreter of a statute. The formula supported by the House of Lords’ cases of Income Tax Commissioners v. Pemsel [1891] A.C. 531 at p. 543 and River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson [1877] 2 App. Cas. 743 at p. 778, is contained in the very first sentences of Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (10th ed.) pp. 1-2:
“A statute is the will of the Legislature; and the fundamental rule of interpretation, to which all others are subordinate, is that a statute is to be expounded according to the intent of them that made it.’ If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous no more is necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense, the words themselves in such case best declaring the intention of the legislature.”
[p.573] of [1980] GLR 565
Having regard therefore to these principles of interpretation, which I have been at pains to canvass in this judgment, I hold that the confession statements which the appellants made were admissible on a plain construction of the unambiguous language of S.M.C.D. 3. Even if they were by a freak of interpretation made inadmissible, the appellants were found with stolen properties soon after they had been stolen; they were seen disposing of the said properties and they gave unsatisfactory explanations. Admittedly, no one saw them stealing or receiving the said properties but in my view the circumstantial evidence does raise the presumption that they were either the thieves or receivers. In State v. Anani Fiadzo [1961] G.L.R. (Pt. I) 416 the Court of Appeal held (as set out in the headnote at p. 416);
“a presumption from circumstantial evidence should be drawn against an accused person only when the presumption follows irresistibly from the circumstances proved in evidence; and in order to justify the inference of guilt, the inculpatory facts must be incompatible with the innocence of the accused and incapable of explanation upon any other reasonable hypothesis than that of guilt.”
This holding was quoted with approval by Jiagge J.A. delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Ashiagbor v. The Republic, Court of Appeal, 9 April 1972, unreported. The appellants were actually tried for stealing contrary to section 124 (1) of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29). If the confession statements particularly of the first appellant is excluded the evidence would as I have indicated, raise the presumption that the appellants were either the thieves or they received the goods knowing them to be stolen. It must be remembered that on a charge of stealing the appellants could be found guilty of receiving in accordance with the provisions of section 156 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30). Furthermore, leaving aside the confession statement, the facts of the case proved in evidence bring to play the doctrine of recent possession as was expounded in the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Nyina v. Commissioner of Police [1964] G.L.R. 452 at p. 456 delivered by Ollennu J.S.C. Under this principle, on the facts of this case, the court can legitimately convict the appellants of receiving. If the confession statements were admitted, they show that at least the appellants stole the articles by finding. Since I have held that the confession statements cannot be excluded, I think the convictions of the appellants are unexceptionable and ought not to be disturbed. It was for these reasons that I dismissed the appeals against the convictions.
[p.574] of [1980] GLR 565
With regard to the sentences the appellants were given three years’ imprisonment with hard labour each. They are youngmen in their early twenties. In my opinion, the court must not close its eyes to the indiscretions even bordering on the criminal that are associated with the very young and many youthful endeavours.
In our time, we have seen the somewhat inexplicable excesses even of young university boys and girls. The appellants here are young first offenders. The first appellant with youthful bravado has added an alias “Killer” to his name. He wants to be called Asigri Issahaq, alias “Killer.” Surely no responsible and enlightened normal person will respectably wish to be called a killer; a destroyer of human life. Clearly in his youthful ignorance nothing is sacrosanct to this semi-illiterate. No doubt he will not understand and appreciate what is meant by the sanctity of life – a concept that may even elude his age groups in our universities. Such a person about to launch on a life of crime needs the sympathy and understanding of the court. He is afterall only 21 years old and therefore new to the ways of the world. His companion who rather seemed to have played a minor role is 25 years. They are brothers of the complainant. I think these young first offenders need to be weaned from a further life of crime instead of being given long prison terms that will accelerate their further degradation by bringing them in close contact with the hardened criminal class. The reformative element in criminal justice is what is now being fostered in almost all progressive and civilised societies and we will do well to encourage it. It is for this reason that on dismissing their appeals, I reduced the sentences of the appellants from three years’ imprisonment with hard labour each to nine months’ imprisonment with hard labour each. They had then already served these sentences and so by my order they were immediately discharged. DECISION Appeal dismissed.
Sentences reduced.
S. O.
