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[1979] SLR (HC) 73High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1980

TUFFUOR vs. ANOKYI AND OTHERS [1980] GLR 764

12 November 1979 · OSEI-HWERE J · ≈ 9 min read

Cite as[1979] SLR (HC) 73
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OSCOLATUFFUOR v ANOKYI AND OTHERS [1980] GLR 764 [1979] SLR (HC) 73
APATUFFUOR v ANOKYI AND OTHERS [1980] GLR 764, [1979] SLR (HC) 73 (Ghana).
BluebookTUFFUOR v ANOKYI AND OTHERS [1980] GLR 764, [1979] SLR (HC) 73 (Ghana High Ct. 1979).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Yeboah v. Krah [1974] 1 G.L.R. 247.

(2) Avril v. Warwick (Sheriff) (1834) 3 Nev. & M.K.B. 871 sub nom. Avril v. Mordant 3 L.J.K.B.

148.

(3) Shattock v. Carden (1851) 6 Exch. 725; 2 L.M. & P. 466; 21 L.J.Ex. 200; 17 L.T.O.S. 160. (4) Munk v. Cass (1841) 9 Dowl. 332; Woll. 100; 5 Jur. 71.

(5) Addai v. Donkor [1972] 1 G.L.R. 209, C.A.

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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION to set aside sale of house for violation of Order 44, r. 14 of Sched. II of the Courts Ordinance. Cap. 4 (1951 Rev.). The facts are fully stated in the judgment.

COUNSEL

A to Dadzie for the plaintiff.

K. Ewusi-Wilson for the defendants.

JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE J.

The issue taken up by the parties as a preliminary point of law for the determination of the court is, “whether the sale violated Order 44, r. 14 of the Courts Ordinance, Cap. 4 (1951 Rev.), Sched. II.” Briefly, the background to the plaintiff’s action is that on 23 September 1970 the first defendant (as the plaintiff) recovered judgment against the plaintiff (as the defendant) in the sum of ¢270. Subsequently, the first defendant applied to the registrar of the trial district court grade I for a fi. fa. to issue for the attachment of the following properties of the plaintiff (then the judgment debtor):

“(1) One compound house at Ntronang and at a place commonly known and called Rest House …

(2) All personal effects of the judgment debtor.”

Following this application, the plaintiff’s house was attached and the third defendant, a licensed auctioneer who had been authorised to sell the house, knocked it down for ¢400.75 to the second defendant. It is the plaintiff’s case that the co-defendant subsequently purchased this house from the second defendant. The plaintiff brought this action claiming from the defendants jointly and severally a declaration that the sale of his house was null and void and should be set aside and also for recovery of possession.

It has been conceded by counsel for both parties that although the writ of fi. fa. issued some time in October 1970, yet the sale of the plaintiff’s house took place as late as 26 April 1972 because of the intermediary steps the plaintiff took in an attempt to defeat the execution. Before this court, the plaintiff’s counsel has tendered a certified copy of the record of proceedings in connection with the criminal charges of threatening and assault against the plaintiff. The plaintiff was alleged to have committed these offences on 12 June 1972 after the bailiffs of the district court had taken possession of the house on 7 June 1972 upon the authority of a writ of possession. In the process of executing the writ of possession the bailiffs removed all the personal effects of the plaintiff and took an inventory of these personal belongings which was tendered as an exhibit at the trial. The inventory appears at page 21 of the certified copy of the proceedings tendered. Counsel for the plaintiff has tendered this inventory to show that the plaintiff had sufficient moveables which the first

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defendant could have attached to satisfy his judgment debt. Counsel for the defendants has also argued that as, for nearly two years, the plaintiff was given every opportunity to settle the judgment debt and he failed to do so the court should infer that the plaintiff would not have left his moveables open for execution. At any rate, he argued that he was prepared to call witnesses to establish that at the time of the attachment by the writ of fi. fa. the plaintiff had no goods in the house. He further contended that the inventory tendered bore no relevance to this case as it was taken some time after the sale of the house.

Order 44 in Schel. II to Cap. 4 regulates the practice as to the mode of execution in the district courts. Although rule 13 of the Order makes all property whatsoever, moveable or immovable, belonging to the party against whom a decree is to be enforced liable to attachment and sale in execution of the decree, yet rule 14 specifically excludes lands from being levied on till goods have been exhausted and only gives the judgment creditor the option to levy on either in a given situation. Rule 14 provides:

‘‘14. If the judgment debtor has sufficient moveable property within the Judicial Division in which the decree was issued to satisfy the debt, damages, and costs recovered, his lands shall not be levied upon;

but if he has not sufficient moveable property within the Judicial Division, it shall be optional to the execution creditor to levy upon his immovable property within the same Judicial Division before levying on his moveable property elsewhere, or to levy upon the moveable property of such judgment debtor wherever it may be found within the Gold Coast [Ghana], before having recourse to his immovable property.”

Simply put, the rule is that whether the execution is carried on within the judicial division or outside it, the judgment creditor is under a mandatory obligation to levy on goods first before he can have recourse to immovable property of the judgment debtor. I have been referred by the plaintiff’s counsel to my own decision in Yeboah v. Krah [1974] 1 G.L.R. 247, the facts of which are not dissimilar to those in this case, and I have been invited to follow that decision. No convincing argument has been advanced to persuade me to change my mind on the decision. In that decision, I observed that there was no duty on the judgment debtor to satisfy the judgment creditor that he had sufficient moveable property to satisfy the judgment debt. On the contrary, it was rather the judgment creditor who had to satisfy the court that the judgment debtor had no sufficient goods to meet the execution; and that proof was afforded by

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the sheriff’s return to the writ of nulla bona or something analogous to it.

As stated in Mather’s Sheriff and Execution Law (3rd ed.), p. 133:

“the Sheriff’s return of nulla bona is prima facie evidence that the party had no goods at that time. Avril v.

Mordant (1834) 3 L.J.(N.S.)K.B. 148. In other words, the meaning of a return of nulla bona is that there are no goods applicable to the plaintiff’s writ. Shattock v. Carden (1851) 6 Exch. 725.”

The sheriff’s return must always disclose a reasonable degree of certainty. In Munk v. Cass (1841) 9 Dowl. 332, the sheriff’s return disclosed that the premises of the defendant were so barricaded that he was unable to ascertain whether the defendant had goods within the bailiwick on which a levy may be made. This was held to be a bad return, as he should have stated either that the defendant had goods or that he had none. These decisions indicate that it is the sheriff who, by putting in hand the process of executing the fi. fa., can inform the judgment creditor that there are no goods or insufficient goods to be levied on. Under Order 44, r. 41, for instance, the bailiff is required to make a full return to the sheriff in Form B of all writs of execution which remained in his hands not fully executed. As indicated in Form B, appended, the bailiff may state under the column as to what has been done under the writ the following, “Goods seized and sold, writ in hand for creditors to point out lands.” Counsel for the first defendant, the executing judgment creditor, could not tender any sheriff’s return to the writ of fi. fa. which disclosed that there were no goods before the house was levied on. In the absence of this proof his argument that it is only reasonable to anticipate that the plaintiff would keep away his goods because he had ample opportunity to do so becomes mere fanciful speculation. The simple truth is that the first defendant did not wait for any opportunity to exercise his option and he did not even leave the registrar to exercise any discretion when by his letter to him, exhibit A, he requested him to attach the house as well as the plaintiff’s personal effects.

I am satisfied from the foregoing that the attachment and sale of the plaintiff’s house contravened Order 44, r. 14 of Sched. II to Cap. 4. Execution under a fi. fa. may be impeached either for illegality or irregularity and, as pointed out in Addai v. Donkor [1972] 1 G.L.R. 209, C. A. where the law in these matters has been crystallised as per Archer J.A. at p. 218:

“(a) Where the sale is illegal, then the sale is void ab initio and no title passed: see Kwabena v. Aninkora [1964] G.L.R. 299, S.C.

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(b) Where the sale is irregular, then it is voidable at the instance of a debtor if he can prove that the alleged irregularity has caused him substantial injury: see Marfo v. Adusei [1964] G.L.R. 365, S.C.”

The argument was advanced by counsel for the defendants that even if there was a breach of rule 14 that was a mere irregularity which could have enabled the plaintiff to set the sale aside in terms of Order 45, r. 31 if he had applied to the court for that purpose at any time within 21 days from the date of the sale, but that as no such application was made the sale became absolute under rule 32. Rule 31 truly empowers the judgment debtor so to apply to the court and set aside the sale but that applies where there is a material irregularity in the conduct of the sale. The breach of Order 44, r.14 will not constitute an irregularity in the conduct of the sale but it will, in my view, contravene the fundamental right to attach the particular property which, because of the imperativeness of the prohibition: “his lands, shall not be levied upon,” will make the attachment illegal and the sale consequently null and void. It is for the above reasons that on 6 November 1979 I gave judgment for the plaintiff as per the endorsements on his writ but reserved the consideration of costs.

Order 44, r. 16 of Sched. II to Cap. 4 points out where the costs should lie. It stipulates that in every case of execution, all steps therein shall be taken on the demand of the party prosecuting the decree who shall be liable for any damage arising from any illegal or irregular proceeding taken at his instance. As the first defendant initiated the illegal attachment of the plaintiff’s land he must bear alone the brunt of the costs. Although the writ in this case was filed as far back as 31 May 1972 and the plaintiff was subsequently granted leave to serve his writ by substitution he took no further steps in the action against the first defendant who finally appeared to the writ only as recently as 13 June 1979. Indeed, the plaintiff took his summons for directions against him the very day the preliminary issue was argued. The first defendant has, therefore, not contributed to the age of this case before the court by any blamable conduct. It is with this in mind that I award to the plaintiff ¢400 costs which are recoverable from the first defendant alone. DECISION Judgment for the plaintiff.

Sale set aside.

K. A. A. M.

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