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[1979] SLR (HC) 75High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1980

WINNEY vs. MANFORD AND OTHERS [1980] GLR 494

31 July 1979 · SARKODEE J · ≈ 8 min read

Cite as[1979] SLR (HC) 75
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OSCOLAWINNEY v MANFORD AND OTHERS [1980] GLR 494 [1979] SLR (HC) 75
APAWINNEY v MANFORD AND OTHERS [1980] GLR 494, [1979] SLR (HC) 75 (Ghana).
BluebookWINNEY v MANFORD AND OTHERS [1980] GLR 494, [1979] SLR (HC) 75 (Ghana High Ct. 1979).

SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.

CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Douglas v. Baynes [1908] A.C. 477; 78 L.J.P.C. 13; 99 L.T. 599; 24 T.L.R. 896, P.C.

(2) Asare v. Antwi [1975] 1 G.L.R. 16, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION by the plaintiff against the defendants for the specific performance of an oral agreement to lease a farming land. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Plaintiff in person.

E. K. K. Akrasi for the defendants.

JUDGMENT OF SARKODEE J.

The plaintiff’s claim is for specific performance of an oral agreement to lease farming land of 306 acres at Bonsokrome in the Western Region. Alternatively, the plaintiff claims the sum of ¢33,000 from the defendants as the cost of cultivating 40 acres oil palm trees on part of the land offered to the plaintiff by the defendants which land the defendants now refuse to lease to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff is a barrister-at-law and the defendants elders of Anona family of Bonsokrome and Busua. The plaintiff says that in 1973 the defendants agreed to lease 306 acres of their family land to him for farming purposes. The defendants charged him ¢500 and the plaintiff agreed to accept the lease. The plaintiff made part payment of ¢200 and gave the sum of ¢10.50 together with a bottle of schnapps as custom demanded. The defendants, according to the plaintiff, then promised to execute a formal lease after the plaintiff had surveyed and demarcated the land and prepared the relevant documents. Relying on the agreement the plaintiff caused the land to be surveyed and demarcated at a cost of ¢800. He started cultivation and at the time of going to court he had planted 35 acres oil palm seedlings at a cost of ¢33,000. Subsequently, the plaintiff prepared a formal lease, tendered the sum of ¢300 being the balance, according to him, of the price and then asked the defendants to execute the lease. The defendants did not accept the sum of ¢300 and refused to execute the said lease. The plaintiff therefore brought this action to enforce the said agreement.

The defendants admit that they agreed to grant to the plaintiff a portion of land for farming purposes but deny that they agreed on

[p.496] of [1980] GLR 494

the extent until the land had been demarcated. Meanwhile, they showed the plaintiff a portion of the land they intended to give to him and allowed him to start farming on it because the plaintiff was anxious to start cultivation as the time for clearing the bush was running out. He was allowed to start work subject to ascertaining the extent of the land after demarcation and after both parties had agreed on the price and the yearly rent to be paid. So as far as the defendants were concerned the sum of ¢200 paid to them by the plaintiff was part payment of customary drinks and not the price.

The defendants say that after their head of family and the plaintiff ‘s surveyor had demarcated the land intended for the plaintiff, the plaintiff alone went with the surveyor, re-demarcated a portion of the land and erected pillars on them. In the course of this the plaintiff included in his land farms belonging to other farmers and thus earmarked to himself an area of 306 acres. As a result of this the defendants refused to execute the lease in the plaintiff’s favour, caused the land to be demarcated again leaving out farms already granted and cultivated by other persons thus leaving a total acreage of 238.68 for the plaintiff. Finally the defendants say that since they and the plaintiff have not agreed on the area to be leased, the price, yearly rent payable by the plaintiff and the condition to be embodied in the lease, the plaintiff is not entitled to his claim.

In their counterclaim the defendants demand the value of sale of wild palm trees by the plaintiff and for subletting the lands of the defendants. Also they ask for injunction to restrain the plaintiff from further cultivating the land until he had reached a proper agreement with the defendants.

Before a court can enforce the specific performance of a contract it must be satisfied that there is, in fact, a concluded contract. That the contract is not inconclusive by reason that the parties have failed to agree expressly or by implication on some essential matter, or by reason that it failed to comply with statutory requirement relating to contracts. Also the contract must be precise and certain and that there should be no such uncertainty and vagueness that exact performance cannot be ordered: see Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 36, para. 389. In other words, to succeed, the plaintiff must satisfy the court that the contract is certain, and where it is so vague in its general terms that the obligations of the parties are not ascertainable the court will not decree specific performance. In his own evidence, the plaintiff said when he was first introduced to the first plaintiff witness, Mr. Lassey, the surveyor, who was then working on Dr. Sangmuah’s land, it was agreed that they would be certain to know the land the defendants would grant to the plaintiff

[p.497] of [1980] GLR 494

only when the first plaintiff witness had completed the work on Dr. Sangmuah’s land. It was when the surveyor completed the work on Dr. Sangmuah’s land that he started demarcating the land intended for the plaintiff. It seems to me therefore that immediately after the first meeting with the defendants the extent of the land could not have been agreed upon. After demarcation the plaintiff prepared a plan for the signature of the defendants which the latter rejected on the ground that the plaintiff had included in the plan farm lands which the defendants had already granted to other persons. Notable among them was the farm of Kofi Dagom. When the plaintiff’s attention was drawn to this he agreed to map out Kofi Dagom’s land. Under cross-examination he agreed that he had not excluded Kofi Dagom’s land. The first plaintiff witness, the surveyor, said when he was demarcating the land he saw certain farms and some coconut trees and that he did not know to whom those belonged; a clear indication that other persons’ farms were within the area surveyed. The defendants could not have agreed they were going to give half a mile square to the plaintiff when they were not in a position to know the extent of the land after demarcating Dr. Sangmuah’s land. Moreover they could not have included other persons farms in what they intended to grant to the plaintiff. The parties were not ad idem about the subject-matter of their agreement. It would be strange indeed for the parties to agree on the price to be paid when they did not know the extent of the land to be granted to the plaintiff.

In his own evidence the plaintiff said that he had not agreed with the defendants on the rates to be paid and so both parties had arranged to go to the Lands Department to ascertain what rates to pay. The defendants had made proposals in a letter dated 1 July 1976 and had asked for ¢1,000. It is therefore clear that the parties had not agreed on the terms which should govern the contract. In my view, the parties could not have agreed on the rates and the price to be paid. The plaintiff could not have been asked to pay ¢500 as the price on the first occasion he met the defendants and I cannot imagine him agreeing to pay ¢500 when the land had then not been demarcated and the extent of it ascertained. The defendants say the price always depended upon several factors and in particular the size of the land to be leased had always to be considered. The third plaintiff witness, the plaintiff’s own supervisor, said he saw two demarcation lines and so he asked the plaintiff the reason for them. The plaintiff told him as the land given to him previously was too small the family of the defendants added some land to it. This evidence from the plaintiff’s own witness corroborates the evidence of the defendants and supports the contention that the parties could not have agreed

[p.498] of [1980] GLR 494

upon the price at the first meeting. Not until the parties had agreed on which portion of the area should go to the plaintiff, it unreasonable to say that they had agreed on ¢500. I hold therefore that the ¢500 was for customary drink and not the price for the contract. That sum was a little on the higher side but that is a matter for negotiation. The price to pay is a material term in every contract of sale, unless the price is ascertained by the contract or a machinery provided for its ascertainment, the contract is incomplete and cannot be enforced: see Douglas v. Baynes [1908] A.C. 477, P.C. applied in Asare v. Antwi [1975] 1 G.L.R. 16, C.A.

Uncertainty of the subject-matter and failure to agree on the price apart, the alleged agreement relied on by the plaintiff is not in writing nor evidenced by a note or memorandum in writing as required by section 4 of the Statute of Frauds, 1677 (29 Cha. 2, c.3), which still applies in Ghana in so far as it relates to a contract for the sale of or other interest in land and which makes any such contract void or unenforceable if it is not in writing or there is no memorandum or note thereof in writing: see Asare v. Antwi (supra). I hold therefore that the agreement relied upon by the plaintiff is unenforceable.

The defendants do not say that they are unwilling to give the land to the plaintiff. Their quarrel is with the size of the land. The defendants prepared a plan exhibit 1 which excluded Kofi Dagom’s land and all other farms already granted to other persons. They say they will be prepared to give to the plaintiff the land shown in exhibit 1 upon both parties agreeing on the consideration and annual rents to be paid.

Finally, the plaintiff has failed to prove his case and it is accordingly dismissed. I accept the evidence of the witnesses called by the defendants to prove their counterclaim and hold that defendants have successfully proved their counterclaim. The plaintiff is accordingly ordered to pay to the defendants the sum of ¢300 which is the balance of customary drink or knocking fee or “nsatoase” money. The plaintiff, his agents, servants or assigns are hereby restrained from further extending the farm and from cultivating the land until proper agreement has been reached with the defendants.

Costs ¢500.

DECISION

Plaintiff’s action dismissed.

Judgment for defendants on counterclaim with costs.

D. R. K. S.

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