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[1979] SLR (HC) 78High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1981

REPUBLIC vs. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS; EX PARTE DOH [1981] GLR 780

15 November 1979 · AMUA-SEKYI J · ≈ 6 min read

Cite as[1979] SLR (HC) 78
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OSCOLAREPUBLIC v DIRECTOR OF PRISONS; ex parte DOH [1981] GLR 780 [1979] SLR (HC) 78
APAREPUBLIC v DIRECTOR OF PRISONS; ex parte DOH [1981] GLR 780, [1979] SLR (HC) 78 (Ghana).
BluebookREPUBLIC v DIRECTOR OF PRISONS; ex parte DOH [1981] GLR 780, [1979] SLR (HC) 78 (Ghana High Ct. 1979).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Darnel’s Case (1627) 3 State Tr. 1.

(2) Carus Wilson’s Case (1845) 115 E.R. 759; (1845) 7 Q.B. 984; 1 New Pact Cas. 193; 6 State Tr.

W.S. 183; 14 L.J.Q.B. 201; 5 L.T.O.S. 52; 9 J.P. 665; 9 Jur. 394.

(3) Republic v. Maikankan [1971] 2 G.L.R. 473, S.C.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for an order of habeas corpus for the release of the applicant, wherein a preliminary objection founded on sections 15, 16 and 19 of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979, was raised. The facts are fully set out in the ruling.

COUNSEL

J. B. Kwenin for the applicant.

Kaleo Bio, Principal State Attorney, for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF AMUA-SEKYI J.

The applicant, Grace Doh, is the wife of Jerome Doh, Assistant Superintendent of Police. On 25 October 1979, she applied ex parte for leave to apply for an order of habeas corpus to secure the release of her husband whom she alleged was being kept in prison unlawfully by the respondent. Leave having been granted, the respondent produced the body of Jerome Doh in court on the return day, and also filed the report required by section 2 of the Habeas Corpus Act, 1964 (Act 244), stating the grounds of the detention. He however objected to this court proceeding to hear arguments on the merits on the following grounds:

“(i) That the combined effect of article 217 of the Constitution, 1979, and sections 15 (2), (3) and (4), 16 and 19 of the transitional provisions of the Constitution clearly ousts the court of jurisdiction to entertain the writ.

(ii) That in case of doubt having regard to article 35 of the Constitution, 1979, it shall be the clear duty of the court

[p.782] of [1981] GLR 780

to stay proceedings and refer the question to the Supreme Court for determination under article 118 of the Constitution.”

Section 15 of the transitional provisions deals with indemnity for certain specified acts, section 16 with confiscation of assets, and section 19 provides, among other things, that Parliament shall have no power to amend sections 15 and 16. Article 217 provides that the transitional provisions shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Constitution. According to counsel, sections 15, 16 and 19 of the transitional provisions override article 35 of the Constitution and have the effect of depriving the court of jurisdiction to entertain this application for an order of habeas corpus in which the respondent alleges, as the ground of the detention, a trial, conviction and sentence by a special court set up under the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Courts) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 3).

In view of the fact that these objections are similar to those raised in other applications before me, I inquired from counsel whether there was any reason why I should not deal with this matter. Counsel indicated that he had no objection to the case proceeding before me.

Let me say at once that I do not find in the transitional provisions anything which prevents a person who is unlawfully detained from applying for an order of habeas corpus. That remedy, I am persuaded, is available to the meanest citizen against the most powerful, and even against the State itself, whenever there is a deprivation of personal liberty without lawful excuse. In Darnel’s Case (1627) 3 State Tr. 1, a return to the writ that the imprisonment was “by the special command of His Majesty,” that is, Charles I, was held not to be conclusive. Said Hyde C.J:

“Whether the commitment be by the King or others this Court is a place where the King doth sit in person, and we have power to examine it, and if it appears that any man hath injury or wrong by his imprisonment, we have power to deliver and discharge him; if otherwise he is to be remanded by us to prison again.”

I cannot accept that the power of the High Court under the Constitution, 1979, to examine a return is inferior to that of the Court of King’s Bench in seventeenth century England.

[p.783] of [1981] GLR 780

The power of the High Court to entertain an application such as this is set out in article 35 (1) and (2) of the Constitution, 1979 in these words:

“35. (1) Where a person alleges that a provision of articles 19 to 34 inclusive of this Constitution has been, or is being or is likely to be contravened in relation to him, then, without prejudice to any other action with respect to the same matter that is lawfully available, that person may apply to the High Court of Justice for redress.

(2) The High Court of Justice shall, under clause (1) of this article have power to issue such directions or orders or writs including writs or orders in the nature of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and quo warranto as it may consider appropriate for the purposes of enforcing, or securing the enforcement of any of the provisions of articles 19 to 34 inclusive to the protection of which the person concerned is entitled.”

One of the fundamental rights which the Constitution guarantees to each and every person in Ghana is the right not to be deprived of his personal liberty, except as may be authorised by law: see article 21 (1).

The return filed sets out the grounds of the detention, but the respondent says that this court has no power to examine the return in order to arrive at a conclusion whether or not the detention is authorised by law. I am unable to accept that submission. In my view, the court is under a duty to examine the return, and if it is not satisfied that the person restrained was tried, convicted and sentenced by the special court as alleged, to discharge him: see section 4 of Act 244. If, on the other hand, the court finds that he is in execution of the sentence of a court of competent jurisdiction, the court will dismiss the application and remand him: see Carus Wilson’s Case (1845) 115 E.R. 759.

I do not see that there is here any serious question of interpretation of the Constitution. Article 35 is plain enough as to the power of the court to entertain the application. I cannot do better than quote the words of caution uttered by Edmund Bannerman C.J. in Republic v. Maikankan [1971] 2 G.L.R. 473, S.C. at p. 478:

“We wish to comment that a lower court is not bound to refer to the Supreme Court every submission alleging as an issue the determination of a question of interpretation of the Constitution or of any other matter contained in article 106 (1)(a) or (b). If in the opinion of the lower court the answer to a submission is clear and unambiguous on the face of the provisions of the Constitution or laws of Ghana, no reference need be made since no question of interpretation arises and a person who disagrees with or is aggrieved by the ruling of the

[p.784] of [1981] GLR 780

lower court has his remedy by the normal way of appeal, if he so chooses. To interpret the provisions of article 106 (2) of the Constitution in any other way may entail and encourage references to the Supreme Court of frivolous submissions, some of which may be intended to stultify proceedings or the due process of law and may lead to delays such as may in fact amount to denial of justice.”

Let the respondent satisfy the court that the person restrained was tried, convicted and sentenced as alleged. Till then the question of referring article 35 or any other provision to the Supreme Court does not arise. It was for these reasons that I overruled the preliminary objections.

DECISION Objection to jurisdiction of court overruled.

E. P. -T.

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