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[1979] SLR (HC) 8High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1980

ABEKA AND ANOTHER vs. THE REPUBLIC [1980] GLR 438

13 July 1979 · AMPIAH J · ≈ 12 min read

Cite as[1979] SLR (HC) 8
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OSCOLAABEKA AND ANOTHER v THE REPUBLIC [1980] GLR 438 [1979] SLR (HC) 8
APAABEKA AND ANOTHER v THE REPUBLIC [1980] GLR 438, [1979] SLR (HC) 8 (Ghana).
BluebookABEKA AND ANOTHER v THE REPUBLIC [1980] GLR 438, [1979] SLR (HC) 8 (Ghana High Ct. 1979).

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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL by the appellants against their conviction and sentence by the District Court, Grade I, Goaso, for assault. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Ohene-Anobaah for the appellants.

Ossei for the respondents.

JUDGMENT OF AMPIAH J.

The appellants herein were on 1 December 1978 convicted of assault by the District Magistrate, Grade I, Goaso, and were sentenced to a term of twelve months’ imprisonment with hard labour each. It is against their conviction and sentence that each of the appellants has appealed.

The complaints by the appellants against the conviction and sentence as contained in their petition filed on 6 December 1978 were that:

“(a) The judgment is erroneous as the jurisdiction of the court was ousted as a bona fide question of title to land was raised, and (b) the verdict is erroneous or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence.”

On 18 December 1978, Mr. Obeng-Manu, counsel for the accused in the trial court, filed yet another petition in which he gave the grounds of appeal as:

[p.441] of [1980] GLR 438

“(a) That the sentence of twelve months’ imprisonment with hard labour was harsh having regard to the circumstances including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, and

(b) that the learned trial magistrate had no jurisdiction to try the case.”

Although this latter petition was filed out of time, the court was prepared to hear counsel for the appellants on the grounds contained in it. Mr. Ohene-Anobaah, counsel for the appellants, however, did not pursue the question of jurisdiction seriously but contended that in view of the appellants’ claim of title to the land they were justified in using force to arrest the complainants in defence of their property and that what the appellants did was no more than the use of reasonable force to apprehend the complainants who, the appellants claimed, were thieves. On 19 December 1978 the appellants were granted bail pending the determination of this appeal.

According to the first prosecution witness, the principal complainant in the case, about twenty years ago he acquired a piece of land from one Adututu; he has worked on this piece of land ever since and in the year in question he cultivated corn and other food crops on the land. On 1 December 1978 he went to this farm with the other complainants in this case (his wife and his brothers) and also some other helpers with a view to harvesting the corn on the land; there were about 30 of them. While on the farm they were confronted by the appellants together with other persons. The appellants accused him of stealing the corn; he denied this and claimed that the corn belonged to him. The appellants having taken the remaining bottle of an alcoholic drink, akpeteshie, which he had brought to the farm, insisted that he should accompany them to their town, Fianko. He refused. Consequently, they tied him up, beat him up and dragged him to Fianko from where they took him together with the other complainants to Kassapin Police Station in a vehicle. Some of his helpers ran away on seeing what was being done to him but the other complainants who had chosen to stay behind and witness what was being done to him were also beaten up and taken along to Kassapin via Fianko. At the police station, they were given medical forms and they proceeded to Goaso Hospital where they were treated and discharged.

The first appellant, Samuel Abeka, does not dispute arresting the complainants. It is his case that for some time now people have been stealing from his farm. He claimed the farm in dispute as his. On the date in question he requested the second appellant, his brother, together with other persons to accompany him to the farm

[p.442] of [1980] GLR 438 on inspection. On the farm he met the complainants together with other persons harvesting his corn. He arrested the first prosecution witness and requested him to accompany him to the police station. The first prosecution witness resisted and the other persons on the farm bolted away. In the circumstances he had to use force to get “the thief”, i.e. the first prosecution witness, to the police station for fear that he might also escape; he claimed that the force used was lawful and reasonable under the circumstances; whatever injuries the complainants sustained arose out of the struggle to free themselves. According to him, the second appellant and the other persons he had taken to the farm, had only assisted him in apprehending the complainants. He denied having assaulted the complainants as alleged; he himself sustained injuries in the process.

After the first prosecution witness had completed his evidence, counsel for the accused submitted that in view of the claim made by both the first prosecution witness and the first accused (the first appellant herein) to the corn farm, the jurisdiction of the court was ousted. In support of his submission he referred to section 180 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30). The trial magistrate overruled this submission and decided that the trial should proceed. Section 180 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 provides:

“180. If, upon the trial of an offence before a District Court, the Court is of opinion that a bona fide question of title to land is raised it shall discharge the accused, but this shall not be a bar to fresh proceedings being instituted in respect of the same facts in a Circuit Court or the High Court.”

In his ruling on the submission by counsel the trial magistrate stated: “It is my view that the section does not apply where the offence affects the body of one of the disputants such as in the instant case.” I am inclined to agree with the magistrate. As a matter of fact, the proviso to section 180 of Act 30, makes exception of offences under section 155 of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), namely, being on premises for unlawful purposes. Also section 202A of the Criminal Code, 1960, as amended by the Criminal Code (Amendment) Decree, 1969 (N.L.C.D. 398), para. 12 states that:

“(1) Whoever with violence makes an entry into any building or land, whether or not he is entitled to the possession thereof, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour, unless hedoes so in pursuance of a warrant or other lawful authority to use such violence. (2) Section 180 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30) (which provides for the discharge of an accused by a District Court where a bona fide question of title to land is raised) shall not apply to an offence under this section.”

[p.443] of [1980] GLR 438

It is also my view that to oust the jurisdiction of the district court under the provisions of section 180 of Act 30, the acts complained of must relate to the land; for example, stealing from the land or trespass on the land. So that when one is charged with trespass on the land or stealing crops from the land, the district court, if satisfied that the accused person is relying on a bona fide claim to title to the land, can discharge the accused person who then may be tried in either the circuit court or the High Court. What must be abhorred is the use of force or violence on the person of one of the disputants to the land by the other under the cloak of a claim of title to the land. So that one cannot lawfully kill or cause harm to another person simply because one is laying claim to title to the land; that in my opinion would result in the law of the jungle.

Besides, I do not think it would be sufficient to oust the jurisdiction of the district court under section180 of Act 30, on the bare assertion that one is claiming title to the land; the magistrate must be satisfied that a bona fide claim being made; title deeds to the land may be produced, the vendor may be called to testify or adjoining boundary owners may be called as witnesses. The parties may even refer to cases pending in court which have bearing on the land dispute.

In the instant case, the trial magistrate did not have to consider any title by the disputants; he decided that as the offence affected the person of one of the disputants, section 180 of Act 30 was not applicable. I think he was entitled to come to that conclusion. Besides, looking at the facts and the evidence I do not think there was enough material on which the court could have decided to oust its jurisdiction. I am therefore not surprised that counsel for the appellants did not seriously insist on this ground of appeal, namely, that the court’s jurisdiction was ousted under section 180 of Act 30.

I am however of the opinion that even though the court’s jurisdiction may not be ousted under section 180 of Act 30, where the acts complained of are to the person of the complainant, an accused person is entitled to raise as a defence the use of reasonable force in defence of a landed property of which a claim is made in good faith. Section 31 of the Criminal Code, 1960, justified the use of force in certain cases and in particular where the force is necessary for the defence of property or possession or for overcoming the obstruction to the exercise of lawful rights—vide section 31 (f) of Act 29. Section 39 of Act 29 explains the above provision thus:

[p.444] of [1980] GLR 438

“39. A person may justify the use of force for the defence of property or possession, or for overcoming an obstruction to the exercise of any legal right, as follows:

(a) a person in actual possession of a house, land, or vessel, or goods, or his servant or any other person authorised by him, may use such force as is reasonably necessary for repelling a person who attempts forcibly and unlawfully to enter the house, land, or vessel, or to take possession of the goods;

(b) a person in actual possession of a house, land, or vessel, or his servant or any other person authorised by him, may use such force as is reasonably necessary for removing a person who, being in or on the house, land, or vessel, and having been lawfully required to depart therefrom, refuses to depart …

(d) a person may use such force, as is reasonably necessary for overcoming any obstruction or resistance to the exercise by him of any legal right.”

In the instant case, I do not think section 39 (c) is relevant.

On the particular facts of this case, it could not be said that the appellants were in actual possession. But assuming for argument sake that they were in possession, could it be said that they were repelling a person who was attempting forcibly and unlawfully to enter the land? I do not think so . The complainants, it is admitted, were on the farm when the appellants came, there could therefore not be any forcible entry which required the use of force to repel it. According to the appellants their intention was to arrest the complainants and send them to the police station; it was not their intention to harvest the corn on the land at the time. So that there could not be an obstruction or resistance to the exercise of their legal rights. In the words of the first appellant: “I requested them to accompany us to the police station; they refused; they struggled with us; in the course of the struggle the first prosecution witness often fell down.”

Perhaps the appellants could avail themselves under section 39 (b). Assuming that the appellants were in actual possession, they would be entitled to use reasonable force to remove a person who, being in or on the land has been lawfully required to depart therefrom but has refused to depart. There is evidence on record to show that the appellants requested the complainants to depart from the farm and accompany them to either the police station or to their town, it does not matter which for purposes of this argument. The first prosecution witness refused and said he was not going. If the request

[p.445] of [1980] GLR 438 was lawful, as the appellants reasonably believed, then they would have been entitled to use reasonable force to remove them from the farm either to be taken to the police station or to the town.

The question then is was the force used in the circumstances reasonable? The trial magistrate did not think so. In his judgment he said: “To tie a human being with a rope like a goat, and arraign him in the sun, is a brutal act which this court has to meet with severity.”

The trial magistrate was entitled to make his findings on the evidence before the court and, as the authorities state, if there is evidence on record to support the findings or conclusion arrived at, an appellate court should not readily disturb such findings. Apart from the bare refusal by the first complainant to accompany the appellants to either their town or the police station, there was no evidence that any other form of resistance was used by him. In fact, even though the complainants had cutlasses with them which they could have used to repel the attack by the appellants, they never used them and the appellants took them from their hands. Only a portion of the corn had been harvested and there was nothing to show either by conduct or on the evidence that the complainants intended to run away and leave their corn behind; the complainants, in fact, refused to leave while their helpers possibly fearing what might happen to them ran away. There was every indication that the complainants would continue to harvest the rest of the corn. Since the appellants had with them other persons, would it not have been reasonable to send some of these men to inform the police while the rest guarded the farm and the complainants who had refused to leave the farm? From the evidence it is quite clear that the first complainant as well as the alleged vendor Adututu were well known to the appellants; the first complainant had been on the land for over twenty years; it does not take just a day to cultivate corn on land and have it harvested. The steps taken by the appellants could therefore not be said to be reasonable in the circumstances. Besides, the tying up of a person, beating him up and dragging him through the sun in the face of no resistance or any attempt to retaliate could not possibly amount to a reasonable use of force. From the evidence on record I do not think the appellants were justified in applying the force they used on the complainants. I think the trial magistrate was right in convicting the appellants on the charge of assault. In the particular circumstances of the case, I do not think the sentences impossed on the appellants was too harsh; I indorse the observation made by the magistrate in passing sentence

[p.446] of [1980] GLR 438 on the appellants. I do not however think that a sentence of imprisonment is the most appropriate in the circumstances. I would in the circumstances, set aside the twelve months’ imprisonment with hard labour imposed on the appellants and impose a fine of ¢150 each on the appellants, in default, the appellants would go to prison for six months with hard labour. The appellants are also each to enter into a bond in the sum of ¢200 with one surety to be of good behaviour to keep the peace for a period of twelve months, in default, six months’ imprisonment with hard labour. ¢200 of the fine if paid is to be given to the complainants.

Subject to this variation in sentence the appeal is dismissed.

DECISION Appeal dismissed.

Sentence varied.

D. R. K. S.

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