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[1980] SLR (CA) 15Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1981

QUAGRAINE vs. ADAMS [1981] GLR 599

18 December 1980 · MENSA BOISON JA · ≈ 20 min read

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OSCOLAQUAGRAINE v ADAMS [1981] GLR 599 [1980] SLR (CA) 15
APAQUAGRAINE v ADAMS [1981] GLR 599, [1980] SLR (CA) 15 (Ghana).
BluebookQUAGRAINE v ADAMS [1981] GLR 599, [1980] SLR (CA) 15 (Ghana Ct. App. 1980).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Thompson v. Park [1944] K.B. 408; [1944] 2 All E.R. 477; 113 L.J.K.B. 561; 170 L.T. 207.

(2) Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. R. [1931] A.C. 414; 100 L.J.P.C. 129; 145 L.T. 129, P.C.

(3) Amakom Sawmill v. Mensah [1963] 1 G.L.R. 368, S.C.

(4) Pascoe v. Turner [1979] 1 W.L.R. 431; [1979] 2 All E.R. 945; (1978) 123 S.J. 164; (1978) 9 Fam.

Law 82, C.A.

(5) Dillwyn v. Llewelyn [1862] 4 De G.F. & J. 517; [1861-73] All E.R. Rep. 384; 31. L.J.Ch. 658; 6 L.T. 878; 8 Jur. N.S. 1068; 10 W.R. 742; 45 E.R. 1285.

(6) Brook’s Wharf and Bull Wharf, Ltd. v. Goodman Brothers [1937] 1 K.B. 534, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from the judgment of the trial circuit court awarding ¢8,000 damages against the appellant. The facts are fully set out in the judgment of Mensa Boison J.A.

COUNSEL

Sackeyfio for the appellant.

M. Atadika (Hammond with him) for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF MENSA BOISON J.A.

The point for decision in this appeal is whether the respondent, who built a house gratuitously on the appellant’s land, is entitled to recover the money spent on the construction. It is only necessary to state briefly the facts found by the trial Circuit Court, Cape Coast, to enable an appreciation of the issue posed. Both the appellant (hereafter called the defendant) and the respondent (hereafter called the plaintiff) are Fantis and belong to the same family at Saltpond. The plaintiff who was orphaned at a very tender age, was adopted (informally) by a relation, Aba Nyamoaba, the mother of the defendant. Consequently, the plaintiff and the defendant grew up together under the same parental nurture and care, and regard each other as a brother and sister. Some time in 1969, the plaintiff, who had made good as a pharmacist at Dormaa-Ahenkro visited home, and expressed to the defendant and other members of the household, including Aba Nyamoaba, his desire to build a dwelling-house at Saltpond for himself. At the meeting, during the household discussion, the defendant offered to the plaintiff, a building plot she had previously acquired for herself and promised that she would later convey the plot to him. But she advised the plaintiff to start with the building in the meantime.

Build indeed he did, and by 1970, the building was at roofing level. There is no doubt that when the defendant offered the plot to the plaintiff it was understood by all that the plaintiff was to’[p.603] of [1981] GLR 599-612’build for himself, although the family expected to have some use and enjoyment of it in the normal course of things. So when in 1970 the defendant pressed upon the plaintiff to have the name on the building plan changed into some other name, impliedly hers or some other female member of the family, the plaintiff refused, for fear that if he acceded to the suggestion his own children might be turned out of the house after his death.

His refusal eventually brought matters to a head. The defendant stopped the mason and workmen engaged on the building from continuing further. The mason was obliged to pack off to Dormaa Ahenkro to report to the plaintiff. At a meeting afterwards at Saltpond, the defendant confirmed to the plaintiff that she had stopped work on the house as she had decided to build for herself, with the husband, on the self-same plot, and added that the plaintiff could submit an account of his expenses so far to her for payment.

Protracted petitions and solicitations, through elders of the family and other persons, in an endeavour to get the defendant to rescind her decision having failed, the plaintiff was obliged to resign himself to it and to give up the project. Four years had passed in the meantime, when the plaintiff made a demand for ¢8,000 as his expenses for the ¢3,000 he had spent by 1970 when work ceased. The plaintiff’s expenses were still unsatisfied when on 14 April 1977, he caused a writ to issue against the defendant in the following terms:

“The plaintiff claims from the defendant specific performance of an agreement to transfer a plot of land to the plaintiff for building purposes or alternatively for ¢3,000 damages for breach of the said agreement”.

The trial court on 30 April 1979, was unable to sustain the plaintiff’s claim for specific performance, on the ground that the agreement was unenforceable for want of consideration. The court was, however, of the opinion that the plaintiff was entitled to a “refund of reasonable sums expended for the benefit of the defendant’. It accepted the claim for ¢3,000 as at 1969-70 and gave “judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of ¢8,000 as value of the building”.

Mr. Sackeyfio, counsel for the defendant is aggrieved by the award of ¢8,000 and has argued with brevity three grounds of appeal. The submissions in terms of the grounds may be summed up thus:

(a) That the trial judge having found that there was no enforceable contract that could be specifically enforced against the defendant, it follows that the plaintiff was unlawfully’[p.604] of [1981] GLR 599-612’on the land and all acts by the plaintiff on the land were unlawful;

(b) in the premise, counsel contended, there could be no breach on the part of the defendant to attract the “damages” of ¢8,000 awarded; and (c) in any event, he further contended, that the jurisdiction of the trial court was ousted at the stage the learned judge found the value of the construction so far to be ¢8,000 by reason of section 32 (1) (a)

of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), which limits the jurisdiction of the court in personal actions to the value of ¢8,000.

The point of jurisdiction may be disposed of in a few words. Contrary to the submission of Mr. Sackeyfio, it appears the claim of the plaintiff was covered as well by section 32 (1) (a) (iii) and not by section 31 (1) (a) (i) of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), namely that, “in all causes and matters involving the ownership, possession, occupation of or title to land where the value of the land does not exceed ¢15,000”. The real point, however, is that the value of ¢8,000 as ascribed by the learned trial judge was only a link in the process of the judge’s reasoning. There was no foundation in the evidence to the parties, and it would be wrong to hold him to it for purposes of founding jurisdiction. What the court arrived at was ¢8,000 as being the value of the property which although within his jurisdiction of ¢15,000 a complaint has been taken to on another ground.

On the contention that the plaintiff was unlawfully on the land in the absence of a binding contract, and so he be equated to a trespasser, I am of the opinion that the facts as found, do not support the contention of learned counsel. The defendant did offer the land to the plaintiff and agreed that the plaintiff could start with the construction of the building to enter upon the land for the agreed purpose of building a dwelling-house on the land.

It is not necessary here to delve into the wealth of learning on the subject of licences. Suffice it to say that, the law is clear beyond argument that at common law until a licence is revoked, a licensee does not commit trespass if he enters and remains on the land for the purpose agreed upon, even if as in the present case, the licence was gratuitous: see Thompson v. Park [1944] 1 K.B. 408 at p. 410. The plaintiff’s presence on the defendant’s land and the erection of the building was therefore a lawful engagement until the defendant revoked the licence by stopping the workmen.

[p.605] of [1981] GLR 599

Now a licensee is entitled to a reasonable time in which to remove himself and his property after the licence has been revoked. This is so whether the licence was gratuitous or contractual. Thus in Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. R. [1931] A.C. 414 at p. 432, P.C., the Privy Council held that a railway company which by licence had erected telegraph installations on Crown land, were wrongfully evicted without reasonable notice sufficient in time to remove their installations and also enable them to make arrangements for the continuance of the telegraph line by erection of poles elsewhere than on Crown property.

In the instant case, the nature or the purpose of the plaintiff’s engagement on the land was to erect a dwelling-house. As found by the trial court, the construction was at roofing level when the defendant revoked the licence; and in the nature of things, the plaintiff could only remove himself from the land, but not the unfinished building. It is in this sense that the defendant having led the plaintiff to alter his position to his detriment in committing his money to a fixed property on the defendant’s land, that equity demands that the plaintiff should at least be reimbursed of what he had spent on the construction. For otherwise the defendant, in taking back her land, with the improvement made by the plaintiff, stands to be unjustly enriched. That in essence, was the plea of learned counsel for the plaintiff at the hearing of this appeal, and I think the claim for refund of the money expended by the plaintiff was a modest relief.

Complaint is, however, taken by Mr. Sackeyfio on the award of ¢8,000. Firstly, that in the absence of a valid contract, as conceded by the trial court, there was no justification in law for an award of that nature. Without forestalling what I would like to say on the aspect for specific performance, it is sufficient for the present to say that the claim is justified in equity. Secondly, even if the claim lies, the quantum is challenged by Mr. Sackeyfio. It is said that without particulars, the respondent could not be given the ¢3,000 on the writ, or much less, its appreciated value of ¢8,000 which was actually awarded.

Now the evidence of the plaintiff on that aspect on which the defendant did not cross-examine, and which the trial court accepted, was, “In 1970 I incurred an expenditure of over ¢3,000. About four years ago when I submitted my bill to her the market price was about ¢8,000.” What appears to have happened was, when in 1970 the defendant revoked the licence, and the plaintiff ceased work on the land, he did not immediately present a demand for payment of the ¢3,000 he had then spent. This can be understood, because, as the evidence goes, the plaintiff went round soliciting’[p.606] of [1981] GLR 599-612’relatives and other persons to intercede with the defendant. The plaintiff must have hoped the intervention would succeed; and it was when at last he realised all was in vain, that it became prudent to present his bill—and that was some four years later.

In all probability, the defendant must have demanded and was presented with particulars of the expenses. The conversion of the ¢3,000 to ¢8,000 at the time was, in proper terminology, “an account stated”. The plaintiff was not consequently obliged to re-open the account by way of giving the particulars; which state of affairs was acknowledged sub silentio by the defendant in not cross-examining on the point.

The fact, however, is that when the trial court found that the sum of ¢8,000 was the just and reasonable refund, it had power by virtue of Order 28, r. 12 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A), and ought, in conformity with practice, to have amended the indorsement on the writ of summons for ¢3,000 to read ¢8,000 before giving judgment for the sum: see Amakom Sawmill v. Mensah [1963] 1 GLR 368, S.C. I accordingly amend the same in support of the judgment of the court below for ¢8,000 and so the complaint against the award fails.

The matter, however, does not rest here. The principle is well established that an appeal to this court may constitute a re-hearing and the court is obliged to give judgment on the merits and justice of the case: see regulations 31 and 32 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1962 (LI 218).

As found by the trial court, the plaintiff went into the defendant’s land on the faith of the defendant’s promise that she would get the land conveyed to him, and on the statement that the plaintiff could in the meantime start construction of the house. The defendant was at Saltpond at all material times and saw work on the house in progress; but for the refusal of the plaintiff to change the name on the building plan, the defendant would not have raised any objection. It was therefore in effect by the encouragement and acquiescence of the defendant that the plaintiff embarked upon the construction and expended money and time, believing fully well that the defendant would stand by her promise.

It is conceded that there was no valid legal contract to compel the defendant to convey. But there is equity raised in favour of the plaintiff on the principle, of what the textbooks term as, “proprietory estoppel,” as treated in Snell’s Principles of Equity (27th ed.) at pp. 565-568. It has been recognised as an exception to the general rule that a person who spends money in improving the property of another has no claim to reimbursement or to any proprietary’[p.607] of [1981] GLR 599-612’interest in the property. For a case in point, reference may be made to the case of Pascoe v. Turner [1979] W.L.R. 431, C.A. There the plaintiff who had led the defendant, a woman he had lived with as man and wife previously, to believe in statements made by the plaintiff that the house in which the two had been living, but from which the plaintiff had then removed, had been given to the defendant as a gift by the plaintiff and in consequence the defendant had spent substantial moneys on repairs, improvement and redecoration on the house, with the full knowledge of the plaintiff, failed in an action to “determine the defendant’s licence revocable at will, the court had to decide what was the minimum equity to do justice to her, having regard to the way in which she had changed her position for the worse with the acquiescence and encouragement of the plaintiff. The plaintiff would therefore be required to give effect to his promise and the defendant’s expectations and to perfect the gift. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal but varied the judge’s order by declaring that the fee simple of the house was vested in the defendant. At page 436 of the judgment, this principle was explained when the court said:

“One distinction between this class of case [i.e. proprietory estoppel] and the doctrine which has come to be known as ‘promissory estoppel’ is that where estoppel by encouragement or acquiescence is found on the facts, those facts give rise to a cause of action. They may be relied upon as a sword, not merely as a shield.”

In the present case, the plaintiff spent money in the construction so far, on the mistaken belief encouraged by the promise of the defendant that she would convey the plot to him. Further, it was known to the defendant that the plaintiff was to incur expenditure but the condition that the plaintiff should use a name other than his own was not made known to him.

From the facts, the four conditions required to raise the equity in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant appear to be satisfied, namely:

(a) expenditure of the sum of ¢3,000 in constructing the building so far on the defendant’s land;

(b) the mistaken belief that the defendant would fulfil her promise to convey the land to the plaintiff;

(c) knowledge on the part of the defendant that the plaintiff was expending money on the construction to profit’[p.608] of [1981] GLR 599-612’the plaintiff himself, although the defendant well knew she was not intending to keep her promise to convey; and

(d) the fact that there is no bar to the equity: see Snell’s Principles of Equity at pp. 565-566.

Now the relief in equity is not based on the claim for specific performance. For as there was no consideration, there was no contract to be enforced specifically. This is well emphasised in Pascoe v. Turner (supra) when at p. 949 the court quoted from the judgment of Lord Westbury L.C. in Dillwyn v. Llewelyn [1861-73] All E.R. Rep. 384 at p. 387 as follows:

“About the rules of the court there can be no controversy. A voluntary agreement will not be completed or assisted by a court of equity; in cases of mere gift, if anything be wanting to complete the title of the donee, a court of equity will not assist him in obtaining it, for a mere donee can have no right to claim more than he has received. But the subsequent acts of the donor may give the donee that right or ground of claim which he did not acquire from the original gift.”

The trial court was therefore right in dismissing the claim for specific performance.

What then is the minimum equity the respondent is thus entitled on the facts of the case to do him justice? The sum of ¢8,000 which is likewise supported by the same equity, or a declaration that the fee simple of the house was vested in the plaintiff. On careful consideration, I think the sum of ¢8,000 that was expended on the house so far, on present day values, is not so substantial as to warrant a declaration of title to the plaintiff.

In my judgment, justice would be satisfied by upholding the award of ¢8,000 as reimbursement to the plaintiff. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.

JUDGMENT OF EDUSEI J.A.

I have read the judgment of Mensa Boison J.A. and share his conclusion that the appeal be dismissed. However, in view of the importance of the principle of law involved, I wish to add a few words of my own.

It cannot be controverted that the defendant-appellant (hereinafter referred to simply as the defendant) encouraged the plaintiff-respondent (who hereinafter is referred to as the plaintiff) to build on the vacant plot of land at Saltpond, the property of the defendant, a sister to the plaintiff. When the plaintiff asked for the documents on the plot so that a conveyance could be made in his name, the defendant answered that they were not ready and that as soon as they were available, she would surrender them to him. The plaintiff’[p.609] of [1981] GLR 599-612’started to make preparations in acquiring building materials from up country and sent them down to Saltpond, the hometown of the parties to the dispute. Before the plaintiff could be permitted to commence building operations on the land, he had to get rid of coconut trees standing on the land by paying ¢22 for them. The plaintiff during this time was working as a pharmacist at Dormaa Ahenkro in the Brong-Ahafo Region. In fact, the plaintiff had been adopted into the defendant’s family whilst an orphan and he always referred to the defendant as his sister.

Relying on the promise made to him by the defendant, the plaintiff proceeded to build on the land and, according to the evidence, six rooms had been constructed up to roofing level when the defendant stopped the plaintiff’s contractor from further construction on the ground that she and her husband had decided to build on that same plot. Despite several appeals made by the plaintiff to other persons to persuade the defendant to desist from her unconscionable conduct, she remained adamant and she said she was prepared to make a refund of the expenses incurred by the plaintiff on the building. When the plaintiff submitted his bill of expenditure, the defendant did nothing about it and remained passive. This was in 1973 though the construction of the building took place between 1969 and 1970. The plaintiff’s story was supported in material particulars by his witness, Araba Kwansima, a full blooded sister of the defendant.

In view of the facts disclosed in the evidence and accepted by the trial circuit court judge, it is unjust for the defendant to try to take the building from the plaintiff without paying for the cost of it, which is the second limb of his claim, and this he assessed at ¢8,000 in 1977 when he testified before the court. The liability of the defendant, in my judgment, is founded on the principle of unjust enrichment. This simply means that whenever a defendant is unjustifiably enriched at the expense of a plaintiff, the plaintiff can compel his ill-gotten gains out of him. Thus Lord Wright M. R. in Brook’s Wharf and Bull Wharf Ltd. v. Goodman Brothers [1937] 1 K.B. 534 at p. 545, C.A. had this to say:

“All the Court can say is what they ought as just and reasonable men to have decided as between themselves.

The defendants would be unjustly benefited at the cost of the plaintiffs if the latter . . . should be left out of pocket by having to discharge what was the defendants’ debt.”

The test of recovery based on the principle of unjust enrichment has generally been suggested to be, not a loss to the plaintiff, but an unjust gain to the defendant.

[p.610] of [1981] GLR 599

The ex cathedra pronouncement of Lord Wright has fortified the viewpoint of Lord Mansfield that quasi-contract is essentially an institution of equity though usually litigated in common law courts in the days gone by, and so is the theory of unjust enrichment. This doctrine of unjust enrichment, which has held the field in America, Scotland and on the continent of Europe for a long time, is gradually coming to be accepted now in England as a useful adjunct to the general principles of equity, judging from certain pronouncements by the courts. The whole concept of equity, including now the doctrine of unjust enrichment, can be summarised in an old rhyme thus:

“These three give place in court of conscience, fraud, accident and breach of confidence,” and the view of some textbook writers is that liability in quasi-contract is co-extensive with liability based on unjust enrichment, and of course others argue that the liability of quasi-contract is founded on the theory of unjust enrichment. Be that as it may, in a number of cases, the controversy seems to be merely academic since both theories would normally lead to the same conclusion. However, in the circumstances of this case, I would prefer to ground my decision on the principle of unjust enrichment as this appeals to me more to be in consonance with the proved facts than to base it on the quasi-contract theory.

It is eminently clear that it is unjust to permit the defendant to have the building without payment of its value if it is appreciated that she herself encouraged the plaintiff to expend money on the building project on the defendant’s plot. This, undoubtedly, is against good conscience and, in the circumstances of this case, amounts to a breach of confidence on the part of the defendant. No court of law administering justice will permit the defendant to keep her ill-gotten gain. She must disgorge it if she wants to have the building in respect of which she has not spent a pesewa. This is what exactly the circuit court judge did.

I, therefore, support the judgment of Mensa Boison J.A. in dismissing the defendant’s appeal which is unconscionable and completely devoid of any merit.

JUDGMENT OF JIAGGE J.A.

Jiagge J.A. I have had the privilege of reading the judgments of my colleagues, Boison and Edusei JJ.A., and wish to add a few words in support.

The plaintiff in this case brought an action in the court below claiming from the defendant (the appellant herein) specific performance of an agreement to transfer to him a plot of land, or alternatively for ¢3,000 as damages for breach of the said agreement.

[p.611] of [1981] GLR 599

The plaintiff and the defendant were brought up together in the same home as brother and sister. The plaintiff, desiring to construct a building, discussed with the defendant the question of acquisition of land for the purpose.

The trial judge found, and his findings were supported by the evidence before him, that the defendant in the presence of other close members of the family, promised to transfer to the plaintiff her self-acquired undeveloped plot of land to build on. The plaintiff on the strength of the defendant’s promise, paid compensation for the economic trees on the land, cleared the land and constructed a six-room house up to roofing level. The court found that all these facts were known to the defendant. However, the defendant sat silently by till the house reached the roofing level when she stopped work on the building and refused to transfer the title to the land.

The judge in the court below, considered the facts and the question whether on those facts, the plaintiff was entitled to specific performance. He held that there was no enforceable contract to warrant an order for specific performance but that the plaintiff was entitled to a reasonable refund of the sums of money he expended on the building and awarded ¢8,000 damages in favour of the plaintiff.

The defendant has appealed against this decision. Counsel for the defendant argued in this court, inter alia, that the plaintiff’s occupation of the land in question was unlawful since the trial judge found that there was no enforceable contract between the parties; that the judge misdirected himself when he awarded ¢8,000 damages; that having found that there was no enforceable contract, there was no basis for the award of damages.

As a general rule, a person who spends money on improving the property of another, does so at his own risk, for he cannot claim, as of right, any reimbursement nor can he claim any proprietary interest in the property on account of his expenditure.

However, there are a number of exceptions to the general rule. Equity, for instance, will intervene to protect the other party in circumstances where undue advantages accrue to the owner of the property and where such owner is guilty of inequitable conduct. The defendant in this case, by promising to transfer title to the land to the plaintiff, misled him into incurring expenses over improvements, to her property. The defendant sat silently by, knowing very well that the plaintiff’s expectations were based on the promises she had made to him. By asserting her rights to the property, she was guilty of unconscionable behaviour and equity will intervene to prevent her from taking undue advantage and deriving benefit from [p.612] of [1981] GLR 599 her inequitable and fraudulent conduct. In my opinion, she, under the circumstances, is estopped from asserting her rights to the land.

However, I recognise that there was no cross-appeal and also that the plaintiff in his claim in the alternative sought an order for ¢3,000 damages. I agree with my two colleagues that the sum of ¢8,000 is a fair assessment at the time of the stoppage of construction of the building. I agree that the appeal should be dismissed.

DECISION Appeal dismissed.

D. R. K. S.

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