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[1980] SLR (CA) 9Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1981

ANKRAH AND ANOTHER vs. HANSEN AND ANOTHER [1981] GLR 847

18 December 1980 · EDWARD WIREDU JA · ≈ 32 min read

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OSCOLAANKRAH AND ANOTHER v HANSEN AND ANOTHER [1981] GLR 847 [1980] SLR (CA) 9
APAANKRAH AND ANOTHER v HANSEN AND ANOTHER [1981] GLR 847, [1980] SLR (CA) 9 (Ghana).
BluebookANKRAH AND ANOTHER v HANSEN AND ANOTHER [1981] GLR 847, [1980] SLR (CA) 9 (Ghana Ct. App. 1980).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Abude v. Onano (1946) 12 W.A.C.A. 102.

(2) Heyman v. Attipoe (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 86.

(3) Fynn v. Gardiner (1953) 14 W.A.C.A. 260.

(4) Kwan v. Nyieni [1959] G.L.R. 67, C.A.

(5) Annan v. Kwogyirem [1975] 1 G.L.R. 291.

(6) Tamakloe v. Attipoe (1951) D.C. (Land) ‘48-’51, 378.

(7) Harlley v. Ejura Farms (Ghana) Ltd. [1977] 2 G.L.R. 179, C.A. (full bench).

(8) Ameko v. Amevor (1892) Sar. F.C.L. 220.

(9) Pappoe v. Kweku (1924) F.C. ‘23-’25, 158.

(10) Quartey v. Quartey (1951) D.C. (Land) ‘48-’51, 401.

(11) Amon v. Wesleyan Methodist Mission Society Div. Ct. ‘29-’31, 7.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from the decision of the High Court, Accra, wherein the head of family was ordered to render accounts of sums of money he had received for and on behalf of the family to the heads of two branches of the same family. The facts are fully set out in the judgment of Edward Wiredu J.A.

COUNSEL

S. A. X. Tsegah for the appellants.

Fui Tsikata for the respondents.

JUDGMENT OF EDWARD WIREDU J.A.

There are two appeals involved in this case. The first and the more important of the two involves a consideration of the extent to which the courts can legitimately intervene [p.850] of [1981] GLR 847 to entertain an action for accounts brought against a head of family by members of his family in respect of family funds in his hands whilst he holds office. The second is an appeal brought against a ruling of the High Court which refused an application for joinder brought on behalf of some principal members of the plaintiff’s family to join the above suit as co-defendants.

The facts of this case which have provoked the present appeal may be briefly stated as follows: The plaintiffs-respondents, hereafter referred to as the first and second plaintiffs respectively, in the manner in which they are described on the writ of summons, and the defendants-appellants, who will hereafter also be referred to as the first and second defendants, are all members of the Mantse Ankrah Family of Otublohum. This family comprises three branches, namely, the Ankrah, Okanta and the Ayi. The first defendant, on the facts before the court, is the overall head of the family. The first and second plaintiffs are the branch heads of the Ankrah and the Ayi branches respectively, whilst the second defendant is the branch head of the Okanta branch of the family.

The plaintiffs in their capacities as branch heads of the Ankrah and the Ayi branches of the family on or about 20 December 1977 issued out of the High Court, Accra, a writ against the defendants with the following endorsement:

“STATEMENT OF CLAIM The plaintiffs jointly and severally claim against the defendants jointly and severally:

1. An account of the following sums received by the first defendant for and on behalf of the Mantse Ankrah Family of Dadebanna Otublohum, Accra that is to say:

(a) ¢160,547, the proceeds of a cheque from the Ministry of Finance, Accra on 13 September 1977.

(b) ¢13,968.95, being part of an amount, from the High Court, Accra on 30 March 1977.

(c) ¢4,000 received by the defendants from the Ghana Commercial Bank, High Street Branch, Accra in or about August 1977.

2. An account of all sums received by the defendants for and on behalf of the said family in respect of its land at Awudome or North Kaneshie, Accra, since 22 December 1976.

3. An order upon the defendants to pay to the credit of the said family’s current account with the said branch bank whatever sums are found due to the said family on said accounts.

[p.851] of [1981] GLR 847

4. Further or other relief as in the circumstances may be just, including in particular a declaration that the first defendant is liable to be deposed from the headship of the said family for breach of trust disclosed by the said accounting.”

INDORSEMENT OF CAPACITIES The first plaintiff sues as head of the Ankrah section of the said family. The second plaintiff sues as head of the Ayi branch of the said family. The first defendant is sued as overall head of the three branches of the said family. The second defendant is sued as head of the Okanta branch of the said family. An appearance was entered on behalf of the defendants on or about 28 December 1977 and on 7 February 1978 a twelve-paragraph statement of claim was filed on behalf of the plaintiffs as follows:

“STATEMENT OF CLAIM 1. The plaintiffs and the defendants are all members of the Mantse Ankrah Family of Otublohum, Accra, which comprises three branches, namely, the Ankrah, Ayi and Okanta branch of the said family.

2. The first plaintiff sues as head of the Ankrah branch, and the second plaintiff as head of the Ayi branch of the said family. The first defendant is sued as the overall head of the said family and the second defendant as the head of the Okanta branch thereof.

3. On 30 March 1977 the first defendant received from the High Court Registrar, Accra, the sum of money in cash whereof a balance of ¢13,968.95 belonged to the said family.

4. About one week later, the said family opened a current account with the Ghana Commercial Bank, High Street Branch, Accra, into which the said ¢13,968.95 was paid. The signatories on the said current account were the plaintiff and the defendants, any two of whom could draw on the account.

5. On the date of payment in as aforesaid, the first plaintiff and the second defendant by cheque made the first drawing out, of the sum of ¢5,000 for use in funeral rites by the said family, leaving intact in the said bank account the credit balance of ¢8,968.95.

[p.852] of [1981] GLR 847

6. In or about the third week of August 1977 the defendants, against the express opposition of the plaintiffs, withdrew more than one-half of the said credit balance from the said account and in breach of trust expended the same in Homowo festivities.

7. On 13 September 1977, the first defendant collected from the Chief Lands Officer, Accra, for and on behalf of the said family, a cheque, from the Ministry of Finance in his name for ¢160,547.40 which was part-payment of compensation money due to the said family under and by virtue of the compulsory acquisition of its land at Awudome, Accra, in the Industrial Estate Acquisition.

8. The first defendant showed the said cheque to the second plaintiff who advised its prompt payment into the said bank account. The first defendant, however, has so far failed to pay the Lands Department cheque into the said bank account despite strong and persistent pressure from the plaintiffs and other elders of the said family.

9. In January 1977, the first defendant unlawfully and in breach of trust began to re-allocate undeveloped parts of the said family’s land at North Kaneshie, Accra, notwithstanding that the same had been conveyed to various persons by a previous head of the said family. Litigation has accordingly been began by the dispossessed former owners.

10. Further, unlawfully and in breach of trust, the first defendant has refused and continues to refuse to carry out binding commitments by the said family to set up a land and property committee, and a finance committee as well as a written family constitution all for the purposes of efficient and fair administration of the said family’s property, finances and social affairs.

11. By reason of the foregoing matters, the said family has suffered loss and injury through the defendants’ unlawful conduct and breach of trust.

12. The plaintiffs therefore jointly and severally claim against the defendants jointly and severally:

(1) An account of the following sums received by the first defendant for and on behalf of the

Mantse Ankrah. Family of Dadebanna Otublohum, Accra, that is to say:

(a) ¢160,547.40, the proceeds of the said cheque.

(b) ¢18,968.95 being part of an amount received from the High Court, Accra on 30 March

[p.853] of [1981] GLR 847

(c) ¢4,000 received by the defendants from the Ghana Commercial Bank, High Street Branch, Accra in or about August 1977.

(2) An account of all sums received by the defendants for and on behalf of the said family in respect of its land at Awudome or North Kaneshie, Accra since 22 December 1976.

(3) An order upon the defendants to pay to the credit of the said family’s current account with the said branch bank whatever sums are found due to the said family on the said accounts.

(4) Further or other relief as in the circumstances may be just, including in particular a declaration that the first defendant is liable to be deposed from the headship of the said family for breach of trust.”

On 3 March 1978 the following statement of defence was filed on behalf of the defendants:

“STATEMENT OF DEFENCE 1. The defendants admit paragraph of the statement of claim.

2. Save that the defendants say that the signatories to cheques drawn on the current account referred to at paragraph 4. of the statement of claim are Nii Ayi Ankrah I and any one of the following, that is to say, the plaintiffs and the second defendant, the defendants admit paragraphs 3 and 4 of the statement of claim.

3. In answer to paragraph 6 of the statement of claim the defendants say that they withdrew the sum of ¢4,000 in August 1977 entirely in accordance with the resolution of the whole Mantse Ankrah Family for such withdrawals and that the said amount was expended on various rituals, customary observances and ceremonies which every head of the Mantse Ankrah Family is in duty bound to perform and observe at every Homowo festival and deny that this expenditure was against the wishes of the Mantse Ankrah Family or of the plaintiffs or in breach of trust as alleged or at all.

4. The defendants admit paragraph 7 of the statement of claim.

5. In answer to paragraph 8 of the statement of claim the defendants say that the whole family at a general meeting agreed that the cheque received from the Lands Department be paid into a separate family account to be operated by the first defendant as head of family to enable him make

[p.854] of [1981] GLR 847 prompt payments of various huge debts owed by the family to various persons as a result of the protracted litigation within the family, for the financing of which the family had previously agreed that the first defendant should raise loans as he might think fit.

6. The first defendant denies paragraph 9 of the statement of claim and says that he has never unlawfully or in breach of trust or otherwise re-allocated plots of the family’s land validly conveyed to other persons.

7. The first defendant emphatically denies paragraph 10 of the statement of claim.

8. The defendants will contend that they are not accountable or answerable to the plaintiffs in respect of the several matters alleged in the statement of claim.

9. Save as is herein expressly admitted the defendants deny every allegation of face in the statement of claim as if the same had been set down herein in extenso and traversed seriatim.”

On 7 March 1978 an application under Order 50, rr. 5-7 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (LN 140A), was filed by the plaintiffs for:

“1. A mandatory injunction requiring the first defendant forthwith to pay into the Mantse Ankrah Family’s current account with the headquarters or High Street Branch, Accra, of the Ghana Commercial Bank the proceeds of the cheques for the sum of ¢160,547.40 collected by him on 13 September 1977 from the Lands Department, Accra, in payment of the compensation money due to the said family under the Accra Industrial Estate Acquisition.

2. A prohibiting injunction restraining the defendants until judgment or further order herein from drawing any cheque or order upon any bank or branch bank in Accra wherein moneys belonging to the said family have been deposited.

3. A further prohibiting injunction restraining the defendants until judgment or further order herein from making any disposition of lands or any interest therein belonging to the said family.”

The affidavits in support of the application sworn to on behalf of the plaintiffs as well as the affidavit in opposition by the defendants were in the main a reiteration of the facts averred in the statement of claim and defence respectively.

[p.855] of [1981] GLR 847

The record of proceedings shows that when the application came on for hearing, the defendants resisted same by raising an objection in limine to the propriety of the plaintiffs’ action. The substance of their objection as contained in paragraph 8 of the statement of defence and repeated in paragraph 4 of the affidavit in opposition is: “Neither in my position as overall head of the said family nor in that of the second defendant as head of one section of the said family are we accountable to the plaintiffs.”

After hearing arguments on the application and the objection raised by the defendants the learned High Court judge overruled the defence objection and granted the reliefs sought by the plaintiffs, in their application. The relevant portion of the ruling of the High Court reads:

“Sarbah’s statement that junior members of the family cannot call upon the head of family for an account does not mean that nobody can call on him for such an account. It is worthy of note that in the course of the argument in Pappoe v. Kweku, counsel for the head of family stated that the family as a whole can call on the head to render accounts. In my view, the senior members of the family, who put the head where he is, have power to call on him to render accounts. Further, in this case, the account relates to the proceeds of the compulsory acquisition of family land. If the plaintiffs could, without first deposing the defendant, have brought an action to recover for the family land he had mortgaged to secure his private debts, there seems to be no reason why they cannot bring an action to recover for the family the proceeds of the sale or compulsory acquisition of the family’s land.

It must also be borne in mind that the term ‘head of family’ may be used correctly to describe either the head of the wider or the head of a branch family. Both are heads of family with capacity to sue and be sued in respect of family property; indeed, in one case, it was held that the head of the wider family had no right to intervene in a suit commenced by a customary successor: Kwakye v. Tuba, [1961] G.L.R. 535. Ollennu J., as he then was, who decided that case bases his decision on the contention that upon being appointed customary successor, the successor acquires the status of a head of family vis-à-vis, the deceased. It would, perhaps, be more accurate to say that he becomes the representative of the head of the immediate family of the deceased and as such has a superior right to litigate the family’s title to property left by the deceased. It seems to follow that if property in which the branch family has an interest is in danger of being lost, the head

[p.856] of [1981] GLR 847 of the branch family has the right to take steps to protect it. In Krabah v. Krakue [1963] 2 G.L.R. 122, C.A. such a right was successfully asserted by the respondent, the head of the wider family, against a member of the family.

If such a right can be asserted by the head of the wider family, so can it be by the head of a branch family.

The circumstance that the delinquent member happens also to be the head of the wider family ought not to be a bar to such retrieving action. For the above reasons, I am unable to uphold the preliminary objection taken by counsel for the defendants, which therefore fails.”

Complaining to be aggrieved by the above ruling, the defendants have appealed to this court originally on two main grounds:

“1. The learned trial judge erred in law in holding that the plaintiffs can sue the first defendant who is the head of the family for accounts.

2. The learned trial judge erred in law in not upholding the preliminary objection taken against the plaintiffs by the defendants.”

The second appeal, as has been adverted to above, was filed against the ruling refusing two applications for joinder by some principal members of the plaintiffs’ family. The first application was by Messrs. John Edward Vanderpuiye, T.O. Vanderpuiye and Naa Darcua II, Queenmother of Otublohum as principal elders of the Ayi branch of the family and the second was brought by Messrs. Thomas Akoe Edmund Ayeh, Lante Lamptey and Madam Evelyn Naa Afuade Ankrah as principal elders of the Ankrah branch. The substance of their supporting affidavits were to challenge the authority of the plaintiffs in maintaining their present action in the names of the Ayi and the Ankrah branches of the family without their knowledge.

The relevant portions of the affidavit of John Vanderpuiye sworn on behalf of the other principal elders of the Ayi branch of the family reads:

“I, John Edward Vanderpuiye of Accra make oath and say as follows:

1. That I am one of the elders and principal members of the Ayi branch of the Mantse Ankrah family of Otublohum, Accra and I have the authority of the following elders and principal members of the said branch to swear to this affidavit: Naa Darcua II, Queenmother of Otublohum, and Mr. T.O.

Vanderpuiye.

[p.857] of [1981] GLR 847

2. That the Mantse Ankrah Family of Otublohum comprises three petty branches namely ¾ Ankrah branch, Ayi branch and Okanta branch.

3. That we are elders and principal members of the Ayi branch of the Mantse Ankrah Family of Otublohum.

14. That the Ayi branch of the Mantse Ankrah family never authorised Mr. Mark Kodjoe Ankrah, the second plaintiff herein to bring any action against the first defendant, the head of the Mantse Ankrah Family.

15. That the said Ayi branch never authorised or gave any mandate to the second plaintiff to bring this action against the first defendant claiming an account of all moneys received by the first defendant for and on behalf of the Mantse Ankrah Family.

17. That the second plaintiff brought this action without cause and without any mandate from the Ayi branch of the Mantse Ankrah Family.

21. That at a family meeting of the Ayi branch of the said family it was resolved that we as elders of the said Ayi branch should join this suit as co-defendants in order to protect the interest of the Ayi branch of the said family and to preserve the solidarity of the Mantse Ankrah Family as a whole.

22. That the second plaintiff joined the first plaintiff in bringing this action without the authority and consent of the Ayi branch of the Mantse Ankrah Family.

23. That our interest as members of the Ayi branch of the said family is greatly affected by this action.

24. That I pray that we should be joined as co-defendants to protect our interest and the interest of the Ayi branch of the Mantse Ankrah Family which is being dragged into the mud by the second plaintiff for his own personal ambition.”

The affidavit in support of the other application on behalf of the Ankrah branch is in substance the same as the one referred to above. This was sworn to by Lante Lamptey on behalf of himself and the other applicants.

The short ruling of the court on these applications reads:

“There is thus no issue fit for trial in this case as to the capacity of the plaintiffs to bring this action. Order 16, r. 8 (b) of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), empowers a head of family to bring an action on behalf of or as representing the family. The admitted facts that the plaintiffs are the heads of the Ankrah and Ayi branches mean

[p.858] of [1981] GLR 847 that they are well within the rules in bringing this action. It is elementary that a person cannot be both the plaintiff and the defendant in the same cause. Therefore since the plaintiffs in this action are representing the Ankrah and Ayi branches, it is not open to members of these branches to join as co-defendants. The applications are dismissed. The applicants in each application will pay the respondent therein ¢50 as costs.”

Both appeals were argued at one hearing as a consolidated appeal without objection.

On 12 February 1980, four additional grounds of appeal were filed on behalf of the defendants which read:

“(a) The learned trial judge erred in law in saying, ‘In my view the senior members of the family who put the head where he is have power to call on him to render account.’ (b) The learned trial judge erred in law in granting an injunction which is wider in scope than the claim before the court.

(c) The learned trial judge erred in law in requesting the defendants to pay forthwith ¢160,547.40 into the family account when the pleadings showed that the greatest part of the said amount has been expended in accordance with a resolution of the Mantse Ankrah Family.

(d) That the learned trial judge erred in law in saying, ‘I do not see how a steering committee composing of persons representing only one family of the three branches of the family can have authority to decide that a second family banking account be opened with the first defendant as sole signatory. Nor do I see how a general steering meeting of the whole family attended by only members of one section can have power to approve such decision without hearing evidence from both sides’.”

At the hearing, learned counsel for the defendants, concentrated his arguments on the two original grounds of appeal which were argued together and ground (d) of the additional grounds. The other additional grounds were abandoned.

In his submission, on the two original grounds of appeal, Mr. Tsegah, counsel for the defendants, submitted that the law was now too well-settled to admit of any doubt that a head of family whilst holding office could not be sued for an account in respect of family funds in his hand as such head. He referred to Asante’s Property Law p. 118 where the learned author quotes with approval the law as stated by Ollennu in his invaluable book Customary

[p.859] of [1981] GLR 847

Land Law in Ghana. He also cited the cases of Abude v. Onano (1946) 12 W.A.C.A. 102; Heyman v. Attipoe (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 86 and Eynn v. Gardiner (1953) 14 W.A.C.A. 260 to support his contention. Continuing, the learned counsel submitted that the learned trial judge missed the point at issue and thereby came to the wrong conclusion that the plaintiffs as heads of two branches of the Mantse Ankrah Family were entitled to maintain their present action because they as elders who appointed the first defendant were entitled to call for accounts from him. Counsel submitted that the customary law procedure to be followed by members of the family was to have the head removed before maintaining their present action for an account. According to learned counsel, this procedure which had been held in the Abude case (supra) to be sound and not contrary to well-known principles of equity, was not followed by the plaintiffs before coming to court.

Counsel next turned to the order of the court requesting the first defendant to deposit certain sums of money into the family’s bank account. He argued that the issues raised in the affidavit evidence with regard to the propriety of opening a second account by the first defendant with the consent of the entire principal elders of the family which the plaintiffs were denying, raised a triable issue which could only be resolved on evidence. He submitted that it was not proper for the trial judge to have resolved such an issue on mere affidavit evidence.

Turning next to the issue of joinder, learned counsel argued that the test applied by the learned trial judge missed the triable issue raised by the plaintiffs that they had brought the action with the consent of the principal elders of the Ayi and Ankrah branches of the family. He submitted that since the applicants as principal elders of the two branches were contending that the plaintiffs did not consult them before maintaining their action and were putting the plaintiffs’ capacities into issue, they made a prima facie case which entitled them to have been joined and that the learned trial judge erred in refusing their application to join the action.

Mr. Fui Tsikata, counsel for the plaintiffs’ submission in support of the ruling on the propriety of the plaintiffs’ action involves (a) an argument that it was premature for the objection to have succeeded, and (b) that evidence was required to decide whether facts existed which justified the plaintiffs’ action. Elaborating on the above, he submitted that the matters raised in the plaintiffs’ statement of claim showed such a complete and total disregard for family decisions by the first defendant that if steps were not promptly taken to stop him, the family would have lost a lot of [p.860] of [1981] GLR 847 valuable property in his hands. He referred to cases like Kwan v. Nyieni [1959] G.L.R. 67, C.A.; Annan v. Kwogyirem [1975] 1 G.L.R. 291 and Tamakloe v. Attipoe (1951) D.C. (Land) ‘48-’51, 378 and submitted that these cases revealed that general statements of the customary law did not lay down absolute principles. He argued that situations under which those cases were brought to court clearly showed departure from the generally accepted customary practice. Counsel argued that these situations justified the court’s intervention at first instance. He submitted that, under circumstances as are instanced by those cases, it was the evidence that made the court to depart from the general principles and created exceptions to them. He therefore submitted that merely looking at the pleadings was not enough justification to shut out the plaintiffs from court. He referred to the case of Harlley v. Ejura Farm (Ghana) Ltd. [1977] 2 G.L.R. 179, C.A. (full bench) as an authority fortifying his argument. He submitted that the ruling appealed from took into consideration all the facts assembled before the court and rightly rejected the objection raised to the plaintiffs’ action.

Turning to the order made against the first defendant to pay certain sums of money into the family bank account, learned counsel submitted that the affidavit evidence before the court amply showed that the only measure to stop the first defendant from dissipating family funds and to preserve the same in the family’s interest, was for the court to have made that order. He disagreed with counsel for the defendants that evidence was required to resolve that issue. Finally on the joinder, learned counsel for the plaintiffs argued that the application was brought in bad faith at a time when contempt proceedings were pending against the first defendant. According to counsel, it would have been unjust to have allowed the joinder at that stage. Counsel further argued that the claims made by the applicants needed to have been supported by copies of the resolutions taken at the alleged family meetings, concluding that the applicants failed to satisfy the court that it was proper to join them. He therefore submitted that their application was properly refused.

The first appeal, as has already been pointed out, involves a consideration of the extent and scope of the head of family’s immunity to accountability. It also calls for a consideration of the extent to which the courts can be called upon and be willing to intervene in an action against the head for an account.

In recent times, calls have been made from various quarters inviting the courts to have a second look at this concept of immunity to accountability of the head of family. These calls have come

[p.861] of [1981] GLR 847 mostly from textbook writers like Daniels, in his article entitled Some Principles of the Law of Trust in West Africa (1962) J.A.L. 164; Bentsi-Enchill in Ghana Land Law an Exposition, Analysis and Critique (1962), p. 37 and Azu Crabbe in John Mensah Sarbah 1864-1910 (1971), p. 85.

Daniels in his recent note in (1976) 8 R.G.L. 70 at p. 73 quoted the following passage from Ollennu’s principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana (1962) at p. 37:

“One other point must be made at this stage. While it is a settled principle of customary law that the head of the family cannot be called upon to account, it is also a well settled principle of customary law that the head of the family holds the family property as a trustee, and should use it for the benefit of the members of the family,”to support his view that the concept is not in accord with modern socio-economic and political changes in the country.

Opinions among textbook writers and decisions of the courts under existing law are that generally the head of family cannot be sued for accounts, and the courts like most of the textbook writers also accept unaccountability of the head to junior members of the family. On these two concepts there is a considerable body of case law: see Ameko v. Amevor (1892) Sar. F.C.L. 220; Pappoe v. Kweku (1924) F.C.’23-’25,158;

Abude v. Onano (supra); Heyman v. Attipoe (supra) and Annan v. Kwogyirem (supra).

The statement by Sarbah in his Fanti Customary Laws at p. 90 on the immunity that has provoked some of the recent calls by textbook writers reads:

“If the family, therefore, find the head of the family misappropriating the family possessions and squandering them, the only remedy is to remove him and appoint another instead; and although no junior member can claim an account from the head of the family, or call for an appropriation to himself of any special portion of the family estate, or income therefrom arising, yet the Customary Law says they who are born and they who are still in the womb require means of support, wherefore the family lands and possessions must not be wasted or squandered.”

This well-settled principle of the native law as stated by Sarbah (supra) was extended by Ollennu in his book, Customary Land Law in Ghana (1962 ed.) 19 at p. 139 as follows:

“The remedy of the stool or the family is firstly to remove the said occupant of the stool, or the said head of the family

[p.862] of [1981] GLR 847 from office. The moment he is deposed, he is no longer the lawful representative of the stool or the family and he becomes liable to hand over and account to his successor or the person or persons entitled by customary law to have custody and control of the stool property. The new occupant or the new head of the family or any individual or group of individuals authorised in that behalf by customary law, can then call upon him to hand over and to make full and proper account of all stool or family funds and other property which came into his possession during his term of office. In short, therefore, while the occupant of the stool or head of family, cannot be sued for accounts, because that is tantamount to a claim by the stool against itself, or by the family against itself, the ex-occupant of the stool or an ex-head of the family maybe sued for accounts.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

Commenting on the Ollennu’s extension (supra), Dr. Kludze in his book, Ewe Land Law of Property (Restatement of African Law; Ghana) 1973 at p. 97 doubted the rationale of the rule of unaccountability during the tenure of the head of family’s office.

A close examination of the above statements by Sarbah and Ollennu reveal (a) that to be able to sue a head of family for an account a particular procedure must be followed and (b) it limits the heads unaccountability to junior members of the family. It is clear therefore from the above that the view held by some textbook writers that Sarbah’s statement accorded an absolute immunity to the head of family to account for family funds cannot be correct. For the law as I understand it, is that the principal elders of the family have a right to call upon the head at a family meeting to account for family funds in his hands. It is when the head fails to do so when called upon by the principal elders that charges may be preferred against him for his removal because it is only by going into accounts that the head can justifiably be accused of having misappropriated and squandered family funds in his possession and upon which justification for his removal can be based. The right of the principal elders of the family to call on the head for accounts at family meeting is in accord with commonsense since the head himself was put into his position as such head by the principal elders of the family at a family meeting. I must here remark that even though the head of family’s position in relation to family property in his possession has been likened to that of a trustee the two are not the same. The head of family has wider discretionary powers over family property in his hands which a trustee does not have in relation to trust property. It is also an acknowledged principle of the customary law that it is [p.863] of [1981] GLR 847 only when the head of family has been deposed that generally he renders himself liable to be sued for an account.

The above statement of the law relating to the head’s immunity, like all customary principles, do not create an absolute immunity. It does not in any way exclude the possibility of the courts’ intervening and seising itself with jurisdiction where circumstances are shown to exist which justify such a course being taken. The party seeking to invoke the aid of the courts under any such circumstance must by his pleadings show that it is either just and reasonable and in the interest of the family to come straight to court for relief or that it would be unjust and unreasonable and in fact impracticable for the family to resort to deposing the head of family before maintaining an action in court for accounts. The case of Kwan v. Nyieni (supra) referred to by learned counsel for the plaintiffs merely enumerates some situations under which the courts will entertain an action involving family property initiated by a member of a family other than the head, the latter being the acknowledged proper person to sue and be sued in respect of family property under the general law. Kwan v. Nyieni acknowledges the principle that, generally speaking under customary law, the proper person to maintain an action involving family property is the head of family. Bentsi-Enchill’s criticism that Kwan v. Nyieni had effectively demonstrated the unsoundness in the above general principle is therefore with respect unjustified for whilst the case acknowledges the general principle it merely sets out situations under which it may be unjust, unreasonable or impracticable to invoke the general principle as a bar to commence an action in respect of family property by members other than the head.

It follows from the above analytical examination of the concept of the head of family’s immunity to accountability that (a) he cannot generally be sued for an account; (b) the immunity is not an absolute one; (c) that principal elders of the family who appointed the head can call on him at a family meeting for an account; (d) that junior members of the family cannot call on the head for an account; (e) that in order to sue the head for an account he must be first removed or that facts must be shown that it is either unjust and unreasonable or that it is impracticable and impossible or that the head has, by this acts, been frustrating all attempts to convene family meeting to go into accounts. And in any such situation which, of course, must be pleaded in the statement of claim the court may intervene. It should be stressed that the immunity is limited to funds or property which was succeeded to by the head as such and moneys accruing from such property and not in relation to funds or property (which though are family funds) yet which

[p.864] of [1981] GLR 847 should go to some other member of family as successor but which has come into the hands of the head as a temporary custodian: see the case of Annan v. Kwogyirem (supra), where a successor to property was competently held to have the right to come to court to sue for the recovery of possession and ask for accounts in respect of property he had succeeded to, which was in the custody of the head as a temporary custodian which he was refusing to hand over.

I must not be taken to mean that by citing instances to illustrate situations which might induce the court to depart from the recognised customary law general practice, I am laying down exhaustive exceptions to the rule. I am only attempting to show that there might be situations where such a departure may be justified. Applying the above principles to the instant case, I find nothing pleaded by the plaintiffs to justify the court seising itself with jurisdiction since the action on the pleadings is a straightforward case for an account against a head of family in respect of family funds in his hands. The pleadings of the plaintiffs fall short of creating an exception to the general rule which is now well-settled that generally the head of family cannot be sued for accounts. This principle of our customary law cannot be easily ignored by the courts merely because it is being urged on them to do so.

We are being asked to break a new ground. We must have a reason to do so. In the Abude case (supra) the practice of first removing the head was held not to be contrary to any principle of equity and good conscience. I myself have not been persuaded that the customary law requirement that the head of family should be removed first before an action for an account can be maintained against him in court is unreasonable. I rather find the procedure to be in accord with modern constitutional practice and can be likened to the constitutional immunity to court action conferred on the President of the Republic by the Constitution, 1979, whilst he holds office. The only apparent difference between the two is that the constitutional immunity is absolute. I find that its rationale is in accord with commonsense and is based on sound reasoning. I am satisfied with the courts’ recognition of this principle because it recognises the incompetence of the courts to arrogate to themselves decisions which customary law and the common law have for centuries reposed in the family’s themselves. Cases which support the principle that discretionary judgments within the jurisdiction of domestic bodies must not be interfered with unless circumstances exist which justify such interferences include: Quartey v. Quartey (1951) D.C. (Land) ‘48-’51, 401 at p. 405 and Amon v. Wesleyan Methodist Mission Society Div. Ct. ‘29-’31, 7.

[p.865] of [1981] GLR 847

The immunity accorded to the head of family in respect of accountability of family funds in his possession whilst he holds office and the procedure provided by the customary law for his removal before rendering him liable to a court action for an account recognise the respect to be given to the head by members of the family. It protects him in the exercise of his discretionary powers over family property. It also protects him from frivolous and frequent litigations which may be commenced by dissentient members of the family and it upholds his dignity.

Whilst I share the views of learned counsel for the plaintiffs that the immunity accorded to the head of family to actions for an account is not absolute, I am unable to accede to his invitation to us to uphold the ruling appealed from on the particular facts before us because he has not successfully shown that there is a justification to entertain the plaintiffs’ action against the defendants which in its present form prima facie offends against the well settled principle regarding the head of family’s immunity to be sued for an account of family funds in his hands. I am also of the view that the objection to the plaintiffs’ action was properly taken at the appropriate time.

In the result, I uphold the submissions by learned counsel for the defendants that the learned High Court judge missed the point at issue which was whether an action for an account on the particular facts of this case could be maintained against the first defendant, admittedly holding office as head of family and not whether he was accountable to principal elders of the family.

The appeal therefore succeeds and the ruling of the High Court on the objection as to the propriety of the plaintiffs’ action against the defendants appealed from is hereby set aside. The objection by the defendants is upheld and the plaintiffs’ action is dismissed accordingly.

Since in my view the conclusion reached on the above issue involving the propriety of the plaintiffs’ action finally determines the fate of the plaintiffs’ action from which the other appeal has been brought, I do not intend to examine in any detail the issues raised by that appeal but I would only say that on the question of joinder, I am satisfied on the face of the affidavits before the court that, a triable issue was raised between the applicants justifying their application to have been favourably considered.

JUDGMENT OF JIAGGE J.A.

I agree with the judgment of my brother Edward Wiredu J.A. and I wish to add a few words in support.

I think the pressure on the courts to equate the position of the head of family with that of a trustee should be firmly resisted.

[p.866] of [1981] GLR 847

The family institution in our tradition carries certain norms that are peculiar to our society. The head of family represents the notion of unity within the family, of members caring for the welfare of other members, and the orphans and the depressed being taken care of within the family. Without the head of the family, the family disintegrates.

The position of the head of family therefore requires the dignity that will command the respect of all members of the family. The discretion of the head of family in expending family funds must not be eroded. Customary law protects the head of family against frivolous actions by disgruntled members of the family but not against abuse of his powers. Where there is such an abuse the elders of the family have the right to call upon the head of family to render account at a family meeting and he can be deposed if he was found wanting.

Taking action against the head of family while he is still the head, derogates from his authority as head and customary law rightly prohibits this.

JUDGMENT OF EDUSEI J.A.

I have considered the two judgments just read by my brother and sister, and do not have anything useful to add.

DECISION

Appeal allowed.

D.R.K.S.

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