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[1980] SLR (HC) 20High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1981

ASIEDU-ADDO AND ANOTHER vs. COMPTROLLER OF CUSTOMS AND EXCISE AND OTHERS [1981] GLR 505

6 August 1980 · CECILIA KORANTENG-ADDOW J · ≈ 10 min read

Cite as[1980] SLR (HC) 20
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OSCOLAASIEDU-ADDO AND ANOTHER v COMPTROLLER OF CUSTOMS AND EXCISE AND OTHERS [1981] GLR 505 [1980] SLR (HC) 20
APAASIEDU-ADDO AND ANOTHER v COMPTROLLER OF CUSTOMS AND EXCISE AND OTHERS [1981] GLR 505, [1980] SLR (HC) 20 (Ghana).
BluebookASIEDU-ADDO AND ANOTHER v COMPTROLLER OF CUSTOMS AND EXCISE AND OTHERS [1981] GLR 505, [1980] SLR (HC) 20 (Ghana High Ct. 1980).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Kassar v. Comptroller of Customs and Excise [1963] 1 G.L.R 109, S.C.

(2) Quainoo v. Attorney-General [1976]1 G.L.R. 106.

(3) Kuah v. Attorney-General [1981] G.L.R. 481.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION to strike out a writ against the Comptroller of Customs and Excise on the ground that there was no notice to the

[p.507] of [1981] GLR 505

Attorney-General in compliance with Act 51 as amended by N.L.C.D. 352. The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling.

COUNSEL

Amoako-Glover for the plaintiffs.

John Boateng for the first defendant

JUDGMENT OF CECILIA KORANTENG-ADDOW J.

This is a claim for the recovery of goods which have been seized by the first defendant and delivered to the third defendant for sale. According to the statement of claim, the plaintiffs entered into a contract of carriage with the second defendant to convey the goods from Rome, Italy to Abidjan, and that while they were in transit, they were seized at the Kotoka International Airport. The claim therefore is for recovery of the goods; perpetual injunction to restrain the first and third defendants and their privies from disposing of the goods; damages for wrongful seizure and detention, and damages against the second defendant for breach of contract of carriage. The writ was issued on 25 May 1980. The statement of claim was filed on 4 June 1980. The second and third defendants entered appearance through their respective solicitors, and the statement of defence was filed on behalf of the third defendant on 2 July 1980. On 11 July 1980 the plaintiffs filed a motion for judgment against all the defendants in default of pleading. On 14 July 1980 at 2 p.m. an appearance under protest was entered on behalf of the first defendant. At 3.30 p.m. the same day an affidavit in opposition was filed by the first defendant.

The motion for judgment came on for hearing on 25 July 1980 but it was adjourned for hearing on 28 July. Counsel for the first defendant decided to submit argument as to whether or not the first defendant is a proper party before the court and whether the plaintiff ought to have complied with the State Proceedings Act (Amendment) Decree, 1969 (N.L.C.D. 352), and served notice on the Attorney-General. In the affidavit in opposition sworn to by a law clerk on the authority of the Solicitor-General, it was deposed that the first defendant is a department of the Republic of Ghana and that it has no legal personality of its own. It was further deposed that the action ought to have been brought against the Attorney-General; that being the case, the Attorney-General ought to have been served with one month’s notice before the action was commenced, in compliance with N.L.C.D. 352. Mr. John Boateng, the learned State Attorney, argued along these lines, and submitted that if judgment were entered against the first defendant, it would be satisfied from public funds so the claim is one which ought to have

[p.508] of [1981] GLR 505 been brought against the Attorney-General and since no notice was given, the claim is incompetent and cannot be maintained so it should be struck out.

Mr. Amoako-Glover, counsel for the plaintiffs on the other hand, argued that section 4 of the Customs Ordinance, Cap. 167 (1951 Rev.), makes the comptroller suable, and he referred to cases in the law reports in which the Comptroller of Customs was a party. He referred particularly to Kassar v. Comptroller of Customs [1963] 1 G.L.R. 109, S.C. He further submitted that N.L.C.D. 352 makes it permissive to bring an action against the Republic. He said article 211 of the Constitution, 1979, also gives a discretion to a plaintiff to bring the action against the Republic but if the plaintiff chooses he may proceed directly against the State department if that can be made a suitable defendant. In this case where the comptroller is a public officer whose salary is above ¢6,000, Mr. Amoako-Glover submitted that he may be sued personally, and that in such a case, he submitted, no notice is required and that notice is required only if one is proceeding against the Attorney-General or the Republic. He relied on Quainoo v. Attorney-General [1976] 1 G.L.R, 106. While this matter was pending for ruling, Mr. Amoako-Glover also drew my attention to the ruling of Edward Wiredu J. (as he then was) in Kuah v. Attorney-General [1981] G.L.R. 481.

The issues involved in this ruling are whether or not the Comptroller of Customs is a proper party before the court, or whether the action should have been brought against the Attorney-General; and whether or not notice should have been served on the Attorney-General before the action was commenced.

Section 1 of the State Proceedings Act, 1961 (Act 51), as amended by N.L.C.D. 352 provides:

“1. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, an action may be brought against the Republic without the fiat of the Attorney-General if the cause of such action arises on or after the 1st day of May, 1969.

(2) No action shall be commenced against the Republic until the expiration of one month after written notice of intention to commence the action has been served by the claimant or by his attorney or agent:

(i) on the Attorney-General or an officer of the Attorney-General’s Department not below the rank of Senior State Attorney, or (ii) in cases where action is to be commenced in a court in any Region, on the officer in charge of the Attorney-General’s Office in that Region

[p.509] of [1981] GLR 505

(3) The notice shall state the cause of action, the name and place of abode of the intended claimant and the relief which he claims.

(4) For the purposes of subsection (1) of this section, where a cause of action is founded on a continuing act it shall be deemed to have arisen at the commencement of the continuing act.”

Section 1 (1) abolishes a fiat. A prospective plaintiff may bring an action directly against the Republic without the consent of the Attorney-General but section 1 (2) provides in mandatory terms that the Attorney-General shall be given notice of the action one month before the commencement of it. Section 1 (3) and (4) gives the conditions which the notice shall satisfy. Nowhere in these provisions is it stated, expressly or impliedly that every action against the Republic should be brought against the Attorney-General. I concede that the Customs and Excise Department is a department under the Ministry of Finance, it is therefore a department of the Republic. It follows that if the plaintiffs chose to do so, they could have made the Attorney-General a nominal defendant, but the discretion is theirs. Cap. 167, Part 13 makes elaborate provisions for legal proceedings. Sections 222 and 223 give the comptroller power to sue for recovery of fines and penalties. If the comptroller has power to take actions, it implies that he has power to defend actions and he can be sued in respect of any matter pertaining to that department. According to section 24 of the State Proceedings Act, 1961, civil proceedings includes proceedings for the recovery of fines and penalties. Therefore if he can sue for these, he can be sued in respect of any matter related thereto.

Section 10 (2) of Act 51 gives a discretion to a prospective plaintiff to institute a claim against the Republic against the Attorney-General. But in such a case, the Attorney-General is only a nominal defendant. Under the provisions of section 10 of Act 51, the Republic may not be nominally made a party to proceedings; the Attorney-General may sue and be sued in respect of proceedings by or against the government. But there are occasions when a government department may be the plaintiff or the defendant. In some cases, the enactment setting up or regulating these departments makes it possible for the department to sue and be sued. In such cases even though the departments are not juristic persons, the Act of Parliament or delegated legislation makes it possible for them to be parties to actions. An example of this is the Department of Customs and Excise. But in a situation where the law endows the tortfeasor with [p.510] of [1981] GLR 505 the right to sue and be sued, the plaintiff would have an option either to proceed against the Attorney-General or the government department which is the tortfeasor or the party to the contract. A contrast between sections 4 and 10 of Act 51 shows clearly that a plaintiff must not necessarily sue the Attorney-General in every case where he has an action against the Republic or a department of the Republic. Section 4 provides that where any servant or an agent of the Republic infringes a patent, a registered trade mark, a copyright and the infringement is committed under the authority of the Republic, the civil proceedings in respect of the infringement shall be brought against the Attorney-General. But section 10 gives discretion in other matters. There is no provision which makes it mandatory to proceed against the Attorney-General in respect of breaches of tort committed by the Comptroller of Customs.

I must point out that the comptroller is not sued in his person as a tortfeasor of the department. The Comptroller of Customs represents the whole department according to Cap. 167, so he stands in the same shoes as the Attorney-General would stand for the Republic. The comptroller is therefore a proper person to sue.

The next matter to resolve is whether the Attorney-General ought to have been given a month’s notice in compliance with section 1 of the State Proceedings Act, 1961, as amended by N.L.C.D. 352. The decision in Kuah v. Attorney-General (supra) is the plaintiffs’ authority for saying that they did not have to comply with the requirement because the action was not brought against the Republic. It is necessary therefore to examine the rationale behind the requirement of notice. In Kuah’s case Edward Wiredu J. stated at p. 487:

“The notice envisaged under N.L.C.D. 352 … is intended to offer the Office of the Attorney-General an opportunity within the one month period to contact the particular state department involved in the action being contemplated for the necessary information to enable the office to study the nature of the claim and to decide what advice to give.”

This being the case, then I should think that since the Attorney-General is the chief legal adviser of the Republic in all matters, it would make no difference whether action is brought against the State department concerned directly or that the Attorney-General is made the nominal defendant. The Attorney-General would still need to be apprised of the matter before the matter gets to court, since ultimately he would have to defend the action or advise on it.

[p.511] of [1981] GLR 505

In Quainoo v. Attorney-General (supra) Edusei J. (as he then was) at pp. 107-108 gave his view of the rationale behind the notice in the following words:

“ . . . the main purpose of Act 51 as amended by N.L.C.D. 352 is, in my view, to let the Attorney-General know that an action is intended to be taken in court against the Republic so that he may advise himself as to the proper course to adopt ⎯ whether the Attorney-General would prefer to settle the matter out of court if it is convenient to do so and thus prevent the Republic being taken to court.”

I agree with Edusei J. I think the notice is a temporising mechanism, to give the Attorney-General time to study the matter, and to determine whether it is worthwhile litigating in respect of it and to advise settlement in appropriate cases. The intendment of the N.L.C.D. 352 is to apprise the Attorney-General of all actions involving the government, whether the Attorney-General or a government department is nominally made the defendant or not. These are proceedings taken in respect of a tort committed by a State department. The Comptroller of Customs is the person who for the time being has charge of the Department of Customs and Excise: see the interpretation in section 3 of Cap. 167. The Comptroller represents the department; that department is a department of the State; its actions therefore are the actions of the Republic. To interpret the requirement of notice under N.L.C.D. 352 to mean that notice is required only when the Attorney-General is made a nominal defendant, and it is not required when there is a suitable State or government department to sue will lead to absurdities. An action against the Republic remains the same whether the Attorney-General is made nominal defendant or the action is brought against a State department or an institution. It is my view therefore that whether the action is brought against the State department or the Attorney-General, the requirement of notice under N.L.C.D. 352 must be complied with.

But I will add that where notice was not given, but the Attorney-General entered unconditional appearance and filed a defence he cannot raise the issue of absence of notice as a bar to the maintenance of the action. Non-compliance with the notices is a bar to instituting the action, but if in spite of non-compliance, the Attorney-General entered unconditional appearance then he would seem to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court and waived that condition. He cannot later raise it as a defence to defeat the claim once he has entered unconditional appearance to the claim. My ruling in this case is that the Comptroller of Customs and Excise is a proper party before the court, but the Attorney-General ought

[p.512] of [1981] GLR 505 to have been notified in terms of N.L.C.D. 352 that the department was going to be dragged into court. The first defendant having entered an appearance under protest can properly take an objection to the action. The objection is sustained. The claim against the Comptroller of Customs and Excise is struck out.

DECISION

Action struck out.

D. R. K. S.

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