SuperLawGHEngage · Educate · Empower
← All decisions
[1980] SLR (HC) 38High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1981

REPUBLIC vs. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS AND ANOTHER; EX PARTE SHACKLEFORD [1981] GLR 554

8 August 1980 · CECILIA KORANTENG-ADDOW J · ≈ 46 min read

Cite as[1980] SLR (HC) 38
Other citation styles and permanent link
OSCOLAREPUBLIC v DIRECTOR OF PRISONS AND ANOTHER; ex parte SHACKLEFORD [1981] GLR 554 [1980] SLR (HC) 38
APAREPUBLIC v DIRECTOR OF PRISONS AND ANOTHER; ex parte SHACKLEFORD [1981] GLR 554, [1980] SLR (HC) 38 (Ghana).
BluebookREPUBLIC v DIRECTOR OF PRISONS AND ANOTHER; ex parte SHACKLEFORD [1981] GLR 554, [1980] SLR (HC) 38 (Ghana High Ct. 1980).

SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.

CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Republic v. Director-General of Prisons; Ex parte Nti [1980] G.L.R. 527, C.A.

(2) Okine, In re [1959] G.L.R. 1; [1960] G.L.R, 84, C.A.

(3) Amponsah, In re [1960] G.L.R. 140, C.A.

(4) Akoto. In re [1961] G.L.R. 523, C.A.

(5) Dumaga, In re [1961] G.L.R. 44.

(6) Progressive Supply Co., Ltd. v. Dalton [1943] Ch. 54; [1942] 2 All E.R. 646; 112 L.J.Ch. 44; 168 L.T. 21; 59 T.L.R. 63; 86 S.J. 385.

(7) Land Realisation Co., Ltd. v. Postmaster-General [1950] Ch. 435; [1950] 1 All E.R. 1062; 66 (Pt.1)

T.L.R. 985.

(8) Liversidge v. Anderson [1941] 3 All E.R. 338; [1942] A.C. 206; 110 L.J.K.B. 724; 116 LT. 1; 58 T.L.R. 35; 85 S.J. 439, H.L.

(9) R. v. Home Secretary; Ex parte Budd [1942] 1 All E.R. 373; [1942] 2 K.B. 14; 111 L.J.K.B. 475;

166 L.T. 293; 58 T.L.R. 212; 86 S.J. 111, C.A.

(10) R. v. Morn Hill Camp (Commanding Officer); Ex parte Ferguson [1917] 1 K.B. 176; 86 L.J.K.B.

410; 115 L.T. 927; 81 J.P. 73; 33 T.L.R. 47, D.C.

(11) Carus Wilson’s Case (1845) 115 E.R. 759; 7 Q.B. 984; 1 New Pract. Cas. 193; 6 State Tr. (N.S.)

183; 14 L.J.Q.B. 201; 5 L.T.O.S. 52; 9 J.P. 665; 9 Jur. 394.

(12) Cox v. Hakes (1890) 15 App. Cas. 506; 60 L.J.Q.B. 89; 63 L.T. 392; 54 J.P. 820; 39 W.R. 145; 6 T.L.R. 465; 17 Cox, C.C. 158, H.L. reversing sub nom Ex parte Cox (Bell) (1887) 20 Q.B.D. 1, C.A.

(13) Cross; Ex parte (1857) 2 H. & N. 354; 26 L.J.M.C. 201, 21 J.P. 407; 157 E.R. 147. (14) Republic v. Commanding Officer of the Third Battalion of Infantry, Ghana Army; Ex parte Kwaku [1974] 2 G.L.R. 340.

[p.560] of [1981] GLR 554 (15) Republic v. Chieftaincy Committee on Wiamoasehene Stool Affairs; Ex parte Oppong Kwame [1971] 1 G.L.R. 321.

(16) State v. General Officer Commanding the Ghana Army; Ex parte Braimah [1967] G.L.R. 196, C.A.

(full bench).

(17) R. v. Home Secretary; Ex parte Greene [1941] 3 All E.R. 104; 85 S.J. 461; see Greene v. Home Secretary [1941] 3 All E.R. 388; [1942] A.C. 284, 111 L.J.K.B. 24; 166 L.T. 26; 58 T.L.R. 53, C.A.

(18) Hawkeridge Case (1616) 12 Co. Rep. 129; 77 E.R. 1404 sub nom R. v. Hawkeridge 1 Roll. Rep.

378.

(19) Howard, Re (1844) 2 Dow. & L. 536; 4 L.T.O.S. 142; 8 J.P. 805.

(20) Authers, Re (1889) 22 Q.B.D. 345; 60 L.T. 454; 53 J.P. 116; 37 W.R. 320; 5 T.L.R. 216; 16 Cox C.C. 588, sub nom Ex parte Authers 58 L.J.M.C. 62, D.C.

(21) R. v. Governor of Lewes Prison; Ex parte Doyle [1917] 2 K.B. 254; 86 L.J.K.B. 1514; 116 L.T.

407; 81 J.P. 173; 33 T.L.R. 222; 25 Cox C.C. 635.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for a writ of’ habeas corpus under the Habeas Corpus Act, 1964 (Act 244). The facts are fully stated in the ruling.

COUNSEL

B. E. Kwaw-Swanzy (Nana Akufo-Addo and Thompson with him) for the applicant.

Miss Asare-Korang, Senior State Attorney for the respondents.

JUDGMENT OF CECILIA KORANTENG-ADDOW J.

The applicant, by his wife, Elizabeth Shackleford, has applied to this court for a writ or order of habeas corpus for the purpose of inquiring into the reason for his detention and ordering his release. The applicant was a businessman carrying on business in Accra. On 8 June 1979, his name was mentioned on the radio requesting him to report at the Air Force Station Burma Camp, Accra and he reported at 1.30 p.m. on that date. What transpired between the time he reported and 23 October 1979 has been stated in paragraph 6 of the affidavit in support of the motion sworn to by his wife. To feel its full effect and get the sequence right, I reproduce the said paragraph hereunder:

“6. That I am informed by my husband, and I verily believe the same to be true:

(a) that upon reporting to the said station he was severely beaten up and sent to the guardroom;

[p.561] of [1981] GLR 554

(b) that later that day, my husband was told by Flt. Lt. Owusu Fianku that my husband had been brought down to the Air Force Station to tell his interrogators all that he knew about the late

Head of State; I. K. Acheampong, and other Commissioners of State.

(c) that on 18 July 1979, my husband was picked from the Air Force Station Guardroom by Flight Officer Eben Odoi to the Arrakan Barracks (5 B.N.) where my husband met a team of interrogators;

(d) that the said team of interrogators included the following, among others: Capt. Sammy Michel,

Capt. Victor Okaikoi, Capt. Edmund Koda, and Flight Officer Eben Odoi;

(e) that during the interrogation my husband was unable to tell the interrogators the business and other activities of Mr. I. K. Acheampong, Commissioners Feli [sic] Quarshie and Minyilla, and as a result he was mercilessly beaten up;

(f) that after this treatment my husband was taken back to the Air Force Station Guardroom;

(g) that before he was taken to the guardroom, he was assured by Capt. Victor Okaikoi and Capt.

Edmund Koda that my husband would soon be released from the guardroom to go home;

(h) that in spite of this assurance, my husband remained in the guardroom until 24 July 1979 when my husband was taken from the guardroom to Peduase Lodge where my husband faced another team of interrogators including, among others Flt. Officer Eben Odoi and a Mr.

Alhassan, Superintendent of Prisons;

(i) that before my husband actually appeared before this team of interrogators, he was severely beaten up. During this time, my husband heard some of the interrogators say that as a youngman my husband had no right to make so much money in business. And the team appeared angry when my husband replied that there was nothing morally wrong for a youngman to succeed in business unless he could be proved to have committed unlawful acts in the process;

(j) that from the Peduase Lodge my husband was sent back to Air Force Station Guardroom;

(k) that on 2 August 1979, my husband was picked from the guardroom by Flt. Officer Eben Odoi and taken to Arrakan Barracks (5B.N.) to meet the team of

[p.562] of [1981] GLR 554 interrogators, and that Capt. Koda and Capt. Okaikoi expressed surprise that my husband had not been released, and they gave further assurance that they would see to his release forthwith;

(l) that my husband was again taken back to the Air Force Guardroom;

(m) that on 7 August 1979 my husband was again taken from the guardroom and sent to Peduase Lodge to meet another team of interrogators. That upon telling his interrogators that he was fed up with their treatment of him and that they could kill him if they chose, my husband was ordered to be marched off;

(n) that my husband was duly marched off and driven back to the Air Force Station Guardroom;

(o) that on 8 August 1979, my husband was sent to the Medium Security Prison, Nsawam, by Mr.

Alhassan, Superintendent of Prisons;

(p) that on 28 August 1979, my husband and Mr. Anane Binfoh were taken to the Ussher Fort

Prisons, apparently with a view to their being released from detention;

(q) that shortly after my husband and Mr. Anane Binfoh had been sent to Ussher Fort Prisons,

Accra, Mr. Anane Binfoh was released but my husband continued in detention;

(r) that on 23 October 1979, the Record Officer of the Ussher Fort Prisons, Accra, called my husband and told him that he had been convicted and sentenced to a term of three years’ imprisonment;

(s) that the said officer did not tell my husband what court had tried, convicted and sentenced him.

Nor was my husband told where and when he was tried, convicted and sentenced.”

On 15 November 1979, when the application was brought before this court, presided over by my brother Amua-Sekyi J., he issued the writ that the respondent “produce the body of Lloyd Shackleford before him and submit a report in writing stating the grounds of the detention.” On 21 July 1980, a motion was filed by the senior state attorney, asking for an order to dismiss the application on grounds that this court has no jurisdiction to entertain it. Supporting this motion was an affidavit sworn to by the Acting Director of Prisons, Mr. S. B. Quayson, a report by Mr. Quayson and a copy of a warrant of commitment. In a five-paragraphed report,

[p.563] of [1981] GLR 554 the Acting Director of Prisons explained the circumstances whereby the applicant came to be placed in his custody. The relevant part of the report is paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 which I quote hereunder:

“3. That the applicant, Lloyd Shackleford, was received into prison custody on 8 August 1979 under a warrant of commitment from the dissolved Armed Forces Revolutionary Special Court, Burma Camp.

4. That the offence stated in the applicant’s warrant of commitment is ‘selling above the control price.’ 5. That copy of the said warrant as exhibited, is my lawful authority for keeping the applicant in my custody.”

The warrant is numbered A.F.R.C. 83. The offence stated is selling above the control price contrary to section 3 (1) L. The sentence is three years; and the warrant is dated 8 June 1979.

On receipt of this report and warrant of commitment, Mrs. Elizabeth Shackleford swore to a supplementary affidavit and filed it on 28 July 1980. In that, she deposed that the warrant of commitment is obviously a forgery because there was no A.F.R.C. Special Court set up as on 8 June 1979 and that it could not have been set up before the 11 June 1979. That it is physically and factually impossible that the A.F.R.C. could have created any special court before 11 June because the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1979, which established the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (A.F.R.C.) itself was promulgated on 11 June 1979.

The hearing of this application was adjourned a few times to afford the respondents the opportunity to file an affidavit in opposition to the facts deposed to in the affidavit and the supplementary one in support of the motion. On 31 July, an affidavit in opposition was filed, deposed to by Peter Abban Nartey, the Chief Superintendent of Prisons, who was in charge of Ussher Fort Prisons between 27 July 1979 and 10 February 1980. He deposed that the applicant was delivered into his custody on 28 August 1979, and that he received a warrant of commitment dated 8 June 1979 on 23 October 1979, and that that warrant is his lawful authority for keeping the applicant.

At a point in the course of these proceedings, the senior state attorney applied for stay of’ the proceedings pending the determination of an appeal by the Court of Appeal of a preliminary point taken by the respondents in this case. I refused the application but reserved my reasons which I now state here. When an application for habeas corpus is made to the court, the law enjoins

[p.564] of [1981] GLR 554 the court to inquire into the allegation of unlawful detention immediately. Section 2 of the Habeas Corpus Act, 1964 (Act 244), provides:

“2. The High Court or the Judge thereof to whom an application is made under section 1 of this Act shall immediately enquire into the allegation of unlawful detention and may make an order requiring the person in whose custody the applicant (or the person on whose behalf the application is made) is detained, (a) to produce the body of the person so detained before the High Court on a day specified in the order, and (b) to submit a report in writing stating the grounds of the detention.”

This application was brought in November 1979, but hearing did not commence until July 1980. The Court of Appeal goes into recess at the end of July and does not resume until October. This appeal therefore cannot be heard until the next term. For a man who has been sentenced to an imprisonment term of three years, he would have served the best part of the sentence before he would be heard. I concede that an appeal, if successful, should not be rendered nugatory, but the appellant must satisfy the court that there is a likelihood of success of the appeal. If I were convinced that at this stage the matter involves an interpretation of the Constitution, 1979, I would be quick to refer the matter to the proper forum. But it is my view that this matter at this stage does not involve an interpretation of the Constitution. Miss Asare-Korang, counsel for the respondents, relying on the decision of the Court of Appeal in Republic v. Director-General of Prisons; Ex parte Nti [1980] G.L.R. 527,C.A. submitted that this matter ought to be stayed. And then basing herself on article 121 (3) of the Constitution, 1979, she contended this court is bound by that decision that the application involved an interpretation of the Constitution and therefore the matter should be stayed pending an appeal.

I have studied the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Ex parte Nti (supra). No reasons were given for the decision. It is my view, therefore, that the concrete decision alone is binding only between the parties to the suit. It is the reason or principle on which a question before a court has been decided, which is binding as a precedent. It is the ratio decidendi of a judgment of a superior court which sets a precedent for itself or inferior courts to follow. As no reasons are stated for the decision in Ex parte Nti, I am slow to accept the submission of Miss Asare-Korang based on that decision.

[p.565] of [1981] GLR 554

The matter in debate is a question involving the liberty of a subject of this country, the right of personal freedom of a citizen of this country, and I for one, should be slow to accept that a matter like this which ought to be determined expeditiously as a matter of policy, should be allowed to drag for months running to a year (by the time the appeal would be heard) before a decision would be taken whether or not the application lies to the court. If the case involves a constitutional matter at all, then it would be irresponsible on the part of this court to shirk its responsibility and refer it to the Supreme Court. For what purpose will a matter like this be referred, where the only issue at this stage is whether or not this applicant has been convicted by the special court set up under the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Courts) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D 3)? When counsel appears before the court and simply says that this matter involves an interpretation of a provision of the Constitution, 1979, I think it is plain commonsense that sitting as a judge, I have a right to determine whether or not it is a question involving an interpretation. This matter does not reach that stage until the factual aspect of it has been determined. It is for these reasons that I refused to stay the proceedings pending the appeal.

The contention of the applicant in this matter is that he has been unlawfully detained. That of the respondents is that the detention of the applicant is based on a warrant of commitment issued by the Special Court of the A.F.R.C. which sat at Burma Camp and dated 8 June 1979, and that, therefore, the detention is lawful. Nonetheless, the Senior State Attorney maintains that by virtue of section 2 (5) of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Special Courts) Decree, 1979 and article 15 (2) of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979, the court has no power to inquire into that detention because he was convicted by the special court. Section 2 (5) of A.F.R.C.D. 3 provides:

“2. (5) It shall not be lawful for any Court to entertain any action or proceedings whatsoever for the purpose of questioning any decision, judgment, findings, order or proceedings of any Special Court convened under section 1 of this Decree; and for the removal of doubts, it shall not be lawful for any Court to entertain any application for an order or writ in the nature of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition or quo warranto and declaration in respect of any decision, judgment, findings, order or proceedings of any such court.”

But the bedrock of the respondents’ contention is section 15 (2) of the transitional provisions which reads:

[p.566] of [1981] GLR 554

“15. (2) For the avoidance of doubt it is hereby declared that no executive, legislative or judicial action taken or purported to have been taken by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council or by any person in the name of that Council shall be questioned in any proceedings whatsoever, and, accordingly it shall not be lawful for any Court or other tribunal to make any order or grant any remedy or relief in respect of any such act.”

The warrant itself, a copy of which was filed, states that the applicant was convicted by the court on a charge of selling above the control price. It does not state what was sold and where. It states also that upon being convicted, the applicant was sentenced to a prison term of three years with hard labour.

But for the serious allegations made by the applicant, namely, that he has never been tried by the special court and that the warrant was not issued as a result of an act of the A.F.R.C., the matter should have ended there. The warrant of commitment would, as it states, have been a sufficient authority to all whom it may concern. The presumption of legality would apply. Because of the allegations made by the applicant, this court is in duty bound to investigate and resolve that simple issue of fact as to whether or not the warrant was issued by the A.F.R.C. Special Court and that it was issued as a result of any trial. When an application for habeas corpus is considered at the various stages of its process, it will be seen clearly that the submission that it does not lie or that this court has no jurisdiction to entertain it cannot be tenable.

The first stage of this application is the ex parte stage. At that stage, the applicant simply comes to court and says that he has been put into prison, and that his detention is unlawful. The applicant at this stage alleged that he was arrested, molested, tortured, interrogated and then thrown into jail. No court would turn a man with this story out of court. So the court orders a writ to issue. The second stage will be when the writ is issued and served on the person detaining the applicant. At the third stage, the respondent files the return. Depending upon the contents of the return, the applicant may file an affidavit to controvert it. Whether or not the affidavit will be receivable to controvert the return is another matter, but this step will be taken at the third stage and considered at the next stage which I call the fourth stage.

The fourth stage is the hearing of the application. It is at this stage that the respondent comes to justify the detention. It is the justification of the detention which will determine whether it is a matter which falls within section 15 (2) of the transitional provisions

[p.567] of [1981] GLR 554 or not. It is my view that if the justification is that the applicant has been convicted by an A.F.R.C. Special Court and he is properly serving a term of imprisonment and this has been controverted, the respondent must establish it. I do not think the prosecution can just dangle the transitional provisions to frighten off the court without establishing that it is a matter which properly falls within the transitional provisions. At the hearing, if the respondents produce a warrant of commitment with a return showing that the applicant has been tried, convicted, sentenced and committed, then the writ of habeas corpus will not issue, for whether the conviction is wrong or not, the court will be stripped of jurisdiction by the transitional provisions to question that commitment. But when the applicant says he has never been tried at all and gives circumstances which lend so much credibility to the deposition, and gives facts which show that it was practically impossible for him to have been tried, and the warrant of commitment is not regular on the face, then the court has to study the justification meticulously.

That this court has the power to embark upon this inquiry is beyond doubt and I indicated that in my ruling of 25 July 1980. The law on the matter has been exhaustively treated in the crop of cases that came before these courts some two decades ago when the provisions of the Preventive Detention Act, 1958, had to be considered. The cases I refer to are: In re Okine [1959] G.L.R. 1 and on appeal [1960] G.L.R. 84, C.A.; In re Amponsah [1960] G.L.R. 140, C.A,; In re Akoto [1961] G.L.R. 523, C.A. and In re Dumoga [1961] G.L.R. 44. The upshot of the discussion in these cases is that the courts are precluded from interfering with the exercise of the discretion by the person endowed with the plenary power so long as his bona fides is not in question. Of all the cases referred to above, it is only in In re Okine that the court elaborates on the principles involved. Besides stating the general principle, Smith J. goes further to give the complete picture. After stating the facts of the case he proceeded at pp. 2-3:

“The Preventive Detention Act, 1958, is analogous to the Preventive Detentions Regulations which were in force in Britain as a war-time measure, and the cases and authorities cited to me have almost entirely related to war-time detentions …

The question of the necessity of making the order at all is not for the Court to consider.”

And having referred to some English cases such as Progressive Supply Co., Ltd. v. Dalton [1943] Ch. 54; Lands Realisation Co.,

[p.568] of [1981] GLR 554

Ltd. v. Postmaster-General [1950] Ch. 435 and Liversidge v. Anderson [1942] A.C. 206, H.L. Smith J. concluded at pp. 3-4:

“From these and other cases cited to me it seems clear that, as regards the Preventive Detention Act, 1958, the only matters that the Court can inquire into are matters relevant to the legality of the detention. In the case of Carltona Ltd. v. Commers. of Works and Ors. ([1943] 2 All E.R. 560 at p. 564) there is the following passage in the judgment of Lord Greene M.R., ‘It has been decided as clearly as anything can be decided that, where a regulation of this kind commits to an executive authority the decision of what is necessary or expedient and that authority makes the decision, it is not competent to the Courts to investigate the grounds or the reasonableness of the decision in the absence of an allegation of bad faith. If it were not so, it would mean that the Courts would be made responsible for carrying on the executive government of this country on these important matters. Parliament, which authorises this regulation, commits to the executive the discretion to decide, and with that discretion, if bona fide exercised, no court can interfere. All that the court can do is to see that the power which it is claimed to exercise is one which falls within the four corners of the powers given by the legislature and to see that these powers are exercised in good faith. Apart from that, the Courts have no power at all to inquire into the reasonableness, the policy, the sense, or any other aspect of the transaction.’ Examples of matters into which the Court can inquire and in which it could interfere are, therefore, the bona fides of the Minister where this is impugned, the genuineness of the Detention Order itself, the identity of the applicant with the person referred to in the Order, the nationality of the applicant and, I would say, the overstepping of statutory limits by the Minister. Such matters as these are relevant to the legality of the detention.”

In support of this, Smith J. cited R. v. Home Secretary; Ex parte Budd [1942] 1 All E.R. 373, C.A. This is the law on the subject.

A look at the legislations on which the detentions in those cases and those involved in the present case are based, will readily show that the principles applicable in those earlier cases are the same as those involved in the present one. The ban which the transitional provisions annexed to the Constitution, 1979, seek to impose

[p.569] of [1981] GLR 554 on the courts is analogous to the principle that when an executive or any person to whom it has delegated the power and discretion to take a particular decision, being satisfied with the necessity of making such decision, makes such a decision, it is not open to the court to review the decision taken because such an action is purely an administrative one. In this case instead of using a human person (a minister) the A.F.R.C. delegated its power to an institution, a special court established for that purpose by statute. The principle involved in the matter is, however, the same. The concept involved is the curtailment of the constitutional right of a citizen affected by the decision or order so made. He is in the process denied his right of testing the validity of the decision taken in the court, presumably in the interest of State security. But in the analogous situations referred to, the courts have held again and again that the court can and will inquire into the bona fides of the person making the order, the genuineness of the detention order itself, and the identity of the applicant with the person referred to in the order. And as it was said in Ex parte Budd (supra) at p. 376:

“Similarly, if for example, a regulation empowered the Home Secretary to detain any person who was in fact an alien, the court could inquire into the nationality of the applicant, since, if it transpired that he was not in fact an alien, his detention would be ultra vires. In all these instances the court would be inquiring into questions relevant to the matter in hand—namely, the legality of the detention.”

And this is all that this court is doing—inquiring into the legality of detention of Lloyd Shackleford as to whether he was in fact tried, convicted and sentenced by the A. F. R. C. Special Court.

It was after the decision in the cases I referred to earlier, i.e. In re Okine; In re Amponsah; In re Akoto and In re Dumoga that the Habeas Corpus Act, 1964 (Act 244), was passed. That Act, however, changed nothing in the law stated above. The object of the Act was to consolidate with amendments the law relating to habeas corpus applications and to give Ghana her own habeas corpus legislation and to do away with dependency on the English Habeas Corpus Act and also to supply the desideratum of giving a right of appeal in habeas corpus proceedings. It will be noted, that all the four cases I have referred to were taken to the Court of Appeal but the court declined jurisdiction but drew the attention of the authorities to the desirability, of granting the court an appellate jurisdiction in that area. Also in dismissing the appeal in In re Amponsah (supra) the court expressed the desire at p. 164 thus:

“We wish, however, to refer to the judgment of this court delivered on the 11th April, 1960 in Re Okine and Others [1960] G.L.R. 84. We repeat the hope expressed therein that provision in our law for a right of appeal in a case such as this will receive the consideration of the legislature.”

Section 5 of the Habeas Corpus Act, 1964, granting the right of appeal states:

“5. An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court, [i.e. Court of Appeal] in any proceedings under this Act, against an order for the release of the person detained as well as against the refusal of such an order.”

But it should be noted that the Act provided for the maintenance of the status quo as far as the law itself was concerned. It states at section 2 that:

“2. The High Court or the Judge thereof to whom an application is made under section 1 of this Act shall immediately enquire into the allegation of unlawful detention and may make an order requiring the person in whose custody the applicant (or the person on whose behalf the application is made) is detained, (a) to produce the body of the person so detained before the High Court on a day specified in the order, and (b) to submit a report in writing stating the ground of the detention.”

There is some force in the submission of Miss Asare-Korang, the learned senior state attorney, namely, that the court cannot go beyond the committal warrant. That submission, however, takes a rather over-simplified view of the matter. It may be emphasised that this court is doing nothing that is not in accordance with the law. What it is doing is precisely what the law enjoins it to do. As stated in In re Okine [1959] G.L.R. I at p. 4 the court can, among other things, inquire into the genuineness of the detention order itself. It is only examining the genuineness of the order of detention. It is neither inquiring into the reasons of the detention, nor is it, examining the soundness or otherwise of the decision or purported decision of the special court set up by the A.F.R.C. which is said to have sat at Burma Camp and decided the case of the applicant on 8 June 1979. And this the court has power to do because of the allegation that the applicant was never tried and that the warrant of commitment could not be the result of a trial.

[p.571] of [1981] GLR 554

If there were no dispute about the authenticity of the warrant of commitment, and it were regular on the face of it, I would concede to the submission of learned counsel, for even apart from the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979, and A.F.R.C.D. 3, a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted to a person lawfully committed or where the effect would be to review or to question the decision of an inferior court on a matter within its jurisdiction: see R. v. Morn Hill Camp (Commanding Officer); Ex parte Ferguson [1917] 1 K.B. 176, D.C. I will also concede that where the return shows that the applicant is in execution under the judgment of a competent court, an affidavit will not be allowed to traverse these facts. However, where the applicant says that he was never put before the court at all and that there was no conviction nor sentence, the court will be in duty bound to go behind the warrant. In Carus Wilson’s Case (1845) 115 E.R. 759, Lord Denman C.J. said of the matter at p. 769:

“Without inquiring whether any affidavit is receivable at all in the case of any prisoner under sentence, we may decide the question before us by considering the principle of the exception that runs through the whole law of habeas corpus, whether under common law or statute, namely, that our form of writ does not apply where a party is in execution under the judgment of a competent Court. If, indeed, it were proposed to shew that the prisoner had never been before such Court at all, or that no such sentence had been in fact given, there might be a difficulty in saying that a traverse to that effect could not be allowed. But, when it appears that the party has been before a Court of competent jurisdiction, which Court has committed him for a contempt or any other cause, I think it is no longer open to this Court to enter at all into the subject matter.”

This dictum sums up my mind, belief and conviction and opinion as to how this matter should be considered and treated. In Carus Wilson’s Case (supra) Williams J. also said at p. 770:

“. . . but, at all events, there is a marked distinction between affidavits that are to shew that the party was never before the Court at all, or that no sentence was pronounced, and affidavits to shew that there is no such law as that acted upon by the Court. By common courtesy, credit is given to Courts which have pronounced the law, that they have proceeded legally.”

[p.572] of [1981] GLR 554

But in the instant case, I concede that the law forbids me to supervise the special court even though inferior to this Court. However, it must be proved first that the matter before the court is a matter upon which the special court had adjudicated or purported to have adjudicated, and that this warrant was issued pursuant to the trial. For this purpose, I cannot proceed on the basis of presumption. I cannot take judicial notice of the conviction and sentence. Since the warrant of commitment has been challenged, its authenticity must be proved. The warrant of commitment must be a legal one. It must show on the face of it, the right to detain. The warrant can only be legal if it were issued by a person who has jurisdiction to issue it. If the person had no jurisdiction to order the detention then that paper cannot justify the detention. That question can only be determined if the identity of the person who issued it is shown. In Liversidge v. Anderson (supra) and all such cases, the authenticity of the warrant was never in dispute. In all my endeavour I have not succeeded in finding a single case in which the person who signed the order or warrant is not known or identified.

The copy of the warrant I have been shown is No. 83. It bears a purported stamp of the A.F.R.C. I have not been shown an undisputed A.F.R.C. stamp to compare this with. In the place provided for the judicial officer is a scrawl which purports to be a signature. The designation of the person who signed it is not shown. The term “judicial officer” is a generic term. It comprises of the registrar, the magistrates grades I and II, judges, etc. But the registrar is not competent to issue a warrant of commitment. It is necessary therefore that the status of the person who signed the warrant must be shown. There must be evidence by which to determine whether the person who signed it was a member of the court or a person competent to issue the warrant. Nowhere in the return or affidavit sworn to in opposition to the application is the name of the person who signed this warrant of commitment stated. The name of the person is not typed on the warrant. The only thing which makes a warrant genuine is the signature of the person competent to issue it. This one bears the signature of an unknown person, a signature which is not decipherable. It bears a mere scrawl, which has not been identified either by the author or any person familiar with it, and which is not related or has been related to any person entitled to sign; it cannot be a signature for the purpose of validity of a warrant of a commitment. Again and again I adjourned this matter to wait for information which would enable me to perform my judicial function, but again and again the court was denied this information. On the information available to me, I have given

[p.573] of [1981] GLR 554 this matter the best consideration I can. The person who signed the warrant could have been identified and the signature proved in his absence. There must be somebody who could have sworn that this scrawl on the warrant is the signature of AB and that AB was a private or sergeant or lieutenant and a member of the A.F.R.C. Special Court. But no attempt has been made to identify this signature. How do I know it was signed by the person who was supposed to sign?

Surely if it were signed by an orderly in the office of the A.F.R.C., it would not be a genuine document of the special court. And when a judge sits in court to adjudicate upon a matter like this, impinging on the liberty of the subject and a warrant of commitment is produced, the judge is not told who signed it, the status of the person who signed it is not shown. In the face of facts deposed to by the applicant, can any reasonable tribunal admit such document as justifying the restraint of a person’s liberty? No reasonable tribunal would admit such document as authentic. A man’s signature is not something you can take judicial notice of. So far as I am concerned, this warrant is an unsigned document. It being unsigned, I am not satisfied it is a genuine act of the A.F.R.C. By this I am by no means challenging the decision or order or act of the A.F.R.C. I am saying that it has not been established that this warrant was issued by the A.F.R.C. Special Court or as a result of any trial by the special court. If the warrant is not an act of the A.F.R.C. or the special court or issued as a result of a trial, then the commitment is illegal and the applicant can challenge it in court.

I would concede that where imprisonment follows a valid conviction, an applicant should not succeed in a habeas corpus application based solely on defect in the commitment documents. However, where there are allegations which show that the warrant is patently defective in that it was neither issued pursuant to a trial or a conviction nor issued by a person competent to issue it, then it is not only a question of dealing with a trivial defect in the warrant of commitment, but an issue which touches on the very basis upon which jurisdiction was derived in issuing that paper.

In Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 11, at pp. 31-32 it is said, “A person who is in custody under a warrant or order of commitment may test the validity of the warrant or order under which he is detained by means of the writ of habeas corpus . . .” In Cox v. Hakes (1890) 15 App.Cas. 506, H.L., Cox was found guilty of contempt and contumacy. He was arrested and lodged in prison on a warrant issued by the sheriff. An application for habeas corpus was made on behalf of Cox on the ground that the writ

[p.574] of [1981] GLR 554 for his arrest and imprisonment was unlawfully issued. The application was granted and he was discharged. See also Ex parte Cross (1857) 2 H. & N. 354.

It has also been urged at this hearing that this court has no jurisdiction to try this case because the very Habeas Corpus Act, 1964 (Act 244), had been abrogated by the Constitution, 1979, as it conflicts with the provisions of the Constitution. A stranger proposition than this have I not heard made before this court. How can the same Constitution which is supposedly promulgated for the good governance of the State and for the assurance of the fundamental rights of the citizens, come to rob the citizens of the very rights protected by the Act and which they cherish above all other things? How can it be envisaged that the Constitution, 1979, came to remove the one bastion which the citizens have for the protection of their liberty? I hope not. As Osei-Hwere J. aptly stated in Republic v. Commanding Officer of the Third Battalion of Infantry, Ghana Army: Ex parte Kwaku [1974] 2 G.L.R. 340 at p. 345:

“Habeas corpus therefore, is the greatest bequest made to us by the common law in ensuring the liberty of the citizen. This bequest has now been enshrined in our treasured charter for all times, viz. the Habeas Corpus Act, 1964.”

(The emphasis is mine.) Act 244 regulates the exercise of the citizen’s common law right to the writ of habeas corpus. It is described as an Act “to consolidate with amendments the law relating to applications for habeas corpus.” The court should therefore lean against any presumption that the Constitution intended to make an important alteration in the law in the applications for habeas corpus. To do that would be putting fetters upon the ability of the court to protect the fundamental human rights. As Hayfron-Benjamin J. (as he then was) ably put it in Republic v. Chieftaincy Committee on Wiamoasehene Stool Affairs; Ex parte Oppong Kwame [1971] 1 G.L.R. 321 at p. 336:

“In the infant democracy of Ghana it is exceptionally important that the courts should not put fetters on their own ability to protect the fundamental human rights so admirably enshrined in the Constitution of the Second Republic, by adopting highly technical and artificial limitations on their powers, limitations which are being rapidly discarded even in monarchial regimes. Democracy in the last analysis, receives its sustenance from remedial laws and procedures; it is the availability of effective and reasonably quick remedies for doing

[p.575] of [1981] GLR 554 justice that gives meaning to democracy. The High Court of Ghana has been given power under article 28 of the Constitution to issue writs and orders in the nature of habeas corpus, certiorari, etc., as it may consider appropriate for the purposes of enforcing, or securing the enforcement of fundamental human rights. It has also been given supervisory powers over all adjudicating authority under article 114 of the Constitution exercisable by the same writs and orders. To restrict these powers by adopting self-imposed limitations would considerably impair the power of the courts to perform and fulfil their duties of securing the enforcement of fundamental freedoms and supervising other adjudicating authorities. I do not propose to do so.”

Article 35 of the Constitution, 1979, gives similar powers to those which article 28 of the Constitution, 1969, gave to the courts. The application of the transitional provisions is irrelevant to the determination of the issue at this stage, and the court would not impose such a ban on itself.

It has also been submitted by the learned senior state attorney that the jurisdiction of this court is ousted by the fact that the hearing of this case involves the enforcement and interpretation of provisions of the Constitution and that as the court has no jurisdiction to do so, I should suspend the hearing until the Supreme Court has ruled upon it. She did not say so explicitly but she could only be making this submission under article 118 (2) of the Constitution, 1979. I was also referred to the case of Republic v. The Director-General of Prisons; Ex parte Nti [1980] G.L.R. 527, C.A. where the Court of Appeal stated at 528:

“In view of article 217 of the Constitution, 1979, and sections 15 (2) and (3) and 16 of the transitional provisions we are agreed that the issues involve the interpretation of the Constitution. Under article 118 (2) a duty is imposed on the High Court to stay proceedings and refer the matter to the Supreme Court.”

No reasons were given for the decision, but it does not seek to lay down the principle that certain class of persons within the community are precluded from asserting their rights under article 35 of the Constitution, 1979, and that is all the applicant is doing. Where a person seeks to enforce article 35, the jurisdiction of the High Court is not ousted by article 118 (2).

Article 15 (2) of the transitional provisions may provide an answer, which cannot be questioned, to the charge, but before resort is had to it, the factual question as to whether this is a matter

[p.576] of [1981] GLR 554 which the transitional provisions is sought to protect must be answered. Otherwise, how can the court tell when one is an A.F.R.C. convict? This matter, in my view, is of such paramount importance that it requires a thorough adjudication and I hope that when this matter is taken up at the next forum the knotty point will be thrashed out. As Akufo-Addo C.J. said in State v. General Officer Commanding the Ghana Army; Ex parte Braimah [1967] G.L.R. 192 at p. 200, C.A. (full bench):

“The courts of Ghana have a duty to safeguard the liberty of the citizen and in any matter affecting that liberty the actions of the executive and its officers are subject to the supervision and control of the courts on habeas corpus (see Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.) Vol. 11, p. 25).”

And he said further in the same judgment and at the same page, “the court as a tribunal of facts will have to be satisfied of the existence of the facts justifying the detention.” I want to be satisfied that the issuance of this warrant was an act of the A.F.R.C.

The issues in this application as I see them are whether the warrant of commitment was issued by the A.F.R.C. or any person authorised in the name of that council, and whether it was issued as result of any trial. Suppose that the A.F.R.C., after interrogating the applicant, was satisfied he had committed no offence, and yet some unauthorised person picked one of these forms, filled it, and sent it to the prison officers, would this be an act which should be protected or saved by the transitional provisions? Certainly not.

The circumstances recounted by the applicant in his affidavit show that he had been taken to the Ussher Fort Prisons with another person with a view to being released. The other person was released. It was not until 23 October 1979 when the warrant of commitment was sent to the prisons even though it is dated 8 June, when the court had not even been set up. The A.F.R.C. handed over power to the present government on 24 September 1979. Other matters not completed were handed over to the special tribunal. But the special tribunal did not deal with the applicant. When all these matters are considered, they cast great suspicion on the authenticity of the warrant of commitment, they raise great doubts in my mind as to whether the applicant was committed by the A.F.R.C. Special Court.

One must not lose sight of the fact that in a revolution a lot of things happen and nobody questions the makers of such coup d’etat. However, when they seek to clothe their actions with the responsibility of legality, then sitting as a judge, I will have to

[p.577] of [1981] GLR 554 look at those things clothed with legality with reference to the norms of legality with which we are familiar, and the tests of validity that are applicable to the acts of all legal tribunals. We were all witnesses to what happened during the A.F.R.C. era. People used that period as an opportunity to settle old scores. A lot of atrocities were committed in the name of the A.F.R.C. Those who were exposed were punished, but others went clean through the net. If the acts of those who went through the net were to be brought up to the court now, can the transitional provisions be pleaded in the name of justice in defence of such acts? If the transitional provisions were pleaded, would that oust the jurisdiction of the court? It will surely not. The transitional provisions can only be pleaded in support of acts or purported acts of the A.F.R.C. Whether or not such acts or purported acts were done in accordance with any procedure prescribed by any law, the courts are not to question them. The word “purported” cannot be used as a blanket to cover all acts which are clearly not acts of the A.F.R.C. as constituted by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1979.

One must also not lose sight of the fact that we are now governed by a Constitution which embodies certain ideals and spirit and these must not be overlooked. The provisions of the Constitution, 1979, are built round the inviolability of the right of the citizen. It will be dangerous to read the transitional provisions in total disregard of the main Constitution to which they are annexed. Therefore in matters concerning the liberty of’ the citizen or subject, there should be meticulous proof of the matters which bring the matter within the transitional provisions. Under the type of Constitution we have today, nothing should be taken for granted. Anything alleged to be an A.F.R.C. act must be proved to be so. The transitional provisions and A.F.R.C.D. 3. s. 2 (5) cannot affect the right and duty of the court to see justice executed.

The respondents in this case are asking the court to infer from the disputed warrant of commitment that the applicant was tried, convicted and sentenced. These are matters which must be proved like any other matter according to the rules of evidence. The burden lies on the respondents. The burden which the respondents are required to discharge is that of producing evidence which is sufficient “so that on all the evidence a reasonable mind could conclude that the existence of the fact was more probable than its non-existence”: see section 11 (4) of the Evidence Decree, 1975 (N.R.C.D. 323). There should be evidence from which the court can determine that the applicant was tried or purported to have

[p.578] of [1981] GLR 554 been tried by the special court and that this warrant of commitment was issued by that court or any person authorised by it. The transitional provisions do not diminish in any way the weight of the burden to be established by a person who deprives another of his liberty; but the transitional provisions do not come in at all until these factual matters have been established. The justification pleaded is that this is a judicial act of the A.F.R.C. This must be proved like all other judicial acts are proved. The best proof would be the order convicting him. I cannot infer this from the disputed warrant of commitment.

In view of the serious allegations made in the affidavit in support of the motion, the respondents ought to have done more than merely producing a copy of the warrant of commitment with an indecipherable signature. The return to the writ merely states that the applicant is being held on the warrant of commitment. The affidavit in opposition more or less reiterated what had been stated in the return and deposed that the matters on which the applicant relied were not within the knowledge of the deponent so he could not answer them. It has been argued on behalf of the applicant that there is no proper return to the application in accordance with section 2 (b) of the Habeas Corpus Act, 1964 (Act 244). It was submitted that the affidavit and report lack particularity and fails to show the ground of the detention. This submission was supported with the case of State v. General Officer Commanding the Ghana Army; Ex parte Braimah (supra). The burden of this submission, as explained by Nana Akufo-Addo is that the attempt made by the respondents to explain the detention does not constitute an acceptable order under the law, and therefore there is no challenge to the matters contained in the affidavits sworn to on behalf of the applicant.

To these submissions which were pursuasively urged, Miss Asare-Korang replied that, the court is not entitled to go beyond the warrant of commitment and that if the applicant is alleging it is a forgery, it is for him to prove it, and that there is no duty on the respondents to establish it is genuine. This is a correct statement of the law, as Goddard L.J. said in his careful judgment in R. v. Home Secretary; Ex parte Greene [1941] 3 All E.R. 104 at p. 121, C.A.:

“I am of opinion that, where, on the return, an order or warrant which is valid on the face is produced, it is for the prisoner to prove the facts necessary to controvert it, and, in the present case, this has not been done. I do not say that in no case is it necessary for the Secretary of State to file an affidavit. It must depend on the ground on which the return

[p.579] of [1981] GLR 554 is challenged, but, where all that the prisoner says in effect is, ‘I do not know why I am interned, and I deny that I have done anything wrong,’ that does not require an answer, because it in no way shows that the Secretary of State had not reasonable cause to believe, or did not believe, otherwise.”

Section 2 (b) of Act 244 requires the person in whose custody the applicant is detained to submit a report in writing stating the grounds of the detention. The nature of the report or information which will be necessary to give, will depend upon the cause for the detention. I do not think there is a stereotyped form of information which every such report should contain.

In Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 11 at p. 44 appears this passage on the contents of the return. It reads:

“The return to the writ must contain a copy of all the causes of the prisoner’s detainer endorsed on or annexed to the writ. It should state the facts relied on as constituting a valid and sufficient ground for detention of the person alleged to be illegally detained. These facts must be set forth clearly and directly and with sufficient particularity. The return must be unambiguous.

The consequence of an insufficient return, where the cause of the imprisonment does not appear specifically and certainly, will be either that the prisoner, because the cause returned of his imprisonment is too general, must be discharged, when, if the cause had been more particularly returned, he ought to have been remanded, or else he must be remanded, when, if the cause had been more particularly returned, he ought to have been discharged. An insufficient return may, however, be amended by leave of the Court.”

Then at p. 47 it is further stated, “Where, after argument, the return is found to be bad or insufficient, the party on whose behalf the writ was issued is entitled to be discharged from custody.” See also Hawkeridge Case (1616) 12 Co. Rep. 129; Re Howard (1844) 2 Dow. & L. 536 and Re Authers (1889) 22 Q.B.D. 345, D.C. But a court is not bound to order a prisoner to be discharged merely on the ground of irregularity in the form of the return, if a good cause of commitment is disclosed on the return. When there is a defect on the face of the warrant of commitment, the conviction, if it exists, must be brought up; if good, it will cure a defective commitment. In such a case if there was a legal conviction to support the commitment, the defect on the face of the warrant will not entitle the applicant to a discharge.

[p.580] of [1981] GLR 554

In R. v. Governor of Lewes Prison; Ex parte Doyle [1917] 2 K.B. 254 at p. 269, Viscount Reading C.J. said:

“But, even though we had come to the conclusion that the warrant of commitment was bad on the face of it, as this is a case of commitment after conviction we are again not only entitled but bound to look at the conviction in order to see whether there is more than a mere technical defect in the commitment … Rex v.

Hawkins and Rex v. Taylor are authorities which abundantly support the proposition that in considering the validity of the committal the conviction must be looked at. It is clear that the Court in Rex v. Taylor thought that they ought to look at the conviction, and if they came to the conclusion that there was a defect in the commitment but none in the conviction they would not grant a writ of habeas corpus.”

In this case, all the court would be satisfied with is whether or not there was a conviction to support the commitment. If there was, and whether or not the conviction was bad, it would be precluded from entertaining this application by A.F.R.C.D. 3. s. 2 (5) and the transitional provisions, s. 15 (2). I say this knowing fully well that I am dealing with the liberty of the subject, but I am also administering law and justice, and I must bow to the Constitution of the land of which the transitional provisions are part, and the law of this land from which A.F.R.C.D. 3 is not separate.

The respondents are enjoined to justify the detention under section 4 (1) of Act 244, and the court must be satisfied that the detention is in accordance with the law. Since they maintain that the applicant is being detained as a result of a judicial act of the A.F.R.C., this act must be proved. The return, which has been submitted shows that the applicant was received into custody on 8 August 1979 under warrant of commitment dated 8 June 1979. Later, an affidavit was filed which shows that in fact the applicant was delivered into custody of the first respondent on 28 August 1979 by a liaison officer, A. I. Hassan, who was attached to the A.F.R.C. Secretariat and that that officer said the applicant was a convict of the A.F.R.C. But it was not until 23 October when the warrant of commitment was received. I take it that this affidavit amends the earlier report filed. All the same at the end of the argument, the return is still found to be insufficient, because the warrant annexed to it, and which seeks to justify the detention is not a legal warrant.

[p.581] of [1981] GLR 554

Some statements were made from the Bar by the senior state attorney that Flight-Lieutenant Ben Odoi and another were being contacted to swear to an affidavit about the trial. I do not know what they would have said, but suffice it to say that, that statement does not help to determine the identity of the alleged judicial officer who signed the warrant of commitment nor that it was issued pursuant to a trial. If it were complete and regular on the face, perhaps I would concede to some of the points relied on by the senior state attorney. The respondents would have done better than merely waving before the court the warrant of commitment like a magic wand and expecting it to do the trick. Instead of their wasting their energies to force the court to disclaim jurisdiction or staying proceedings, the respondents should have produced a copy of the decision of the special court bearing on this matter and the record of proceedings of the court of 8 June 1979 or both; or an affidavit could have been sworn by the alleged judicial officer who was purported to have signed the warrant, refuting the matters deposed to by the applicant. That would have clinched the matter. It is then that section 2 (5) of A.F.R.C.D. 3 and the transitional provisions, s. 15 (2) of the Constitution, 1979, would have come into play to oust the jurisdiction of the court.

The contents of the affidavit supporting the applicant’s affidavit for habeas corpus are pointed and serious and demand a rebuttal. And so long as they remained unanswered, this court would be bound to uphold them. I am referring in particular to paragraph 7 of the affidavit filed in support of the detainee’s application and also paragraphs 8, 9, 10 and 20 of his supplementary affidavit. Paragraph 7 of his supporting affidavit reads:

“7. That I am informed by my husband and I verily believed the same to be true, that ever since his arrest and detention on 8 June 1979, he has never been brought before the special court set up by the A.F.R.C. under A.F.R.C.D. 3 of 1979.”

Paragraphs 8-10 and 20 of the supplementary affidavit reads:

“8. That there was no A.F.R.C. Special Court as at 8 June 1979, the same having been set up after and not before 11 June 1979.

9. That the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1979, which established or created the A.F.R.C. itself is declared to have been made on 11 June 1979.

[p.582] of [1981] GLR 554

10. That it is physically and factually impossible that the A.F.R.C. could have created any special court before 11 June 1979.

20. That according to a statement announced on Radio Ghana it was not until 15 June 1979 that the A.F.R.C. Special Court became ready to start sitting to try cases. And according to a statement made on Radio Ghana, the A.F.R.C. Special Court trials actually started on the night of Wednesday, 11 July 1979, not before.”

The facts deposed to show that it was virtually impossible for the special court to have tried and convicted the detainee as stated in the warrant of commitment. The affidavit filed by the respondents in opposition contain nothing by way of demurrer to the allegations made by the applicant. The deponent, Peter Abban Nartey, the Chief Superintendent, does in fact say that he could not contest the allegations. He deposed in paragraph 5:

“The matters referred to in the said affidavit are matters not within my knowledge nor that of the first respondent. Since the affidavit expressly states and admits that they were carried out at places other than areas controlled by the prisons.”

Since the allegations of the applicant stand unchallenged, I am bound to accept and uphold them. If the applicant were tried on 8 June 1979, his interrogation would not have continued up to 7 August 1979. If the applicant were tried on 8 June 1979 and the warrant issued the same day, then one wonders why it was not delivered until the A.F.R.C. had gone out of power for a good one month before it was given to the prison authorities. It cannot come under the saving sections of the transitional provisions. The detention is without a just cause and it is therefore unlawful and the applicant should be discharged.

I would like to close this judgment with the opening words of Lord Halsbury L.C. in his speech in the case of Cox v. Hakes (1890) 15 App. Cas. 506 at p. 514, H.L.:

“For a period extending as far back as our legal history, the writ of habeas corpus has been regarded as one of the most important safeguards of the liberty of the subject. If upon the return to that writ it was adjudged that no legal ground was made to appear justifying detention, the consequence was immediate release from custody.”

[p.583] of [1981] GLR 554

There is no justification for the detention of the applicant. He is therefore entitled to immediate discharge. He must be released and set free forthwith.

DECISION

Application for habeas corpus granted.

E. P.-T.

Scroll to Top