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[1980] SLR (HC) 47High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL I)

AGYEMAN VII vs. NKUM AND ANOTHER [1982-83] GLR 520

19 June 1980 · SARKODEE J · ≈ 16 min read

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OSCOLAAGYEMAN VII v NKUM AND ANOTHER [1982-83] GLR 520 [1980] SLR (HC) 47
APAAGYEMAN VII v NKUM AND ANOTHER [1982-83] GLR 520, [1980] SLR (HC) 47 (Ghana).
BluebookAGYEMAN VII v NKUM AND ANOTHER [1982-83] GLR 520, [1980] SLR (HC) 47 (Ghana High Ct. 1980).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Kponuglo v. Kodadja (1933) 2 W.A.C.A. 24.

(2) Kuma v. Kofi (1956) 1 W.A.L.R. 128.

(3) Adobea v. Lassey (1956) 1 W.A.L.R. 181.

(4) Agbo Kofi v. Addo Kofi (1933) 1 W.A.C.A. 284.

(5) Ebiassah v. Ababio (1946) 12 W.A.C.A. 106.

(6) Mansah v. Asamoah [1975] 1 G.L.R. 225.

(7) Abowaba v. Adeshina (1946) 12 W.A.C.A. 18.

(8) Solomon v. Ackon [1964] G.L.R. 1 (9) Ricketts v. Addo [1975] 2 G.L.R. 158.

(10) Manu v. Emeruwa [1971] 1 G.L.R. 442.

(11) National Provincial Bank of England v. Jackson (1886) 33 Ch. D. 1; 55 L.T. 458; 34 W.R. 597, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION by the plaintiff against the defendants for damages for trespass, declaration of title to land and perpetual injunction. Wherein the defendants counterclaimed for the same reliefs against the plaintiff. The facts are fully stated in the judgment of the court.

COUNSEL

James Mercer for the plaintiff.

Willie Amarteifio for the defendants.

JUDGMENT OF SARKODIE J.

The plaintiff claims against the defendants a declaration of title to a piece of land with a cocoa farm thereon situate at Mpokuampa, Bibiani and commonly called “Sahuma.” According to him he shares boundaries on one side with Ekua Seguah, and on another with Kwabena Ennin. On the third side the land is bounded by the farm of Kwaku Duro and on the fourth side by the motor road from Bibiani to Abrofrem. Also he claims an order for possession, perpetual injunction, ¢20,000 damages for trespass and an order for an account of cocoa proceeds from 1969 to 1978.

The plaintiff, the Omanhene of Lower Dixcove in the Western Region, is the successor of two of his late uncles, Nyame Bobuo and Kwesi Bomua who, according to the plaintiff settled at Bibiani about 1910, obtained the land described above from the chief of Nkawie and in about 1912 made a cocoa farm on it. Since the death of the last of the two uncles in 1941, the plaintiff says he has been in possession and control of the said farm and has been paying tribute to the chief of Nkawie. The plaintiff alleges that in 1969 the second defendant drove the plaintiff’s caretakers and labourers from the farm, occupied and continues to occupy the said farm to the detriment of the plaintiff.

The defendants deny that the plaintiff is entitled to his claim and say that the said land was never occupied by Nyame Bobuo and

[p.522] of [1982-83] GLR 520

Kwesi Bomua in 1912 or at any other time. The first defendant says he acquired title to the land in dispute by succession and he traced this through his ancestors Kobina Nketsia and Kofi Sekyi who developed the land into a cocoa farm. That Kofi Sekyi was survived by Kobina Nketsia. Upon the death of Kobina Nketsia he was succeeded by Kwame Bentum, the immediate predecessor of the first defendant. In 1947 Kwame Bentum obtained a loan of £15 from one Koomson, the immediate predecessor of the plaintiff in this case and in exchange, the said Bentum pledged the cocoa farm to Koomson for six years. Since the death of Kwame Bentum, the first defendant has made every effort to redeem the farm but the plaintiff has refused and says the farm is his own property. Owing to the attitude of the plaintiff, the first defendant entered the farm, took possession of it and put the second defendant in charge. The first defendant in his counterclaim asks for a declaration of title to the land in dispute an order for possession, perpetual injunction and ¢1,000 damages for trespass.

The plaintiff claims a declaration of title to the land in dispute, trespass and perpetual injunction. The defendant has challenged the plaintiff’s title to the land in dispute. This puts into issue the title of the plaintiff: see Kponuglo v. Kodadja (1933) 2 W.A.C.A. 24. The plaintiff must therefore succeed on the strength of his case. The plaintiff himself is not resident at Bibiani and therefore had to rely on witnesses whom he put forward as boundary owners. Apart from the evidence of these persons the plaintiff himself did not seem to know the land in dispute.

In 1969 the plaintiff instituted an action in the District Court, Bibiani against the defendant claiming title to the very parcel of land the subject-matter in the present suit. That case was struck out for want of prosecution and ¢60 costs were awarded against the plaintiff. Following submission by counsel for the defendants as to the value of the land the court ruled it had no jurisdiction to hear the case. In that case, as appears in exhibit 1, the plaintiff gave the names of Madam Afua Tawiah, Kwasi Bi, Andrews Akoto as his boundary owners. In cross-examination in this case he denied ever knowing these persons. He also denied he shared boundaries with them. The writ in this case was issued in 1969. In it, Afuah Tinwah, Kwasi Bi and Andrews Akoto were put forward as boundary owners. Summons for directions were taken in 1973. In 1974 the plaintiff amended the indorsement on his writ and gave as his boundary owners Ekua Acquah, Kwabena Ennin and Kwaku Duro, all persons he had not mentioned before.

Throughout the litigation in the district court the fourth side of the land in dispute has always been described as bounded by the motor road from Bibiani to Abrofrem. The land has always been commonly called “sahuma.” No reason for the change was given either in the

[p.523] of [1982-83] GLR 520 pleadings or at the trial. The position would have been different if the second group of of [1982-83] GLR 520-528 boundary owners were put forward as successors. I am not surprised that to establish his title the plaintiff called the second set of boundary owners. I am not for one moment suggesting that a litigant is not entitled to amend his pleadings in order to reflect the case he intends putting forward. What I want to put across is that in such a situation where the case of the litigant stands or falls on the evidence of his witnesses the credibility of such witnesses must be above reproach. The plaintiff was unable to tender any document to buttress his claim and depended entirely on the evidence of those with whom he said he shared boundaries.

It might be argued that the plaintiff realising the mistake he had made in naming the wrong persons abandoned the claim at the district court and started afresh in the High Court but he could not repeat the same mistake when issuing the original writ in the High Court. If indeed the plaintiff had been in possession of the land since 1941, that is for 39 years when the last of his ancestors died, he would have known his boundary owners. That apart, and perhaps what is more important is that the second set of persons put forward as boundary owners were not at all impressive in the witness-box.

Their answers to questions in cross-examination made me conclude that they had no connection whatsoever with the land in dispute. I believe they were put forward as witnesses because of the contents of exhibit 2 which named Kwame Tawiah, Afua Tinwah and Andrews Akoto as boundary owners. Exhibit 2 also says the fourth side of the land is bounded by the Abrofrem motor road. The plaintiff said his ancestors acquired the parcel of land from the Nkawie stool but the undisputed evidence is that it is not the Nkawie chief alone but three chiefs control the lands in the area and must always execute document for transfer of land together as can be seen from exhibit 3. Be that as it may, the plaintiff was not certain about the amount of tribute he paid to the Nkawie chief. Taking the evidence as a whole, I find it difficult to rely on the evidence of the plaintiff’s witnesses to give title to the disputed land to him.

The defendant has been consistent throughout the case. He denies that the plaintiff is the owner of the land. He also denies that the plaintiff’s ancestors ever settled at Bibiani on the disputed land. He contends that the land in dispute was cultivated by his ancestors, the last of whom, Kwame Bentum, pledged it to one Koomson for the sum of £15. The first defendant succeeded Kwame Bentum. He knew of the pledge before the death of Kwame Bentum. Therefore after Kwame Bentum’s death the first defendant travelled to Bibiani to meet Koomson who was then expected to be in possession of the farm. Koomson had died and the farm was in the possession of the plaintiff who had then appointed to it a certain woman caretaker. The

[p.524] of [1982-83] GLR 520 first defendant reported the matter to the head of the Fante community at Bibiani who caused a letter to be written to the plaintiff inviting him to Bibiani. The plaintiff failed to attend the call. The defendant therefore put his own caretaker, the second defendant on the land. Since the death of the second defendant the first defendant has been in possession.

In support of the pledge agreement the first defendant called Kwesi Ankobeah, one of the witnesses to the transaction. He was present when Kwame Bentum took the loan of £15 from Koomson and gave his cocoa farm, the subject-matter in dispute, as security. He confirmed that Bentum was to redeem the farm after six years and that the parties prepared a document as evidence of the transaction. He identified exhibit 2. He knew the land in dispute having inspected it with the parties before the pledge agreement was entered into. The defendant tendered exhibit 3, a plan showing the land in dispute and signed by the three chiefs who control lands in the area or their representatives; in other words, confirming the first defendant’s title to the land in dispute.

The Nkawie stool was represented by one Gyanae who the chief confirmed in cross- examination was the person then looking after the interest of Nkawie stool and had full powers and authority to sign documents on behalf of Nkawie stool. One of those who signed exhibit 2 was chief Amo whose children the plaintiff mentioned were for some time caretakers of the disputed land. This goes to strengthen the case of the first defendant that the land in dispute was pledged to the plaintiff’s predecessor and that he was at one time in possession. I hold in all the circumstances that Kwame Bentum took a loan of £15 from Koomson and pledged his cocoa farm as security. The transaction in my view was a simple and straightforward customary law pledge.

It appears Kwame Bentum did not redeem the pledge before his death but that is not fatal to the defendants’ case for a pledge can be redeemed at any time, no matter how remote: see Kuma v. Kofi (1956) 1 W.A.L.R. 128. Lapse of time is no bar and by native custom a pledgor or his successor may redeem the pledge at any time: see Adobea v. Lassey (1956) 1 W.A.L.R. 181. In Agbo Kofi v. Addo Kofi (1933) 1 W.A.C.A. 284 lands known as the Dove lands were pledged in 1869 to secure a loan of six shillings and six pence. About 1926, that is roughly 57 years later, the successor of the pledgor applied to the successors of the original pledgee. It was held that the pledgor or his successor was entitled to redeem after that long lapse of time. As soon as the debt is paid the pledgee must vacate the land or be ejected: see Ebiassah v. Ababio (1946) 12 W.A.C.A. 106.

Learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that as exhibit 2, the document evidencing the pledge, was not stamped under the Stamps Ordinance, Cap 168 (the enactment which was in force in 1947) it is

[p.525] of [1982-83] GLR 520 inadmissible in evidence and cannot therefore be relied upon. Section 15 of the Ordinance provides:

“15. No instrument made liable by this Ordinance to any stamp duty shall be pleaded or given in evidence in any Court, unless the same be duly stamped:

Provided that no instrument shall in any criminal trial, enquiry, or proceedings be inadmissible in evidence for want of a stamp.”

The section does not apply to instruments sought to be tendered in criminal cases. In civil cases, it applied only to documents made liable by the Ordinance to stamp duty. In Mansah v. Asamoah [1975] 1 G.L.R. 225, Anin J.A. (as he then was) quoting Abowaba v. Adeshina (1946) 12 W.A.C.A. 18 said at p. 241:

“There are certain types of evidence . . . which are inadmissible per se, they cannot form the basis for a decision, and objection to them may be taken at any stage of a trial or on appeal…”

The section makes unstamped documents, where the Ordinance says they should be, inadmissible per se. The party seeking to tender such a document is mandatorily prohibited from pleading or giving evidence of the document without it being stamped. The trial court is equally mandatorily prohibited from receiving it in evidence and therefore the trial court’s judgment founded on such document cannot be supported: see Solomon v. Ackon [1964] G.L.R. 1 at p. 7. Perhaps it will be useful to set out the contents of exhibit 2.

“In the consideration of the sum of fifteen pounds (£15) received from one Mr. Koomson of Mpokuampa near Bibiani in the Western Region, I the undermarked Kwame Bentum of Gomoah Brofo in the Central Region (Region) now residing at Bibiani in the same Western Region aforesaid, hereby voluntarily give my own bona fide cocoa farm to the said Koomson to pluck it for a period of six years (6 years) as an interest on his amount of £15 paid to me as same:

Terms: After the said 6 years, I shall have to pay the said amount of £15 to the said creditor Koomson before the redemption is made by me.

The said cocoa farm in question is being laying at Saahane also near Mpokuampa near Bibiani in the same Western Region and bounded as follows: On the first part by Kwame Tawiah and Boakyi’s cocoa farms: second part by Andrews Akoto’s and Danso’s cocoa farms. On the third part by Efuah Tinwah’s cocoa farm and on the fourth part by the Aborfrem motor road.

This agreement was read to me in Fanti language before I made my thumb-print as same.

[p.526] of [1982-83] GLR 520

Dated and stamped at Bibiani this 24. 6. 1947.

Witnesses and their marks Kofi Afabe x Ekuah Penden x .. .. .. Principal Debtor Kwasi Ankobia x .. .. .. Kwame Bentum x Chief Armu Principal Debtor Kwame Bentum x.”

It is wrong to say that exhibit 2 is a receipt or a deed and therefore needed stamping. It does not seek to acknowledge the payment of any sum of money or debt or any part of a debt. It is therefore not a receipt within the meaning of sections 52 and 54 of Cap. 168. If it were a receipt it would have attracted stamping without which it would be inadmissible per se. Further, in an effort to bring exhibit 2 within the Ordinance, learned counsel for the plaintiff drew the court’s attention to Mansah v. Asamoah (supra) suggesting that since exhibit 2 had not been stamped it was inadmissible in evidence.

That case turned on the interpretation of section 14 (5) of the Stamp Act, 1965 (Act 311), as amended by the Stamp Act, 1965 (Amendment) Decree, 1967 (NLCD 160). That section as substituted by NLCD 160 provides:

“160. Save as otherwise expressly provided in this section, any instrument executed in any part of Ghana or relating, wheresoever executed, to any property situate, or to any matter or thing done or to be done, in any part of Ghana, shall not, except in criminal proceedings, be given in evidence, or be valuable for any purpose, whatsoever, unless it is duly stamped in accordance with the law in force at the time when it was first executed, in the proportion to which the value of the property situate in Ghana stands, with that of the whole of the property covered by the instrument.”

This is a new provision. It is obviously broad and wide indeed. Out of the confusion in trying to understand it comes out this vital point that it requires instruments to be stamped in accordance with the law in force at the time when they were first executed. The Court of Appeal has interpreted this to include instruments executed before the coming into force of the Act in 1967. Thus in Ricketts v. Addo [1975] 2 G.L.R. 158 the court applied the section to receipts prepared in 1937. It seems to me a pledge agreement unlike receipts is not caught by the subsection for Cap. 168 does not specifically mention a pledge agreement. The Ordinance mentions mortgages but it must be emphasised that the two are different. A pledge in customary law is the delivery of possession and custody of property real or personal, by a

[p.527] of [1982-83] GLR 520 person to his creditor to hold and use until the debt has been paid, an article borrowed is returned or replaced, or obligation is discharged: see Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana, p. 94. On the other hand a mortgage is a kind of security which passes the property in the goods out and out to the mortgagee and unlike a pledge there is the incidental right of foreclosure: see Manu v. Emeruwa [1971] 1 G.L.R. 442.

Finally, exhibit 2 is not a deed. A deed requires stamping. Exhibit 2 is a written instrument on paper, it is signed and it expresses an intention to pass an interest to the grantee but in order to make it effective as a deed it must be delivered as the act and deed of the party expressed to be bound thereby and it must be sealed: see National Provincial Bank of England v. Jackson (1886) 33 Ch.D. 1. Exhibit 2 lacks the two very vital prerequisites of a deed that is sealing and delivery. It does not therefore come under section 15 of Cap. 168. It does not therefore require stamping.

Assuming that I am wrong in my assessment and that exhibit 2 requires stamping and it is therefore inadmissible in evidence and excluded, will that affect the case put forward by the defendant? In my view it will not. The position is different, as in the instant case, where the party who puts in the document is able to establish his case independently of the unstamped document. If the document is rejected or is out of the way he can still rely on the solid and reliable evidence he has otherwise built up: per Archer J.A. (as he then was) in Mansah v. Asamoah (supra).

Kwesi Ankobeah, the first defendant witness, said in his evidence:

“When I was at Bibiani we had a brother from the same town called Kwame Bentum. He had a cocoa farm at Bibiani. One day he told me he was not well. He came to tell me something. I went with him to Koomson to raise a loan of £15. Bentum offered his cocoa farm as a pledge. A document was prepared. The condition was that the loan should be repaid after six years. I made my mark to the document.”

The first defendant himself often visited Bentum at Bibiani when he was alive. The first defendant knew about the farm which Bentum pledged to Koomson. It was after the death of Bentum when the defendant as his successor found exhibit 2 in Bentum’s box. He proceeded to Bibiani to look for Koomson. He learnt that Koomson had died. He then took steps to redeem the pledge but without success. Apart from the first defendant, the first defendant witness gave oral evidence of the details of the pledge agreement independently of exhibit 2. I have no reason to doubt the sincerity of the first defendant witness. He was firm and unshaken under rigorous cross-examination.

[p.528] of [1982-83] GLR 520

His evidence clearly established the pledge agreement between Koomson and Kwame Bentum. In my view, the first defendant relied on evidence other than exhibit 2 to prove his claim. After efforts he made to redeem the pledge had failed, he took possession, it appears forcibly, of the land in dispute and put his representatives on it.

I hold that the plaintiff has failed to establish his claim and it is accordingly dismissed. The first defendant succeeds in his counterclaim. I find that he is entitled to the land in dispute. He is hereby ordered to repay the equivalent of the £15 on or before 30 June 1980 in order to put an end to the pledge but this does not take away his right to redeem the pledge at any time he shall continue to be in possession of the said land. The plaintiff, his servants, successors and assigns are hereby restrained from entering the land in dispute or in any way from interfering with the quiet enjoyment of the defendant and his servants, agents and successor of the said land.

DECISION

Plaintiff’s action dismissed.

Defendant’s counterclaim allowed.

E. P. -T.

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