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[1980] SLR (HC) 50High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL I)

BRUTUW vs. AFERIBA AND ANOTHER [1982-83] GLR 464

19 June 1980 · OSEI-HWERE J · ≈ 27 min read

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OSCOLABRUTUW v AFERIBA AND ANOTHER [1982-83] GLR 464 [1980] SLR (HC) 50
APABRUTUW v AFERIBA AND ANOTHER [1982-83] GLR 464, [1980] SLR (HC) 50 (Ghana).
BluebookBRUTUW v AFERIBA AND ANOTHER [1982-83] GLR 464, [1980] SLR (HC) 50 (Ghana High Ct. 1980).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Flower v. Lloyd (1877) 6 Ch.D. 297; 46 L.J.Ch. 828; 37 L.T. 419; 25 W.R. 793, C.A.

(2) Cole v. Langford [1898] 2 Q.B. 36, 67 L.J.Q.B 698; 14 T.L.R. 427.

(3) Jonesco v. Beard [1930] A.C. 298; [1930] All E.R. Rep. 483; 99 L.J. Ch. 228; 142 L.T. 616, H.L.

(4) Anyimah III v. Kodia IV [1962] 2 G.L.R 1.

(5) Baker v. Wadsworth (1898) 67 L.J.Q.B. 301.

(6) Kojo Fon v. Atta Fua (1929) F.C. ‘26-’29, 522.

(7) Birch v. Birch [1902] P. 130; 71 L.J.P. 58; 86 L.T. 364; 50 W.R. 437; 18 T.L.R. 485; 46 S.J. 393, C.A.

(8) Hornal v. Neuberger Products Ltd. [1957] 1 Q.B. 247; [1956] 3 W.L.R. 1034; 100 S.J. 915; [1956] 3 All E.R. 970, C.A.

(9) Hip Foong Hong v. Neotia & Co. [1918] A.C. 888; 87 L.J.P.C. 144; 119 L.T. 588, P.C.

(10) Anderson v. Titmas (1877) 36 L.T. 711; 41 J.P. 680.

[p.467] of [1982-83] GLR 464

(11) Young v. Kershaw (1899) 81 L.T. 531; 16 T.L.R. 52, C.A.

(12) Ansah v. Busanga [1976] 2 G.L.R. 488, C.A.

(13) Nkegbe v. African Motors [1978] 1 G.L.R. 32.

(14) Abouloff v. Oppenheimer (1882) 10 Q.B.D. 295; 52 L.J.Q.B. 1, 47 L.T. 325; 31 W.R. 57, C.A. (15) Cammell v. Sewell (1858) 3 H. & N. 617; 27 L.J.Ex 447; 4 Jur. (N.S.). 978, 32 L.T.O.S. 196; on appeal (1860) 5 H. & N. 728; 29 L.J. Ex. 350; 2 L.T. 799; 6 Jur. (N.S.) 918; 8 W.R. 639. (16) Harrison v. Mayor & Co. of Southampton (1853) 4 De. G.M.& G. 137; 1 Eq. Rep. 299; 22 L.J. Ch.

722; 21 L.T.O.S. 294; 18 Jur. 1; 1 W.R. 422.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION to set aside the judgment of the High Court, dated 26 August 1975 given in favour of the defendants on the ground that the judgment was obtained by fraud. The facts are fully stated in the judgment of the court.

COUNSEL

Ewusie-Wilson for the plaintiff.

J. B. Short for the defendants.

JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE J.

By the indorsement on her writ the plaintiff’s claim against the defendants is for:

“(a) declaration setting aside the judgment of this honourable court dated 26 August 1975 and confirmed by the judgment of the Court of Appeal dated 16 June 1977 on the ground of fraud.”

In her twelve-paragraphed amended statement of claim the plaintiff made the following averments:

“(1) The plaintiff is the head of family of Nana Effina Anona family of Yaayaakuano near Cape Coast in the Central Region.

(2) The land, the subject-matter of suit No. 15/70 entitled Kobena Amoasi, Odikro of Yaayaakuano for himself and on behalf of Nana Effina Anona family of Yaayaakuano versus (1) Ebusuapanyin Effua Aferiba, etc., etc. (2) Fawuhutwer of Yaayaakuano in which judgment was given by the High Court, Cape Coast, on 26 August 1975, and same was confirmed by the judgment of the Court of Appeal dated 16 June 1977, is the ancestral property of the plaintiff’s family.

(3) The defendants for the purpose of obtaining the judgments referred to in paragraph (2) above and which are sought to be set aside in this action perpetrated gross and serious fraud on the High Court of Justice.

[p.468] of [1982-83] GLR 464 PARTICULARS OF FRAUD (a) Manufacturing concrete pillars and placing them on the land in dispute so as to represent that the said pillars were placed on the land by the late John Mensah Sarbah Barrister-at-law, who died in 1910 or otherwise by Mrs. Sarah Sarbah, the mother of John Mensah Sarbah, Barrister-at-law, who died in 1917.

(b) Falsely claiming that the said John Mensah Sarbah was succeeded by his mother Mrs. Sarah Sarbah when to the knowledge of the defendants John Mensah Sarbah died leaving a will which was admitted to probate.

(c) Falsely claiming that the land in dispute belonged to John Mensah Sarbah when to the knowledge of the defendants the land did not form part of the estate of John Mensah Sarbah, because by the wills of John Mensah Sarbah, Eva Nancy Sarbah, Mrs Gwira and a trust deed, the estate of John Mensah and his mother Sarah Sarbah eventually passed into the hands of Sarah Wilhemina Adjoa Williams, nee Taylor and after her death to her lawfully wedded husband under the Ordinance—Mr. Kobena Aaba Taylor who sold all the properties in the said estate without any opposition from the defendants or from any other members of their family.

And that if the land in dispute formed part of the said estate it would also have been sold.

(d) Falsely stating that Fawuhutwer, the second defendant, has lived at Yaayaakuano village for over 80 years when the defendants well knew that the said Fawuhutwer has for a greater part of his life lived at Wanyaito village, and moved to live a Yaayaakuano only when the first action started.

(e) Falsely claiming in one breath that Yaayaakuano village and the inhabitants thereon were bought by John Sarbah—the father of John Mensah Sarbah—from the plaintiff’s ancestors, and in another admitting that despite the alleged sale, the plaintiff’s predecessors have been the odikros of Yaayaakuano since it was founded by Nana Effina.

(f) Suborning witnesses to come and give perjured evidence to the court.

(4) The plaintiff says that by reason of the fraud perpetrated by the defendants, which fraud came to light only after the judgment of the Court of Appeal, her family has suffered the loss of her ancestral lands.

[p.469] of [1982-83] GLR 464

(5) The plaintiff says that Yaayaakuano lands comprise the village of Yaayaakuano and its surrounding lands.

(6) The plaintiff further says that a very small part of the land in question was long before the turn of the 19th century pledged to John Sarbah, the father of Mr. John Mensah Sarbah, Barrister-at-law.

(6a) The plaintiff adds that the averment in paragraph (6) above is amply supported by the evidence of the plaintiff and the other witness in the first case, which evidence stood uncontradicted.

(7) The plaintiff says that when John Mensah Sarbah attempted to take the land of her ancestors, he was driven from the land.

(8) The plaintiff says that when John Mensah Sarbah was driven from Yaayaakuano he moved to Wanyaito village where he settled some of his domestics amongst whom was the second defendant.

And that, in fact, the second defendant was served with the first writ of summons at the village where he was at the time living.

(9) That the said second defendant is a stranger at Yaayaakuano village. And so is the first defendant.

(9a) The plaintiff says that the fact that John Mensah Sarbah was driven away from the portion of the land in dispute pledged to him is supported by the fact that none of his descendants attempted or have attempted to rebuild the ruins of the buildings he left behind on the land; neither did they remain on nor return to the land in question.

(10) The plaintiff therefore contends that Yaayaakuano village and its surrounding lands have never been sold to John Sarbah or to his son John Mensah Sarbah.

(11) The plaintiff again contends that the defendants’ claim of her ancestral land is a grossly fraudulent one.

(12) Wherefore the plaintiff claims against the defendants the relief indorsed on her writ of summons.”

Following the amended statement of claim, the defendants filed a short amended defence which was to the effect that they rely on their previous defence and added that:

“the matters contained in the amendment granted are irrelevant to the issue of fraud in so far as the setting aside of a judgment on the ground of fraud go. Indeed, matters akin thereto were the subject-matter of additional grounds of appeal filed in the Court of Appeal by the present solicitor for the plaintiff.”

[p.470] of [1982-83] GLR 464

It is, therefore, also pertinent to quote that previous defence which runs as follows:

“(1) The defendants deny paragraph (1) of the statement of claim and say that Yaayaakuano land is their property.

(2) The plaintiff is not of Yaayaakuano and by virtue of the matters mentioned in paragraph (2) of the statement of claim the land is their property.

(3) In reply to paragraph (3) the defendants say that:

(a) The age of the concrete pillars was given by the surveyor appointed by the court and he was corroborated by Kobena Amoasi who said that Nana Sarbah then fixed pillars around the boundaries.

(b) A will is made by a testator; a successor is appointed by the family after the death of the testator.

(c) The evidence as to who sold and who bought and the circumstances surrounding the transaction came from the plaintiff.

(d) The averment contained in this subsection is false to the knowledge of the plaintiff.

(e) The falsity of this averment is shown by the absence of any details whatsoever.

(4) The plaintiff had an opportunity of raising the matters mentioned in paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 at the trial: she must therefore forever keep her silence.

(5) It was the plaintiff who gave evidence as to how John Sarbah bought Yaayaakuano land.

(6) The defendants will contend that since the plaintiff’s present solicitor took part in the presentation of the appeal which was dismissed on 17 June 1977, this action is an earnest joke which must be dismissed. The defendants will raise at or before the trial the question whether the action is maintainable against them.

(7) The plaintiff through her solicitors filed additional grounds of appeal signed by their present solicitor:

It is therefore oppressive and vexatious that after the failure of the appeal when all the matters being now raised could and should have been canvassed, the defendants are now being faced with another trial.

(8) Save as has been herein expressly admitted or admitted by necessary implication, the defendants deny each and every allegation of fact contained in the statement of claim as if they had been set out herein in extenso and traversed seriatim.”

[p.471] of [1982-83] GLR 464

It was upon these issues joined that the plaintiff filed the following summons for directions:

“(1) Admissions:

THAT paragraph (3) (f) of the plaintiff’s statement of claim be deemed to be admitted by the defendants.

(2) Issues:

Whether or not the defendants obtained the judgment in suit No. 15/70 delivered by the High Court on 26 August 1975 and its subsequent confirmation by the Court of Appeal on 16 June 1977 by perpetrating gross and serious fraud on the court. Whether or not the judgment of the High Court dated 26 August 1975 and the judgment in the subsequent appeal dated 16 June 1977, be set aside on the ground of gross and serious fraud perpetrated by the defendants upon the court.”

The plaintiff prosecuted her action at the trial through her attorney who is also a principal member of her family. According to her one Kobena Amoasi, who has since died, sued the defendants herein in respect of Yaayaakuano land and judgment was given against him. When Kobena Amoasi died the prosecution of the case was taken over by the plaintiff herein, Ekua Brutuw. During the progress of the trial she, the plaintiff’s attorney, was in court and she gave evidence that pillars had been erected around the whole land. This piece of evidence surprised her because she knew that those pillars were only on a small portion of the land that had been pledged. She, accordingly, went to the land that same day to verify whether in truth, there were these pillars around the land. She found that the old pillars were there all right but that they had erected new pillars in addition around the whole land. The old pillars bore the inscription “J.M.S.” The new pillars either bore the inscription “S.S.”, or “J.M.S.” In other words, quite apart from the old “J.M.S.” pillars there were these new pillars which were marked “J.M.S.” and were standing interspersed among the new pillars also marked “S.S.” The plaintiff’s attorney said that she chipped off a portion of an old “J.M.S.” pillar, a portion of a new “J.M.S.” pillar and a portion of a pillar marked “S.S.” and brought them home. At the time she took these samples the former lawyer for Kobena Amoasi, Mr. Ampiah, was about to leave his practice at the Bar and so she subsequently handed the samples to their present solicitor, Mr. Ewusie-Wilson. As she wanted to know the age of the samples she was advised to take them to the University of Science and Technology where they make a study on cement. She took them there but she was told that their machine for observation had broken down. Instead they gave her the address of their principals in the United Kingdom who could determine the age of the samples. These

[p.472] of [1982-83] GLR 464 samples were accordingly forwarded to that address in the United Kingdom and they subsequently forwarded their report to her lawyer.

It was the plaintiff’s case that John Mensah Sarbah died in 1910 testate and that by his will he bequeathed his real and personal effects to his mother Sarah Sarbah. Sarah Sarbah herself died in 1917 and she also left a will in which she devised all her real property to her daughter Nancy Sarbah who in turn bequeathed by her will all her personal and real property to a Mrs. Ogoe and Mrs. Dorothy Brown Essuman Gwira. Mrs. Gwira also died testate and bequeathed all her property to Sarah Wilhemina Adjoa Williams who married Kobena Aaba Taylor under the Marriage Ordinance.

She predeceased Kobena Taylor and the latter obtained letters of administration in respect of her estate. When Kobena Aaba Taylor came by the estate he sold out everything. From the chain of the successive dealings with the real estate of John Mensah Sarbah the plaintiff contended that the defendants completely fell outside the pale of the various wills which passed John Mensah Sarbah’s said estate from one hand to the other until it ended in the outright sale. If Yaayaakuano land had been owned by John Mensah Sarbah it would have been sold; it has not been sold, ergo it did not belong to John Mensah Sarbah.

Accordingly to the plaintiff it was only a small portion of the Yaayaakuano land that was pledged to Sarbah (meaning from the statement of claim, John Sarbah, the father of John Mensah Sarbah). Sarbah built on the land pledged to him and he also cultivated it. As the land did not belong to the pledgor a time came when Sarbah was driven away from the land and he, accordingly, removed the roof of the building and he and his people went to live at a place called Wenyiato.

This building has been in ruins up to this day and Sarbah’s people have done nothing about that. Fawuhutwer (the second defendant), therefore lied when he said in the former trial that he had lived at Yaayaakuano all along. He had only come to live at Yaayaakuano because of the case. At the former trial both Amoasi and Brutuw gave evidence about the pledge and, according to the plaintiff, this was not challenged.

The whole foundation of the plaintiff’s case is that the pillars around the land were recently erected and that they were not placed there by either John Mensah Sarbah who died in 1910 or Sarah Sarbah who died in 1917. To buttress this the plaintiff called one Kofi Abakah, the first plaintiff witness and Kofi Mensah, the second plaintiff witness. According to the second plaintiff witness he was in his house about fifteen years ago when one Papa Penyinyena called him and told him that some pillars had been brought in and so he should assist him to convey them to the bush. He and two others went to carry these pillars, nine of them in all, to the bush. He was paid ¢3

[p.472] of [1982-83] GLR 464 for his services and he went away.

The first plaintiff witness said that his father was this Penyinyena who has since died. About fifteen years ago his father asked him to accompany him to the field to fix some pillars which he had asked some labourers to bring to the land. He followed his father to the Yaayaakuano land and there he saw nine pillars placed under an “Ebar” tree. He assisted his father to erect these pillars. He asked why they had erected the pillars and his father told him that the land is their own land and that he was fixing the pillars so that if any case arose over the land in future the pillars would give them support.

The defendants’ counsel firmly elected not to call any evidence after the plaintiff had closed her case and with that understanding both counsel addressed the court. The plaintiff’s counsel called on the court, even without more, to give judgment for the plaintiff since her claim that the defendants had obtained the previous judgment against her predecessor by suborning witnesses had not been denied specifically and must be deemed to have been admitted by them. Quite apart from this he also sought to show that the plaintiff had led ample evidence to establish that the defendants fraudulently erected those “new” pillars on the land and that they relied heavily on the existence of these pillars as their defence. He argued that the judgment was tainted with the fraud.

In his submissions the defendants’ counsel argued, inter alia, that even if the judgment of the High Court now impeached by the plaintiff had been obtained by perjured evidence that would be no ground for setting it aside. He invited the court to concern itself only with the fraud averred in the plaintiff’s pleadings that the defendants had manufactured the pillars and erected them on the land in dispute. He pointed out that nowhere did the plaintiff and her two witnesses mention in their evidence that the defendants had gone to erect the pillars.

Counsel further invited the court to condemn the unilateral action taken by the plaintiff’s attorney to prove the alleged fraud in respect of the pillars and to place no reliance on such evidence as it will be immoral to do so. He argued that the court, at the first trial, had been told by the surveyor that he found old and new pillars on the land and he gave their ages. As the court had all the facts about the pillars it cannot be said that the judgment was obtained by fraud. At any rate, the judgment was based on the evidence of the plaintiff who said that Nana Sarbah fixed pillars around the land. If these pillars were fixed by Nana Sarbah who allegedly died in 1892 then, counsel asked, what could have happened to those pillars. He argued that it was possible that some of them might have gone into ruins and some also misplaced. Counsel contended that the evidence of the first and second plaintiff witnesses did not indicate where Penyinyena

[p.474] of [1982-83] GLR 464 allegedly fixed the pillars and asked whether they were fixed around the land the plaintiff admitted was sold to Sarbah or that they were fixed around the land which was not sold. There was also no evidence that the defendants were privies to the activities of Penyinyena and he asked that the court should accord no respect to the evidence of the first and second plaintiff witnesses. In conclusion he invited the court to dismiss the action.

The law on the matter is without question that if a judgment of the Court of Appeal has been obtained by fraud it may be impeached by original action without the leave of the court: see Flower v. Lloyd (1877) 6 Ch. D. 297, C.A. A judgment of the High Court may be impeached in like manner: see Cole v. Langford [1898] 2 Q.B. 36; or in cases where an appeal may be brought on such judgment by appeal to the Court of Appeal, where further evidence may by leave of the Court of Appeal where necessary, be admitted for the purpose of establishing the alleged fraud.

In effect, where the fraud becomes known whilst the judgment is on appeal the aggrieved party may ask the leave of the Court of Appeal to adduce further evidence to establish the fraud alleged. Otherwise it is the settled practice of the court that the proper method of impeaching a completed judgment on the ground of fraud is by action, in which the particulars of the fraud must be exactly given and the allegation must be established by strict proof: see Jonesco v. Beard [1930] A.C. 298, H.L.

The fraud used must be the principal point in issue, and necessary to be proved, before the propriety of the judgment can be investigated. In Anyimah III v. Kodia IV [1962] 2 G.L.R. 1 at pp. 17-19 Adumua-Bossman J. (as he then was) relied on the decisions in Flower v. Lloyd (supra); Baker v. Wadsworth [1898] 67 L.J.Q.B. 301 and Fon v. Fua (1929) F.C. `26 -`29, 522 in coming to the conclusion that perjury committed by the successful party or his witnesses in the first trial as the foundation or ground for a claim to set aside a judgment will not avail.

It seems, however, that this is not an absolute principle of law for it is stated at p. 1333 of Daniell’s Chancery Practice (8th ed.) that where the party against whom the judgment is to be set aside was privy to procuring the perjury an action to set aside the judgment so obtained is maintainable, for it is a rule that a judgment obtained by fraud can be set aside as against parties to the fraud and those claiming under them: see the judgment of A.L. Smith L.J., quoted in Birch v. Birch [1902] P. 130, C.A.

The standard of proof required to prove an allegation of fraud in a civil action was resolved in Hornal v. Neuberger Products Ltd. [1957] 1 Q.B. 247, C.A. The headnotes of that decision state:

“In a civil action where fraud or other matter which is or may be a crime is alleged against a party or against persons not parties

[p.475] of [1982-83] GLR 464 to the action, the standard of proof to be applied is that applicable in civil actions generally, namely, proof on the balance of probability, and not the higher standard of proof beyond all reasonable doubt required in criminal matters; but there is no absolute standard of proof, and no great gulf between proof in criminal and civil matters; for in all cases the degree of probability must be commensurate with the occasion and proportionate to the subject-matter. The elements of gravity of an issue are part of the range of circumstances which have to be weighed when deciding as to the balance of probabilities.”

Lord Buckmaster has described fraud in Jonesco v. Beard (supra) at pp. 301-302 as an “insidious disease, and if clearly proved to have been used so that it might deceive the Court, it spreads to and infects the whole body of the judgment.” Setting aside a judgment on the score that it has been obtained by fraud is, of course, to be distinguished from an application for a new trial on the ground of discovery of new evidence.

The distinction is well brought out in Hip Foong Hong v. Neotia & Co. [1918] A.C. 888 at p. 894, P.C. where it is stated that in all applications for a new trial the fundamental ground must be that there has been a miscarriage of justice. If no charge of fraud or surprise is brought forward, it is not sufficient to show that there was further evidence that could have been adduced to support the claim of the losing party; the applicant must go further and show that the evidence was of such a character that it would, so far as can be foreseen, have formed a determining factor in the result.

It is further pointed out that such considerations do not apply to questions of surprise and still less to questions of fraud. Lord Buckmaster here again sententiously pronounced that a judgment that is tainted and affected by fraudulent conduct is tainted throughout, and the whole must fail. The rules which pertain to an application for a new trial are also contained in the decision of Anderson v. Titmas (1877) 36 L.T. (N.S.) 711 and Young v. Kershaw and Burton v. Kershaw [1899] 81 L.T. (N.S.) 531, C.A., which Adumua-Bossman J. (as he then was) referred to in his judgment quoted above. From the foregoing a party who sets out to impeach a judgment obtained by fraud needs not establish that but for the fraud the verdict would have been different or that the fraud formed a determining factor in the judgment impeached.

The plaintiff pleaded subornation of perjury as one of the particulars of fraud on which she relied to set aside the judgment. It was incumbent on the plaintiff not only to particularise this fraud with exactness but also to establish that allegation by the strict proof such a charge required. The plaintiff called no evidence to prove that charge and her counsel contended on her behalf that that proof was

[p.476] of [1982-83] GLR 464 unnecessary because the defendants, by their failure to traverse that charge specifically, must be deemed to have admitted it. It was with this confidence that the defendants had no answer to the charge that in the summons for directions filed on her behalf the plaintiff asked, under the heading “Admissions,” that paragraph (3) (f) of the statement of claim be deemed to be admitted by the defendants.

To this argument the defendants’ counsel pointed to the general traverse contained in paragraph (8) of the defence as a sufficient answer, and I quite agree with him. In Ansah v. Busanga [1976] 2 G.L.R. 488, C.A. this point of practice was reaffirmed that although it was necessary and desirable for allegations of fact contained in an opponent’s pleadings, if not admitted, to be denied specifically and not evasively, nevertheless a general traverse in proper form (such as is contained in paragraph (8) of the defence) operated to put the matter at large and to put the opponent to proof of those allegations of fact.

The plaintiff failed to prove the charge that the defendants were guilty of subornation of perjury. The particulars of fraud contained in paragraph (3) (b)-(e) of the statement of claim cannot, in my opinion, avail the plaintiff as grounds for setting aside the original judgment which is the subject of this action. These particulars, which the plaintiff sought to prove, did no more than to show that the defendants at the former trial perjured themselves and, as noted before, mere proof of perjury is not such fraud to ground an action for setting aside.

The judgment sought to be set aside is, principally, the judgment of Sampson Baidoo J. (beatae memoriae) delivered on 26 August 1975. This judgment was, admittedly, confirmed by the Court of Appeal. At the trial of the action before Sampson Baidoo J. it was conceded by the defendants that the original title of the Yaayaakuano land lay in the plaintiff’s family. In his pleading the plaintiff admitted that a portion of this family land was sold to the defendants’ predecessor (John Sarbah).

When the plaintiff came to give evidence in court he testified that that portion of the land was pledged. The defendants asserted ownership to the whole of the Yaayaakuano land which was originally acquired by the plaintiff’s family. They founded their derivative title to the land on purchase by John Sarbah. In their defence they pleaded, however, that John Mensah Sarbah purchased the land. An aspect of their defence contained in their paragraph (3) ran as follows:

“John Mensah Sarbah died in 1910 and was succeeded by his mother Sarah who caused pillars to be erected along the whole circumference of the land. The said pillars are standing to this day.”

The first defendant was asked, when she was under cross-examination whether she had documents on the land and her answer was simply

[p.477] of [1982-83] GLR 464 this: “All I know are the pillars on the land.” The second defendant also testified that the cement pillars were erected all over the boundaries during the lifetime of Mensah Sarbah. In the concluding part of the judgment the learned judge said:

“. . . I find as fact that the defendants’ family has for years been exercising acts of ownership over the land in dispute without any opposition, and I accept the defendants’ case that the areas surrounded by the survey pillars marked `J.M.S.’ and `S.S.’ comprise the two parcels of land bought by the late John Sarbah (Snr.) as admitted by the plaintiff’s family in their letter.”

It cannot be doubted that the existence of these “J.M.S.” and “S.S.” pillars was one of the determining factors of the judgment. It was for this reason that the plaintiff in this action set herself the task of establishing fraud in respect of the erection of those pillars.

Exhibit H which was tendered by the plaintiff speaks for itself. It is a scientific report on the three pieces of concrete which were chipped off the pillars and forwarded to the address in the United Kingdom to determine their age. These pieces of concrete were allegedly examined by the Research and Development Division of Cement and Concrete Association, a firm registered in England. The concluding part of the report states:

“On the evidence of the clinker fragments it appears that H.S. 2192 (old J.M.S.) was made before 1920; that E.S. 2193 (new J.M.S.) and E.S. 2194 (S.S.) were made about 1940 and possibly after 1950.”

When the plaintiff’s counsel sought to tender exhibit H it was objected to by the defendants’ counsel. The court, however, overruled the objection and accepted it in evidence although the author had not been called as a witness. The circumstances under which the court can accept such a document are fully encompassed by Order 37, rr. 60-65 (1) of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A) and explained in Nkegbe v. Africa Motors [1978] 1 G.L.R. 32.

The surveyor at the previous trial gave his opinion on the age of the pillars to be about 40 years for the J.M.S. pillars and about 30 years for the S.S. pillars. If the court had accepted this opinion of the age of the pillars it would have given the lie to the defendants’ claim that they were all erected even before the death of Sarah Sarbah in 1917. The surveyor, in spite of his pious claim to the contrary, was no expert on the matter and, even if he was such a one, he could not by his mere observation determine the age of concrete pillars cannot doubt that the surveyor’s evidence about the age of the pillars. I have no impress any court and if, as alleged in the amended defence, the plaintiff’s counsel had raised an issue on the age of the pillars before

[p.478] of [1982-83] GLR 464 the Court of Appeal, that was why it failed to impress that court.

Indeed, Sampson Baidoo J. did not certainly place any reliance on the particular evidence that the “J.M.S.” pillars were about 40 years old and the “S.S.” pillars about 30 years old. Rather he seemed to have relied on his evidence that these pillars were very old pillars. Exhibit H exposed the defendants’ claim of old age for the pillars. The probative value of exhibit H was fully weighted by the evidence of the first and second plaintiff witnesses who actually carried the nine pillars to the land and erected them there about fifteen years ago.

Their evidence conclusively demonstrates that those pillars they placed on the land could be no other pillars than the “S.S.” pillars and the new “J.M.S.” pillars which (as indicated in the plan tendered earlier on in court) flank roughly the eastern half of the land originally acquired by the plaintiff’s family. That conduct in Penyinyena in planting those pillars on the land, to use a rather plebeian expression, amounted to swindling.

It was urged on behalf of the defendants that the plaintiff at the former trial had himself admitted in his evidence that Nana Sarbah fixed the pillars around the boundaries of the land in addition to those boundary trees and features already existing around the land. The learned judge who heard the evidence did not comment on this piece of evidence and it is not clear, when read with the plaintiff’s preceding evidence, whether he was referring to the land that was given to Nana Sarbah or to the whole of his family land. I do not think that it will be legitimate to put that gloss to this evidence, as the defendants’ counsel would invite the court to accept, that the plaintiff had admitted that Nana Sarbah fixed the pillars to surround the whole of his family land.

It is truly not enough, when fraud is set up in answer to a judgment, to show that somebody has been guilty of fraud in the conduct of the case; the fraud must have been on the part of one of the parties to the action in which the judgment was obtained. See Flower v. Lloyd (supra) and Abouloff v. Oppenheimer & Co. (1882) 10 Q.B.D. 295 at p. 308. It suffices if it appears that the proceedings themselves were actually concocted and conducted in fraud: see Cammell v. Sewell (1858) 3 H & N 617. Although the evidence discloses that it was Penyinyena who caused the new pillars to be fixed yet it is clear from the evidence of the first defendant at the trial that this man was one of her caretakers on the land. Under the normal principles of agency where an agent commits fraud he fixes liability on his principal.

I am satisfied that the defendants who knew of this fraud perpetrated by Penyinyena concocted and conducted their defence on that fraud. The court was invited to place no weight on the evidence called by the plaintiff to prove that the pillars were only recently

[p.479] of [1982-83] GLR 464 manufactured and erected on the land because the plaintiff had not called on the court at the previous trial to conduct an inquiry to establish the alleged fraud in fixing the pillars.

The method suggested by counsel may well have been quite satisfactory but there was nothing which prevented the defendants at this trial to have also called their own evidence, for instance, to challenge the scientific report offered by the plaintiff. Mere lapse of time will not prevent the court from examining into a question of fraud: see Harrison v. Mayor & Co. of Southampton (1853) 22 L.J. Ch. 722. As noted before, considerations for an application for a new trial on the ground of discovery of new evidence are quite different from those for setting aside a judgment as having been obtained by fraud. In determining the issue before me I am well reminded of the dictum of Morris L.J. in Hornal v. Neuberger Products Ltd. (supra) at pp. 266-267 where he states:

“In English law the citizen is regarded as being a free man of good repute. Issues may be raised in a civil action which affect character and reputation, and these will not be forgotten by judges and juries when considering the probabilities in regard to whatever misconduct is alleged. There will be reluctance to rob any man of good name: there will also be reluctance to make any man pay what is not due or to make any may liable who is not or not liable who is. A court will not be deterred from a conclusion because of regret at its consequences: a court must arrive at such conclusion as is directed by the weight and preponderance of the evidence.”

Although this court is not sitting on appeal over the judgment yet I must remark that but for the pillars surrounding the land the defendants’ evidence as to how the whole land was acquired could not have passed muster. I find the fraud proved against the defendants and I, accordingly set aside the judgment of this court, dated 26 August 1975. The judgment of the Court of Appeal confirming the decision is, in the result, of no effect. I award to the plaintiff ¢700 costs. DECISION Judgment of court obtained by fraud set aside. E. P. -T.

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