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[1980] SLR (HC) 64High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL I)

REPUBLIC vs. GHANA INDUSTRIAL HOLDING CORPORATION; EX PARTE AMARTEY KWEI AND OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 510

13 June 1980 · CECILIA KORANTENG-ADDOW J · ≈ 15 min read

Cite as[1980] SLR (HC) 64
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OSCOLAREPUBLIC v GHANA INDUSTRIAL HOLDING CORPORATION; ex parte AMARTEY KWEI AND OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 510 [1980] SLR (HC) 64
APAREPUBLIC v GHANA INDUSTRIAL HOLDING CORPORATION; ex parte AMARTEY KWEI AND OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 510, [1980] SLR (HC) 64 (Ghana).
BluebookREPUBLIC v GHANA INDUSTRIAL HOLDING CORPORATION; ex parte AMARTEY KWEI AND OTHERS [1982-83] GLR 510, [1980] SLR (HC) 64 (Ghana High Ct. 1980).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Ridge v. Baldwin [1963] 2 All E.R. 66; [1964] A.C. 40; [1963] 2 W.L.R. 935; 127 J.P. 295; 107 S.J. 313; 113 L.J. 716, H.L.

(2) Vine v. National Dock Labour Board [1956] 1 All E.R. 1; [1956] 1 Q.B. 658; [1956] 2 W.L.R. 311;

100 S.J. 73; [1955] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 531, C.A.

(3) Vidyodaya University Council v. Silva [1965] 1 W.L.R. 77; 108 S.J. 896, P.C.

(4) Republic v. Boateng; Ex parte Adu-Gyamfi II [1972] 1 G.L.R. 317, H.C.

(5) Levandowsky v. Attorney-General (No.2) [1971] 1 G.L.R. 49, C.A.

(6) Benneh v. The Republic [1971] 2 G.L.R. 354, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for leave to issue an order of certiorari to quash the directive of the government ordering the dismissal of the applicants from the employment of a statutory corporation and for leave to apply for orders of injunction to restrain the respondents from carrying out the purported acts of dismissal.

COUNSEL

Tsatsu Tsikata for the applicants.

[p.513] of [1982-83] GLR 510

JUDGMENT OF KORANTENG-ADDOW J.

This is an ex parte application for leave to issue an order of certiorari to quash the purported dismissal by the government of all unionised employees of the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation (GIHOC). The applicants are also asking leave to apply for an injunction to restrain the government from assuming the duties of the management of Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation, and lastly, an injunction to restrain GIHOC from taking any steps on the basis of the purported orders of the government.

The first applicant is the chairman of the GIHOC Workers Union Council, the second applicant is the secretary of the same council and the third applicant is the treasurer. They bring this application for themselves and on behalf of all other members of the Workers Trade Unions of all the divisions of the GIHOC. The first respondent is a statutory corporation created by the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation Decree, 1967 (NLCD 207), as amended by the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1970 (Act 354). The grounds of the application are contained in the statement accompanying the application and the facts of the case are stated in the supporting affidavit. From these documents, the facts of the case may be stated as follows: The applicants are all employees of the GIHOC. An announcement was made on the national radio on 6 June 1980, and this announcement was published in the local newspapers, notably 9 June 1980 issue of the Daily Graphic at the front page, purporting to emanate from the government and giving directives that “all employees of the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation belonging to a particular local union who carried out demonstrations last Thursday [5 June 1980], should be dismissed with immediate effect.”

Following the announcement, a meeting was held by the acting managing director of the first respondent-corporation and the executive of the workers council. At that meeting, the acting managing director informed the members that he had been informed by the Minister of Industries that, at a meeting held by the management and the minister, all the unionised staff of the corporation were dismissed. Consequently, the employees were prevented by the police from going to their places of work. The workers have, in fact, been dismissed by being locked out. The lock-out must have been carried out by their employers, the GIHOC; and they have, in fact, been told that the management has dismissed them. The applicants are contending that their lock-out is a breach of their collective agreement. They particularly rely on article 13 (5) which provides, inter alia, that “Before a worker is summarily dismissed, he shall be given the opportunity to defend himself.”

Arguing the motion, Mr. Tsatsu Tsikata submitted that the applicants have been denied natural justice because they were dismissed in

[p.514] of [1982-83] GLR 510

flagrant disregard of article 13 (5). In short, he said the workers were not given the opportunity to defend themselves. He argued further, that by asking the workers to re-apply for employment, the first respondent had acted against the presumption that one is innocent until proved guilty. But the bedrock of the applicants’ case is that the government has usurped the rights and powers of the management of the first respondent-corporation by ordering the dismissal of the workers. According to the applicants, by the terms of its incorporation as contained in NLCD 207, the powers of appointing or employing and dismissing have been reserved for the management, and these rights cannot be waived. Mr. Tsatsu Tsikata submitted therefore that the government directives or decision is unlawful and the applicants should be granted leave to issue a writ or order of certiorari to remove the matter into this court and to quash it.

There is no difficulty about the principles of the prerogative order of certiorari. Those principles are well-settled. They have been repeatedly stated by various text-writers on constitutional and administrative law, and discussed by eminent judges throughout the years. I only wish to refer to Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. II where the nature of the remedy is described and the scope within which the order may issue has also been defined. The order of certiorari is a means of controlling inferior courts and other persons and bodies having the legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects and having the duty to act judicially. As Wade put it in his book, Administrative Law (2nd ed.), p. 116:

“certiorari is used to bring up into the High Court the decision of some inferior tribunal or authority in order that it may be investigated and if the decision does not pass the test it is quashed.”

There must always be a record of the order sought to be quashed. The order should direct that the record of the proceedings of which complaint is made, be removed to the High Court, where, if proved to be defective, it will be quashed. In this instant case what is being sought to be quashed? Is it the newspaper publication or what? The grant of such an application is not a matter of course. The court must be satisfied that it is the appropriate remedy before leave will be granted.

This is why it is required by the rules that a statement should accompany the application setting out, among other things, the relief sought, and the grounds on which it is sought. The body or authority whose decision the order is meant to quash must have been under a duty to act judicially, as it is the jurisdiction or power of such a person or authority which the court must control and keep within their legal bounds. See Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 1, p. 55, para. 114 where the principle is neatly described and the situations in which certiorari will lie are laid down:

[p.515] of [1982-83] GLR 510

“Any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially, is subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the High Court of Justice, exercised by means of these orders. It is not necessary that it should be a court: an administrative body in ascertaining facts or law may be under a duty to act judicially notwithstanding that its proceedings have none of the formalities of, and are not in accordance with the practice of, a court of law. It is enough if it is exercising, after hearing evidence, judicial functions in the sense that it has to decide on evidence between a proposal and an opposition.”

If the government gave directives for the workers to be dismissed, these directives could not have been addressed to any authority but the management of the GIHOC. In the first place, it is my view that, the government in giving those directives was not required to act judicially. That would be an executive action and in such a case the influence of judicial considerations would not come in. It is apparent that the government took a particular view of the matter and they issued directives passing it on to the management of the GIHOC. The court has not been shown these directives. The applicants themselves have not seen them. That is why they rely on a newspaper publication of them. The publication in the newspaper distinctly states that the government had “directed” and not “decided.” When this is read together with paragraph 10 of the affidavit in support of the motion, it may only be inferred that those directives were given to the GIHOC and they acted accordingly. Paragraph 10 of the affidavit reads:

“10. At a meeting between the deputy managing director, now acting as managing director, of the first defendant-corporation and the executives of the workers council of the first defendant-corporation, the deputy managing director informed us that they had been informed by the Minister of Industries at a meeting that management had held with the said minister that all unionised staff of the first defendant-corporation, had been dismissed, and that those who wished to re-apply should do so and that written directives to the first defendant-corporation were to follow.”

If the government had purported to exercise the power of dismissal, it would have dismissed the workers directly, it would not have given mere directives to the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation. The part played by the government in this matter, in my judgment, would not be tantamount to a decision which may form the subject-matter of investigation and be quashable. The management could have ignored those directives, but the fact that the management acted, or felt obliged to act according to the wishes of the government does not [p.516] of [1982-83] GLR 510

make the dismissal an act of the government. I think it is an exercise in sophistry to say that the GIHOC did not dismiss the workers. The workers have de facto been sacked by the GIHOC, and GIHOC had the power to do that. The directives by the government to the GIHOC did not take away the power to make dismissals.

What this whole matter boils down to is one of the relationship between master and servant. And the relationship (between the GIHOC and the workers) is contractual. It is regulated by a collective agreement, a copy of which was annexed to the motion. If the workers are complaining, as they are, of their dismissal, and if, as asserted in their affidavit in support, it is the GIHOC which employs and dismisses them, then what is material for the purposes of this application is not what the government has done or had not done. Since the actual lock-out was carried out by the GIHOC, the workers’ immediate remedy must surely be sought from the GIHOC. Assuming that what the GIHOC did is a breach of contract, the remedy for breach of contract is well-known. It is either a claim in damages or in appropriate cases, for specific performance. In Ridge v. Baldwin [1963] 2 All E.R. 66 at p. 71 Lord Reid stated the principle in the following words:

“The law regarding master and servant is not in doubt. There cannot be specific performance of a contract of service and the master can terminate the contract with his servant at any time and for any reason or for none.

But if he does so in a manner not warranted by the contract he must pay damages for breach of contract. So the question in a pure case of master and servant does not at all depend on whether the master has heard the servant in his own defence: it depends on whether the facts emerging at the trial prove breach of contract.”

See also Vine v. National Dock Labour Board [1956] 1 All E.R. 1 at p. 8, C.A. where in his dissenting judgment, which was approved later by the House of Lords, Jenkins L.J. said of the principle:

“In the ordinary case of master and servant, however, the repudiation or the wrongful dismissal puts an end to the contract, and a claim for damages arises. It is necessarily a claim for damages and nothing more. The nature of the bargain is such that it can be nothing more.”

I am not aware of any case in which the remedy of certiorari has applied in a case of breach of contract.

The substratum of the application is that there is a denial of natural justice, because the workers were not heard in accordance with the provisions of the collective agreement. Prerogative remedies cannot be used for the enforcement of a contract of employment: see

[p.517] of [1982-83] GLR 510

Wade, Administrative Law (2nd ed.) p. 126 where the point is discussed. Even though it is a fundamental rule of natural justice that a man has a right to be heard, i.e. audi alteram partem, this rule of natural justice does not apply to the ordinary relationship of master and servant. The facts of the case of Ridge v. Baldwin [1964] A.C. 40, on which counsel relied do not apply. But the principle stated in it applies. To my mind, the relevant case would be Vidyodaya University Council v. Silva [1965] 1 W.L.R. 77. The circumstances in both cases were similar, yet natural justice was applied in one and it was held not to apply in the others. In the Baldwin case, usually referred to as the Brighton case, the dismissal of the chief police constable was contrary to express provisions of statutory regulations governing the police force and not only a breach of the principles of natural justice. In the Vidyodaya case, the Privy Council refused certiorari to a university lecturer who had been dismissed without a hearing, from his post in Ceylon. In his judgment at p. 79, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest made this statement of the law:

“The law is well settled that if, where there is an ordinary contractual relationship of master and servant, the master terminates the contract the servant cannot obtain an order of certiorari. If the master rightfully ends the contract there can be no complaint: if the master wrongfully ends the contract then the servant can pursue a claim for damages.”

Perhaps the plea of denial of natural justice would have availed the applicants if their positions were regulated by statute rather than contracts. But it is quite improper to grant the remedy of certiorari in a case like this. An order of certiorari is a discretionary remedy, therefore if the grounds do not justify the application, the application should be refused. This application is not likely to succeed so I refuse to grant leave. The applicants have liberty to bring an appropriate action for the vindication of their rights.

With regard to the application for injunction, I shall deal with the claim against the first respondent, i.e. the third relief in the statement, first. The relief as contained in the statement reads:

“(c) an injunction directed against the first defendant-corporation restraining them from taking any steps on the basis of the purported orders.”

This relief will mean in effect enforcing a contract of service. But a contract of employment is one of service and not servitude. The parties are not perpetually bound to carry through the obligations under the terms of the contract. It is well established that a contract for personal services is not specifically enforceable at the suit of either party. The relationship may be severed in appropriate circumstances.

[p.518] of [1982-83] GLR 510

But more importantly, the procedure by which the applicants are seeking the injunction is wrong. A relief for injunction which is a private civil remedy, cannot be sought together with an order for certiorari. Prerogative remedies have their own peculiar process, so they cannot be joined to any other form of action. Wade puts the matter succinctly in his Administrative Law (2nd ed.) at pp. 127-128 thus:

“But the prerogative remedies can be sought only by their own peculiar process . . . They cannot, therefore, be married to any other form of action. Declarations, injunctions and other private law remedies, on the other hand, have no special procedure of their own. Any or all of them may be sought in an ordinary action, and there are no restrictions on interlocutory process, cross-examination and so forth.”

This relief is an ordinary equitable remedy of injunction; in my view therefore the application is not likely to succeed. With regard to it, in any case, no leave is required.

In respect of relief (b) when I pointed out to counsel that being a private law remedy it cannot lie with this application, counsel replied that the remedy sought is in the nature of quo warranto, which procedure is the same as one for mandamus. I concede that leave is required for such an application. A writ of quo warranto, used to be a writ demanding that a person produced a warrant proving that he has been legally authorised to hold public office or to practice certain privileges.

This writ is now obsolete; but on the same principles, an injunction may now be granted to restrain such a person from so acting. An application for such remedy may be tacked on to application for certiorari: see Republic v. Boateng; Ex parte Adu-Gyamfi II [1972] 1 G.L.R. 317. But the big question is whether it lies against the government or the Attorney-General. The directives which the applicants complain about is purported to have been issued by the government. By the second relief, the applicants are seeking to restrain “the government from purporting to assume the duties of the management of the first respondent-corporation and hence dismissing the unionised workers of the first respondent-corporation.” Mr. Tsatsu Tsikata contended that the State Proceedings Act, 1961 (Act 51) cannot apply to shield the government if it acted ultra vires. It is my view that the doctrine of ultra vires has no application here because there is no statutory power which the government has exceeded. It is a case in which section 13 of Act 51 applies. The proviso to section 13 (1) reads:

“Provided that— [p.519] of [1982-83] GLR 510

(a) where in any proceedings against the Republic any such relief is sought as might in proceedings between private persons be granted by way of injunction or specific performance, the court shall not grant an injunction or make an order for specific performance, . . .”

Section 13 (2) reads:

“(2) The court shall not in any civil proceedings grant any injunction or make any order against a servant of the Republic if the effect of granting the injunction or making the order would be to grant relief against the Republic which could not have been obtained in proceedings against the Republic.”

Even though Mr. Tsatsu Tsikata contended that the Attorney-General should find the appropriate authority or minister who gave the directives and saddle him with responsibility, it is quite clear from the application, the accompanying statement and the affidavit in support that it was the government against which the applicants complain. The Attorney-General therefore represents the government in this application. The Government of Ghana represents the Republic of Ghana, so for all practical purposes, the Government of Ghana is synonymous with the Republic of Ghana. The injunction therefore is directed against the Republic. Therefore to grant an injunction against the Government of Ghana will have the effect of granting that relief against the Republic. It will be futile to grant such a relief, which the court cannot enforce. The general rule as invoked in Levandowsky v. Attorney-General (No.2) [1971] 1 G.L.R. 49, C.A. and reiterated in Benneh v. The Republic [1971] 2 G.L.R. 354, C.A. is that a court cannot stultify itself by entertaining an action in which the relief claimed cannot be enforced. It will be futile to grant leave to apply for such remedy. The application should be dismissed, and I do so order accordingly.

DECISION

Application dismissed.

J. K. E. E.

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