REPUBLIC vs. REGISTRAR HIGH COURT, SEKONDI; EX PARTE ESSEL [1982-83] GLR 333
19 August 1980 · ANDOH J · ≈ 7 min read
[1980] SLR (HC) 66Other citation styles and permanent link
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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
AN APPLICATION for an order of mandamus directed at the deputy sheriff to enforce an order of ejectment given by a rent officer and the High Court. And a second application for an order of prohibition to stay execution of the ejectment order. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment.
COUNSEL
K. A. Erskine for the applicant in first application.
J. Mercer for the applicants in second application.
G. Owuo for the first respondents.
JUDGMENT OF ANDOH J.
There are two applications before this court. The first one filed by Mr. K. Atta Erskine, counsel for and on behalf of the applicant, Paul Storm Acheampong of Takoradi, is for an order of mandamus directed to the deputy sheriff, District Court Grade I, Takoradi to eject Andrew Essel, Effuah Mbah and Kojo Esson all of house No. 59/4, Agyeman Road, Takoradi or for an order of contempt of court or both of the said last three persons from continuing to live in the said premises despite an order of Ansah-Twum J. ordering their ejectment from the said premises to enable the said house to be repaired, reconstructed and renovated.
The second application is brought by Mr. James Mercer, counsel for and on behalf of Andrew Essel, Affua Mbah and Kojo Esson all of the said house praying this court, for an order of prohibition restraining the registrar, High Court, Sekondi, the deputy sheriff, District Court Grade I, Takoradi and Paul Acheampong, the applicant in the first application, from executing, enforcing or in any way carrying into effect the judgment or order of the High Court, Sekondi dated 11 May 1979, or of the rent officer of 10 May 1976 on the ground of their being void for want of jurisdiction and for such further order or orders as this court may deem fit.
The facts were these: Paul Storm Acheampong, the applicant in the first application, is the customary successor of the late Kofi Mensah. Kofi Mensah himself was the successor of the late Kofi Essel who was the owner, by self-acquisition, of house No. 59/4, Agyeman Road, Takoradi. Andrew Essel, Effuah Mbah and Kojo Esson all of house No. 59/4, Agyeman Road, Takoradi, are the children of the late
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Kofi Essel, the owner of the said house. As children of the late Kofi Essel, they lived in the said house without paying rent. When the late Kofi Mensah succeeded to their father’s estate, the position did not change.
The three children continued to live in their late father’s house. It seems there were other tenants in the house who were paying rent. When Paul Storm Acheampong became the customary successor of the late Kofi Mensah, he applied for and was granted letters of administration in respect of this house. The house appeared to have been in need of repairs. He notified all in occupation of the premises to leave to enable the necessary repairs and renovations to be done.
The tenants refused to quit and the relatives in occupation also refused to quit. A complaint was made to the rent officer who after inquiries ordered the tenants perhaps including Andrew Essel, Effuah Mbah and Kojo Esson to quit from the premises. But these mentioned persons were no tenants and therefore probably not amenable to the jurisdiction of the rent officer. The tenants including the relatives appealed to the rent magistrate.
The rent magistrate set aside the order of the rent officer thereby restoring the tenants and the children in occupation of the premises. It seems to me that during the second hearing before the rent magistrate, Essel, Mbah and Esson identified themselves with the tenants and gave them or one of them the mandate to represent them and prosecute the appeal which was successful. Paul Storm Acheampong appealed to the High Court, Sekondi, and by a judgment of Ansah-Twum J. dated 11 May 1979, the appeal was allowed. The children of the late Kofi Essel applied to the High Court for a stay of execution before Ansah-Twum J.
The application was dismissed. One of the tenants applied to the Court of Appeal for a stay of execution but this application like the former one suffered a similar fate. Meanwhile, the children of the late Kojo Essel instituted an action not against Acheampong but someone else who upon failure to enter appearance had default judgment entered against him to the effect that the three children were entitled subject to good behaviour to live in the said house. That action had been brought before Andoh J. It was after the dismissal of the motion for stay of execution, that Acheampong, the victorious party, applied for an order for ejectment. The stay of execution having been refused by Ansah-Twum J., the deputy sheriff was met with the order of the High Court constituted by Andoh J. that the children were entitled to live in the premises subject to good behaviour. The deputy sheriff could not execute the order of Ansah-Twum J.
The judgment of Andoh J. has now been vacated. So therefore if the application for an order of prohibition is refused, the deputy sheriff cannot lawfully refuse to execute the order of mandamus and it
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seems the children may be found liable for contempt of court, they having been ordered to quit. But Mr. James Mercer argues on their behalf that since the relatives, namely Essel, Mbah and Esson are not tenants, the rent officer and the High Court had no jurisdiction to make an order of ejectment against them. During the application for stay of execution pending appeal before Ansah-Twum J., if an appeal was contemplated at all, this point was vigorously pressed by counsel for the children.
The learned judge held that the children were estopped from canvassing that they were relatives having identified themselves as tenants and made one of the tenants a spokesman. A similar application for stay of execution to the Court of Appeal by a tenant was dismissed with costs. It seems true to say that perhaps since on the admission of Paul Storm Acheampong, Essel, Esson and Mbah were relatives not paying rent, the rent officer had no jurisdiction over them.
In fact they could not confer jurisdiction on him either and it seems, the question of jurisdiction could not be said to have been waived by them. And even so, a question of jurisdiction can be raised even on a second appeal but the question is whether by this procedure of prohibition to stop the enforcement of the order of the High Court, constituted by Ansah-Twum J. this court of concurrent jurisdiction may appropriately question that order of the High Court judge or declare it as being void for want of jurisdiction.
When this same point was raised before Ansah-Twum J. on 14 June 1979 when the tenants including the children were praying for a stay of execution, the learned judge dealt with the point as follows:
“I also agree that the so-called relatives have accepted throughout the trial of this matter up to the point of appeal before this court their position as being equal with all the tenants and did even agree and chose one of the tenants as the spokesman of all the tenants including the so-called relatives. It seems to me therefore that they cannot now complain since they are now in my view, clearly estopped from claiming that they were not liable to vacate the premises because they are relatives.
I do not think that even if you are a relative and you are unreasonably refusing to allow the owner of the premises to repair same by giving him vacant possession, the court should say that because you are not a tenant properly so-called but a relative, the owner of the premises being the landlord cannot bring an application under the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220) to eject you. I do not think that that is the correct position of the law.”
So the point that Essel, Mbah and Esson as relatives are not liable to be ejected was raised before Ansah-Twum J. and he considered it and refused to countenance the submission. In my view, that point can
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be raised once more on appeal but cannot be raised by this procedure. I think it is not open to me as a court of concurrent jurisdiction even if I may be attracted by the submission, to subvert it by these proceedings.
The point could still be raised on appeal. The Court of Appeal has already refused a stay of execution on application by one of the tenants and to grant an order of prohibition would amount to either reviewing the order of Ansah-Twum J. or disregarding the order of the Court of Appeal. I hold therefore that unless an application for stay of execution is made by the three children to the Court of Appeal, this court cannot prohibit the respondent in the first application from enforcing or otherwise executing the lawful order or judgment of Ansah-Twum J.
I would in the premises therefore order the deputy sheriff of the district court to proceed and carry out or execute the order of ejectment. But it should be noted that the children like the tenants ought by law to be reinstated on completion of the works. A visit to the premises revealed a deplorable state of condition and that must be rectified.
I make no order as to costs.
DECISION Application for execution of ejectment order granted.
Application for prohibition refused.
K. B.
