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[1981] SLR (CA) 13Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1981

TOBAH AND ANOTHER vs. KWEKUMAH AND OTHERS [1981] GLR 648

14 April 1981 · JIAGGE JA · ≈ 7 min read

Cite as[1981] SLR (CA) 13
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OSCOLATOBAH AND ANOTHER v KWEKUMAH AND OTHERS [1981] GLR 648 [1981] SLR (CA) 13
APATOBAH AND ANOTHER v KWEKUMAH AND OTHERS [1981] GLR 648, [1981] SLR (CA) 13 (Ghana).
BluebookTOBAH AND ANOTHER v KWEKUMAH AND OTHERS [1981] GLR 648, [1981] SLR (CA) 13 (Ghana Ct. App. 1981).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Republic v. Asokore Traditional Council; Ex parte Tiwaa [1976] 2 G.L.R. 231, C.A.

(2) Republic v. Western Nzima Traditional Council; Ex parte Nana Kpani Ackah III [1973] 2 G.L.R.

107.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL by the defendants from the ruling of the High Court that it had jurisdiction to determine a chieftaincy dispute. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment of Jiagge J.A.

COUNSEL

Gwira for the appellants.

No appearance by or for the respondents.

JUDGMENT OF JIAGGE J.A.

The plaintiffs’ claim in the High Court was for:

“(a) a declaration that the defendants herein have no right to nominate or appoint or confirm or instal or outdoor any candidate as the Chief of the Agona Division without the consent of the plaintiffs who represent the majority and the lawful kingmakers; and (b) interim injunction restraining the defendants, their agents, privies, etc. from confirming or outdooring any person pending the determination of this suit.”

The defendants were served with the writ of summons on 22 December 1978 but they neither entered appearance nor filed a defence. The plaintiffs on 9 March 1979 filed an ex parte action for interlocutory judgment against the defendants. The action [p.650] of [1981] GLR 648 was granted and on 10 April 1979 final judgment was signed in the following terms:

“Motion is granted as prayed. Judgment is hereby entered in favour of the plaintiffs herein as against the defendants. It is further declared that the defendants herein have no right to nominate or appoint or confine or instal or outdoor any candidate as the chief of Agona Division without the consent of the plaintiffs who represent the majority and the lawful kingmakers of the area.”

On 17 April 1979, the defendants filed a motion on notice to set aside the judgment in default of appearance. The affidavit in support of the motion, inter alia, stated:

“That it is our contention that the matter now before the court is a chieftaincy cause or matter and that this court is not the proper forum to determine it. That in fact, this same matter is pending before the judicial committee of the Ahanta Traditional Council, Busua, since 27 December 1978.”

It would appear from the defendants’ affidavit in the court below, that the plaintiffs had filed a similar action seeking the same redress before the judicial committee of the Ahanta Traditional Council barely five days after the writ of summons filed in the High Court had been served on the defendants. The learned judge of the High Court ruled that he had jurisdiction to entertain a chieftaincy cause or matter and dismissed the motion to set aside the judgment. This appeal by the defendants is against the ruling of the High Court and the main ground of appeal before this court was whether or not the judge of the High Court had jurisdiction “to hear and determine any cause or matter affecting chieftaincy.”

We were satisfied that the High Court had no such jurisdiction. We allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the court below. We now give the reasons for our decision. Section 15 (1) of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), clothed a traditional council with “. . . exlusive jurisdiction to hear and determine any cause or matter affecting chieftaincy which arises within its area . . .” The exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by this section was regulated by the Chieftaincy (Proceedings and Functions) (Traditional Councils) Regulations, 1972 (LI 798), reg. 2 which provides, “The jurisdiction conferred on each Traditional council by section 15 of the Chieftaincy Act and these regulations shall be exercised by a judicial committee.”

The combined effect of section 15 (1) of Act 370 and LI 798, reg.2 is that the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the traditional

[p.651] of [1981] GLR 648 council to hear and determine any cause or matter affecting chieftaincy which arises within its area “shall be exercised by a Judicial Committee.”

Apaloo C.J. in Republic v. Asokore Traditional Council; Ex parte Tiwaa [1976] 2 G.L.R. 231 at p. 244, C.A. observed, “The actual body clothed by law to determine a chieftaincy dispute is the judicial committee of the council not the council as such.”

The next point to consider is whether the plaintiffs’ claim in the court below constitutes “ a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy.” The learned trial judge held and rightly so, that it did. The Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), s. 113(1) (c) provides:

“113. (1) In this Act unless the contrary intention appears -’cause or matter affecting chieftaincy’ means any cause, matter, question or dispute relating to any of the following:

(c) the right of any person to take part in the nomination, election, appointment or installation of any person as a Chief or in the destoolment of any Chief.”

The subject-matter of the plaintiffs’ claim in the court below falls within section 113 of Act 372. The law provides that the judicial committee of the traditional council has exclusive jurisdiction to deal with the matter. There was evidence before the court that a similar claim for the same redress was pending before the judicial committee of the Ahanta Traditional Council which according to the law had exclusive jurisdiction to deal with the matter.

The learned trial judge, however, had difficulties in deciding which court had jurisdiction in the matter. He held that section 52 of Act 372 was in conflict with the provisions of section 14(1) of the same Act and felt called upon to resolve the conflict. Section 52 provides:

“52. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act or any other enactment the Court of Appeal, the High Court, a Circuit and a District Court shall not have jurisdiction to entertain either at first instance or on appeal any cause or matter affecting chieftaincy.”

Whilst section 14(1) (a) provides, “Subject to the provisions of the Constitution and any other enactment the High Court of Justice shall have – (a) an original jurisdiction in all matters.”

The learned trial judge held that there was a conflict in the two sections because whereas section 14(1) (a) gave the High Court jurisdiction in all matters, section 52 limited such jurisdiction by excluding “any cause or matter affecting chieftaincy.”

[p.652] of [1981] GLR 648

The learned trial judge misled himself by ignoring the first part of section 14(1) (a) which made the original jurisdiction of the High Court “Subject to the provisions of the Constitution and any other enactment.” Section 14(1) (a) qualified the original jurisdiction of the High Court in all matters. The “all matters” referred to in section 14(1) (a) is “Subject to the provisions of the Constitution and any other enactment” such as section 52 of Act 372 and section 15 of Act 370. In other words, section 14(1) (a) of Act 372 provides the foundation in the use of the words “subject to” for the limitation placed on “all matters” and permits no conflict whatever. Section 14(1)(a) also had article 114 of the Constitution, 1969, in contemplation. The article provides:

“114. The High Court of Justice shall have supervisory jurisdiction over all inferior and traditional Courts in Ghana and any adjudicating authority and in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction shall have power to issue such directions, orders or writs including writs or orders in the nature of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and quo warranto as it may consider appropriate for the purposes of enforcing or securing the enforcement of its supervisory powers.”

And section 20 of Act 372 on the supervisory powers of the High Court provides in similar terms:

“20. The High Court of Justice shall have supervisory jurisdiction over all inferior Courts in Ghana and any adjudicating authority other than a military Court or tribunal and in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction shall have power to issue such directions, orders or writs including writs or orders in the nature of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and quo warranto as it may consider appropriate for the purposes of enforcing or securing the enforcement of its supervisory powers.”

These supervisory powers of the High Court exercised by way of the common law prerogative writs are clearly distinguishable from the ban on the jurisdiction of the High Court in “causes or matters affecting chieftaincy.” The action before the court was not a prerogative writ seeking to correct some mischief in an inferior court or tribunal. The claim before the High Court was one in which the law provided that the traditional court should have exclusive jurisdiction and the High Court has no concurrent jurisdiction to deal with the matter. A judgment delivered in a matter in which the court has no jurisdiction is void ab initio and must be set aside.

[p.653] of [1981] GLR 648 The appeal is allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside. There will be costs for the defendants fixed at ¢300 with costs of ¢200 at the court below.

And costs paid in the court below are to be refunded.

JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS J.A.

I agree.

JUDGMENT OF EDUSEI J.A.

I have no doubt whatsoever in my mind that this appeal should succeed. The determination of chieftaincy disputes is exclusively reserved to traditional tribunals: the judicial committees of the traditional councils, of regional houses of chiefs and of the National House of Chiefs. The jurisdiction of the High Court in such matters is ousted except when it is dealing with prerogative writs connected therewith: see for example, Republic v. Western Nzima Traditional Council; Ex parte Nana Kpani Ackah III [1973] 2 G.L.R. 107.

I share the views expressed, and the reasons for allowing the appeal, as set out in the main judgment of the President, and I have nothing more to add.

DECISION Appeal allowed.

D. R. K. S.

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