IN RE YENDI SKIN AFFAIRS; ANDANI vs. ABUDULAI [1981] GLR 866
15 June 1981 · JIAGGE JA · ≈ 34 min read
[1981] SLR (CA) 7Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Yendi Skin Affairs, In re; Andani v. Abudulai [1981] G.L.R. 283, C.A.
(2) Fidelitas Shipping Co., Ltd. v. V/O Exportchleb [1966] 1 Q.B. 630; [1965] 2 W.L.R. 1059; [1965] 2 All E.R. 4; 109 S.J. 191; [1965] Lloyd’s Rep. 223, C.A.
(3) Robertson v. Reindorf [1971] 2 G.L.R. 289, C.A.
(4) Henderson v. Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100; [1843-60] All E.R. Rep. 378; 1 L.T. (O.S.) 410; 67 E.R. 313, (5) Bilson v. Apaloo [1981] G.L.R 24, S.C.
(6) Hilton, Re; Ex parte March (1892) 9 Morr. 286; 67 L.T. 594.
(7) Mackenzie-Kennedy v. Air Council [1927] 2 K.B. 517, C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION for an order to set aside the summons for directions made by the Court of Appeal on 9 December 1980. The facts are fully stated in the rulings of Jiagge and Edward Wiredu JJ.A.
COUNSEL
Kwame Tetteh for the applicant.
Appiah for the respondent.
JUDGEMENT OF JIAGGE J.A.
This is a motion on notice praying this court for an order to set aside the summons for directions made by this court on 9 December 1980. In his affidavit in support of the motion, the applicant deposed to the following facts: That some time in August 1979, he was served with notice of appeal and summons for directions, and that the applicant in that earlier proceedings was the respondent herein; that the motion was heard ex parte on 8 December 1980 and that he was not represented because his counsel was ill. The applicant deposed further that the court, in the application for summons for directions, also granted the respondent liberty to apply to have the summons for directions set aside; that the court erroneously assumed jurisdiction in the earlier proceedings and entertained an application for summons for directions under the Yendi Skin Affairs (Appeal) Decree, 1979 (S.M.C.D. 238); that he on 14 January 1981 applied to this court to have the ruling granting summons for directions set aside on the ground that S.M.C.D. 238 had been repealed by the Yendi Skin Affairs (Appeal)
[p.870] of [1981] GLR 866
(Repeal) Decree, 1979 (A.F. R.C.D. 32); that this court dismissed his application on 16 April 1981 on the ground that A.F.R.C.D. 32 was published after the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council had handed over power and that A.F.R.C.D. 32 was of no legal effect: see Yendi Skin Affairs, In re; Andani v. Abudulai [1981] G.L.R. 283, C.A.
The applicant in his affidavit stated further that, S.M.C.D. 238 never existed in law and that although the notice appeared in Gazette No. 44 for 25 May 1979, the paper was in fact printed after 4 June 1979, and that he obtained his information from a search conducted at the Assembly Press.
At the hearing of the motion before this court, the respondent raised a preliminary objection that the application before the court was incompetent because a similar application to set aside the order made on 9 December 1980 for summons for directions to issue had been dismissed by this court on 16 April 1981 and that in dismissing the application this court held that A.F.R.C.D. 32 was published in October 1979. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council handed over power on 24 September 1979; A.F.R.C.D. 32 was therefore of no effect; that the matter before the court had been adjudicated upon and that a decision had already been taken by this court. Counsel for the applicant in reply stated that his client accepted the court’s ruling in the application to set aside the order made by this court on 16 April 1981 for summons for directions to issue, but that the present application raised the serious issue of jurisdiction and that the validity of S.M.C.D. 238 was being questioned. Counsel urged that the issue of the validity of A.F.R.C.D. 32 on which the court adjudicated in the previous proceedings was in no way dependent on the validity of S.M.C.D. 238, and that the two applications therefore were different.
Counsel urged that there were three special circumstances why the application to set aside the summons for directions must be heard again. These are:
1. That the present application goes to the root of the statute which purports to give this court jurisdiction.
2. The determination of the issue in either A.F.R.C.D. 32 or S.M.C.D. 238 will not depend on each other. That the validity of S.M.C.D. 238 is a different matter.
3. The dilatoriness or otherwise of the present application should go only to costs.
After counsel’s submissions in reply to the preliminary objection, the court invited counsel for the applicant to argue the motion on merit. Counsel intimated that he wanted to adduce fresh evidence
[p.871] of [1981] GLR 866 before arguing the motion on merit. His attention was drawn to the fact that there was no application before the court to adduce fresh evidence. Counsel then submitted that he would rest his case and abide by the ruling on the preliminary objection.
The arguments of counsel on either side centred round three Decrees: the Yendi Skin Affairs Decree, 1974 (N.R.C.D. 299), S.M.C.D. 238 and A.F.R.C.D. 32. The Yendi Skin Affairs Decree, 1974, is not a Decree of general application but affects two individuals in particular. The Decree (a) declares the nomination, selection and enskinment of Mahamadu Abudulai as Ya-Na and Paramount Chief of Dagbon, null and void; (b) prohibits the said Mahamadu Abudulai from purporting to be Ya-Na, or in any manner asserting any claim as Ya-Na or Paramount Chief of Dagbon or doing any act tending to incite disaffection against Ya-Na Yakubu II, Paramount Chief of Dagbon; and (c) creates an offence punishable by ten years’ imprisonment without an option of a fine if the said Mahamadu Abudulai contravenes any provision under (b) above. The Decree further creates an offence punishable on summary conviction by a fine not exceeding ¢1,000 or imprisonment for two years or both if any person recognises, or in any way supports, encourages or canvasses any claim that Mahamadu Abudulai is Ya-Na or Paramount Chief of Dagbon. Any person doing any act tending to incite disaffection against Ya-Na Yakubu II, Paramount Chief of Dagbon shall be liable to the same punishment. The Decree also provides that it shall apply notwithstanding any enactment, customary law or any other law to the contrary.
The Yendi Skin Affairs (Appeal) Decree, 1979 (S.M.C.D. 238), provides:
“238. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any enactment, any person affected by the provisions of the Yendi Skin Affairs Decree, 1974 (N.R.C.D. 299) who is aggrieved by the findings of the Committee of Inquiry into certain matters relating to the Yendi Skin Affairs, which findings were given effect to by the said Decree, may appeal to the Court of Appeal against such findings.”
The Decree provides further that N.R.C.D. 299 shall remain in force until the appeal is determined in favour of the persons aggrieved. S.M.C.D. 238 according to the Gazette was made on 16 May 1979 and published on 25 May 1979. A.F.R.C.D. 32 repeals S.M.C.D. 238 and enacts: “Any cause of action accruing under the said Decree hereby abates.” According to the Gazette A.F.R.C.D. 32 was made on 8 September 1979 and published on 21 September 1979.
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Mahamadu Abudulai, the aggrieved person under N.R.C.D. 299, filed notice of appeal and summons for directions on 9 August 1979 under S.M.C.D. 238 and the Court of Appeal Rules, 1962 (L.I. 218), r. 38.
On 9 December 1980 the application was granted by this court in the terms sought and directions were given that the notice of appeal which had already been served on Ya-Na Yakubu Andani be deemed a proper notice. The court further granted liberty to the said Yakubu Andani, Ya-Na, for good cause to have any of the directions varied, rescinded or otherwise set aside and or to obtain additional directions as the court may think fit.
On 14 January 1981, the applicant herein by way of motion on notice sought an order of this court to set aside the directions made on 9 December 1980 on the ground that in view of A.F.R.C.D. 32 the respondent’s appeal and the subsequent ruling of this court on directions were null and void. Evidence was led before the court to show that A.F.R.C.D. 32 was printed in October 1979 although the Gazette notification shows that it was published on 21 September 1979. Section 3 (7) of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1979 provides: “A decree made by the Revolutionary Council shall, unless otherwise provided in that decree, come into force on the date of the publication of that decree in the Gazette.” According to the Gazette, A.F.R.C.D. 32 was published on 21 September 1979 and therefore came into force that day. But the evidence before the court was that that particular Gazette No. 44 was printed in October 1979.
Faced with the facts, this court in the earlier ruling delivered on 16 April 1981 per Edusei J.A. held:
“A Gazette must be printed before it can be published. A Decree must also be printed before it can be published in a Gazette. The reverse is an obvious impossibility. The evidence makes it abundantly clear that both A.F.R.C.D. 32 and Gazette No. 44 were printed in October 1979 and it follows as a matter of course and commonsense that A.F.R.C.D. 32 was published at the earliest opportunity in October 1979, when Gazette No. 44 was also printed and published.”
Section 18 (2) of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979 states, “Upon the coming into force of this Constitution the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1979 shall cease to have effect.” The Constitution, 1979 came into force on 24 September 1979. On that day the empowering instrument of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council ceased to exist and therefore any Decree purporting to have been made by
[p.873] of [1981] GLR 866 the A.F.R.C. and published after 24 September 1979 has no legal effect whatever.
This court in the said earlier ruling held per Edusei J.A.:
“In plain language A.F.R.C.D. 32 does not in the eyes of the law exist, and its contents can only be described as brutum fulmen. Consequently what it sought to do—the repeal of the Yendi Skin Affairs (Appeal) Decree, 1979 (S.M.C.D. 238), is now a wild-goose chase, and S.M.C.D. 238 is in full force and of legal validity.
As a result, the application of Ya-Na Yakubu Andani, the applicant herein, fails and it is dismissed and the appeal of Mahamadu Abudulai, the respondent herein, is still pending in this court.”
Article 198 (2) of the Constitution, 1979, provides that an appeal shall lie as of right to the Court of Appeal from any person aggrieved by the adverse findings made against him by a commission of inquiry. With the coming into force of the Constitution, 1979, even if N.R.C.D. 299 were not repealed by A.F.R.C.D. 32, it would have been repugnant to the Constitution, 1979, as it seeks to deprive an aggrieved person of his constitutional right of appeal and this would necessitate the striking down of the offensive Decree, N.R.C.D. 299.
However, the application before this court prays for an order setting aside the directions made by this court on 9 December 1980. This court has already adjudicated on this matter and delivered its ruling on 16 April 1981. But counsel argued that the court’s decision in the earlier proceedings was on the validity or otherwise of A.F.R.C.D. 32 that his application dealt with the validity or otherwise of S.M.C.D. 238 and that the two issues were different and must be considered separately.
This court in the earlier proceedings was called upon to make an order setting aside directions made by the court and granting leave to the then applicant, Mahamadu Abudulai, to appeal against the findings of the Yendi Skin Affairs Committee of Inquiry. In resolving the issues raised in the cause, the court considered the effect of N.R.C.D. 299, S.M.C.D. 238 and A.F.R.C.D. 32 on the application made.
The respondent in the earlier proceedings used S.M.C.D. 238 as the bedrock of his defence against the application to set aside the courts directions and his success was based on the right of appeal created under S.M.C.D. 238. If there were reasons why S.M.C.D. 238 should not have been considered by the court in the earlier proceedings, the applicant herein had ample opportunity
[p.874] of [1981] GLR 866 to state his case in full, as S.M.C.D. 238 was put in issue; and the decision of the court was based on its validity. All the facts referred to by the applicant in his affidavit in support of his motion were available at the time of the hearing in the earlier proceedings. An estoppel per rem judicatam will operate against a party bringing a second action against the same party for the same cause. Lord Denning M.R. in Fidelitas Shipping Co. Ltd. v. V/O Exportchleb [1965] 2 All E.R. 4 at pp. 8-9, C.A. clearly put the matter as follows:
“The law, as I understand it, is this: if one party brings an action against another for a particular cause and judgment is given on it, there is a strict rule of law that he cannot bring another action against the same party for the same cause . . . But within one cause of action, there may be several issues raised which are necessary for the determination of the whole case. The rule then is that, once an issue has been raised and distinctly determined between the parties, then, as a general rule, neither party can be allowed to fight that issue all over again. The same issue cannot be raised by either of them again in the same or subsequent proceedings except in special circumstances.”
See also Robertson v. Reindorf [1971] 2 G.L.R. 289, C.A. In the previous proceedings S.M.C.D. 238 was put in issue and the defence of the respondent was based on it. The court adjudicated on the matter upon the facts placed before it. If there were other relevant facts, the applicant had the opportunity to present his case in full for the consideration of the court. The parties to litigation are required by the court to bring forward their whole case. The court will not permit the same parties or their privies to open the same subject-matter of litigation in respect of a cause already adjudicated upon by a court of competent jurisdiction except in certain special circumstances. If the parties through negligence, inadvertence or even accident omitted part of their case and the cause was adjudicated upon and disposed of by a court of competent jurisdiction, estoppel per rem judicatam will operate against the parties and their privies, not only in relation to matters actually dealt with in the judgment, but also those which ought to have been brought up then but were not. Thus in Henderson v. Henderson [1843-60] All E.R. Rep. 378 at pp. 381-382 Wigram, V.-C. states the principle:
“The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment,
[p.875] of [1981] GLR 866 but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time.”
See also Foli v. Agya-Atta (Consolidated) [1976] 1 G.L.R. 194.
The application before the court is in effect a request to produce evidence that was available at the previous hearing and which the applicant, exercising reasonable diligence might have brought forward at the time but did not. There must be an end to litigation and parties are estopped from presenting their cause piecemeal in a series of actions. Under the general rule the parties are estopped by the findings of fact in the earlier proceedings—and the applicant is caught by the general rule.
Counsel for the applicant urged, however, that there were special circumstances why the general rule should not apply and that these circumstances relate to the jurisdiction of the court. Lack of jurisdiction is, of course, an important ground of appeal but this court has no jurisdiction to entertain appeals from its own decisions. The power to review exercised by the full bench of the Court of Appeal under the Courts Amendment Act, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 101), is no longer available. This, however, does not affect the inherent jurisdiction of this court to review its own decision for the purpose of correcting errors apparent on the face of such decisions.
Article 121 of the Constitution, 1979, provides:
“121. (1) The Court of Appeal shall consist of— (a) the Chief Justice;
(b) not less than five Justices of the Court of Appeal; and (c) such other Justices of the Superior Court of Judicature as the Chief Justice may, for the determination of a particular cause or matter by writing under his hand, request to sit in the Court of Appeal for such period as the Chief Justice may specify or until the request is withdrawn.
(2) The Court of Appeal shall be duly constituted by any three Justices thereof and when so constituted the most senior of the Justices shall preside.”
The phrase “any three Justices thereof” has been the subject of judicial discourse in the recent suit of Bilson v. Apaloo [1981] G.L.R. 24, S.C. The majority decision of the Supreme Court in that case was that the words employed in the Constitution, “for the definition of a duly constituted Court of Appeal provide for
[p.876] of [1981] GLR 866 the Court’s quorum simpliciter. The maximum number of members who can sit on the Court of Appeal has not been specified. It has been left deliberately open.” If the court is said to be duly constituted, by “any three Justices thereof” it is difficult to see how the phrase can be interpreted to mean setting up the minimum as well as the maximum quorum.
The history of the Court of Appeal supports the majority decision that the phrase referred to the court’s quorum simpliciter. Section 6 sub-part 20B (1) of the Courts (Amendment) Ordinance, 1957 (No. 17 of 1957), provides, “The Court of Appeal shall be duly constituted if it consists of an uneven number, not less than three, of the Judges of the Supreme Court.” This section provides the minimum number of judges but not the maximum. The door was left open to the Chief Justice to empanel more than three judges whenever he considered that it was necessary, the Chief Justice was at liberty, for instance, to empanel five justices if in his opinion the issues to be adjudicated upon generated a lot of public interest. Section 2 (2) of the same Ordinance provides:
“2. (2) The Supreme Court shall be a Court of Record and shall consist of— (a) The High Court of Justice; and (b) The Court of Appeal.”
Section 10 (1) of the Courts (Amendment) Ordinance, 1957 substituted “High Court” for the “Supreme Court” and section 10 (2) substituted “Court of Appeal” for the “West African Court of Appeal.”
The Courts Act, 1960 (C.A. 9), introduced a new hierachy of courts as follows:
(a) Supreme Court
(b) The High Court
(c) The Circuit Courts.
In this new set up, the Court of Appeal ceased to exist but its jurisdiction was conferred on the Supreme Court. Section 7 (1) provides, “The Supreme Court when exercising appellate jurisdiction, whether civil or criminal, or any other jurisdiction shall be deemed to be a duly constituted bench if such court comprises three or five of the Judges of the Supreme Court.”
The Court Act, 1960 in effect endorsed the liberty of the Chief Justice to empanel five judges of the Supreme Court (which also exercised the jurisdiction of the previous Court of Appeal), to deliberate upon issues of great importance or causes which have generated great public interest any time this was considered necessary.
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The bench of five judges became known within the judiciary as the full bench. But the full beach and the ordinary bench exercised the same jurisdiction. Both the full bench and the ordinary bench had inherent jurisdiction to review decisions of the court to correct errors apparent on the face of such decisions.
The Courts Decree, 1966 (N.L.C.D. 84), thus set up the hierarchy of the courts: “a Supreme Court of Judicature, consisting of the Court of Appeal and the High Court, which shall be the Superior Courts of Ghana.” Section 6 (1) provides:
“6. (1) The Court of Appeal when exercising appellate jurisdiction whether civil or criminal, or any other jurisdiction shall consist of—
(a) an ordinary bench comprising three Justices of Appeal; or
(b) a full bench comprising five Justice of Appeal.”
Section 7 (2) provides:
“7. (2) The jurisdiction of a full bench of the Court of Appeal shall consist of—
(a) a review and determination of a decision of an ordinary bench of such Court—
(i) upon a question of law alone; and (ii) upon an ordinary or full bench of such Court giving leave for such review and determination;
(b) a review and determination of any other decision of an ordinary bench of such Court where it appears to a full bench of such Court that there as been miscarriage of justice.
This jurisdiction shall not be exercised by an ordinary bench of such Court.”
It is significant to note that: (1) The legislative authority did not only recognise the practice, within the judiciary of referring to the bench of five justices as the full bench, but also actually adopted the use of the terms ordinary beach and full bench; (2) the Courts Decree, 1966, clothed the full bench with additional jurisdiction that could not be exercised by the ordinary bench; and (3) a review under this Decree amounted to much more than the inherent power of the court to correct errors apparent on the face of its own decisions. A review under this Decree was more or less an appeal.
Until the Courts Decree, 1966, both the ordinary beach and the full bench exercised the same jurisdiction. For the first time in
[p.878] of [1981] GLR 866 the history of the full bench, its jurisdiction was enhanced over and above that of the ordinary bench, and the full bench had jurisdiction to review the decisions of the ordinary bench not merely to correct errors apparent on the face of such decisions, but the review had more or less the character of an appeal. This was the law until the Constitution, 1969, came into force. Article 13 (2) of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1969, transferred all reviews pending before the full bench of the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court as substantive appeals.
My understanding of this provision of the law is that the Court of Appeal could no longer review its own decisions in the form of appeal as under the Courts Decree, 1966, nor exercise any other jurisdiction which was exclusive to the full bench. The court could only review its own decisions for the purpose of correcting errors apparent on the face of such decisions. There was, however, no apparent intent in the Constitution, 1969 to limit the Court of Appeal to a bench of three and no more.
The Courts (Amendment) Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 101), reintroduced the position as it was before the Constitution, 1969. The full bench of the Court of Appeal was again clothed with jurisdiction that could not be exercised by the ordinary bench. Section 3 (1) of the Courts (Amendment) Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 101), provides, “For the purposes of this section the Court of Appeal shall be duly constituted for the despatch of its business by five Justices thereof (in this section referred to as ‘a full bench’ of such court).”
This position was altered by the coming into force of the Constitution, 1979. The Constitution confers on the Supreme Court the jurisdiction to interpret its provisions. I think, it is permissible to express an opinion on sections that have already been interpreted by the Supreme Court, especially in view of the fact that the minority judgments in the suit Bilson v. Apaloo (supra) attempted to read into the phrase “any three Justices thereof” more than the words seem to import.
The dictionary meaning of the word “any” is “one of many, no matter which.” This phrase, following immediately after article 121(1) (c) of the Constitution, 1979 on the justices of the superior courts of judicature, naturally, I think, refers to any three of these justices, no matter which. It cannot in my view be read to set both the minimum and the maximum limit to the composition of the Court of Appeal.
The long history of the ordinary bench and the full bench of the Court of Appeal is such that if there were an intention to abolish the full beach it would have been expressed in explicit terms and
[p.879] of [1981] GLR 866 not by the phrase “any three Justices thereof.” There is no apparent intent shown in the Constitution, 1979 to indicate that the full bench of the Court of Appeal has been abolished. What the Constitution, 1979 has done in my view, is similar to what happened when the Constitution, 1969 came into force. The full bench of the Court of Appeal, as I understand this provision of the law, cannot exercise the additional jurisdiction conferred on it by N.R.C.D. 101. This means that the Court of Appeal has no jurisdiction to review its own decisions except to correct errors apparent on the face of such decisions.
This application is incompetent because it seeks in effect, a review in the form of an appeal from this court’s earlier decision, on the application to set aside directions given by the court.
In view of the considerations stated above the preliminary objection should be upheld and the application must fail. The motion is accordingly dismissed.
JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS J.A.
I am also of the view that the application should be dismissed. This is clearly another bite at a very bruised cherry. It should be resisted. The mere contention that the court’s jurisdiction under S.M.C.D. 238 is called in question should not lead us automatically to abdicate our judicial functions and permit the re-agitation of a matter that has been disposed of. If we lack jurisdiction, that same constitutional incapacity should restrain us from pronouncing on the matter. A proper forum should be sought.
JUDGMENT OF EDWARD WIREDU J.A.
I have had the advantage of being involved in the determination of all the three applications brought to this court in connection with the Yendi Skin Affairs, namely:
(1) the ruling of 9 December 1980 on the application for directions brought by the respondent,
(2) the first ruling on the application by the applicant to set aside the directions given in (1) above on 16 April 1981, and
(3) the present and, in fact, the second application by the applicant to set aside the ruling of 9 December 1980.
I therefore feel constrained to add my concurring voice to support the judgment just read by the president of the court which I have had the opportunity of reading beforehand in a draft form and which conclusion I fully endorse.
The facts which have provoked the present application are devoid of any complexity. They have been set out in meticulous detail in the ruling of this court dated 16 April 1981. In view of the above, one may think it unnecessary to set out the same facts again
[p.880] of [1981] GLR 866 in this ruling. On consideration of the point raised for determination in the present application, however, it may not be wise to take that view if one were to make any meaningful reading of this ruling. I have therefore resolved to state the facts not in very much detail but in so far as they are relevant to the determination of the present application.
On or about 9 August 1980, the respondent complaining to be aggrieved and dissatisfied by the findings of a one member committee of inquiry which probed the Yendi Skin Affairs filed in the registry of this court a notice of appeal seeking the reversal of the findings of the said committee.
After filing the notice of appeal he sought the directions of this court by an application under rule 38 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1962 (L.I. 218), which confers power on the court in a case such as the one brought by the respondent, to determine the practice and procedure which should be followed. It was the case of the respondent in that application that the Yendi Skin Affairs (Appeal) Decree, 1979 (S.M C.D. 238), which conferred on him a right of appeal to this court was silent as to the procedure that was to be followed.
By its ruling of the same day (9 December 1980) this court acceded to the respondent’s request and held the application as being proper and that it had jurisdiction to give the directions. The court therefore proceeded to give directions and concluded as follows:
“We hereby grant liberty to the said Yakubu Andani for good cause to have any of these directions varied, rescinded or otherwise set aside and or to obtain additional directions as this court may think fit.”
At this stage it is pertinent to pause and consider what were the central points considered by the court in granting the respondent’s application. A cursory reading of the ruling reveals two points, namely (a) a consideration of whether S.M.C.D. 238 conferred a right of appeal on the respondent, and (b) whether this court had jurisdiction under rule 38 of L.I. 218 to order the directions it did give. These two points in my view are deserving of serious consideration by any would-be applicant who may seek to exercise the right reserved in the said ruling to impeach the order of directions therein given, and the significance of this consideration will be made clear later in the course of this ruling.
On or about 14 January 1981, the present applicant sought to exercise his reserved right to set aside the directions contained in the ruling of 9 December 1980. He filed in this court an application
[p.881] of [1981] GLR 866 to that effect. The application was heard and on 16 April 1981 the court dismissed it: see Yendi Skin Affairs, In re; Andani v. Abudulai [1981] G.L.R. 283, C.A.
The present application is the second that the applicant herein has brought to this court seeking the same relief as the one which was dismissed on 16 April 1981, namely to set aside the directions of 9 December 1980. Under what authority this second application was brought is yet to be determined.
The affidavits in support of the application were sworn to by the applicant himself and Mr. Alhaji Ibrahim Mahama, described as counsel for the applicant. The relevant paragraphs of the applicant’s affidavit read:
8. That I am advised by counsel and verily believe the same to be true that this honourable court has no jurisdiction to entertain and hear both the summons for directions and the appeal filed by the respondent.
9. That I am advised by counsel and verily believe the same to be true that this honourable court erroneously assumed that it had jurisdiction to entertain and hear the summons for directions and the appeal by virtue of the Yendi Skin Affairs (Appeal) Decree, 1979 (S.M.C.D. 238), which purported to come into force on 25 May 1979 as evidenced by Gazette No. 24 of 25 May 1979 and to give the respondent the right to appeal.
10. That on 14 January 1981 I applied to this honourable court to have set aside the ruling on the summons for directions on the sole ground that S.M.C.D. 238 had been repealed by A.F.R.C.D. 32 and that the ruling was given per incuriam.
11. That on 16 April 1981 this honourable court gave a ruling to the effect that A.F.R.C.D. 32 which had been printed and published after the dissolution of A.F.R.C. had no force of law and therefore cannot repeal S.M.C.D. 238.
12. I am advised and verily believe the same to be true that S.M.C.D. 238 never existed in law on 25 May 1979 and has never at any time had the force of law and is a nullity for the following reasons:
(i) by the National Redemption Council (Establishment) Proclamation Decree, 1972 as amended by the Supreme Military Council (Establishment) Proclamation Decree, 1978, a Decree of the Supreme Military Council shall, unless otherwise provided in that Decree come into force on the date of publication of that Decree in the Gazette.
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(ii) S.M.C.D. 238 which purports to be gazetted in Ghana Gazette No. 24 of 25 May 1979 was printed and published well after 4 June 1979 when the Supreme Military Council and the National Redemption Council had been dissolved and their Proclamation (Establishment)
Decrees repealed by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Establishment) Proclamation, which came into force on 4 June 1979.
(iii) At the time S.M.C.D. 238 could have come into force the Government of the S.M.C. did not exist and could not make any law. Only the Government of the A.F.R.C. existed and only that government had power to make law for the governance of Ghana.
13. That the above facts regarding the printing and publication of Gazette No. 24 of 25 May 1979 were obtained from the Assembly Press as a result of a search I authorised my solicitor to make on my behalf.
14. In the circumstances, I swear to this affidavit in support of my application to set aside the order made by this honourable court in favour of the respondent on 9 December 1980.
An affidavit in opposition to the application was sworn to by the respondent. This affidavit runs into no less than 22 paragraphs. The relevant paragraphs of which also read:
“1. I am the respondent to the motion filed by Yakubu Andani herein.
2. I was served with the said motion together with the affidavit of Yakubu Andani and the supplementary affidavit of Alhaji Ibrahim Mahama through my counsel in Accra on 8 June 1981.
3. A motion in same terms as the present was filed by Yakubu Andani on 14 January 1981 and that motion was dismissed by the honourable Court of Appeal on 16 April 1981.
4. I respectfully say that Yakubu Andani has subjected me to harassment in manner as may fairly be described as abuse of the due process of law. I humbly say that an end ought to be put to these harassments.”
On the application coming before us for hearing on 15 June 1981, a notice of objection was filed on behalf of the respondent raising an objection in limine to the competency of the application before the court. As papers were served the very day of hearing
[p.883] of [1981] GLR 866 the matter was adjourned to the following day for consideration.
The terms of the respondent’s objection is a reiteration of the matters raised by his affidavit referred to above and it reads:
“Take notice that at the hearing of the motion filed by Yakubu Andani herein, counsel for Mahamadu Abudulai will raise the objection that it is not competent for Yakubu Andani to make the present application on the grounds that the same or a similar application had been made by him in this matter and same dismissed by the Court of Appeal and consequently that the present application be dismissed.”
Making his submission on the objection, Mr. Appiah counsel for the respondent submitted that a motion to set aside the directions of this court contained in its ruling of 9 December 1980 was brought and moved by the applicant and was dismissed by this court on 16 April 1981. According to counsel, in the first application, like the present one, the applicant sought to vacate the directions on the ground that S.M.C.D. 238 on which the respondent relied to obtain the directions ceased to exist on the coming into force of A.F.R.C.D. 32. Counsel submitted that the applicant failed to make out his case and the application was dismissed. Continuing, Mr. Appiah submitted that since the present application was to seek the same relief as the first it constituted an abuse of due process of the law and the applicant must not be permitted to do so as this would lead to endless litigation. He therefore submitted that the first application having been dismissed on merits, the present one for the same relief was incompetent and that the applicant must be held estopped from bringing any such application after the dismissal of the first one.
Counsel for the applicant, Mr. Kwame Tetteh, submitted that the issue raised for determination in the application before the court was not the same as was determined in the earlier one. According to counsel, the sole issue fought in the earlier application was the validity of A.F.R.C.D. 32 and that the fate of S.M.C.D. 238 which is in issue here was not determined in the first application. He submitted that the present application which sought to attack the legal existence of S.M.C.D. 238 was of such a fundamental nature that it went to the root of the jurisdiction of the court and that the present application was one of special circumstance and therefore ought to be entertained. For authority, learned counsel cited the case of Robertson v. Reindorf [1971] 2 G.L.R. 295 at p. 301, C.A.
A careful examination of the submission by Mr. Appiah, counsel for the respondent, brings out for consideration the extent to which
[p.884] of [1981] GLR 866 a plea of estoppel per rem judicatam can be successfully raised as a defence to an action. The essentials of res judicata as a defence may be nutshelled as follows: In order that a defence of res judicata may succeed, it is necessary to show not only that the cause of action was the same but also that the plaintiff has had an opportunity of recovering and but for his own fault might have recovered in the first action that which he seeks to recover in the second: see Re Hilton; Ex parte March (1892) 67 L.T. 594.
In all cases where the cause of action is really the same and had been determined on merits and not on the same ground which had ceased to operate when the second action is brought, the plea of res judicata would succeed. The doctrine applies to all matters which existed at the time of giving the judgment and which the party had an opportunity of bringing before the court. If however, there is a matter subsequent which could not be brought before the court, the party is not estopped from raising it.
A party cannot claim in a subsequent proceeding, to raise a ground of claim or defence which on the pleading or the form of the issue was open to him in the former one: see Re Hilton (supra). The mere discovery of fresh evidence on matters which have been open to controversy in the earlier proceedings is no answer to a defence of res judicata. The discovery of fresh evidence which entirely changes the aspect of the case and was not and could not by reasonable diligence have been obtained, may be a ground to raise fresh evidence: see Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 15 at pp. 183-187.
Having attempted to collect in a nutshell the essential requirements of res judicata as a defence, I shall now proceed to examine the facts of the present application to see how far the respondent’s plea of res judicata against the applicant has been made out.
In order to appreciate the conclusion I am about to reach, answers to the following questions may be pertinent:
(a) what were the claims brought for determination by the applicant in both the former and the present applications?
(b) what was the respective cases put forward by the parties in the former application? An answer to this will determine what matters were put in issue; and
(c) what was the result of the former application?
There is no doubt that the application brought before the court on 14 January 1981 for determination was in substance the same as the one before us now, i.e. to get aside the directions given in this court’s ruling dated 9 December 1980, though different grounds
[p.885] of [1981] GLR 866 have been raised in the two applications. In the former application, the case put up by the parties are clearly set out in the court’s ruling of 16 April 1981 as follows:
“The contention of the applicant as set out in his supporting affidavit is that in view of Yendi Skin Affairs (Appeal) (Repeal) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 32), the respondent’s appeal and subsequent summons for directions resulting in the ruling of 8 December 1980, have been rendered nugatory. A.F.R.C.D. 32 sought to repeal S.M.C.D. 238 which gave right of appeal to the respondent. The respondent also in his opposition affidavit maintains that the A.F.R.C.D. 32 never had any force in law and therefore S.M.C.D. 238 is still in full force and the respondent’s appeal to the Court of Appeal stands valid.”
This shows clearly that both S.M.C.D. 238 and A.F.R.C.D. 32 were put in issue. This was the case presented by the parties that resulted in the dismissal of the application. The question that arises then is whether on the face of the above facts the applicant can competently come to court for the second time for the same relief?
The doctrine of estoppel per rem judicatam has developed as a public policy principle recognised by the courts to attempt to bring litigation to an early end, and as far as practicably possible and necessary, to save time, expense and to discourage the practice of resorting to piecemeal litigation. Thus a party to an action is enjoined by law to present his case as fully as he can within the limits of the law. Generally speaking therefore, a party who has lost an earlier action in a court of competent jurisdiction is not permitted to re-open the same matter for re-litigation.
A careful analytical examination of the facts of the present application reveals:
(a) That the issue raised in the application is the same as was raised in the former application.
(b) That the relief being sought now is the same as was sought in the former application.
(c) That S.M.C.D. 238 which the applicant now seeks to impeach its legal existence was put in issue in the former application. In fact, it was the bedrock of the respondent’s success in obtaining the directions of this court on 9 December 1980.
(d) That the facts being urged in support of the present application were available and did exist at the time of the hearing of the former application and also at the time of delivery of the ruling.
[p.886] of [1981] GLR 866
(e) That had the applicant done any diligent search he would have availed himself of these in the former application.
(f) That an opportunity was offered to the applicant who could have recovered in the former application, but for want of due diligence that which he now seeks to recover.
(g) That the applicant gives the impression that the present application is based on a fresh ground discovered subsequent to the directions of this court but the point to be considered is that it did exist at the time of bringing the former application.
The more one closely examines the facts of the present application and the points urged against its propriety, the more one becomes convinced of its incompetence and counsel’s reliance on the authority of Robertson v. Riendorf (supra) at p. 301 to support same shows a complete misconception of the law as enunciated therein and misappreciation of the facts of this case.
The court has inherent jurisdiction to strike out as frivolous and vexatious, a claim or defence which has been already decided in previous proceedings against the party raising it or might have been raised in the previous proceedings in which the facts necessary to raise it have been decided against the part desiring to raise them: see Mackenzie-Kennedy v. Air Council [1927] 2 K.B. 517 at p. 528, C.A. per Scrutton L.J.
Next to be considered is the authority under which the present application was brought. Counsel for the applicant did not hesitate to seek refuge under the right reserved in the ruling of 9 December 1980. He frankly conceded that the ruling of 16 April 1981 was correct.
A careful reading of the ruling will reveal that the right reserved for the applicant for good cause shown to have the “directions set aside, varied or added to” was not intended to be used as a licence permitting the applicant to resort to piecemeal applications in complete disregard for the now deep-rooted and acknowledged doctrine of estoppel per rem judicatam. It did not confer multiple liberties on the applicant to come to court ad infinitum so long as he could urge some ground. It is my considered view that the liberty reserved was subject to the principle of estoppel and that it enjoined the applicant in his first application to have put before the court all the available grounds and facts which he could have raised in support of the exercise of the right reserved in the ruling. It did not give him licence to resort to piecemeal applications and once the right was exercised it became exhausted. It ceased to exist and in the instant case, it was sealed by the ruling of this court dated 16 April 1981 which dismissed the former application. All issues
[p.887] of [1981] GLR 866 raised in that application became merged in the ruling and cannot be raised again in another subsequent proceedings.
The preliminary objection therefore succeeds and I would uphold same. I hereby dismiss the application as being incompetent.
DECISION Preliminary objection upheld. Application dismissed accordingly. D. R. K. S.
