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[1981] SLR (HC) 10High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1981

MARFO vs. THE REPUBLIC [1981] GLR 722

23 July 1981 · TWUMASI J · ≈ 8 min read

Cite as[1981] SLR (HC) 10
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OSCOLAMARFO v THE REPUBLIC [1981] GLR 722 [1981] SLR (HC) 10
APAMARFO v THE REPUBLIC [1981] GLR 722, [1981] SLR (HC) 10 (Ghana).
BluebookMARFO v THE REPUBLIC [1981] GLR 722, [1981] SLR (HC) 10 (Ghana High Ct. 1981).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Mosi v. Bagyina [1963] 1 G.L.R. 337, S.C.

(2) Stack v. Boyle 342 U.S. 1 (1951).

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION by an accused person for bail pending trial wherein the issue arose, inter alia, whether the Attorney-General ought to be notified before a valid grant of bail pending trial. The facts are sufficiently set out in the ruling of the court.

COUNSEL

K. O. Brenu for the applicant.

Ahlijah, Principal State Attorney, for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF TWUMASI J.

On 13 July 1981, a criminal matter entitled Samuel Marfo v. The Republic was, among other cases, called in the normal course of business of this court. It was an application for bail pending trial of a criminal offence, to wit, fraud by false pretences contrary to the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), s. 132, involving an amount of two thousand cedis (¢2,000). When the case was called one Sarfo Ababio announced himself as the legal representative for the applicant.

He was not one of the legal practitioners with whom I have familiarised myself since I assumed the High Court bench in this jurisdiction. There was nothing of his physiognomy which indicated, even faintly, that he was not a legal practitioner. He had his barrister’s wig and robes, and spoke eloquently like any average lawyer would do. Indeed, my research through the roll of lawyers in Ghana, confirmed that he was not a pseudo-barrister. He made an application for bail for Samuel Marfo then standing trial before the District Court Grade I, Tarkwa.

The obvious conclusion I came to was that the trial court had refused bail for the accused. When I read the averments in the affidavit in support of the application, I became satisfied that it evidently disclosed a prima facie case for bail and that there was no apparent good reason for this court to refuse the application. The applicant was prepared to offer security for any recognisance or bond. The trial court had itself seen fit to grant bail but, for no justifiable cause, had rescinded the bail although the applicant had never defaulted in appearing before the court. Section 96 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code 1960 (Act 30), as amended by the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Decree, 1975 (NRCD 309), s. 2 empowers the High Court or circuit court to direct in any case that any person be admitted to bail or that the bail required by a district court or a police officer be reduced, notwithstanding anything in the provisions relating to bail under section 96 (1) of the Act.

In my opinion, subsection (2) gives the High Court or a circuit court very extensive supervisory powers over the district court and the police in matters of bail and I cogitate and even venture to asseverate, that this power can even be exercised by the High Court or the circuit court in an appropriate case suo motu without an application by the accused or his counsel, if the court is informed that bail has been improperly withheld or has been granted upon unconscionable terms. I therefore feel hesitant to subscribe to the view expressed by the learned Chief State Attorney that bail granted by the High Court by virtue of its powers under section 96 (2) of Act 30, would be void and of no legal effect if it was granted without the prior knowledge of the Attorney-General.

I feel afflicted by a certain degree of scepticism about the rightness of that proposition, if I may say so, with the greatest respect. In saying this, I am not in any way exhibiting ignorance of the practice prevalent in the High Court whereby in matters of bail pending trial or appeal against conviction or sentence, the Attorney-General is notified. But the crucial question is whether notice to the Attorney-General is such a statutory essential or mandatory condition to

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the grant of pre-trial bail that its non-compliance could vitiate the grant of bail.

Upon a meticulous study of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960, I came to the conclusion that in any criminal proceeding where notice to the Attorney-General is required, express provision has been made by the draftsman. It is, indeed, a tribute to the draftsman of the Code that he had at the back of his mind the cardinal principle in the administration of criminal justice that penal legislation, unlike legislation for civil claims and remedies, ought to be given a strict interpretation and, therefore, its provisions are scrupulously drafted. For example, under section 179 of Act 30, a trial court is required to notify the Attorney-General if, in its opinion, a case before it should be tried on indictment. And section 329 of Act 30 requires that the Attorney-General, representing the Republic as one party to a criminal cause or matter, should be notified to attend the hearing of an appeal by a convicted person.

No such express provisions are found in the sections dealing with pre-trial bail. I may per force emphasise that, in applying penal statutes, decisions in civil actions must be resorted to with the greatest caution. The case of Mosi v. Bagyina [1963] 1 G.L.R. 337, S.C. cited to me has a rather minimal appeal to me in this criminal matter. I cannot accept the view that failure to notify the Attorney-General of an application by an accused for pre-trial bail is a statutory irregularity in criminal procedure, strictly speaking. I would decline offering such a proposition.

By so declining, I should not be misinterpreted as condemning or disapproving the desirability in appropriate circumstances, to notify the Attorney-General in matters of bail. For its virtue as a helping hand to the judge in appraising the relevant factors and conditions for granting bail in particular criminal cases, if for no other reason, the practice should be encouraged, even insisted upon, by the courts.

It has also been argued that, Mr. Sarfo Ababio, who appeared for the accused, was in breach of the constitutional injunction provided under article 201 (c) of the Constitution, 1979, that a public officer should not engage in any private business, profession or trade and that his representation made the proceedings irregular because he was, and still is, employed by the State Gold Mining Corporation. If the assertion that counsel was at the time he advocated for bail a public officer, then he clearly was guilty of gross misconduct.

But it seems to me that it is the counsel who by his act, renders himself liable to disciplinary sanctions; and I do not see how his misconduct should inure to diffuse the jurisdiction of the High Court in granting bail to the accused person. Under chapter six of the Constitution, 1979, the people of Ghana profess in no

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uncertain terms their tenacity for fundamental human rights, most prominent of which is the liberty of the individual. There is so much bias in favour of the rights of the individual under the Constitution, 1979, that the courts feel called upon to uphold and protect those rights. In all written constitutions which contain bill of rights, the rights of the individual predominate over every other thing. I do not think it would be proper for the High Court to vacate an order granting bail to an accused person merely on the ground that the counsel who appeared for him happened to be a public officer prohibited from engaging in private practice.

The traditional rule in criminal justice as I know it is that, even where there is an error in the proceedings, the courts do not quarrel if the error inures to the benefit of a person accused of a criminal offence. Trouble arises only when the error or irregularity, inures to deprive the accused person of his constitutional rights. Bail is so fundamental that it should not be treated with levity. As Mr. Justice Vinson rightly said in the United States Supreme Court case of Stack v. Boyle 342 U.S. 1 (1951) at p. 4:

“This traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the unhampered preparation of a defense, and serves to prevent the infliction of punishment prior to conviction. Unless this right to bail before trial is preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning.

The right to release before trial is conditioned upon the accused’s giving adequate assurance that he will stand trial and submit to sentence if found guilty.”

In my opinion, an offence involving a meagre sum of ¢2,000 is not so serious an offence as to justify a court refusing bail to the offender who is prepared to secure his appearance for trial.

With regard to the application for transfer of the matter from the District Court Grade 1, Tarkwa, to another court, I can do no more than to advert to section 99 of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), which empowers the Chief Justice at any stage of a trial, with or without any application by the parties, to transfer the case from one court to another and section 101 of the Act which empowers a judge of the High Court to exercise the powers conferred upon the Chief Justice. In my opinion, the power of transfer is designed to accord with the sound public policy to engender public confidence in the administration of justice in our courts. Transfers of cases are not necessarily based upon whether an allegation made against a trial or magistrate is true or false. They are made in the supreme

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interest of the judiciary which owes a sacred duty to the general public.

Having regard to all the circumstances of this case, and the allegations contained in the application for transfer, I would forthwith order a transfer of the case from the District Court Grade I, Tarkwa, to the Circuit Court, Sekondi. I order the Registrar of the High Court, Sekondi, to inform the District Court Grade I, Tarkwa, by telegraphic or telephonic communication or preferably for the sake of expedition, by a letter delivered by hand to the magistrate informing him of the order of transfer until a sealed order of transfer is prepared in the statutory form, in confirmation of the transfer order.

In exercise of the powers conferred on me by section 96 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30) as amended, I hereby direct the District Magistrate, Tarkwa, to admit the applicant to bail in the sum of ¢2,000 with one surety pending the transfer of the matter to the circuit court. This order should also be served on the magistrate in the manner prescribed for the transfer order.

DECISION

Application allowed.

Case to be transferred to Circuit Court, Sekondi.

J. K. E. E.

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