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[1981] SLR (HC) 14High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1981

REPUBLIC vs. DISTRICT MAGISTRATE GRADE II, BIBIANI; EX PARTE DAAH [1981] GLR 764

10 August 1981 · TWUMASI J · ≈ 6 min read

Cite as[1981] SLR (HC) 14
Other citation styles and permanent link
OSCOLAREPUBLIC v DISTRICT MAGISTRATE GRADE II, BIBIANI; ex parte DAAH [1981] GLR 764 [1981] SLR (HC) 14
APAREPUBLIC v DISTRICT MAGISTRATE GRADE II, BIBIANI; ex parte DAAH [1981] GLR 764, [1981] SLR (HC) 14 (Ghana).
BluebookREPUBLIC v DISTRICT MAGISTRATE GRADE II, BIBIANI; ex parte DAAH [1981] GLR 764, [1981] SLR (HC) 14 (Ghana High Ct. 1981).

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CASE REFERRED TO

Quist v. Kwantreng [1961] 2 G.L.R. 605.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for an order of prohibition to issue against the District Magistrate Grade II, Bibiani, on the ground that he lacked jurisdiction to hear and determine a land suit pending before him. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Forson for the applicant.

Ahlijah, Chief State Attorney for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF TWUMASI J.

This is an application for the prerogative order of prohibition to issue against the District Magistrate Grade II, Bibiani, on the ground that he lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine a land suit pending before him. Needless to point out, section 38 of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), limits the jurisdiction of the district court grade II in land matters to lands whose value does not exceed one thousand cedis (¢1,000). This statutory provision does not, however, seem to be riderless because section 37 (3) of the Act imposes a mandatory duty upon the district court to proceed to hear and determine any dispute relating to any land notwithstanding that its value exceeds one thousand cedis (¢1,000) “if the parties agree that it should do so.” Obviously, the converse must also be accorded an implied statutory force that, where the parties do not agree, the district court shall not proceed to hear and determine the suit. There are therefore two prerequisites: (a) the evidence that the value of the land exceeds one thousand cedis (¢1,000), and (b) an agreement by the parties that the court proceeds to hear and determine the suit. It is section 37 (2) of the Courts Act, 1971, that imposes a mandatory duty on the district court to call evidence as to the value of any land where a dispute arises as to its value. Where the court finds from the evidence that the value of the land is in excess of the value specified for the jurisdiction of the court, the court shall, notwithstanding the excess value, proceed to hear the case if the parties agree that it should do so. The first question to be asked always is whether there is a dispute as to the value of the land.

In the instant case, the defendant disputed the value of the land by swearing to an affidavit that it exceeded ¢1,000. He estimated it to be worth ¢3,000. The learned magistrate conceded that the

[p.767] of [1981] GLR 764

performance of the mandatory duty imposed upon him by section 37 (2) of the Act was required at that stage of the proceeding. This statutory duty was not performed. The learned magistrate stated in an affidavit as his reason for the default that before he could call evidence, the defendant (the applicant in the present proceedings willingly withdrew his affidavit. But rather puzzling enough, this same defendant has averred in his affidavit before this court that he in fact raised an objection to the jurisdiction of the trial magistrate but despite the objection, the magistrate said that if he refused to give evidence, judgment would go against him so he grudgingly gave evidence. Apparently, the defendant was not represented by counsel. The case proceeded to close of evidence. Thereafter, the defendant instructed his solicitor to file a motion objecting to the jurisdiction of the court. This motion was dismissed by the magistrate.

It is rather unfortunate that the learned magistrate should have created a leeway for needless controversy in such a simple matter and thus involving all concerned in an unnecessary expenditure of time, energy and money. In Quist v. Kwatreng [1961] 2 G.L.R. 605, Ollennu J. (as he then was) as resourceful of the

law as ever, after his usual penetrating research through Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 9 at pp. 349-350 and a few English cases, delivered himself at pp. 613-614 thus:

“Since as an inferior court, the jurisdiction of the local court in any matter must be apparent on the proceedings before it, the giving of the necessary consent which should vest the local court with jurisdiction to continue hearing such a case, must be given expressly and be recorded as part of the proceedings, it is not consent which should be merely implied, it is consent which must be positively expressed, otherwise it will not appear on the face of the proceedings and there will be complete absence of jurisdiction.”

These dicta from Ollennu J. admittedly affected a local court; the principles in them are, nevertheless, transferable to the case before me which is in respect of the jurisdiction of a district court being an inferior court and also apply with equal force to the interpretation of section 37 (2) of the Courts Act, 1971. It is only the record of proceedings, particularly that portion where the defendant is alledged to have willingly consented to the jurisdiction, which could have convinced me that the defendant agreed that the district court should proceed with the case. Unfortunately, the respondent did not exhibit the record. I find it difficult to accept the respondent’s story because it is not most improbable that he defendant would, if

[p.768] of [1981] GLR 764

in fact he had willingly agreed to the jurisdiction, have persisted in objecting to the jurisdiction at the close of evidence. Even if the defendant had withdrawn his affidavit, that conduct was equivocal and could not be equated with express consent .

Mr. Forson, counsel for the applicant submitted that the question of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. Postulated as a general rule, Yes! But I would not go the whole hog with counsel for the applicant to lay down a proposition that in all cases, the question of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. In all cases in which jurisdiction is created by a statute, what the statute clearly says determines the nature and extent of the jurisdiction. There are cases where a statute permits the parties to a dispute to confer jurisdiction on a court under certain conditions. But there are also cases where the consent of the parties to a cause or matter is completely ousted. In the latter case, the question of jurisdiction can be raised at any time. For example, if the circuit court or the district court embarks upon the hearing of a cause or matter relating to succession to property of any person who had at the time of his death a fixed place of abode outside the area of jurisdiction of the court: see section 32 (1) (a) (vii) of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372). In such a situation, the question that the court has exceeded its jurisdiction can be raised at any time, even on appeal. In the former case, however, if the parties to the suit comply with the statutory requirement for the conferment of jurisdiction, e.g. by express consent, they will be estopped from raising the question of jurisdiction after such consent has been given. If after express agreement, parties are allowed to raise the question of jurisdiction which they themselves have conferred on the court, there would be no end to litigation and any party to a suit who at a stage of the proceedings senses danger would dodge the legal duel by the side door using as his vehicle the issue of jurisdiction. This is clearly unacceptable as it is doubtlessly capable of undermining the policy rationale of the enactment. Under any of the foregoing cases, where jurisdiction is ousted, all proceedings, if taken, shall be a nullity.

Since in the instant case, there is no record that the parties expressly conferred jurisdiction on the court, the court has exceeded its jurisdiction and prohibition ought to be issued. The application is granted. I order that the case be tried de novo by the Circuit Court, Takoradi.

DECISION

Application granted.

J. K. E. E.

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