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[1981] SLR (HC) 2High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1981

BOGYA vs. BOAKYE [1981] GLR 908

23 June 1981 · ANSAH-TWUM J · ≈ 31 min read

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OSCOLABOGYA v BOAKYE [1981] GLR 908 [1981] SLR (HC) 2
APABOGYA v BOAKYE [1981] GLR 908, [1981] SLR (HC) 2 (Ghana).
BluebookBOGYA v BOAKYE [1981] GLR 908, [1981] SLR (HC) 2 (Ghana High Ct. 1981).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Cooper v. Slade (1958) 6 H.L. Cas. 746; 27 L.J.Q.B. 449; 31 L.T. (O.S.) 334.

(2) Miller v. Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 All E.R. 372; [1947] W.N. 241; [1948] L.J.R. 203; 177 L.T. 536; 63 T.L.R. 474; 91 S.J. 484.

(3) Sogbaka v. Tamakloe [1973] 1 G.L.R. 25.

[p.912] of [1981] GLR 908 (4) Tufour v. Beng [1963] 1 G.L.R. 21.

(5) Attiase v. Abobbtey, Court of Appeal, 21 July 1969, unreported; digested in (1969) C.C. 149. (6) Banson v. Nana [1965] G.L.R. 24.

(7) Odifie v. Panin [1964] G.L.R. 317.

(8) Adejumo v. Abegunde [1965] G.L.R. 499, S.C.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION for damages for slander. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment.

COUNSEL

W. A. H. Amarteifio (Miss Sutherland with him) for the plaintiff.

Bentsi-Enchill (Brenu with him) for the defendant.

JUDGMENT OF ANSAH-TWUM J.

As per his writ of summons, the plaintiff claims against the defendants (¢40,000) damages for slander. The plaintiff is a farmer and he lives at Wantram in the Wassa Amanfi Traditional Area. According to the plaintiff, he belongs to the stool or royal family of Wantram.

The plaintiff pleaded in paragraphs (6) and (9) of his statement of claim that:

“(6) That after this incident the defendant caused a gong-gong to be beaten informing the large crowd that gathered that the plaintiff is a thief who has been stealing other people’s livestock.

(9) The stool of Wantram which should have been occupied by the plaintiff has now eluded him because of these vicious allegations.”

The plaintiff’s case is that about three years ago, the defendant went to his, the plaintiff’s village near Wantram and told the plaintiff that he, the defendant, had lost two of his sheep and had been looking for same. The plaintiff said he readily told the defendant that the sheep strayed to his farm and destroyed his cocoa pods. He therefore caught and confined the two sheep at his village. The plaintiff further told the court that he disclosed to the defendant that he did not know the owner of the sheep and thinking that the sheep belonged to the people who go about buying sheep, he treated them as stray sheep. He did later, however, release the sheep to the defendant.

About three days later, it was reported to him, the plaintiff, at his village that the defendant had caused gong-gong to be beaten concerning his lost sheep. The plaintiff said he therefore went to the defendant’s village, also near Wantram, and asked him why he had caused the gong-gong to be beaten about the sheep again.

[p.913] of [1981] GLR 908

The defendant told him he did not request the gong-gong to be beaten in the manner complained of by the plaintiff. The plaintiff continued that even though he did not believe the defendant’s denial, he went back to his village. The plaintiff said after that incident, any time he went to Wantram town he heard people hooting at him and calling him a thief. He did, he said, as a result of that gong-gong beating, lose the stool of Wantram which he should be occupying now. He has, in addition, lost the respect the people of Wantram had for him as a royal member of the community in which he lived.

When the plaintiff was cross-examined by learned counsel for the defendant, he stated, among other things, that he heard earlier that the defendant had caused the gong-gong to be beaten to the effect that he had lost two sheep. He agreed, however, that he kept the defendant’s sheep at his village for about one week before he sent the sheep to his sister at Wassa Akropong, eight miles away. The plaintiff could not therefore release the defendant’s said sheep to him when the defendant went to the plaintiff’s village looking for them. The plaintiff further admitted that considering the known and accepted custom of Wantram their town, when he, the plaintiff, found the defendant’s sheep on his farm, he should have sent the sheep to the chief of Wantram, for a gong-gong to be beaten with a view to tracing the owner of the sheep.

The plaintiff stated further that because the defendant denied having caused the gong-gong to be beaten in the manner he complained of, he lodged a complaint against the linguist of Wantram and was to call the defendant as his witness. The defendant also did, thereafter, lodge a complaint to the police about his lost sheep. The plaintiff admitted he pleaded guilty to a charge of stealing with explanation at the District Court, Tarkwa. He was however, subsequently, discharged for want of prosecution because the police prosecutor failed to appear to prosecute on a given date. The plaintiff, who admitted that he has never had a formal education and is an illiterate, admitted further that the Wantram Stool is now occupied by his own younger brother, who is a well and highly educated person, having passed through a teacher training college.

The plaintiff called one Kwabena Akaah as his first witness. Akaah testified to the effect that he heard Kwesi Ketewa, the gong-gong beater, saying that the plaintiff, Kweku Bogya, had stolen Boakye’s, the defendant’s sheep. The gong-gong he said, was beaten along the streets of Wantram. Kwesi Ketewa told him, Akaah, later that it was Okyeame Ampofo of Wantram who instructed him to beat the gong-gong with those words. The first witness for the plaintiff admitted under cross-examination by counsel for [p.914] of [1981] GLR 908 the defendant, that he and the plaintiff are first cousins on the maternal side.

He knows the plaintiff is not a thief and would not believe that okyeame Ampofo would ask anybody to beat a gong-gong to the effect that the plaintiff had stolen a sheep. The first witness for the plaintiff made a further admission of the known and accepted custom of Wantram that if somebody’s sheep strayed into another person’s farm at Wantram and the farmer found the sheep but failed to report to the chief of Wantram within a day or two, that he had found a strayed sheep on his farm, it would be right for the owner of the sheep to assume that the farmer had stolen the sheep.

The second witness for the plaintiff, Kwabena Akumaning, who claims to be the plaintiff’s uncle, told the court among other things, that he had wanted to offer the Wantram stool to the plaintiff when it became vacant, but because of the incident which took place concerning the defendant’s lost sheep, he did not consider it proper to offer the plaintiff the stool; the plaintiff was, as a result, considered unsuitable for the stool. This witness said he had wanted to settle the dispute between the parties herein before the defendant reported the matter to the police. He therefore, thereafter wrote to the police to get the defendant’s complaint withdrawn for settlement out of court, but settlement failed because the defendant was asking for ¢1,000 as compensation, which the plaintiff refused to pay.

Kwesi Ketewa, the third witness for the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s key witness, gave evidence to the effect that it was Okyeame Ampofo (who was called by the defendant as his second witness) who instructed him, the third witness for the plaintiff, to beat the gong-gong to say that Opanyin Boakye’s sheep which got missing was stolen by Opanyin Bogya. The third witness for the plaintiff says he is the plaintiff’s maternal cousin, but when he was told that the plaintiff had stolen a sheep he believed it.

The defendant has denied in his statement of defence as well as in his evidence before this court that he ever instructed that the gong-gong should be beaten to the effect that the plaintiff was a thief and had stolen his sheep. He specifically pleaded in paragraphs (9) and (10) of his statement of defence that:

“(9) The defendant caused a second gong-gong to be beaten to inform the people in the community that he had found his lost sheep and that the sheep were with the plaintiff’s sister at Wassa Akropong for safe-keeping.

(10) The defendant did not cause the gong-gong to be beaten to inform the community that the plaintiff was a thief,

[p.915] of [1981] GLR 908 but rather to let the community know that he had found his lost sheep, and so nobody should continue with the search.”

The defendant has stated further in his evidence before this court, among other things, that he lost two of his sheep at his village about three years ago and he therefore went round the neighbouring villages and places looking for them. Some days went by and he could not find the sheep. The defendant therefore caused the gong-gong to be beaten at Wantram to the effect that he had lost two sheep and that if anybody found them he should take the sheep to him. He did earlier on send to the plaintiff’s village, because he had common boundary, with the plaintiff, to find out whether the lost sheep had been seen there. The plaintiff was not at his village at the time. The defendant’s sheep had been missing for two weeks when the defendant learnt that the plaintiff had come back to his village. The defendant said because he shared common boundary with the plaintiff, he decided to go to the plaintiff himself to find out whether or not he had seen his lost sheep.

The plaintiff upon the first inquiry said he had not seen the defendant’s sheep, but later on, prompted by his own wife, the plaintiff admitted having found the lost sheep one day on his way to his village. He said he caught the sheep, assisted by his nephew, and took them to his village where he kept them for some time. He later sent them to his sister at Wassa Akropong to be added to his own sheep there. The defendant said when he returned to his village, he sent to the linguist to cause the gong-gong to be beaten to the effect that he had found his lost sheep as they were caught by Opanin Bogya, that is, the plaintiff.

According to the defendant, the plaintiff went to his, the defendant’s village the next day accompanied by his wife and enquired from him whether it was true he, the defendant, had caused a gong-gong to be beaten to the effect that he, Bogya had stolen the sheep. The defendant said he denied having done anything of the sort. The plaintiff went away but later sent a letter to the defendant asking him to appear before the Omanhene. The defendant told the court, he did, upon that decide that he should report the matter to the police; he therefore went to the police and reported that the plaintiff had wrongfully caught his sheep. Following that complaint, the police went with the defendant to the plaintiff’s village where the police found the sheep and took them away. The plaintiff was later charged with stealing the sheep, to which charge’ the plaintiff pleaded guilty with explanation.

[p.916] of [1981] GLR 908

When counsel for the plaintiff cross-examined the defendant, he said, the plaintiff pleaded guilty with explanation but offered no explanation, and that the case was adjourned at that stage. He said he in turn reported the matter to the police because he did not want the matter to be heard at an arbitration; as the plaintiff had gone to the omanhene, he did not want to go there at all.

The second witness for the defendant, Opanin Kwesi Ampofo, a Senior Linguist at Wantram, is, to my mind, a key witness whom the plaintiff rather should have called. This is because Okyeame Ampofo is supposed to be the very linguist through whom the defendant sent the words which the plaintiff complains of, to be published by way of the gong-gong message delivered by Kwesi Ketewa, the third witness for the plaintiff. I have therefore decided to reproduce the most important parts of his evidence here.

The evidence of the second witness for the defendant, inter alia, is that when the defendant lost two of his sheep about three years ago, the defendant sent a messenger to him with a message that he the linguist should cause a gong-gong to be beaten to the effect that whoever found that lost sheep should take them to the defendant for a reward. He said because Wantram had no chief at the time, he sought permission from the queenmother and the head of the royal family who granted him permission and that he caused the gong-gong to be beaten. The second witness for the defendant continued that three days later, many people, including the plaintiff and senior members of the stool family, met in the royal house of the head of the royal family to nominate a candidate for the vacant Wantram Stool. The second witness for the defendant told the court that he announced to all present, including the plaintiff, that the defendant (Boakye) had lost two of his sheep and had caused a gong-gong to be beaten to that effect. The plaintiff and the others there said they had not seen the lost sheep. The second defendant witness continued that some time later, he received another message from the defendant calling upon him to cause another gong-gong to be beaten to tell the public that he had found his lost sheep with the plaintiff and therefore the search for the sheep should cease. The second witness for the defendant maintains that that was the message he gave to the gong-gong beater and no more. He said he never asked Kwesi Ketewa, the third plaintiff witness, to say that the plaintiff was a thief and that he had stolen the defendant’s sheep. The second defendant witness added that if the third witness for the plaintiff, Ketewa, ever said that, then he lied and those words were Ketewa’s own words.

[p.917] of [1981] GLR 908 The second witness for the defendant claimed further that it is never true that the plaintiff was not selected for the Wantram Stool because of any allegation that the plaintiff had stolen sheep. He said the general wish of the people at the time was to select an educated royal for the stool. The plaintiff, being a complete illiterate, was not therefore considered at all. The plaintiff’s first cousin, Kweku Prah, now bearing the stool name of Nana Ntiri Kofi II, was nominated, elected and installed as chief of Wantram. This was all done in the presence of and with the consent and approval of the plaintiff, who had earlier on been asked to go for a loan as the people had decided that the stool should go to the plaintiff’s family. The people kept their word and gave the stool to the plaintiff’s first cousin, a trained teacher.

The second witness for the defendant claims that Kwabena Akumaning, the second plaintiff witness, though a royal at Wantram, is not the head of the royal family at Wantram. Akumaning who lives at Bogoso, was not present at the meeting which considered and selected a candidate for the stool. He was invited, but he, Akumaning sent to say that he was indisposed and he never came for the nomination. It is significant to note here that this piece of evidence, which was not seriously challenged, seriously contradicts the testimony given by the second plaintiff witness, Akumaning, to the effect that the plaintiff was a candidate but that he lost the stool because of the allegation that the plaintiff had stolen a sheep.

Summarised above, are the rival stories told by the parties herein and their witnesses; and the issues agreed upon to be settled from the evidence as a whole are:

“(a) Whether the defendant beat the gong-gong to the effect that the plaintiff is a thief.

(b) Whether the plaintiff has been injured in his reputation.

(c) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to his claim.

(d) Any other issues arising from the pleadings.”

Learned counsel for the defendant, has, considering the evidence before the court, submitted that there had been no evidence whatsoever that the words complained of by the plaintiff were in fact uttered by the defendant, or that the defendant authorised their publication if they were ever so published. Counsel submitted that the plaintiff’s own evidence was all hearsay. No one had been called to say that he heard those words coming from the defendant. There should be proof that the words complained of either came from the defendant directly or through his agent.

Learned counsel for the defendant also submitted that the plaintiff failed because the linguist, Okyeame Ampofo, who sent

[p.918] of [1981] GLR 908 the third witness for the plaintiff to beat the fateful gong-gong was not called by the plaintiff. It was rather the defendant who called Okyeame Ampofo as his second witness, and he told the court that he never received any such words as complained of from the defendant; neither did he, Okyeame Ampofo, instruct the third witness for the plaintiff, Ketewa, to utter those words. On the question of probability counsel cited Cooper v. Slade (1858) 6 H.L. Cas 746 at p. 772 and Miller v. Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 All E.R. 372 at p. 374.

Counsel submitted further that even though the defence was not that of justification, the plaintiff’s own conduct in the matter, considering the accepted custom of the area, made the plaintiff himself rightly think the people were likely to conclude that he stole the sheep. Counsel was of the view that even if the plaintiff was defamed he had not established any injury he had sustained which would entitle him to an award of damages, there being evidence that the plaintiff, being an illiterate, was never proposed for the stool. The stool, however, went to the plaintiff’s house and his first cousin got it. This was with the approval and consent of all members of the plaintiff’s family, including the plaintiff himself. The plaintiff therefore fails and his claim must be dismissed.

On his part, counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the plaintiff had proved his case and he referred to paragraph (9) of the defendant’s statement of defence which he claimed, shows the defendant’s connection with the beating of the second gong-gong. Counsel submitted further that the third witness for the plaintiff’s evidence shows that the words he said he uttered came from the defendant through the linguist, Okyeame Ampofo. The third witness for the plaintiff must therefore be believed. Counsel also argued that, in any case if the defendant admits his message was that he had seen his lost sheep because it was Bogya who caught them, then that statement implied that Bogya stole the sheep. Counsel refers to Sogbaka v. Tamakloe [1973] 1 G.L.R. 25 as establishing that it is the understanding of the reasonable by-stander that matters and not the reproduction of the very words.

Counsel further submitted that the defendant’s conduct in the matter showed he was not happy with the plaintiff’s conduct in the matter; he believed the plaintiff stole the sheep and he therefore reported the matter to the police. Counsel was of the view that it was therefore more likely that the defendant sent that message that the plaintiff was a thief. The court should not believe the first and second witnesses for the defendant. Counsel finally submitted that the law applicable here is customary law, and so issue (b) is

[p.919] of [1981] GLR 908 irrelevant; under customary law the words complained of are actionable per se. In the view of counsel, the plaintiff was entitled to damages because there was evidence that, but for this scandal, the plaintiff would be the present occupant of Wantram stool. He lost it because of that false publication. A good deal of damage has been done thereby to the plaintiff’s reputation and the plaintiff must therefore succeed and be awarded substantial damages.

I have carefully considered the evidence placed before me in this case as a whole and I find it is undisputed that the defendant lost two of his sheep which he kept at his village near Wantram about three years ago. I find that the defendant’s village is not far from the plaintiff’s village, which is also not far from Wantram. I find that the defendant had common boundary with the plaintiff and that when the former’s sheep got missing, he sent messengers to the latter’s village, as his neighbour, looking for the lost sheep. I find that the defendant searched fruitlessly in other places around his village for his lost sheep. The defendant did therefore send to Okyeame Ampofo, the chief linguist of Wantram, and requested the gong-gong to be beaten to the effect that he had lost two of his sheep and whoever found them should send them to the defendant for a reward. I find further, as the plaintiff himself admitted under cross-examination by defence counsel, that he heard earlier that the defendant had caused the gong-gong to be beaten to the effect that he, the defendant had lost two sheep. I find that apart from this, the plaintiff was at a meeting held in the house of the head of the royal family of Wantram three days after the gong-gong announcing the loss of the defendant’s sheep, and that Okyeame Ampofo, whom I found to be a truthful witness, informed all present including the plaintiff, about the loss of the defendant’s sheep. I also find that the plaintiff and others said they had not seen the defendant’s lost sheep. Now we are not told at what point in time the plaintiff caught the two sheep, but it is significant to note that the evidence shows clearly that the plaintiff got to know before, or soon after, he caught the two sheep that the defendant had lost two of his sheep. In spite of all that, however, the plaintiff confined and kept the sheep at his village, for at least one week; and without reporting his find to the chief or elders of Wantram, he sent the sheep to Wassa Akropong, eight miles away for his sister to add them to his own flock of sheep at Wassa Akropong. I accept the evidence adduced by the defendant that it was about two weeks after he had lost those sheep that he himself went to the plaintiff’s village still looking for his sheep. I find that, even at that time, it was with some difficulty that the plaintiff disclosed to the defendant that it was he who caught his two sheep and that [p.920] of [1981] GLR 908 he had sent them to his sister at Wassa Akropong. I find that the sheep remained with the plaintiff for at least three weeks at the time police went to this village, after the defendant had lodged the complaint, to collect the sheep.

It is also significant to note the plaintiff’s own admission of the existence of a Wantram custom which demanded that soon after he had found the lost sheep he should have sent them to the chief of Wantram for the gong-gong to be beaten with a view to tracing the owner thereof. I find that it is the custom of the people living at and around Wantram that if somebody’s sheep strays into another person’s farm at Wantram and the farmer finds the sheep but he fails to report this to the chief of Wantram within a day or two, it would be right for the owner of the sheep to assume or conclude that the farmer has stolen the sheep. The piece of evidence having come from the first witness for the plaintiff, Kwabena Akaah.

Now, I come to the most crucial question to be answered in this matter, and, it is whether or not the defendant beat the gong-gong to the effect that the plaintiff is a thief. Paragraph (6) of the plaintiff’s statement of claim states: “That after this incident, the defendant caused a gong-gong to be beaten informing the large crowd that gathered that the plaintiff is a thief who has been stealing other people’s livestock.” The plaintiff is not here pleading an innuendo or saying that the defendant caused certain words to be published through the message of the gong-gong beater which were understood to mean that he was a thief. He says the gong-gong beater said he was a thief and had been stealing other people’s livestock. The first witness for the plaintiff, Kwabena Akaah, says he heard the gong-gong beater saying. “Kwaku Bogya has stolen Boakye’s sheep.” The third witness for the plaintiff, Kwesi Ketewa, the gong-gong beater himself says he said, “opanyin Boakye, sheep which got missing was stolen by opanyin Bogya.”

It is my view that though the above three statements may convey one significant message that the plaintiff, Bogya, is a thief, three different groups of words have been employed here; the group of words in one are different from those in the other. We are told that the defendant did not himself give the message to Okyeame Ampofo; he sent a messenger. That messenger was not called and Okyeame Ampofo called by the defendant, rather says the message he received and which he transmitted to Kwesi Ketewa, the third witness for the plaintiff, for the gong-gong message was, “Boakye says he has found his lost sheep with Bogya and therefore the search for the sheep should cease.’ It seems to me therefore that the plaintiff has failed to satisfy me that he is himself sure of the words he

[p.921] of [1981] GLR 908 complains of as having been published by the defendant. Are they the words he pleaded in paragraph (6) of his statement of claim, or those in the first witness for the plaintiff’s evidence or those in the third witness for the plaintiff’s evidence? Which is which? It is all hearsay and it is therefore not surprising that the plaintiff cannot be specific. We cannot ascribe all the three different statements to the defendant since none of those making those statements here in court tells the court that he heard the statements he is making now from the very lips of the defendant. It is equally very difficult to ascribe any of the statements to the defendant since there has been no connecting link between the lips of the defendant and the lips of Ketewa along which those words could flow . I will therefore reject the plaintiff’s contention that the defendant did authorise publication of any of those messages he has purported to ascribe to the defendant. I accept Okyeame Ampofo, the second witness for the defendant’s testimony that the message he received from the defendant and which he gave to Ketewa for the gong-gong message were the following, “Boakye says he has found his lost sheep with Bogya and therefore the search for the sheep should cease.”

Learned counsel for the plaintiff has submitted that the law applicable here is customary law and therefore issue (b) should be regarded as irrelevant. In other words, it is not necessary in an action for damages for slander under customary law, to prove special damages, since under customary law the words complained of are actionable per se. I think, however, that in an action for slander, where the plaintiff complains that he has been falsely accused of being a thief, it does not really matter which branch of the law is selected, common law or customary law, since it seems to me that in either case the law does not require proof of special damages. I think further that the plaintiff may decide in such a case to go by either the common law or customary law, depending upon the size of the damages and the jurisdiction of the court in which he wishes to commence his action. It is settled law that words proved to have been uttered by the defendant imputing an indictable offence committed by the plaintiff are actionable per se under the common law: see Tufuor v. Beng [1963] 1 G.L.R. 21 at p. 22 as stated in the headnote, where it was held:

“The words proved to have been uttered by the defendant imputed to the plaintiff the commission of the indictable offence of theft. In their natural and primary meaning they were defamatory of the plaintiff and actionable per se.”

[p.922] of [1981] GLR 908

The Court of Appeal also held in Attiase v. Abobbtey, Court of Appeal, 21 July 1969, unreported; digested in (1969) C.C. 149 that:

“The words which the trial local court found as a fact to have been published, namely ‘the plaintiff is a prostitute and practising prostitution in her store,’ were capable of being understood by those who heard the respondent to mean that the appellant was keeping a brothel camouflaged as a store. Running a brothel is a misdemeanour punishable by imprisonment under sections 275 and 279 of Act 29 and section 296 (4) of Act 30. The circuit court judge was consequently wrong in holding that they were not actionable per se if the law applicable were the common law. Dictum of Vaughan Williams L.J. in Marks v. Samuel [1904] 2 K.B. 287 applied.”

And in Sogbaka v. Tamakloe (supra) at p. 26, Francois J. (as he then was) held as stated in the headnote:

“In an action for slander a party need not elect which law he is proceeding under. If it appears on the whole facts that the law applicable is customary law it should prevail. Customary law was the applicable law in the instant case and the epithets complained of were not mere vituperation and were actionable per se. It was not necessary to reproduce the exact words used by the defendant for it is the impression of reasonable by-standers of what they understand that matters.”

It was again held in Attiase v. Abobbtey (supra) that:

“Under customary law, publication of defamatory words are actionable, if false, and it does not matter whether they may be rejected at common law as mere words of vulgar abuse uttered in the heat of a quarrel …”

It is my view therefore that in the instant case, if the words the defendant admits he authorised publication of are found to be defamatory of the plaintiff, meaning, falsely, that the plaintiff is a thief, then the action lies either at common law or customary law, depending mainly upon the forum chosen and the size of the damages sought. I think, however, that judging from the words complained of and the amount of damages claimed, the plaintiff has based his action on the common law: see Banson v. Nana [1965] G.L.R. 24, where Lassey J. (as he then was) held, as stated in the headnote, in case where the words complained of were, “if you eat one’s property free, there is punishment for it,” and the plaintiff claimed only £G25 damages:

“The plaintiff’s action was based on the customary law. This was evident from the words alleged to have been spoken [p.923] of [1981] GLR 908 and also from the size of the sum claimed by way of damages. Moreover, the original local court in which the action was instituted had jurisdiction to administer only customary law under section 15 of the Local Courts Act, 1958 (No. 23 of 1958).”

See also Odifie v. Panin [1964] G.L.R. 317: where it was held, among other things, as stated in the headnote:

“The principle that at customary law an action for slander, lies at the instance of the person slandered is well established, but the customary remedy of recanting is obsolete. However the principle being established, can be developed by judicial process and accordingly the courts can now make an award of adequate damages.

Wankyiwaa v. Wereduwaa [1963] 1 G.L.R. 332 followed.

(2) The quantum of damages awardable should have some relation to the seriousness or otherwise of the injury and to the extent of the damage done. In this connection there is no difference between the damages awardable in a common law action for slander and those awardable to customary law. In all cases of assessment of damages the question should be left to the discretion or good sense of the court after proof of damage.”

As I have held already, the plaintiff failed to establish that the defendant himself uttered or authorised publication of the words he complains of, but the learned counsel for the plaintiff seems now to suggest in his address to the court, that even if what the defendant said was that he had seen his lost sheep because it was Bogya who caught them, that implied that Bogya stole the sheep. Counsel did here refer to Sogbaka v. Tamakloe (supra) as establishing that the understanding of the reasonable by-stander that matters but not the reproduction of the very words used.

It seems to me that the defendant having denied in his statement of defence that he did by the gong-gong inform the people in the community that the plaintiff is a thief (see paragraph (10) of his statement of defence), and having pleaded in paragraph (9) that he caused the gong-gong to be beaten to inform the people in the community that he had found his lost sheep and that the sheep were with the plaintiff’s sister at Wassa Akropong for safe-keeping, if the plaintiff still claimed that these words are capable of bearing the defamatory meaning as contained in the words he complained of, then he should have pleaded the necessary innuendo to give the defendant a chance to meet that claim. It seems to me that

[p.924] of [1981] GLR 908 having failed to plead that the words the defendant admits he authorised for publication bore any hidden defamatory meaning, he also failed to plead that those words were published at all by the defendant.

This is because the plaintiff never led any evidence in the alternative that the gong-gong beater might have used those words which were understood to mean that the plaintiff was a thief. It is my view that it will be too late in the day to plead that now. See Gatley on Libel and Slander (5th ed.), para. 809 at p. 446:

“In slander also the actual words spoken must be set out verbatim in order that the defendant may know the certainty of the charge, and may be able to shape his defence. It is not sufficient to allege that the slanderer used such-and-such words or to that effect.”

The defendant admitted in his evidence before this court that when he returned from his visit to the plaintiff’s village he sent to inform Okyeame Ampofo that he had found his sheep as they were caught by Bogya, the plaintiff, and that Okyeame Ampofo should cause the gong-gong to be beaten to that effect. This has been confirmed by Okyeame Ampofo and if the plaintiff claims this to be a publication of defamatory words concerning him, then he should have amended his statement of claim and inserted the necessary innuendo. This he failed to do, and he cannot now rely on it in proof of his case. He did not plead any innuendo and did not lead evidence to show the sense in which Okyeame Ampofo to whom those words were admittedly published, understood them. Again: see Gatley on Libel and Slander quoted (supra) at p. 450:

“Where the words are not defamatory in themselves but only by reason of extrinsic circumstances the plaintiff must insert an innuendo averring the precise defamatory meaning conveyed to those persons to whom the words were published, otherwise his statement of claim will disclose no cause of action.”

See also Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 24, para. 157 at p. 87, where it is stated, “If the defendant tranversed the innuendo, the burden is on the plaintiff to show that the words were understood to bear the meaning which he thereby assigned to him.”

It is my view that even if the plaintiff was able to prove (and here I find that he did not) that the defendant had by the gong-gong beating published that he, the plaintiff was a thief, there is ample evidence on record to show that the defendant could have successfully relied on the defence of justification. Even though the defendant did not specifically plead justification, his counsel solicited evidence under cross-examination, the plaintiff’s counsel raising

[p.925] of [1981] GLR 908 no objection, to show that by reason of the plaintiff’s own conduct in the matter, the defendant was entitled to regard him as a thief. There being evidence, which the plaintiff himself endorses, that it is the well-known and accepted custom of the people at Wantram that:

“If somebody’s sheep strays into another person’s farm at their village and the farmer fails to report this to the chief within a day or two, it would be right for the owner of the sheep to assume that the farmer has stolen the sheep.

Here the undisputed evidence is that the defendant’s two sheep strayed and found their way either to or towards the plaintiff’s village. The plaintiff caught the sheep, kept them at his village for at least one week, and thereafter, without reporting to the Chief of Wantram or any elder thereof, sent the sheep to Wassa Akropong, eight miles away, to his sister for the sheep to be put into his flock of sheep over there. The sheep remained at Wassa Akropong for about two more weeks before the defendant, still looking for them, traced them to the plaintiff. There is ample evidence that all that time the plaintiff was fully aware that the defendant had lost two of his sheep and had beaten the gong-gong asking the finder to return them to him for a reward.

I accept Okyeame Ampofo’s evidence to the effect that only three days after he had caused the first gong-gong to be beaten about the loss of the defendant’s sheep, he met the plaintiff and many elders of the town of Wantram and told them of the loss of the defendant’s sheep. It is my view that the plaintiff could not have truthfully and honestly claimed that he was not aware that the defendant had lost two of his sheep and that the sheep he caught and had conveyed to his sister at Wassa Akropong, were or could be those sheep, the loss of which the defendant had clearly announced to everybody at or near the town of Wantram.

I am further satisfied that even though the defendant had reasonable grounds upon which he could have lodged complaint with the police when he traced his sheep to the plaintiff, the defendant reported the matter to the police only when he realised that the plaintiff wanted to take advantage of the gong-gong which was beaten after the defendant’s visit to his village, to claim that his reputation had been injured. The evidence is that when the defendant reported the matter to the police, the police went to the plaintiff’s village and collected the defendant’s two lost sheep. The police charged the plaintiff before the District Court, Grade 1 at Tarkwa; the plaintiff pleaded guilty with explanation, but offered no explanation, and has offered none at all throughout this trial. I would not

[p.926] of [1981] GLR 908 say that the plaintiff has exhibited any conduct required of an innocent man. There could certainly have been a prima facie case and a discharge for want of prosecution would not entitle the plaintiff to bring an action for malicious prosecution. I am also of the view that an action for slander in the circumstances would not succeed since the defendant had reasonable grounds to believe that the plaintiff had stolen his sheep and that he could be convicted on the charge of stealing: see section 125 of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), which provided that: “A person steals if he dishonestly appropriates a thing of which he is not the owner.” I wonder whether the facts unfolded before me here could have afforded the plaintiff any answer to a charge of stealing under section 124(1) of Act 29.

It therefore follows that the defendant, having led evidence which establishes justification, the court could not refuse to consider that piece of evidence because there has been no specific plea of justification, since no objection was raised against introduction of that piece of evidence: see Adejume v. Abegunde [1965] G.L.R.

499 at p. 500, S.C. where it was held:

“Although evidence is inadmissible to prove material facts which have not been pleaded, yet when such evidence is adduced at a trial without objection from counsel, the trial judge is bound to take it into consideration. Thus even though the plaintiff had not set out in his statement of claim the very words of the libel complained of, the fact that counsel for the defendant had not objected to the admission in evidence of the letter containing the alleged libel meant that the court was bound to consider the case put forward by the evidence. Abowaba v. Adeshina (1964) 12 W.A.C.A. 18, and

Yartey v. Construction and Furniture (West Africa) Ltd. [1962] 1 G.L.R. 86, S.C. applied.”

I do on the whole, hold that the plaintiff has failed to establish his claim against the defendant herein and the claim must therefore fail. The plaintiff’s claim is accordingly dismissed with costs to the defendant assessed at ¢1,500 inclusive of counsel’s costs.

DECISION

Action dismissed.

J. K. E. E.

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