HORMEKU vs. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS [1982-83] GLR 354
16 June 1981 · ROGER KORSAH J · ≈ 8 min read
[1981] SLR (HC) 24Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Republic v. Central Disciplinary Board; Ex parte Tsawodzi [1973] 2 G.L.R. 299.
(2) Republic v. Inspector-General of Police; Ex parte Wood [1973] 2 G.L.R. 113.
(3) Bank of Ghana v. Nyarko [1973] 2 G.L.R. 265, C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION by way of an originating summons for the declaration that the plaintiff’s purported dismissal was null and void
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and that he remained lawfully a member of the Prisons Service. The facts are sufficiently set out in the ruling.
COUNSEL
Tsatsu Tsikata for the plaintiff.
No appearance for or by the defendant.
JUDGMENT OF KORSAH J.
Julius Bessah Hormeku was an employee of the Ghana Prisons Service. His conditions of employment included a provision that in cases of misconduct or unsatisfactory service, disciplinary proceedings shall be conducted against him. Such disciplinary proceedings shall be summary or commence with a written charge preferred against the alleged offender; it shall enable the defendant in formal proceedings to call appropriate witnesses; it shall enable persons to be compellable to give evidence or produce exhibits in formal proceedings; and it shall enable the defendant in any proceedings before the Director of Prisons or other superior prisons officer or before the disciplinary board to appeal to the Prisons Service Board within six weeks against any decision involving the imposition of a penalty and providing that such penalty shall not take effect until the appeal is determined: see section 19 of the Prisons Service Decree, 1972 (NRCD 46).
On 22 July 1980 Julius Bessah Hormeku was at a parade at Wa Prison when the superintendent of prisons handed to him what turned out to be a letter of dismissal signed by the Director of Prisons. The letter reads:
“Dear Sir, A critical examination of the case preferred against you had revealed that the charges have been established and you are found guilty.
You are accordingly dismissed from the service with immediate effect.
If you wish to appeal to the Prisons Service Council against this penalty, you are at liberty to do so within six weeks from the date of receipt of this letter in accordance with NRCD 46, s. 19 (3)(d).”
Julius Bessah Hormeku claims that before receiving this letter, he had not been summoned to appear at any disciplinary proceedings to answer any of the charges preferred against him. If that is so then the punishment imposed by the Director of Prisons was meted out arbitrarily.
It is obvious to me that the arbitrary exercise of the power to impose punishment is clearly inconsistent with the conditions of
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service insisting on the observance of the audi alteram partem rule at disciplinary proceedings as well as that which gives a right of appeal to a defendant.
In an ordinary case, employers are legally entitled to dismiss their employees provided the relevant facts and the express or implied terms of the relevant contract of employment empower them to do so. If, however, an employer wrongfully dismissed an employee, the employee could maintain an action only to recover damages for wrongful dismissal, but not to obtain an order that he or she should be reinstated or that the dismissal is null and void.
With regard to public officers, the framers of the Constitution, 1979, in their wisdom, have provided that a public officer shall, except as otherwise provided in the Constitution, retire from the public service on attaining the age of 60 years: see article 162 (1) of the Constitution, 1979.
To secure public officers their tenure of office under the changing vicissitudes of politics, and to protect them from the capricious use of power, article 155 (b) of the Constitution, 1979, provides that: “No member of the public services shall be …dismissed or removed from office or reduced in rank or otherwise punished without just cause.” I ask myself: How is just cause to be shown except at proceedings at which the defendant is accorded the right to answer the charges against him? Indeed, article 158 (1) (e) recites that:
“It shall be the duty of the Public Services Commission… to prescribe the principles to be followed in the establishment and operation of joint negotiating committees and disciplinary bodies in the public services and public corporations.”
I am not aware of any disciplinary body, other than that existing under section 19 of NRCD 46, set up to deal with cases of misconduct arising in the Prisons Service. Those provisions must, therefore, be deemed to govern disciplinary proceedings in the Prison Service until altered.
From this body of legislation, we arrive at this situation: a public officer has a constitutional right to remain a public officer until he reaches the age of 60. Until that age, he cannot be removed without just cause. Such cause must be shown to exist at disciplinary proceedings conducted in accordance with regulations made in that behalf. In the instant case, section 19 of NRCD 46.
It seems to me that, unlike the ordinary case of wrongful dismissal; Parliament recognised that even if the employer had the right, in strict law, to dismiss the employee, such right could not be exercised without the employer first showing just cause. Put in another way, the Constitution, 1979, as in the Constitution, 1969, bestowed on a public officer the right not to be dismissed without just cause.
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This right has been recognised by the courts in several cases where statute has regulated the procedures to be followed in disciplinary proceedings, and non-observance of those regulations have resulted in breaches of principles of natural justice, or a person assuming jurisdiction which he has not: see Republic v. Central Desciplinary Board: Ex parte Tsawodzi [1973] 2 G.L.R. 299 and Republic v. Inspector-General of Police; Ex parte Wood [1973] 2 G.L.R. 113 to take but two random examples.
It is true that in the cases referred to, the party unjustly affected applied for a writ of certiorari to quash the decision impugned. But nothing precludes any person unjustly dismissed from seeking redress by way of an ordinary writ of summons. The preference for certiorari, I imagine, is because it is more expeditious than proceedings commenced by an ordinary writ of summons:
By his writ then the plaintiff claims:
(a) a declaration that he remains lawfully a member of the Prisons Service;
(b) damages for defamation; and in the alternative; and
(c) damages for wrongful dismissal.
At the hearing of this case, the plaintiff, through counsel, abandoned reliefs (b) and (c) indorsed on the writ of summons, and limited himself to a declaration that he remains a member of the Prisons Service.
Although the writ of summons and statement of claim were served on the defendants on 9 March v. Nyarko [1973] 2 G.L.R. 265, C.A. What that case really decided, and with which I am in full agreement, was that whether the dismissal of an employee of a statutory corporation was wrongful or not depended on the evidence and the contract of service between the employee and the corporation. The disparity between the facts of that case and the instant one is not difficult of discerning.
To begin with, Nyarko and his co-plaintiff were employees of a statutory corporation, Mr. Hormeku is a public officer. Secondly, the provision in the Constitution, 1960, s. 51 (2) with regard to the tenure of office of public officers reads:
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“(2) Subject to the provisions of the Constitution and save as is otherwise provided by law, the appointment, promotion, transfer, termination of appointment, dismissal and disciplinary control of members of the Public Services is vested in the President.”
This reckless piece of legislation, giving almost unlimited powers to the President over the employment of public officers, provided the fertile soil which nourished “the one o’clock fever.” Whether or not this provision applied to employees of statutory corporation, was not material to the decision in the Nyarko case (supra). Nyarko was dismissed in 1967, when the Constitution of the First Republic had been suspended and that of the Second Republic had not been promulgated.
Thus before 1969, public officers enjoyed no security of tenure; they could be dismissed from office on a caprice; and often were. It is this evil that the 1969 and 1979 Constitutions sought to cure. The Constitution, 1979, art. 155 provides that:
“155. No member of the public services shall be – (a) victimised or discriminated against for having discharged his duties faithfully in accordance with this Constitution;
(b) dismissed or removed from office or reduced in rank or otherwise punished without just cause.”
This provision of the Constitution has thus created another category of dismissal which for want of a better expression, I shall call unjust dismissal.
It seems to me that the essential difference between wrongful dismissal and unjust dismissal is that the former is based purely on a contract of employment which does not guarantee the employee the right to work up to any age; whereas the latter depends on a contract a fundamental clause of which guarantees the employee’s tenure of office up to the age of 60, if there is no just cause to remove him. And whereas damages alone, and not specific performance or an injunction is the appropriate remedy for wrongful dismissal, in an action for unjust dismissal other reliefs may be claimed in addition to or as alternative to damages.
I say other reliefs may be claimed in the case of unjust dismissal because, if it is the policy of the Constitution that no public officer should unjustly be deprived of his right to work for his country, then the only way of enforcing that right is to acknowledge his right to be reinstated. In so saying, I am well aware that there may be instances where although the employee’s complaint of unjust dismissal may be
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well founded, it may not be considered practical and fair to the employee to be reinstated. In such a case, it may be possible to recommend re-deployment. I must confess my happiness in not being taxed, in the instant case, with the vexed question of assessing damages. Is it to be assessed on the basis of reasonable notice or on the basis of a purchase of life? These are issues to be determined when they arise.
In the present case, insofar as the laid down procedures were not observed before the plaintiff was dismissed, the dismissal was ultra vires NRCD 46 and to that extent null and void.
And insofar as the Prisons Service did not show just cause for this dismissal, he was unjustly dismissed. The plaintiff is entitled to a declaration that his dismissal is null and void. And I do so declare.
I award costs of ¢1,000 against the defendants in favour of the plaintiff.
DECISION
Declaration granted.
Order accordingly.
K. A. A.
