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[1981] SLR (HC) 31High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL I)

REPUBLIC vs. BEKOE AND OTHERS; EX PARTE ADJEI [1982-83] GLR 91

27 February 1981 · OSEI-HWERE J · ≈ 8 min read

Cite as[1981] SLR (HC) 31
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OSCOLAREPUBLIC v BEKOE AND OTHERS; ex parte ADJEI [1982-83] GLR 91 [1981] SLR (HC) 31
APAREPUBLIC v BEKOE AND OTHERS; ex parte ADJEI [1982-83] GLR 91, [1981] SLR (HC) 31 (Ghana).
BluebookREPUBLIC v BEKOE AND OTHERS; ex parte ADJEI [1982-83] GLR 91, [1981] SLR (HC) 31 (Ghana High Ct. 1981).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) In re Bramblevale Ltd. [1970] Ch. 128; [1969] 3 W.L.R. 699; [1969] 3 ALL E.R. 1062; 113 S.J.

775, C.A.

(2) Churchman v. Joint Shop Stewards’ Committee of the Workers of the Port of London (1972) I W.L.R. 1094; (1972) 3 ALL E.R. 603; 116 S.J. 617, C.A.

(3) Comet Products U.K. Ltd. v. Hawkex Plastics Ltd. (1971) 2 Q.B. 67; [1971] 2 W.L.R. 361; (1971)

1 All E.R. 1141; (1970) 114 S.J., C.A.

(4) Yianni v. Yianni [1966] 1 W.L.R. 120; [1966] I All E.R. 231, 110 S.J. 975.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

An APPLICATION for committal for contempt. The facts are fully set out in the ruling.

COUNSEL

O. K. Sampson for the applicant.

E. F. Short for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE J.

On 21 October 1980, the judicial committee of the Central Regional House of Chiefs granted an interim injunction restraining the respondents herein from interfering in any way with

[p.93] of [1982-83] GLR 91

some ten cocoa farms and house No.C/2, Nana Quarters, Agona Nyakrom. The committee further appointed the registrar of the regional house of chiefs as manager-receiver of the said farms with whom the respondents had to go into account, at the latest, by mid-November 1980. It has not been denied that after the said order of the judicial committee, the registrar summoned some of the parties and their respective counsel to his office and it was then agreed that the registrar would visit the parties at Agona Nyakrom on 7 November 1980 for the respondents to hand over to him the ten farms and the house.

The applicant has disclosed in his affidavit that the registrar did come to Agona Nyakrom and met the parties but the respondents wilfully refused to go with the registrar to the said farms and they also wilfully failed to account to him in respect of the proceeds from the said ten cocoa farms. He also complains that the respondents have failed to account to him in respect of the proceeds from the said ten cocoa farms. He also complains that the respondents have failed to hand over to him as ordered by the judicial committee the said house No.C/2, Nana Quarters, Agona Nyakrom and that the seventh respondent, Kofi Dadzie, occupies the said house in wilful disregard of the order of the judicial committee.

In answer to the applicant’s affidavit, the sixth respondent has sworn to an affidavit on behalf of himself and the other respondents as follows:

“3. That the registrar of the Central Regional House of Chiefs came to Agona Nyakrom on 7 November 1980. He arrived there about 3 p.m.

4. On his arrival I was called to the office of the Omanhene. Present were Yaw Bekoe, Appiah Manso, Seimebi and myself, Kojo Kuma, the registrar and the applicant. The second, third, fourth and seventh respondents were not present.

5. The registrar then read to us the ruling of the house and told us of his mission. He then asked the whereabouts of those who were working on the farms.

6. The registrar was informed that all the workers were at their respective villages. He then decided that he would come the following week and we should notify the workers to meet him the following week.

7. That the registrar then informed us that the house’s vehicle was off the road and that he had to hire a taxi at a cost of ¢600. He suggested that we should share the cost of the taxi with the applicant.

8. We explained to him that we had no money at the moment and that we would pay our share the following week when he arrived.

9. The registrar became annoyed and left. He never came again.

[p.94] of [1982-83] GLR 91

10. The respondents have therefore not disobeyed the order of the house in any way.

11. The first, second, third, fourth and seventh respondents were not in court when the ruling was given nor were they served with copies of the said ruling.

12. The respondents have in no way disobeyed the interim injunction and consequential orders made by the house.

13. That Kofi Dadzie lives in Accra and does not stay in the ahenfie. The applicant has not attempted to occupy the ahenfie ever since the ruling was given.”

Although this motion deals with a civil contempt, it partakes of the nature of a criminal charge. The respondents are liable to be punished for it and may be sent to prison. The principle of law is quite clear that where a person is charged with contempt of court, which involves his liberty, his guilt must be proved with the same strictness as that required in a criminal trial, that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt: see In re Bramblevale Ltd. [1969] 3 W.L.R. 699, C.A. and Churchman v. Joint Shop Stewards’ Committee of the Workers of the Port of London [1972] 1 W.L.R. 1094, C.A.

The result of a motion for contempt assuming a quasi-criminal character is that the onus of proof lies all through on the applicant. Its negative aspect is that a man charged with contempt of court cannot be compelled to give evidence against his will although where an affidavit is used in evidence the court has discretion under the rules of court to order the deponent to be cross-examined upon it: see Comet Products U.K. Ltd. v. Hawkex Plastics Ltd. [1971] 2 W.L.R. 361, C.A. Another result of the quasi-criminal character of a committal motion for breach of an order of court is that the rule of procedure that the judge cannot, or at least, should not, call any evidence himself independently of the parties, unless or until the parties consent or do not object, does not apply.

The court, accordingly, has power, in order to find out the truth of the matter, to issue a subpoena on its own motion on a material witness: see Yianni v: Yianni [1966] 1 W.L.R. 120. The substance of the applicant’s charge of contempt has been denied in the affidavit filed in answer by the respondents. There was no other affidavit to support the applicant’s affidavit. With the respondent ensconced behind his protective cast, in that the applicant had to prove strictly the charge of contempt against him the court, in retrospect, ought to have allowed the applicant all the facility to prove the charge seeing that contempt of court is a serious charge concerning which the court must endeavour to arrive at the truth.

Unfortunately, a hint by the court, given out of misconception of the applicant’s affidavit, that his charge of contempt was based on hearsay evidence, left his counsel nonplussed so much so that he failed to press for an adjournment to

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call for a supporting affidavit from the registrar of the Central Regional House of Chiefs and, if needs be, to give evidence in court and, if the respondents are unwilling to give evidence, to ask that he cross-examines the deponent who put in the affidavit on behalf of the respondents. The court’s misconception arose because it was unmindful of paragraph 4 of the respondents’ affidavit which acknowledges that the applicant was present at the meeting at Agona Nyakrom initiated by the registrar. On the face of the affidavits filed, the applicant failed to prove the contempt beyond reasonable doubt and the respondents are entitled to the benefit of the doubt.

Paragraph 11 of the respondent’ affidavit, if it is true, introduces a legitimate defence. A person cannot be guilty of contempt of an order of the court of which he has had no notice. In Churchman v. Joint Shop Stewards” (supra) a complaint that some dockers, together with the joining shop stewards’ committee of which they were members, had been guilty of an unfair industrial practice was laid before the National Industrial Relations Court. The complainants applied to the court for interim relief and the dockers were given notice of the application, but they did not attend the hearing and were not represented at it. The court made an interim order against the dockers pending the determination of the complaint. This order was breached by the dockers and the court signed warrants for their arrest and detention. On appeal to the Court of Appeal by the Official Solicitor, Lord Denning M.R. observed at p. 1098, C.A.

“Seeing that the men were not before the Industrial Court, it was important that the order should be served on them, so that they should know the precise terms of it. It might have been sufficient if the substance of the order had been brought to their notice in some other way, but in order to support a committal, it would have to be made clear to them what conduct would be a breach of the order, so that they would know what was lawful and what was not, and such notice ought to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.”

The applicant has failed to satisfy the court that all the respondents had notice of the orders of the judicial committee of the Central Regional House of Chiefs prior to the date of the alleged contempt, either because they were present in court when the interim orders were made or that they were subsequently served on them. Although it appears from the ruling of the tribunal below that the respondents were represented by counsel, yet, it is my view that, in matters of contempt which will deprive the liberty of a subject, actual, but not imputed, notice of the specific terms of the order must be proved. The respondents cannot hereafter plead ignorance of the interim orders

[p.96] of [1982-83] GLR 91

because they were all served with the applicant’s motion and supporting documents which includes the ruling containing the said interim orders. As the evidence before me is insufficient to prove that the respondents are in contempt, I would dismiss the motion.

DECISION

Application for contempt dismissed.

J. A. A.

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