HAUSA vs. THE REPUBLIC [1981] GLR 840
18 May 1981 · TWUMASI J · ≈ 11 min read
[1981] SLR (HC) 9Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Omaboe v. Kwame [1978] G.L.R. 122, C.A.
(2) Powell v. Alabama 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
(3) Lutterodt v. Commissioner of Police [1963] 2 G.L.R. 429,
(4) R. v. Ansere (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 385, C.A.
[p.842] of [1981] GLR 840
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL against the judgment of a trial court convicting the appellant for the offence of careless driving and negligently causing harm on the ground, inter alia, that the accused was deprived of his right to enter a defence. The facts are set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
Richard Apaloo for the appellant.
Asafo-Adjei, Senior State Attorney for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF TWUMASI J.
This is an appeal from the decision of the District Court, Prestea, by which the appellant was convicted on one count of careless driving, contrary to section 18 (1) of the Road Traffic Ordinance, 1952 (No. 55 of 1952), and on twenty-three counts of negligently of causing harm, contrary to section 72 of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29).
One of the major issues raised on the appeal by counsel for the appellant was that the appellant was deprived of his right to enter a defence. The record of proceedings reveals that on 21 January 1980, the learned trial magistrate delivered a ruling to the effect that the prosecution had adduced evidence sufficiently strong to warrant the accused being called upon to enter his defence. The appellant had engaged the services of a counsel and the latter had been conducting the defence. Apparently, counsel was absent on the day the ruling was delivered and so the case was adjourned to 4 February 1980. On the later date, counsel could not attend court but wrote a letter to which the court made reference without stating the contents. Nevertheless, the case was adjourned to 19 February 1980. Again, on the later date, counsel failed to attend court and a further adjournment to 22 February 1980 was granted. On 22 February 1980, counsel wrote a letter to the court apparently informing it of his inability to attend court and asking for a further adjournment. Whether counsel gave good and sufficient reasons for his absence is not clear from the record of proceedings. But the learned magistrate fumed with rage at what might have appeared to him to be a calculated fiddling by the defence. The upshot of this somewhat bizarre state of affairs was that the learned magistrate ordered the appellant to enter his defence or suffer conviction. The appellant did not succumb to the threat of conviction. To quote the learned magistrate’s own words, “Try as the court did to persuade and encourage accused to put up his defence, he refused to talk except to say that once his counsel was not there he would not say anything.” The case was adjourned for three days for judgment on 25 February 1980 and on that day, the appellant was convicted and sentenced.
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I have pondered over the events that culminated in the conviction and I feel very strongly that serious comments seem to be called for. Counsel for the appellant has passed strictures on the conviction inflicted on the appellant in the absence of counsel and accused the learned magistrate of prejudice. Before this court, he explained his absence from the trial court to the fact, of which he urged this court to take judicial notice, that the Western Region was afflicted with a severe shortage of fuel during the time of the trial and for that reason, he could not travel as regularly as he might wish and the trial court was aware of it. I took judicial notice of the fuel shortage. The learned senior state attorney for the Republic referred to Omaboe v. Kwame [1978] G.L.R. 122, C.A. and submitted that the absence of counsel could not invalidate the conviction. In Omaboe v. Kwame, counsel for the defendant had made a request to the court to excuse his absence from court on a specified day and the request had been refused and the case had proceeded to judgment in his absence. On his return, he applied to the trial court to set aside the judgment. This was refused and he appealed. The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was right in refusing to set aside the judgment and dismissed the appeal. The court observed that since the appellant was in court, it could not be said that justice had not been done to him. But sight should not be lost of the subtle caution made by the Court of Appeal at p. 126 that, “Ideally judgment should only be given when the court has heard all parties to the case.”
The Omaboe case, quite apart from the fact that it was a civil matter relating to title to land, is on its facts, entirely on polar side to the criminal matter before us which touches upon the liberty of the subject. Article 26 (2) (d) and (e) of the Constitution, 1979, in it concern for the right of an accused person provides:
“(2) A person who is charged with a criminal offence—
(d) shall be given adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; and
(e) shall be permitted to defend himself before the Court in person or by counsel of his own choice.”
In the realm of the criminal law, the accused is endowed with a constitutional right to defend himself “by counsel of his own choice.” The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution which bears close affinity to article 26 (2) (d) and (e) of our Constitution reads, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . , and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence.” In
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Powell v. Alabama 287 U.S. 45 (1932) a case upholding the right of counsel, Mr. Justice Sutherland said at pp. 68-69:
“The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law.
If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he has a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.”
Obviously, the policy rationale which inspired the framers of the Constitution, 1979, to enact article 26, was that the constitutional rights of a person accused of a crime should be jealously guarded in accordance with the rule of law. Consequently, it would be myopic on the part of a trial court to make a facile comparison of the constitutional right of an accused person to counsel of his own choice with that of a defendant in a civil matter. Where, as in this case, the accused evinced a desire to be defended by counsel of his own choice and where that counsel had written to ask for an adjournment, it was wrong for the learned magistrate to have disregarded his request and to have fulminated against the accused who was doing nothing more than to insist on his constitutional right. The appellant never said anything which could be viewed remotedly, as a deliberate contempt of the court. But the learned magistrate took a rather jaundiced view of the appellant’s stance. This is unfortunate. The result was that justice was not seen manifestly to have been done. The appellant really needed the assistance of his counsel who had been conducting the case brilliantly judging from his line of cross-examination. How can the appellant at the time of his defence be left in the lurch to fend for himself single-handed?
In all criminal cases, even where the trial court believes the prosecution witnesses, it should still go on to consider the accused’s version to see if it is true or short of being true, it is nevertheless reasonably probable having regard to the whole evidence adduced at the trial: see Lutterodt v. Commissioner of Police [1963] [p.845] of [1981] GLR 840
2 G.L.R, 429 and R. v. Ansere (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 385, C.A. Where therefore the defence counsel has succeeded in raising grave issues by his line of cross-examination, it is improper for a trial court to hasten anything that would inure to muzzle the accused’s version of the issues raised.
On the merits of the case too, the learned magistrate revelled in the realms of speculation and arrived at a conclusion wholly unsupported by evidence. For instance, there was evidence that the windscreens of the two vehicles got broken into smithereens and fell on the ground and that the particles were found in the lane of the appellant’s vehicle and near the point of impact shown by him but the learned magistrate, instead of resolving that factor in favour of the appellant, conjectured that it might be that some passers-by heaped the broken glasses in the lane of the appellant. No evidence could be found to support this curious reasoning. In the view of the court, the reasonable inference that ought to have been drawn from the facts was that the appellant’s point of impact, even if not true, might be reasonably probable.
There was also a conflict in the testimonies of the first and second prosecution witnesses which the learned magistrate wrongly evaluated in assessing their credibility. The first prosecution witness said he applied his brakes and stopped and that while his vehicle had stopped, the appellant’s vehicle came with speed to hit it. But the second prosecution witness said the first prosecution witness tried to stop but could not do so before the impact. This is a material conflict. One or the other of the witnesses must no doubt have spoken falsehood, but certainly both of them could not be credible witnesses as the learned magistrate concluded. In his statement to the police, admitted as exhibit D, the appellant stated that when he reached a curve he saw the vehicle of the first prosecution witness fully loaded and right in the appellant’s lane. To avoid collision he applied his brakes but still the first prosecution witness’ vehicle remained in his lane. He applied his brakes the second time but as it was raining and the road was slippery, his vehicle turned to the left and hit the offside mudguard of the first prosecution witness’ vehicle. The appellant’s statement is so amply supported by the police sketch which clearly shows the brake marks of the appellant’s vehicle. These pieces of evidence alone should have afforded the appellant the benefit of the doubt because they weakened the prosecution’s case. The one aspect of the case which apparently was the butt of the learned magistrate’s conclusions, was his arithmetical
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calculations of the measurements on the police sketch. He took as his point of departure, the width of the appellant’s vehicle and said:
“The width of the vehicle of the accused is 8ft. 4ins. (label G) and the distance from point of impact (indicated by the accused) to the nearside edge of the road is 5ft. 5ins. (B). When this distance is added to the width of the accused’s vehicle it comes to 13ft. 9ins. This means that the accused occupied 13 ft. 9ins. of the road leaving 7ft. 3ins. out of the width of the road of 21 feet for the first prosecution witness.”
This arithmetical appraisal of the issue is, to say the least, rather simplistic for the simple reason that it could only be predicated by the impossible assumption that the measurements were taken immediately before the accident.
In any event, the conclusion drawn from this mechanical approach to the problem upon which the learned Senior State Attorney principally based himself to support the judgment, proceeded in complete disregard of what the appellant said in his statement to the police, exhibit D, that in the process of avoiding collision by applying his brakes, his vehicle turned to the left. It becomes crystal clear from what the accused stated to the police that the point of impact cannot provide an impeccable answer for the issue of negligence. It is as well to observe that the fact alone that a collision between two vehicles occurred in the lane of traffic of one driver, rather than in the lane of the other, would not in itself be a proper yardstick for apportioning blame to one driver or the other, for, in the normal course of events, the negligent act of one driver or both always precedes and is often potently causative of the collision. It would indeed be unjust for a negligent driver to escape liability merely on the basis of the fortuity that the eventual collision resulting from his initial negligence did not occur in his lane of traffic. Observing lopsidedly at the point of impact alone in resolving issues of road traffic negligence would ineluctably lead to injustice. Each case must be examined on its own facts since negligence is always a question of fact deducible from a specific constellation of facts proved. In my view, if the learned magistrate had applied his mind properly to all the facts including the appellant’s statement, he would have arrived at a different conclusion.
Speaking for myself, he came to the wrong conclusion. For these reasons, the appeal against conviction is allowed. The appellant is acquitted and discharged on all the counts. It is not necessary
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to burden myself with the issue as to the rightness or otherwise of the sentences imposed on the appellant. I would order that any fine if paid should be refunded to the appellant.
DECISION
Appeal allowed.
J. K. E. E.
