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[1981] SLR (SC) 10Supreme Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL I)

REPUBLIC vs. REGISTRAR OF HIGH COURT; EX PARTE ATTORNEY-GENERAL [1982-83] GLR 407

1 December 1981 · CHARLES CRABBE JSC · ≈ 25 min read

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OSCOLAREPUBLIC v REGISTRAR OF HIGH COURT; ex parte ATTORNEY-GENERAL [1982-83] GLR 407 [1981] SLR (SC) 10
APAREPUBLIC v REGISTRAR OF HIGH COURT; ex parte ATTORNEY-GENERAL [1982-83] GLR 407, [1981] SLR (SC) 10 (Ghana).
BluebookREPUBLIC v REGISTRAR OF HIGH COURT; ex parte ATTORNEY-GENERAL [1982-83] GLR 407, [1981] SLR (SC) 10 (Ghana Sup. Ct. 1981).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Republic v. Hagan [1968] G.L.R. 607.

(2) R.v. Kuree (1941) 7 W.A.C.A. 175.

(3) R.v. Ansere (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 385, C.A.

(4) Twumasi-Ankrah v. R. (1955) 14 W.A.C.A. 673.

(5) Tetteh v. R. [1965] G.L.R. 670.

(6) Nyame v. The Republic [1971] 2 G.L.R. 140.

(7) Ampadu v. The Republic [1979] G.L.R. 71.

(8) Okyere v. The Republic [1972] 1 G.L.R. 99.

(9) Armah v. Government of Ghana [1968] A.C. 192; [1966] 3 W.L.R. 828; [1966] 3 All E.R. 177; 131 J.P. 43; 110 S.J. 890, H.L.; reversing sub nom. R. v. Brixton Prison Governor; Ex parte Armah [1968] A.C. 192; [1966] 3 W.L.R. 23; 110 S.J. 468; Sub nom. Kwesi Armah, Re [1966] 2 All E.R.

1006, D.C.

(10) R.v. Electricity Commissioners; Ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee Co. (1920), Ltd.

[1924] 1 K.B. 171; 93 L.J.K.B. 390; 130 L.T. 164; 88 J.P. 13; 39 T.L.R. 715; 68 S.J. 188, C.A.

(11) R.v. Surrey Justices (1870) L.R. 5 Q.B. 466; 39 L.J.M.C. 145.

[p.409] of [1982-83] GLR 407 (12) R.v. Bedfordshire County Council; Ex parte Sear [1920]2 K.B. 465; 89 L.J.K.B. 425; 123 L.T. 50;

84 J.P. 97; 36 T.L.R. 369; 18 L.G.R. 249.

(13) R.v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Shaw [1951] 1 K.B. 711; [1951] 1 All E.R. 268; 115 J.P. 79; [1951] 1 T.L.R. 270; 95 S.J. 76; 49 L.G.R. 123; 1 P & C.R. 288, D.C. affirmed [1952] 1 K.B. 338, [1952] 1 All E.R. 122; 116 J.P. 54; [1952] 1 T.L.R. 161; 96 S.J. 29; 50 L.G.R. 193; 2 P & C.R. 361, C.A.

(14) R.v. Brighton and Area Rent Tribunal; Ex parte Marine Parade Estates (1936), Ltd. [1950] 2 K.B.

410; [1950] 1 All E.R. 946; 114 J.P. 242; 66 (Pt. 2) T.L.R. 8; 94 S.J. 339; 48 L.G.R. 403, D.C. (15) Nakkuda Ali v. Jayaratne [1951] A.C. 66; 66 T.L.R. (Pt. 2) 214; sub nom. Ali v. Jayaratne 94 S.J.

516,P.C.

(16) Baldwin & Francis Ltd. v. Patents Appeal Tribunal [1959] A.C. 663; [1959] 2 W.L.R. 826; 103 S.J.

451 ; [1959] 2 All E.R. 433, H.L.

(17) Stack v. Boyle 342 U.S. 1 (1951).

(18) Ex parte Blyth [1944] K.B. 532; [1944] 1 All E.R. 587; 133 L.J.K. B. 401; 171 L.T. 283; 60 T.L.R.

353; 885 J. 204; 42 L.G.R. 272.

(19) R. v. Tunwashe (1935) 2 W.A.C.A. 236.

(20) Owusu v. The State [1967] G.L.R. 435.

(21) Okyere v. The Republic [1972] 1 G.L.R. 99.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for grant of certiorari founded on error of law on the face of the record. The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling.

COUNSEL

Mrs. Adusah-Amankwah for the applicant.

E. D. Kom for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF CRABBE J.S.C.

On 12 October 1981, the High Court of Justice presided over by Sarkodee J. gave a ruling. He said:

“Throughout criminal trials there is a golden thread which is that the prosecution must prove each and every ingredient of the offence charged beyond reasonable doubt. To succeed in charging extortion under section 239(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), the prosecution must satisfy the trial court that the accused demanded or obtained money or other valuable consideration under colour of his office. This means that the person who gave out the money or valuable consideration must be called by the prosecution. It is a notorious fact now that Henry Kojo Djaba a victim of the extortion was out of the country and

[p.410] of [1982-83] GLR 407 returned after the conviction of the accused. He could not have been called by the prosecution. In any case it is not denied that he was not called by the prosecution. In my view proof of a vital ingredient of the offence of extortion was missing. On this ground alone the conviction is prima facie bad in law and the appeal is likely to succeed. I do not think I need to wait for the record of proceedings to make up my mind. The accused is accordingly granted bail in the sum of ¢10,000 with one surety to be justified.”

In respect of this ruling an application was made to this court on the ground that there was an error of law on the face of the record for:

“An order of certiorari to bring up and quash the ruling of the High Court dated 12 October 1981 in suit No.

156/81. AND for such further order or orders as to this court may appear just in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under article 119 of the Constitution, 1979 of the Republic of Ghana.”

In an affidavit in support of the application, the law clerk in the office of the Attorney-General, stated:

“2. That I am aware that Mr. J. E. K. A. Appiah, the special prosecutor to the defunct Armed Forces Revolutionary Council Review Tribunal was convicted on two counts of a charge of extortion and sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment with hard labour by his honour the circuit court judge Mr.

Owusu Sekyere in Accra on 22 September 1981 and was consequently lawfully imprisoned.

3. That I am aware that the said J. E. K. A. Appiah was released on bail on 12 October 1981 by an Accra High Court presided over by his lordship Mr. Justice Sarkodee following an application for bail pending appeal by his counsel.

4. That I am advised by counsel and believe same to be correct that in granting bail the learned judge said that the prosecution had failed to prove a vital ingredient of the offence and stated as follows: ‘In my view proof of a vital ingredient of the offence of extortion is missing . . . On this ground alone the conviction is prima facie bad in law and the appeal is likely to succeed. I do not need to wait for the record of the proceedings to make up my mind.

5. That I am advised by counsel and believe same to be true that neither the record of proceedings nor the judgment of the trial court was exhibited in the court and therefore his lordship the judge did not see either of them at all when dealing with the application.

[p.411] of [1982-83] GLR 407

6. I am further advised by counsel and believe same to be true that at the time of considering the application for bail no application for the record of proceedings nor the judgment had been made at all much less either of them being available even to the applicant (accused).

7. I am advised by counsel and believe same to be correct that there is an error of law on the face of the record, i.e. his lordship the High Court judge’s ruling, and that in the circumstances certiorari should lie for quashing the said ruling by the Supreme Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction granted it under article 119 of the Constitution, 1979 of the Republic of Ghana . . .”

To this Mr. J. E. K. A. Appiah, the accused, deposed to an affidavit in which he stated that in his application for bail he had complained of errors of law, and that the errors of law he complained of, as deposed to in paragraph 23 of his supporting affidavit were:

“4. Error of law and fact in that the prosecution had failed to establish the ingredients of the offence of extortion, i.e.:

(a) no proof that the alleged payment of 1,000 pounds and 10,000 pounds were respectively made by the said H. K. Djaba and E. K. Owusu named in the charge sheet;

(b) no proof that the appellant made a corrupt demand or any demand on the said H. K. Djaba and E. K. Owusu to pay him the sums alleged or any other sums;

(c) the said H. K. Djaba and E. K. Owusu as alleged victims of extortion or their agents were not called as witnesses of the prosecution to testify whether they made the alleged payments, and the circumstances in which they made them if they in fact made them; and

(d) no proof that the appellant communicated with the alleged victims of extortion or their agents much less to demand the alleged or any other sums from either or both of them; or to represent or misrepresent the nature and character of the appellant’s office at the tribunal to either or both of them.”

He stated further that in arguing the application for bail his counsel expatiated on the issue of failure to prove the ingredients of the charge of extortion, contending that for the prosecution to succeed the victims of the extortion should have been called to prove the demand made on them and that they parted with money or valuables as a result of representations or misrepresentations made to them by the accused, or alternatively the agents of the victims should have been called to prove the above ingredients, but that was not done. Even if the

[p.412] of [1982-83] GLR 407 obtaining was proved the fact of obtaining “under colour of office” should have been proved beyond reasonable doubt and evidence in proof of that fact would only be given by the victims or their agents. That was not done. He relied on the judgment of Amissah J.A. in Republic v. Hagan [1968] G.L.R. 607 at p. 611, C.A. where the learned Justice of Appeal had said:

“Nevertheless it does seem to me that not every demand or obtaining constitutes extortion merely because the culprit happens to be a public officer. The demand or obtaining must have some reference to his public office. That element is what in the Appiah case comes out as the duties of the public office which are represented or even misrepresented and through which the money is obtained.”

He contended that in the case of extortion the victims of the extortion or their agents were material witnesses. Failing to call them, the charge could not succeed, citing R.v. Kuree (1941) 7 W.A.C.A. 175; R.v. Ansere (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 385, C.A.; Twumasi-Ankrah v. R. (1955) 14 W.A.C.A. 673; Tetteh v. The State [1965] G.L.R. 670, S.C.; Nyame v. The Republic [1971] 2 G.L.R. 140, C.A. and dictum of Taylor J. (as he then was) in Ampadu v. The Republic [1979] G.L.R. 71 at p. 76 that:

“. . . all [the cases cited] support the proposition that if a material witness is not called and the evidence of such a witness is capable of removing all reasonable doubts from the prosecution’s case or in the alternative if the absence of such evidence creates reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case, then the prosecution have failed to prove their case with that degree of certainty which the law demands and a conviction cannot be sustained.”

The ruling of Sarkodie J. in the application for bail was, he stated, based on the principle of law above quoted. The learned judge had not committed any error of law to found an application for certiorari. It was true he did not exhibit the judgment of the circuit court or the proceedings. These were not available even and were still not available though he had applied for a certified true copy of the judgment.

To his knowledge and belief a record of proceedings was not a sine qua non for an application for bail: see Okyere v. The Republic [1972] 1 G.L.R. 99. On the day of his conviction, 22 September 1981, his leading counsel upon his oral instructions applied for a certified true copy of the judgment. His not personally applying for the same could not amount to an error of law on the face of the record. He concluded by saying that when a court had jurisdiction and was properly seised with a matter, an application for certiorari would not

[p.413] of [1982-83] GLR 407 lie if that court made an error of law. That was a matter for an appeal as laid down by Lord Reid in Armah v. Government of Ghana [1966] 3 All E.R. 177 at p. 187, H.L. thus:

“If a magistrate or any other tribunal has jurisdiction to enter on the enquiry and to decide a particular issue, and there is no irregularity in the procedure, he does not destroy his jurisdiction by reaching a wrong decision. If he has jurisdiction to go right, he has jurisdiction to go wrong. Neither an error in fact nor an error in law will destroy his jurisdiction.”

At the hearing of the application for the grant of the order of certiorari, counsel for the applicant was not present. Counsel for the respondent stated that all the facts and the law they wished to rely on were as stated in the affidavit in opposition to the application. He would not ask that the application should be dismissed or struck out. I did not, therefore, as I could have done, dismiss the application for want of prosecution. Certiorari is the process by which the control which a superior court exercises over the judicial acts of inferior jurisdictions is maintained. It is a command to certify, or to return the records of the cause or matter before an inferior jurisdiction or a cause or matter before it, to the end that the applicant for the order may have sure and speedy justice. The time-honoured basis for the issue of the writ was stated by Atkin L.J. in R. v. Electricity Commissioners; Ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee Co. (1920), Ltd. [1924] 1 K.B. 171 at p. 205, C.A.:

“Wherever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially, act in excess of their legal authority they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King’s Bench Division exercised in these writs.”

The object of the issue of the order of certiorari is as stated in Halsbury’s Laws of England (2nd ed.) p. 839:

“… to give relief from some inconvenience or error supposed, in the particular case, to arise from a matter being disposed of before an inferior court less capable than the High Court of rendering complete and effectual justice . . .”

In England, R. v. Surrey Justices (1870) L.R. 5. Q.B. 446 and R. v. Bedfordshire County Council; Ex parte Sear [1920] 2 K.B. 465 seem to have laid down the proposition that the order for certiorari cannot be refused if the application is made by the Attorney-General on behalf of the Crown, or if the party aggrieved is entitled to it ex

[p.414] of [1982-83] GLR 407 debito justitiae. R. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Shaw [1951] 1 K.B. 711, C.A. also lays down the proposition that certiorari does not issue solely on the ground of jurisdiction but that the superior jurisdiction may examine not only the jurisdiction, but, as well, the reasons given for the inferior jurisdiction’s decision in so far as the reasons appear on the face of the record.

But, if the jurisdiction of the inferior court is purely discretionary, then, insofar as the inferior court had acted in accordance with its prescribed procedure, the King’s Bench Division cannot interfere by certiorari however unusual that court considers either the procedure or the decision to be: see R.v. Brighton and Area Rent Tribunal; Ex parte Marine Parade Estate [1950] 2 K.B. 410, D.C.

Section 7 of the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1938, abolished the writ of certiorari. It is now an order of certiorari. Formerly one could, by the process of certiorari remove proceedings on indictment from petty sessions or quarter sessions to the High Court. This is now a power to order a change of venue in all indictable cases where the interests of justice require: see section 11 of the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1938. The long standing jurisdiction of the High Court to quash decisions or proceedings in error, that is to say, for error of law, has been superseded by appeals by way of case stated to the Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench Division.

Many orders of magistrate’s courts in many civil matters are still subject to the order of certiorari. The order of certiorari is now a very useful vehicle to enable the High Court to review the decisions of ministerial and administrative tribunals in cases where there is no form of appeal. In any case, the tribunal making the decision must be under a duty to act judicially: see Nakkuda Ali v. Jayaratne [1951] A.C. 66, P.C. One great fact that emerges from a consideration of the historical antecedents of the order of certiorari is that the order is very much an exercise of a discretionary power. The courts decide—keeping options open—which applicant they will listen to. The courts decide whether to grant a remedy or not to grant a remedy. This is no longer open to question.

Now, what is an error of law as contended by the applicant? It seems to me from a reading of the relevant case law, the Northumberland case (supra) included, and the dictum of Lord Denning in Baldwin & Francis Limited v. Patents Appeal Tribunal [1959] A.C. 663 at p. 693, H.L. that:

“ . . . if a tribunal bases its decision on extraneous considerations which it ought not to have taken into

[p.415] of [1982-83] GLR 407 account, or fails to take into account a vital consideration which it ought to have taken into account, then its decision may be quashed on certiorari . . .”

The complaint in this case is that the record of proceedings, including the judgment of the trial court were not before the judge. They were not exhibited. He could not therefore have seen them. Yet the learned judge of the High Court of Justice in his ruling has said that:

“In [his] view proof of a vital ingredient of the offence of extortion is missing . . . On [that] ground alone the conviction [was] prima facie bad in law and the appeal [was] likely to succeed. [He did not] need to wait for the record of proceedings to make up [his] mind.”

On that statement of the judge, the applicant contends that:

“There is an error of law on the face of the record, i.e. his lordship the High Court judge’s ruling, and that in the circumstances certiorari should lie for quashing the said ruling by the Supreme Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction granted it under article 119 of the Constitution, 1979 . . .”

The affidavit of the applicant does not say anything about arguments in court before the learned judge of the High Court. The affidavit is completely silent on the issue. Surely, an applicant for bail does, in court, make submissions and supports his arguments with whatever facts and law are available to him. Why then did not the applicant in his affidavit supply this court, with the notes of the judge as to what transpired before the High Court of Justice? A consideration of those notes would clearly indicate whether the judge did not have any material before him on which he could have based his ruling, particularly that part of the ruling now called in question by the applicant.

That omission on the part of the applicant before the court is supplied by the affidavit of the respondent before this court. He contends that he had complained about errors of law in his affidavit supporting the application for bail. And he set them out in extenso in his affidavit before this court. He further contended that his counsel “in arguing the application for bail . . . expatiated on the issue of failure to prove the ingredients of the charge of extortion . . .”

These facts as deposed to by the respondent have not been challenged by the applicant. They bear testimony to the statement of the judge complained of. In the face of these facts, these assertions by the respondent, and not challenged by the applicant, can it be said that there is an error of law on the face of the record? Paragraphs 2 and 3

[p.416] of [1982-83] GLR 407 of the respondent’s affidavit before this court reproducing in part paragraph 23 of his affidavit before the High Court of Justice, clearly indicate that the judge had sufficient material before him — more than sufficient, I should have said—on which to base his statement to which exception is taken.

There is no evidence before this court either that the applicant, before the High Court of Justice, challenged those facts which have been repeated for the benefit of this court. Nowhere in the affidavit supporting the application before this court is it stated as a fact that there was such a challenge. Indeed, some time after 7 December 1981, and very late in the day, the applicant by an affidavit sworn to by another law clerk supplied this court with a copy of the proceedings before the High Court of Justice. Those proceedings, as supplied by the applicant, bear out the truth of the facts deposed to by the respondent. The applicant bases his case on the absence of the record of the proceedings before the High Court of Justice. It is also contended by the applicant that at the time of the application for the bail, “no application for the record of proceedings nor the judgment had been made at all . . .” The respondent agrees that the record of the proceedings were not available and are still not available even though [he had] applied for a certified true copy of the judgment.

The respondent before this court was an accused person who has been convicted on two “counts of a charge of extortion.” It is clear that he was not tried in absentia. He was thus in court and heard all the evidence that was given against him. He is aware of all that had gone on at his trial. He is in possession of the facts. More so, perhaps, than the law clerks in the office of the Attorney-General who may not have been in court during the trial. When such a respondent swears to an affidavit and swears to facts within his competence, much reliance is likely to be placed on the facts as deposed to by him. It is in contrast to the “I am aware” and “I am advised” approach of a person who does not indicate that he was at the trial. Hence the significance and the need for a challenge to the facts as so deposed to—if a challenge there be. And if there is no such challenge as to the facts then, of course, a court would accept the facts not challenged. Where, therefore, a court of competent jurisdiction bases a decision—or a ruling for that matter—on facts not challenged, its decision or ruling cannot be attacked on a ground of error of law such as in this case. If a court of competent jurisdiction cannot accept facts deposed to in an affidavit – which facts are not challenged—of what use are affidavits in trials or causes or matters before these courts!

[p.417] of [1982-83] GLR 407

Error in law implies a mistake. And to succeed it must be shown that there is a mistake in the judgment or in the ruling or the decision which makes it erroneous. Before 1875 error of law lay from an inferior court of record to the Queen’s Bench Division. From superior courts of record it lay to the Court of Exchequer Chamber and on to the House of Lords. Before the redress of erroneous judgments in the Court of King Bench 1584 (27 Eliz. 1, c. 8), error of law from the Queen’s Bench lay direct to the House of Lords. The Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict., c. 77) substituted the more simple method of appeal in civil cases. Section 2 (1) of the Criminal Appeals Act, 1907 (7 Edw. 7, c. 23), abolished the writ of error in criminal cases. In its place appeal now lies.

Is there then an error of law? It is not contended that the judge had no jurisdiction. There is no argument before me to indicate that the judge went outside his jurisdiction. It has not been shown that the judge had gone wrong in the discharge of a statutory duty. It has not been shown that the learned judge took extraneous matters into account. The only ground is the absence of the record of the proceedings. On that, the applicant has, very late in the day, supplied a copy of the record of proceedings. That record of the proceedings supports the facts deposed to by the respondent as to the foundation upon which rests the ruling of the judge. There is, then, no mistake on the part of the learned judge to found the charge of error of law, in respect of the ruling of the judge of the High Court of Justice.

Bail as known to our law is the procedure by which a person arrested or imprisoned for an offence under our law is set at liberty. That liberty is a conditional liberty. It is conditional upon the appearance in court for further proceedings of the person to whom bail has been granted. The sole aim of an application for bail is thus to secure the release, pending trial, of the person concerned. It is granted on the condition also that the person concerned furnishes sufficient security to ensure his appearance for the further proceedings.

The grant of bail is an exercise of a discretionary power. The exercise of the discretion must not be punitive. The main consideration is the likelihood of the person concerned failing to appear for the further proceedings. These are dependent upon the nature of the offence, the evidence in support of the charge, the charge itself, the position of the accused and the severity of the punishment, as also the independence of the sureties. These considerations are, to me, sound and workable. They stress the common law principle that bail ought, or should, be granted unless it can be shown that there is the likelihood that the accused or the prisoner will not turn up at the further proceedings.

[p.418] of [1982-83] GLR 407

The grant of bail to persons facing trial is a matter within the sole discretion of the trial court. In a famous American case Stack v. Boyle 342 U.S. 1 at pp. 4 and 5 (1951) the Supreme Court stated that:

“The right to release before trial is conditioned upon the accused’s giving adequate assurance that he will stand trial and submit to sentence if found guilty . . . Since the function of bail is limited, the fixing of bail for any individual defendant must be based upon standards relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence of that defendant.”

The Statute of Westminster, Prisons and Bail Act, 1275 (3 Edw. 1 c. 15), appears to be the first statutory regulation on the question of granting bail. This had come about as a result of the misuse of the discretionary power and, of course, then things were not as they are now. That statute laid down certain cases in respect of which magistrates could not grant bail. Firstly, serious offences, such as murder and treason. Secondly, offences where there is very little doubt as to the guilt of the accused, such as pickpockets caught in the act. Thirdly, offences relating to the escape of prisoners and the like. A noteworthy feature of the statute is that it did not attempt to lay down a single principle on which the grant of bail should be based. A list is provided. A list for the grant. And a list for refusal. There was no fundamental change in the law between 1826 and 1875. True, there were changes in the procedure in order to curb and obviate abuse. The Criminal Law Act, 1826 (7 Geo. 4, c. 64) laid down the principle that bail should be granted in cases where the presumption of guilt is small. It also stated that:

“ . . . where any Person shall be taken on a Charge of Felony or Suspicion of Felony . . . and the Charge shall be supported by positive and credible Evidence of the fact, or by such Evidence as . . . shall . . . raise strong Presumption of the Guilt of the Person charged, such Person shall be committed to Prison . . .”

The principle then again is that bail shall not be granted where there is the strong likelihood of conviction. The Prevention of Vexatious Removal of Indictments into Court of Kings Bench Act, 1835 (5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 33), s. 3—swept away all the factors which previously governed the grant of bail. In their place a single criterion was substituted—that of the accused being available to stand trial. The Indictable Offences Act, 1848 (11 & 12 Vict., c. 42), placed the question of bail solely within the discretion of the committing justice. And as Stephen commented in A History of the Criminal Law of England (1883) Vol. 1, p. 239:

“The short result is that the justice may in his discretion either grant bail or refuse to bail any person accused either of felony or

[p.419] of [1982-83] GLR 407 of any common misdemeanour except libel, conspiracies other than those named, unlawful assembly, night poaching and seditious offences.”

In respect of the latter offences bail could not be refused. The Indictable Offences Act, 1848 provided that in cases of treason no bail could be taken except by the High Court. The only condition upon which bail would then be granted as provided by section 23 of the Act was:

“procuring and producing such surety or sureties as, in the opinion of such justice, will be sufficient to ensure the appearance of such accused person at the time and place when and where he is to be tried for such offence.”

The Bail Act, 1898 (61 & 62 Vict., c. 7) modified this obsolete requirement of sureties. An accused could be admitted to bail on his own recognisance. From this little skirmish into history it does appear that the guiding principle, even in legislation, for granting bail is that the accused person should appear for the further proceedings. That is the intendment of the provisions of our own Code relating to the grant of bail. The modern position regarding bail is summed up by Archbold, Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice in Criminal Cases (36th ed.), pp. 71-72, s. 203 thus:

“The proper test of whether bail should be granted or refused is whether it is probable that the defendant will appear to take his trial . . . The test should be applied by reference to the following consideration:

(1) The nature of the accusation;

(2) The nature of the evidence in support of the accusation;

(3) The severity of the punishment which conviction will entail;

(4) Whether the sureties are independent or indemnified by the accused person.”

All these principles deal with bail before trial. C. K. Allen— Law in the Making (5th ed.) 1951 at p. 293— cites the dictum of Hallet J in Ex parte Blyth [1944] K.B. 532 at p. 540: “that a judge of the King’s Bench Division has an inherent jurisdiction to grant bail to a convicted person pending appeal.” But he adds, characteristically, that that proposition “ is still open to question by higher courts”

For our purposes the grant of bail to a person convicted of an offence pending appeal has been governed by R. v. Tunwashe (1935) 2 W.A.C.A. 236 for a considerable number of years. The conditions as stated are:

[p.420] of [1982-83] GLR 407

“(1) That bail will not be granted pending an appeal save in exceptional circumstances or where the hearing of the appeal is likely to be unduly delayed.

(2) That in dealing with the latter class of case the Courts will have regard not only to the length of time which must elapse before the appeal can be heard but also to the length of the sentence to be appealed from, and further that these two matters will be considered in relation to one another.”

These are matters which the High Court of Justice was entitled to take into account in dealing with the application for bail as well as all other elaborations of these in the cases that followed the Tunwashe case (supra), i.e. Owusu v. The State [1967] G.L.R. 435 and Okyere v. The Republic [1972] 1 G.L.R. 99. I am dealing with the issue of bail per se in the application before me.

I thus do not feel compelled to examine these cases. I am dealing with the issue whether the learned judge exercised his discretion judiciously. In that regard there is no evidence before this court that the judge did not take these matters into account. The copy of the proceedings before the High Court supplied very late in the day to this court shows clearly that, at least, the Okyere case (supra) was cited. And the mere fact that the learned judge did not mention any decided case in his ruling does not mean that he did not consider any.

As already demonstrated, there was sufficient evidence before the judge, both oral, by way of arguments of counsel, and documentary, by way of the affidavit—at least of the respondent before this court—on which to base the exercise of his discretion. It has not been shown before this court that in the exercise of his discretionary power the judge had not been “fair and candid,” which is a duty imposed on him because he was exercising a discretionary power. It has not been shown that the judge has been “arbitrary, capricious or biased either by resentment, prejudice or personal dislike.” It has not been shown that the judge has acted not “in accordance with due process of law.” And where is the inconvenience supposed? There is none. For none has been cited. Where a judge or other judicial officer in the exercise of his judicial functions is vested with discretionary powers, the exercise of the discretionary power cannot be questioned, by virtue of the provisions of articles 4 and 214 of the Constitution, 1979 unless it is shown that that judge or other judicial officer has violated the duty to be fair and candid, that he has been arbitrary, capricious or biased either by resentment, prejudice or personal dislike and that he has not acted in accordance with due process of law.

In these proceedings before this court the applicant has not adduced any evidence, advanced any argument or produced any [p.421] of [1982-83] GLR 407 document that satisfies me that the judge who granted the bail in the High Court of Justice had abused the exercise of his discretionary power. In the circumstances I refuse the grant for the order of certiorari and dismiss the application.

DECISION Application for grant of order of certiorari dismissed.

E. P. T.

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