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[1981] SLR (SC) 4Supreme Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1981

FATTAL AND ANOTHER vs. MINISTER FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND ANOTHER [1981] GLR 104

8 May 1981 · ARCHER JSC · ≈ 51 min read

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OSCOLAFATTAL AND ANOTHER v MINISTER FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND ANOTHER [1981] GLR 104 [1981] SLR (SC) 4
APAFATTAL AND ANOTHER v MINISTER FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND ANOTHER [1981] GLR 104, [1981] SLR (SC) 4 (Ghana).
BluebookFATTAL AND ANOTHER v MINISTER FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND ANOTHER [1981] GLR 104, [1981] SLR (SC) 4 (Ghana Sup. Ct. 1981).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Benham’s Case (1610) 8 Co.Rep. 113 (b); 77 E.R. 646.

(2) Trop v. Dulles 356 U.S. (1958).

(3) Sam v. Comptroller of Customs and Excise [1971] 1 G.L.R. 289.

(4) Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

(5) Great Britain (R. J. Lynch Claim) v. Mexico Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases (1929-30), 221.

(6) Nottebohm Case (Second Phase) I. C.J. (1955), 4.

(7) Afroyim v. Rusk 387 U.S. 253.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION for, inter alia, a declaration that the Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree, 1978 (S.M.C.D. 172), which purportedly deprived the plaintiffs of their Ghanaian citizenship acquired under the Ghana Nationality Act, 1971 (Act 361), was ultra vires, inter alia, the Constitution, 1979, chaps. 5, 9 and 12 and thus null and void. The facts are fully set out in the judgment of Archer J.S.C.

COUNSEL

B. E. Kwaw-Swanzy, Zwennes and Brown for the applicants.

Mrs. Campbell, for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF ARCHER J.S.C.

The first plaintiff, Mohamed Fouad Fattal, was a citizen of the Lebanon by birth until February 1973 when he renounced his Lebanese nationality and acquired a Ghanaian citizenship by naturalisation under the Ghana Nationality Act, 1971 (Act 361). The second plaintiff, Mahmoud Fattal, was also a citizen of the Lebanon by birth until June 1976 when he renounced his Lebanese [p.108] of [1981] GLR 104 nationality and acquired a Ghanaian citizenship by naturalisation under the Ghana Nationality Act, 1971. In July 1978, while the second plaintiff was outside Ghana undergoing medical treatment, the first plaintiff was arrested by the Special Branch of the Ghana Police Force and kept in custody for interrogation in connection with an alleged non-payment of import duty which, including penalties, amounted to ¢6,339,422.72. Notwithstanding an immediate payment of ¢1,000,000 and seven post-dated cheques to cover the balance which he made to the Special Branch out of fear and in the hope that he would be released from detention, the first plaintiff was kept in custody until 1 August 1978 when the then Supreme Military Council passed the Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree, 1978 (S.M.C.D. 172), which provides:

“GHANA NATIONALITY (AMENDMENT) DECREE, 1978 WHEREAS the persons specified in the Schedule to this Decree are citizens of Ghana by naturalisation;

AND WHEREAS the Supreme Military Council is satisfied that the said persons have, over the years engaged in serious trade malpractices and in activities constituting economic sabotage and subversion of the economy of Ghana contrary to the public interest;

AND WHEREAS the Supreme Military Council is therefore satisfied that the said persons have by their said acts forfeited their right to continue to be citizens of Ghana by naturalisation;

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ENACTED by the Supreme Military Council as follows:- 1. The persons specified in the Schedule to this Decree shall cease to be citizens of Ghana by naturalisation and accordingly any certificates of naturalisation as citizens of Ghana granted to them are hereby cancelled.

2. This Decree shall be deemed to have come into force on the 1st day of August, 1978.

SCHEDULE MOHAMED FOUAD FATTAL MAHMOUD FATTAL Made this 1st day of August, 1978.

LT.-GENERAL F. W. K. AKUFFO Chairman of the Supreme Military Council”

The effect of this Decree was to re-confer on the two plaintiffs the status of aliens. On the next morning, 2 August 1978, the then Commissioner for Internal Affairs also issued the following executive instruments under section 13 of the Aliens Act, 1963 (Act 160), ordering the deportation of the two plaintiffs:

“EI 144 M. F. FATTAL DEPORTATION ORDER, 1978 WHEREAS in the opinion of the Commissioner responsible for Internal Affairs the presence in Ghana of M.

F. FATTAL, an alien, is not conducive to the public good.

NOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred on the Commissioner responsible for Internal Affairs by section 13 of the Aliens Act, 1963 (Act 160) this Order is made this 1st day of August, 1978.

M. F. FATTAL is hereby ordered to leave Ghana on the 2nd day of August, 1978, and thereafter to remain out of Ghana.

B. S. K. KWAKYE Commissioner for Internal Affairs.”

“EI 145 MAHMOUD FATTAL DEPORTATION ORDER, 1978 WHEREAS in the opinion of the Commissioner responsible for Internal Affairs the presence in Ghana of MAHMOUD FATTAL, an alien, is not conducive to the public good.

NOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred on the Commissioner responsible for Internal Affairs by section 13 of the Aliens Act, 1963 (Act 160) this Order is made this 1st day of August, 1978.

MAHMOUD FATTAL is hereby ordered to leave Ghana on the 2nd day of August, 1978, and thereafter to remain out of Ghana.

B. S. K. KWAKYE Commissioner for Internal Affairs.”

The first plaintiff was on the same day removed from custody and put on an aircraft flying outside Ghana. Both plaintiffs have since remained outside Ghana. At the time of their deportation, the first and second plaintiffs had been normally resident in Ghana for about 42 and 26 years respectively.

[p.110] of [1981] GLR 104

On 25 March 1980, the plaintiffs invoked the original jurisdiction of this court and claimed the following reliefs:

“A declaration (a) That the Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree, 1978 (S.M.C.D. 172), whereby the Supreme Military Council purported to deprive the plaintiffs of their status as citizens of Ghana by naturalisation without obtaining a judicial order of the High Court of Justice in that behalf as required by section 10 of the Ghana Nationality Act, 1971 (Act 361), is ultra vires the powers conferred on the Supreme Military Council and is null and void as being contrary to law and in particular to the National Redemption Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1972, as amended, the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1969, and the continued operation of the said S.M.C.D. 172 is inconsistent with, or incontravention of the provisions of chapters 5, 9 and 12 of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1979.

(b) That the S.M.C.D. 172 constitutes an usurpation of the judicial power of the State vested in the judiciary, and a legislative judgment and a bill of pains and penalties imposing cruel, harsh unusual and inhuman punishment contrary to law and to the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights whereby the plaintiffs were rendered stateless persons; and its continued operation is inconsistent with or in contravention of the provisions of chapters 5, 9 and 12 of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1979.

(c) That the plaintiffs are citizens of Ghana by naturalisation notwithstanding the said S.M.C.D. 172.

(d) That the continued deportation of the plaintiffs from Ghana is unconstitutional.”

The defendants on the other hand maintained that the plaintiffs were lawfully denaturalised by S.M.C.D. 172 and were deported under powers conferred upon the then Minister of Internal Affairs and therefore the plaintiffs’ case disclosed no grounds in law.

It is obvious that only two legal issues are to be resolved in this suit. The first, is whether S.M.C.D. 172 which cancelled the acquired citizenship of the plaintiffs was ultra vires the then Supreme Military Council in view of the provisions of the Proclamation issued in 1972. The second, is whether S.M.C.D. 172 which is still on the statute books as existing law is now inconsistent with article 17 (3) of the Constitution, 1979, which confers sole and exclusive jurisdiction on the High Court to deprive a citizen of Ghana, otherwise

[p.111] of [1981] GLR 104 than by birth, of his citizenship, and if so, whether S.M.C.D. 172 is void and of no effect by virtue of article 1 (2) of the Constitution.

On the first legal issue, learned counsel for the plaintiffs argued that when the Proclamation, 1972, was issued, the judicial power vested in the courts by the Constitution, 1969, was preserved and although the Proclamation had suspended the Constitution, the courts continued in existence with the same powers, duties, functions and composition as they had immediately before 13 January 1972. One of such powers and functions was spelt out in section 10 of the Ghana Nationality Act, 1971, which provides:

“10. The High Court of Justice may, on an application made in that behalf by the Attorney-General, deprive any person who is a citizen of Ghana, otherwise than by birth, of that citizenship on the ground that the activities of any such person are inimical to the security of the state or prejudicial to public morality or the public interest.”

It was therefore contended on behalf of the plaintiffs that as the Proclamation itself had preserved section 10 of Act 361, it was illegal and unlawful for the then Supreme Military Council to enact S.M.C.D. 172 to cancel the citizenship of the plaintiffs. In other words, there was a naked usurpation of the judicial power by the legislative power vested in the Council. It seems the first legal issue can be dealt with through a straight path by asking and answering the question: Did the Supreme Military Council have power to enact S.M.C.D. 172, notwithstanding the existence of section 10 of Act 361?

The expression “judicial power” was first referred to in article 41 (2) of the First Republican Constitution of 1960 as follows:

“41. (2) Subject to the provisions of the Constitution, the judicial power of the State is conferred on the Supreme Court and the High Court, and on such inferior courts as may be provided for by law.”

Yet when the erstwhile National Liberation Council seized power and suspended the Constitution, 1960, it provided in paragraph 2 (3) of its Proclamation of 24 February 1966, that:

“2. (3) Notwithstanding the suspension of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana and subject to any decree that may be made by the National Liberation Council, all courts in existence immediately before the 24th day of February, 1966 shall, on and after that date continue in existence with the same powers as they had immediately before the said date…”

[p.112] of [1981] GLR 104

It is significant to note that the powers of the courts were made subject to any Decree that may be made by that Council. Simply put, the judicial power solely vested in the courts became subject to laws enacted by the Council and not subject to the Constitution, 1960, that had been suspended.

In 1969, the Constitution of the Second Republic also provided in article 102 (1):

“102. (1) The judicial power of Ghana shall be vested in the Judiciary of which the Chief Justice shall be the Head; and accordingly no organ or agency of the executive shall be given any final judicial power.”

Here too, it is very interesting to observe that there is no reference to the legislature. When the Constitution, 1969, was suspended by the then National Redemption Council, the Proclamation of 13 January 1972 provided in section 4 (a):

“4. Notwithstanding the suspension of the Constitution, and until provision is otherwise made by law, — (a) all Courts in existence immediately before the 13th day of January, 1972 shall continue in existence with the same powers, duties, functions and composition as they had immediately before that date.”

On this occasion, the Proclamation made it clear that “until provision is otherwise made by law” the existing powers and functions of the courts shall continue. Indeed the judicial power guaranteed by the Constitution, 1969, became subject to laws enacted by the then National Redemption Council, the predecessor of the Supreme Military Council. There is no doubt that since 1966, military governments in Ghana have always reserved to themselves the legislative power to either enhance or curtail the judicial power vested in the courts. In all cases, the guarantee given by each Constitution was thrown overboard by the suspension of the relevant Constitution.

Why was this possible? Under a normal constitutional government, sovereignty lies with the people and the Constitution is supreme. Under a military government sovereignty ceases to rest with the people until the military hands over to a civilian government or until the people can mobilise themselves and overthrow the military government by force and regain their sovereignty. Moreover, in the absence of a written constitution, which delimits the powers of the various organs of state, a military government is at liberty to do what it likes by Decree which has the force of the law. It is an absolutist government.

Indeed, section 3 of the National Redemption Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1972, provided:

“3. (1) Until such time as a new Constitution is promulgated by the people of Ghana, the Council shall have power for such purposes as they may think fit to make and issue Decrees which shall have the force of law in Ghana.

(2) Subject to any Decree made under the immediately preceding subsection, any enactment or rule of law in force in Ghana immediately before the 13th day of January, 1972 shall continue in force and any such enactment or rule of law may by Decree of the Council be revoked, repealed, amended (whether by addition, omission, substitution or otherwise) or suspended.

(3) Where any enactment or rule of law in force immediately before the 13th day of January, 1972 is in conflict with any provision of a Decree made by the Council the said provision shall prevail over the enactment and to the extent to which the enactment conflicts with the provision of the Decree, that enactment shall be deemed to be amended by the Decree.’”

The language used in drafting these three clauses allows no room for ambiguity or conjecture as to the intentions of those who seized power. Decrees passed by the Council were sovereign, paramount and supreme notwithstanding the presence of existing laws that conflicted with the Decrees. It follows that the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 10 of the Ghana Nationality Act, 1971, was subject to Decrees enacted by the Supreme Military Council in view of section 3 of the Proclamation, 1972, which minced no words when it provided that the powers of the courts shall continue “until provision is otherwise made by law” —which means law to the contrary.

It follows that where there are no constraints, restrictions or limitations on the legislative power, the laws enacted by the legislature must be enforced by the courts. S.M.C.D. 172 was passed by a military government in the absence of a constitution. But military governments are not the only offenders in this field. It did happen in this country when there was a constitution in force with a civilian government in power.

The Deportation (Othman Larden and Amadu Baba) Act, 1957 (No. 19 of 1957) comes readily to mind. On that occasion under a certificate of urgency an Act of Parliament was passed for the deportation of two persons. Moreover, court proceedings pending to determine the validity of earlier deportation orders made by a minister were terminated automatically by the Act. The

[p.114] of [1981] GLR 104 learned trial judge sitting on the case that morning was powerless and he could only express his disgust in the courts room after the Act had been passed by remarking that the Act was a pernicious piece of legislation. The Acting Governor-General had no option but to give his assent to the Bill. The Acting Governor-General at the time was the Chief Justice of the land. There was a lot of barking over this affair but there was no biting.

It seems that, in view of the express words of section 3 (3) of the Proclamation, 1972, the provisions of section 10 of the Ghana Nationality Act, 1971 (Act 361), must be deemed to have been amended by S.M.C.D. 172 by virtue of the fact that section 10 of the Act conflicted with the provisions of the Decree which in the clear words of section 3 (3) of the Proclamation, 1972, must prevail over section 10 of Act 361. It is therefore not open to any court of law to declare S.M.C.D. 172 ultra vires and thus null and void.

The second legal issue to be resolved has a facade that at first blush appears very alluring and enchanting indeed but as soon as the facade is removed one becomes unnerved with chagrin. The plaintiffs’ case is that the continued operation of S.M.C.D. 172 is inconsistent with or in contravention of the provisions of chapters 5, 9, and 12 of the Constitution, 1979, which deals with citizenship. Chapter 9 governs the legislature and chapter 12 the judiciary. There is no doubt that S.M.C.D. 172 is still on the statute books as part of the written laws of the land. It has not been repealed and the plaintiffs, argument therefore is that its continued operation is inconsistent with the Constitution, especially the chapters already referred to. What is the legal or constitutional basis for this inconsistency? Article 1 (2) of the Constitution, 1979, provides:

“1. (2) This Constitution shall be the supreme law of Ghana and any other law found to be inconsistent with any provision of this Constitution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void and of no effect.”

In view of this article, the plaintiffs maintained that they were unlawfully deprived of their Ghanaian citizenship by virtue of S.M.C.D. 172 which is existing law and they cannot regain their lawfully acquired citizenship. Moreover by virtue of the deportation orders they cannot re-enter Ghana.

What is the existing law? Article 4 (4) of the Constitution, 1979, provides:

“4. (4) The existing law shall, except as otherwise provided in clause (1) of this article, comprise the written and unwritten laws of Ghana as they existed immediately before the coming

[p.115] of [1981] GLR 104 into force of this Constitution, and any Act, Decree or statutory instrument issued or made before that date, which is to come into force on or after that date.”

By this definition S.M.C.D. 172 is an existing law and forms part of the laws of Ghana as categorised in article 4 (1) of the Constitution. However, article 4 (5) also makes it clear that “the operation of the existing law after the coming into force of this Constitution shall not be affected by such commencement.” This means that if S.M.C.D. 172 is still operative, assuming for purposes of argument that it is, then it shall not be affected by the Constitution, 1979; rather, under article 4 (6), S.M.C.D. 172:

“shall be construed with such modifications, adaptations, qualifications and exceptions as may be necessary to bring it into conformity with the provisions of this Constitution, or otherwise to give effect to, or enable effect to be given to, any changes effected by this Constitution.”

Now assuming that S.M.C.D. 172 is operative, is there any subject matter before this court which calls for construction? There is none. No modifications, adaptations, qualifications and exceptions have to be introduced by the court to bring S.M.C.D. 172 into conformity with the provisions of the present Constitution. Are there any changes brought about by the Constitution, to which effect should be given? There is no constitutional change to be effected. The change that the Constitution has effected is that article 17 (3) of the Constitution has restored, reinforced and retrenched the provisions of section 10 of the Ghana Nationality Act, 1971, and has given exclusive jurisdiction to the High Court to deprive citizens, otherwise than by birth, of their citizenship on stated grounds.

Although S.M.C.D. 172 is on the statute books as part of the written laws and as such an existing law, is it operative? The answer is that whatever was intended to be done by the Decree has been done, completed and in short the Decree is spent. Unlike the phoenix, it will never rise from its ashes and operate again as an inconsistent law so as to incur the wrath and indignation of article 1 (2). The purpose of S.M.C.D. 172 was to cancel the certificates of naturalisation of the plaintiffs and no more. Even if S.M.C.D. 172 is still operative, its repeal will not restore the certificates of the plaintiffs in view of section 8 of the Interpretation Act, 1960 (C.A. 4). Its repeal will only cleanse the statutory books of a piece of nauseous debris.

What then is the statutory utility of S.M.C.D. 172? An attempt will be made to classify the existing law as defined by the Constitution, 1979, with special reference to statutes. To illustrate in a very

[p.116] of [1981] GLR 104 simple manner the nature of S.M.C.D. 172, statutory law will be equated with a volcano. There are three types of volcanoes —the active, the dormant, and the extinct.

Active statutory laws are in operation almost everyday. Dormant statutory laws are invoked from time to time, but rarely, when the occasion demands. Extinct statutory laws are never invoked because they are inoperative. Like the extinct volcano, extinct statutory laws have exuded all the lava in their interstices. The Deportation (Othman Larden and Amadu Baba) Act, 1957, already referred to, is in this category of extinct statutory laws, so is S.M.C.D. 172. An example of a dormant statutory law can be found in the Cocoa Industry and Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board (Amendment) Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 63), s.3 (3) of which provides:

“3. (3) Where the assets of any licensed buying agent is insufficient to meet any debt required to be paid under subsection (1) of this section that agent may, in addition to the forfeiture of his assets, be imprisoned for such period not exceeding ten years as the National Redemption Council may by writing determine.”

There is no evidence that this dormant statutory law was ever applied but it is clear that it is part of the written laws, that is an existing law, of this country and it enables the government by the stroke of the pen to imprison persons affected by the Decree without resorting to criminal prosecution in the ordinary courts. Surely, any President of the Republic who attempts to invoke this dormant statutory law while the present Constitution is still in force will ditch himself in a very serious constitutional quagmire.

The attempt would be a clear usurpation of the judicial power vested in the courts by article 114 (1) of the Constitution and in the eyes of article 1 (2), N.R.C.D. 63 shall, to the extent that it conflicts with article 114 (1), be void and of no effect. Examples of active statutory laws need not be given. They govern our lives daily.

This illustration, through volcanic behaviour, demonstrates that S.M.C.D. 172 is now of no consequence. It is extinct and obsolescent. Its repeal is not necessary. It remains on the statute books not as operative law but as legal history evidencing the despotic handiwork of a military regime. S.M.C.D. 172 is not an operative law and its continued existence as statute law is therefore not inconsistent with any provision of the Constitution, 1979.

Throughout their arguments, learned counsel for the plaintiffs made repeated references to the Constitution, 1979, as if it has retrospective effect. S.M.C.D. 172 was passed after the Constitution, 1969, had been suspended and had ceased to be in force during the reign [p.117] of [1981] GLR 104 of the military regime.

But it was urged on behalf of the plaintiffs that S.M.C.D. 172 amounted to a legislative judgment—an act that is clearly prohibited by article 89 (1) (a) of the Constitution, 1979. Perhaps, it should be pointed out that article 89 (1) (a) is a constitutional innovation. There was no such provision in the Constitution, 1969, and as such, it cannot be even suggested that S.M.C.D. 172 offended the spirit of the Constitution, 1969. Article 89 (1) (a) applies to legislative judgments passed after the commencement of the Constitution, 1979, and not before. Indeed, article 89 (1) (b) of the Constitution, 1979, prevents Parliament from passing any law which is to operate retrospectively either in intent or content. The Constitution will therefore be expected to practise what it has ordained.

It cannot operate retrospectively or retroactively otherwise the Constitution will be guilty of what in Scottish legal parlance is referred to as reprobating and approbating. The Constitution came into force on 24 September 1979 and not a day earlier. This is what the Constitution of the Third Republic of Ghana (Promulgation) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 24), says and the provisions of the Constitution, 1979, cannot now be invoked to nullify a valid piece of legislation competently passed by the appropriate authority before the commencement of the Constitution on the ground that it is a legislative judgment when in fact at the time of its enactment there was no legal prohibition against legislative judgments, Lord Coke’s well-known canon, Nova constitution futuries imponere debet, non praeteritis (2 Coke Inst. 292) (A new law ought to regulate what is to follow, not the past) is now firmly entrenched in article 89 (1) (b) of the Constitution, 1979, which itself is new law and is also bound by Coke’s canon.

This case prompts one to define the role of the Supreme Court when such matters come before it. It is not known why the then Supreme Military Council acted with such frenetic haste by passing S.M.C.D. 172 without initiating legal proceedings in the High Court. May be the allegations against the plaintiffs were tenuous and the activities of the plaintiffs could not be said to be inimical to the security of the State or prejudicial to public morality or the public interest, or maybe the Council did not have the temperament to countenance dilatory court proceedings. But all these suggestions are mere conjecture.

However, one reality must be appreciated: Although S.M.C.D. 172 may appear unjust, unreasonable and even autocratic, yet it is not within the province of this court to strike it down merely because it is an unjust or unreasonable law. The days when courts of law could embark upon such an exercise are over. Before the seventeenth century, English judges, most of whom were

[p.118] of [1981] GLR 104 clerics, could make pronouncements condemning Acts of Parliament as unjust, contrary to good reason and divine law. Sir Edward Coke is reported in Benham’s Case (1610) 8 Co.Rep. 113 (b) at p. 118 (a) to have said that an Act of Parliament that is repugnant or against common right and reason must be void. Coke did not cite the Act or the case in question. He was merely echoing the judicial sentiments of that period. Even Blackstone, an adherent of divine law later admitted that the courts had no right to upset Acts of Parliament otherwise the judicial power would be subversive of all governments. Since then no English court of law has dared to challenge an Act of Parliament.

When S.M.C.D. 172 was enacted, there was no Constitution holding the legislative power in leash and no court could have declared S.M.C.D. 172 invalid, null and void. The former National Redemption Council abolished by the Courts (Amendment) Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 101), the Supreme Court established by the Constitution, 1969. The Supreme Military Council passed the Judicial Service (Amendment) Decree, 1977 (S.M.C.D. 101), to remove a former Chief Justice from office without any just cause being shown.

Previous military governments by Decree set up military tribunals to try civilians thus usurping the judicial power. No one at the time challenged these Decrees.

With the demise of these military regimes, this court is now being invited to give retrospective effect to the Constitution so as to nullify existing laws. The court cannot give retrospective effect to the Constitution. But the court can nullify an existing law only if at the time it was passed it was invalid or its continued operation conflicts with the Constitution. Moreover, the court cannot now strike down any existing law merely because it appears unjust or unreasonable.

This court is “supreme” only within the bounds of the Constitution. The court has not within its environment nuances of supremacy, sovereignty or omnipotence. It cannot redress injustices perpetrated by military regimes in the past under Decrees enacted by them. One of the responsibilities of this court under the Constitution is to declare laws unconstitutional. It is not its role to declare laws unjust or unreasonable if such laws have been regularly enacted by the legislature within its recognised powers.

The second legal issue for determination by the court must therefore be resolved in favour of the defendants’ contention that although the Decree under which the plaintiffs were deprived of their Ghanaian citizenship is still on the statute books as an existing law, yet it is not inconsistent with any provisions of the Constitution, 1979. Accordingly the declaration sought by the plaintiffs cannot be granted.

[p.119] of [1981] GLR 104

Finally, it must be remarked that the circumstances revealed by the plaintiffs can only compel a court of law and conscience to refuse their application with a heavy heart. But one can derive consolation from two facts, firstly, that S.M.C.D. 172 does not constitute a perpetual injunction restraining them from re-applying for naturalisation; and secondly, that the deportation orders in E.I. 144 and E.I. 145 are not irrevocable.

No doubt, the appropriate authorities outside the judiciary are at liberty to re-appraise the plight of the plaintiffs and do what is proper in accordance with the commonsense of the ordinary Ghanaian and his sense of justice and fairplay. Such a re-appraisal will not be inhibited by any transitional provision in the present Constitution. S.M.C.D. 172 after all is not an A.F.R.C. Decree. Moreover, such a re-appraisal by a constitutional government will be in consonance with the dictates of the various international conventions on human rights to which Ghana has sincerely appended her signature.

JUDGMENT OF SOWAH J.S.C.

I agree.

JUDGMENT OF SOWAH J.S.C

I also agree.

I agree with the general conclusion arrived at in the opinion just read. I am also of the opinion that this action fails and ought to be dismissed.

JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.S.C.

The plaintiffs in this case have invoked the original jurisdiction of this court under article 2 (1) (a) of the Constitution, 1979. The article provides:

“2. (1) A person who alleges— (a) that an enactment or anything contained in or done under the authority of that or any other enactment… is inconsistent with, or is in contravention of, a provision of this Constitution, may at any time bring an action in the Supreme Court for a declaration to that effect.”

Pursuant to this provision, their counsel took out a writ on their behalf on 25 March 1980, and the nature of the relief formulated in the said writ is:

“A declaration (a) That the Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree, 1978 (S.M.C.D. 172), whereby the Supreme Military Council purported to deprive the plaintiffs of their status as citizens of Ghana by naturalisation without obtaining a

[p.120] of [1981] GLR 104 judicial order of the High Court of Justice in that behalf as required by section 10 of the Ghana Nationality Act, 1971 (Act 361), is ultra vires the powers conferred on the Supreme Military Council and is null and void and being contrary to law and in particular to the National Redemption Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1972, as amended, the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1969, and the continued operation of the said S.M.C.D. 172 is inconsistent with, or in contravention of the provisions of chapters 5, 9 and 12 of the Constitution, 1979.

(b) That the S.M.C.D. 172 constitutes an usurpation of the judicial power of the State vested in the judiciary, and a legislative judgment and a bill of pains and penalties imposing cruel, harsh unusual and inhuman punishment contrary to law and to the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights whereby the plaintiffs were rendered stateless persons; and its continued operation is inconsistent with or in contravention of the provisions of chapters 5, 9 and 12 of the Constitution, 1979.

(c) That the plaintiffs are citizens of Ghana by naturalisation notwithstanding the said S.M.C.D. 172.

(d) That the continued deportation of the plaintiffs from Ghana is unconstitutional.”

I think it is necessary for me to dispose of the proposition inherent in the submission urged in support of the first declaration sought that S.M.C.D. 172 is ultra vires the powers of the Supreme Military Council and is inconsistent with the National Redemption Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1972, and therefore null and void. Section 3 (1), (2) and (3) of the Proclamation provides:

“3. (1) Until such time as a new Constitution is promulgated by the people of Ghana, the Council shall have power for such purposes as they may think fit to make and issue Decrees which shall have the force of law in Ghana.

(2) Subject to any Decree made under the immediately preceding subsection, any enactment or rule of law in force in Ghana immediately before the 13th of January, 1972 shall continue in force and any such enactment or rule of law may by Decree of the Council be revoked, repealed, amended (whether by addition, omission, substitution or otherwise) or suspended.

(3) Where any enactment or rule of law in force immediately before the 13th day of January, 1972 is in conflict with any provision of a Decree made by the Council the said provision

[p.121] of [1981] GLR 104 shall prevail over the enactment and to the extent to which the enactment conflicts with the provision of the Decree, that enactment shall be deemed to be amended by the Decree.”

Clearly the combined effect of the provisions above demonstrates that the Supreme Military Council at the time it exercised power in this Republic was a sovereign legislature of the Westminster variety and wielded therefore a type of power of the Austinian specie well-known to students of British constitutional law. It was William Blackstone, the well-known English jurist, who in his Commentaries on the Laws of England (1884) (3rd ed.), Vol. 1, p. 185, described this positivist concept of English jurisprudence:

“An act of Parliament . . . is the exercise of the highest authority that this kingdom acknowledges upon earth.

It has power to bind every subject . . . even the king himself… And it cannot be altered, amended, dispensed with, suspended, or repealed, but . . . by the same authority of parliament.”

I think S.M.C.D. 172 if it conflicts with the provisions of section 10 of Act 361 or any provisions of the suspended Constitution, 1969, then those provisions must be deemed to have been amended by S.M.C.D. 172, but S.M.C.D. 172 at the time it came into force was valid and of full force.

I will now consider the other two declarations sought. For these, it may be worthwhile to have a firm grasp of the relevant factual basis of the claim. This can be elicited from the statement of the plaintiffs’ case:

“1. The first and second plaintiffs were born citizens of the Lebanon and until August 1978 or thereabouts the first plaintiff had been normally resident in Ghana for some 42 years and the second plaintiff for about six years.

2. During the period of their continuous residence in Ghana the first plaintiff in or about February 1973, lawfully acquired Ghanaian citizenship by naturalisation, and the second plaintiff also acquired Ghanaian citizenship by naturalisation in or about June 1976. The naturalisation of the first and second plaintiffs was obtained specifically under and in the terms of the Ghana Nationality Act, 1971 (Act 361), and the plaintiffs severally acquired the protection conferred by the said Act as well as by the general laws, national and international, and by treaties governing the status of citizens and naturalised persons to which the Government of Ghana are parties.

[p.122] of [1981] GLR 104

3. In or about 26 July 1978 the first plaintiff was arrested by officers of the Special Branch of the Ghana Police Force and taken into police custody without being shown a warrant and without being informed of the grounds for his arrest and detention. On the said date the second plaintiff was abroad and out of Ghana undergoing serious medical treatment.

4. On 27 July 1978 while the first plaintiff was still in custody without any criminal offence, civil debt or other lawful judgment having been pronounced or proved either against him or against the second plaintiff by a duly constituted court of law the first plaintiff heard an official news bulletin broadcast by the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation that “the Fattal Group of Companies had been called upon to pay a penalty of ¢6,339,000 for false declaration and evasion of import duty.’ The said news bulletin was published in the Daily Graphic of 28 July 1978. No such accusation, claim or demand had at any time previously been made against the plaintiffs or their companies other than a claim for purchase tax which had indeed been paid by the plaintiffs.

5. On the same day, 27 July 1978, the first plaintiff was interrogated by officers of the Special Branch as to how he proposed to pay the said sum of ¢6,339,000 and was assured by the officers of the said Special Branch that upon payment of the said sum the first plaintiff would be released from detention.

In a state of great agitation and trepidation the first plaintiff borrowed eight loose cheque leaves and wrote out one cheque for immediate payment of ¢1,000,000 and seven post-dated cheques for the balance of the said amount all of which he handed over to the Special Branch officers. The first plaintiff was, however, not released from detention.

6. On 31 July 1978 in his cell at the Special Branch the first plaintiff was for the first time handed a letter dated 27 July 1978 purporting to be a letter of demand from the Comptroller of Customs for payment of the sum of ¢6,339,442.72 ‘to mark irregularities connected with the motor vehicles imported between the period 1968 and 1970.’ No other particulars were given in the letter with reference to the irregularities alleged or the sum claimed. The plaintiffs say that the said demand was an unlawful demand in that it was not sanctioned by statute or other law at the time it was so made being contrary to the laws then in force relating to the matters thereby involved.

[p.123] of [1981] GLR 104

7. On or about 2 August 1978, the first plaintiff, while still being held in detention by the Special Branch, heard another news broadcast in which it was announced that the plaintiffs had refused to pay the sum of nearly ¢6.4 million demanded as above stated, and that their acquired citizenship of Ghana had in consequence been cancelled and withdrawn by a Decree of the Supreme Military Council and an order made for their immediate deportation from Ghana.

8. Shortly after the said news broadcast on the same day, 2 August 1978, the first plaintiff, still in detention, was handed a letter dated 1 August 1978 purporting to be signed by the Commissioner for

Internal Affairs, informing him that he was forthwith to be deported from Ghana.

9. The first plaintiff was immediately removed under escort to the Kotoka International Airport, Accra, where he was put on aircraft flying out of Ghana. The first plaintiff was deposited at a spot outside Ghana, and has since then remained outside Ghana.

10. The second plaintiff was at the time already outside Ghana undergoing medical treatment in a hospital, and has since remained outside Ghana.

11. By the Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree, 1978 (S.M.C.D. 172) made on 1 August 1978, it was enacted that the plaintiffs ‘shall cease to be citizens of Ghana by naturalisation and accordingly any certificates of naturalisation as citizens of Ghana granted to them are hereby cancelled.’ Further by the aforesaid legislation the plaintiffs were pronounced adjudged and attainted guilty of various ‘trade malpractices and activities constituting economic sabotage and subversion of the economy of Ghana contrary to the public interest,’ and that they ‘have by their said acts forfeited their right to continue to be citizens of Ghana by naturalisation’.” Although the Attorney-General as the second defendant would appear to have filed a statement of case for himself and presumably for the first defendant, the gravamen of the defence is contained in an amendment to the statement of the defendants’ case which was filed on 9 March 1981. The significant portions are:

“2. The defendant states that the plaintiffs’ were lawfully denaturalised and that the defendant will rely on National Redemption Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1972, as subsequently amended, and in particular section 3 (2) and (3) and also on the Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree, 1978 (S.M.C.D. 172).

[p.124] of [1981] GLR 104

3. The defendant says that the plaintiffs were deported from Ghana in August 1978, under E.I.s.

144 and 145 respectively made on 1 August 1978, by the Commissioner for Internal Affairs in exercise of powers conferred on the Commissioner by the Aliens Act, 1963 (Act 160), and in particular by sections 12 (1) (f) and 13 thereof.

4. The discretion conferred on the Commissioner by sections 12 (1) (f) and 13 of the Aliens Act, 1963, in exercise of which the plaintiffs were deported, is not open to challenge or scrutiny in this or any other court. Neither is the opinion of the Commissioner, expressed in E.I.s, 144 and 145 of 1978 to the effect that the plaintiffs’ presence in Ghana is not conducive to the public good, open to examination in this or any other court for the purpose of establishing whether or not there are good grounds or sufficient evidence to support that opinion.

5. It is denied that the deportation of the plaintiffs which occurred long before the Constitution, 1979, came into effect, is or can in anyway be subject to the provisions of that Constitution being an act fully completed at a time when that Constitution did not exist.

6. The defendant, however, will rely on article 30 (3) (d) and (f) of the Constitution, were the Constitution to be said to be applicable.

7. The defendant says therefore that the plaintiffs’ statement of case discloses no ground in law or at all upon which the commissioner’s afore mentioned discretion under Act 160 can be questioned nor can his afore mentioned opinion be examined in this honourable court or any other court. Also the defendant says that the plaintiffs’ statement discloses no cause of action and therefore the plaintiffs are entitled to none of the reliefs sought or any other relief in this action.”

Having regard to the declarations sought, it is obvious that a number of the facts stated in the statements of the cases of the parties are quite irrelevant and cannot possibly assist this court in its effort at resolving the issues in controversy between the parties. Speaking for myself, I deplore this tendency, alas too rampant now, of burdening the statement of cases with a lot of immaterial and unnecessary facts which bedevil the cases and mark simple issues with the stamp of complexity. In my respectful opinion, this unfortunate but seemingly innocuous practice must be nibbed in the bud before it swamps us.

[p.125] of [1981] GLR 104

I think the undisputed facts upon which this case has to be decided devoid of unnecessary details is simple: The plaintiffs were until 1 August 1978 citizens of Ghana by naturalisation. On 1 August 1978 by the Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree, 1978, they were deprived of their Ghanaian citizenships and certificates of naturalisation previously granted to them were statutorily cancelled. On 24 September 1979, the Constitution, 1979, came into force. It is upon these facts that the plaintiffs maintain that S.M.C.D. 172 is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution and is therefore void and of no effect. The defendants naturally resist this contention.

S.M.C.D. 172 is a short one and it reads:

“GHANA NATIONALITY (AMENDMENT) DECREE, 1978 WHEREAS the persons specified in the Schedule to this Decree are citizens of Ghana by naturalisation;

AND WHEREAS, the Supreme Military Council is satisfied that the said persons have, over the years engaged in serious trade malpractices and in activities constituting economic sabotage and subversion of the economy of Ghana contrary to the public interest;

AND WHEREAS the Supreme Military Council is therefore satisfied that the said persons have by their acts forfeited their right to continue to be citizens of Ghana by naturalisation;

NOW, THEREFORE BE IT ENACTED by the Supreme Military Council as follows:

1. The persons specified in the Schedule to this Decree shall cease to be citizens of Ghana by naturalisation and accordingly any certificates of naturalisation as citizens of Ghana granted to them are hereby cancelled.

2. This Decree shall be deemed to have come into force on the 1st day of August, 1978.

SCHEDULE MOHAMED FOUAD FATAL MAHMOUD FATAL Made this 1st day of August, 1978 LT.-GENERAL F. W. K. AKUFFO Chairman of the Supreme Military Council.”

In the course of considering this matter, I posed the hypothetical question, suppose for “naturalisation” wherever it occurs, the word

[p.126] of [1981] GLR 104 “birth” were substituted in S.M.C.D. 172, will the constitutional invalidation of the said Decree restore the lost citizenship? I am given to understand that in such a case it will, as citizenship by birth is a serious thing. I think if that is right then the same will apply to citizenship by naturalisation as the distinction sought to be drawn is illogical, illusive and capricious.

The questions that immediately call for answers are in my opinion, inter alia, the following:

(1) Is S.M.C.D. 172 an existing law?

(2) Is S.M.C.D. 172 inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Constitution?

(3) If yes, what is the effect of the inconsistency?

1. Is S.M.C.D. 172 an existing law?

The Constitution, 1979, itself gives a definition of the existing law in its article 4 (4) where it is provided:

“4. (4) The existing law shall… comprise the written and unwritten laws of Ghana as they existed immediately before the coming into force of this constitution, and any Act, Decree or statutory instrument issued or made before that date, which is to come into force on or after that date.”

On this definition it is clear that any Act, Decree or statutory instrument made before 24 September 1979 and which came into force before that date is an existing law. Measured against this explanatory definition, it seems to me that prima facie S.M.C.D. 172 is an existing law.

I am prepared to concede that an alleged existing law to which no effect whatsoever can be given ought to be properly described as obsolete. It may be called existing law in the narrow sense that it is on the statute books and has not been formally repealed but because no effect of any sort can be given to it, it indeed lacks the attribute of law. This is because law properly so-called must have at all periods of its existence an element of enforceability by the courts. Call it sanctions.

Now if S.M.C.D. 172 is a spent force, so that there will now be no conceivable situation or circumstances which will call for its application by the court, then in my humble opinion, it was law but it is now not an existing law. In the course of the argument before this court, I got the impression from the submissions of the Attorney-General’s representative, that it is being assumed that S.M.C.D. 172 has exhausted its effect. The argument sustaining this assumption would seem to be that it set out to denaturalise the defendants and to cancel their certificates of naturalisation and consequently having

[p.127] of [1981] GLR 104 achieved these objects, it has no further operative force. It seems to me that this is a too facile and rather simplistic contention; subjected to a meticulous analysis the assumption can successfully be exposed as misconceived.

In the first place the argument fails to recognise and appreciate the fact that citizenship is a status and it is generally passed on from parent to child continuously from generation to generation. Furthermore deprivation of citizenship, dependent as it is, on a statute will continue as long as the statute is extant, since any claim to citizenship can normally be rebutted by the disabling statute.

The point needs illustration: Suppose the two plaintiffs were now in 1981 to claim in an action at law at the High Court to be citizens of Ghana. And suppose the Constitution, 1979, makes no provision whatsoever in relation to citizenship. Will their claim not be defeated by reliance on S.M.C.D. 172? I think so. if so then in 1981, the Decree is not a spent force. Suppose six months after the passing of S.M.C.D. 172, i.e. in 1979, and before the Constitution came into force, the defendants were to return to Ghana and claim to be Ghanaian citizens would they not have been met by the provisions of S.M.C.D.

172? I think so. If so then in 1979 the Decree would not be a spent force.

If S.M.C.D. 172 is exhausted, at what date did it cease to have effect? At what point of time one may ask between 1 August 1978 and 24 September 1979 did it cease to be operative? I cannot help thinking that if it can be established that the plaintiffs are dead, then a plausible but debatable argument of a sort can probably be advanced that S.M.C.D. 172 is a spent force since those it affects are no more. Even then the position is not satisfactory and that argument can also be exposed as misconceived.

Suppose after the coming into force of the Constitution, 1979, any of the defendants were to father a child outside Ghana whose mother is a non-Ghanaian and the child was born after the coming into force of the Constitution. And suppose the Constitution did not invalidate S.M.C.D. 172. Article 13 (b) of the Constitution provides:

“13. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, . . .

(b) a person born outside Ghana after the coming into force of this Constitution shall become a citizen of Ghana at the date of his birth if either of his parents is or was a citizen of Ghana.”

Will a claim for citizenship by a guardian ad litem for such a child founded on article 13 (b) not be met on behalf of the State by reliance on S.M.C.D. 172? The fact that citizenship once acquired is

[p.128] of [1981] GLR 104 under certain circumstances transmissible to one’s progeny (as I have already pointed out) militates against the argument that by their death, the defendants will render otiose the legal effect of S.M.C.D. 172. I think critical consideration of these questions and matters shows that the contention that S.M.C.D. 172 ceased to be operative before 24 September 1979 is clearly untenable.

I hold that S.M.C.D. 172 is a law which existed in Ghana immediately before the coming into force of the Constitution and consequently an outstanding question is whether or not it is inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Constitution.

2. Is S.M.C.D. 172 inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Constitution?

The Constitution, 1979, has made elaborate provisions spelling out the circumstances under which, and the authority by which a person who is a citizen by naturalisation can be deprived of his citizenship. The provisions contained in article 17 (3) are:

“17. (3) The High Court of Justice may, on an application made in that behalf by the Attorney-General, deprive a person who is a citizen of Ghana, otherwise than by birth, or that citizenship on the ground – (a) that the activities of that person are inimical to the security of the State or prejudicial to public morality or the public interest; or (b) that that citizenship was acquired by fraud, misrepresentation or any other improper or irregular practice.”

Article 17 (3) (a) is virtually identical with section 10 of the Ghana Nationality Act, 1971 (Act 361), which provides:

“10. The High Court of Justice may, on an application made in that behalf by the Attorney-General, deprive any person who is a citizen of Ghana, otherwise than by birth, of that citizenship on the ground that the activities of any such person are inimical to the security of the state or prejudicial to public morality or the public interest.”

Under the constitutional scheme contained in article 17 (3) the authority to deprive a naturalised person of his citizenship is neither the executive nor the legislature. It is the judiciary acting by the High Court and upon constitutionally specified and proven grounds. This provision is now new; article 17 (3) was substantially culled from article 10 (3) of the Constitution, 1969. The law, i.e. S.M.C.D. 17

[p.129] of [1981] GLR 104 that deprives a person of his citizenship by legislative mode is clearly inconsistent with the provisions contained in article 17 (3) of the Constitution, 1979.

Furthermore the preamble to S.M.C.D. 172 shows the reasons why the legislature passed the said Decree. Reading the preamble and the statement of the plaintiffs’ case, it is clear that the legislature was in effect passing judgments on the conduct of the plaintiffs and imposing the punishment of deprivation of citizenship for the alleged conduct.

This is clearly a legislative judgment and article 89 (1) (a) of our Constitution completely proscribes this sort of legislation. Moreover as was held by the U.S. Supreme Court in Trop v. Dulles 356 U.S. 86 (1958) deprivation of citizenship for criminal offence may very well be “cruel and unusual punishment” and although article 23 (1) (a) does not use the term cruel and unusual, I think deprivation of citizenship in circumstances rendering the person stateless would seem to be cruel and inhuman and degrading punishment and ought to be considered to contravene at least the spirit of articles 23 (1) (a) and 21 (1) of the Constitution, 1979. I think S.M.C.D. 172 for the reasons I have canvassed must be taken to be definitely inconsistent with article 17 (3) and a contravention of the spirit of articles 23 (1) (a) and 21 (1).

3. What is the effect of the inconsistency or contravention?

Once it is established that an existing law is inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Constitution, then our Constitution itself indicates in as unequivocal a language as cannot be mistaken the effect which the court should give to the said law. As it is put in clause 2 in the very first article of the Constitution:

“(2) This Constitution shall be the supreme law of Ghana and any other law found to be inconsistent with any provision of this Constitution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void and of no effect.”

This provision was lifted without any alteration in form or phraseology from article 1 (2) of the Constitution, 1969. I recall considering its effect in Sam v. Comptroller of Customs and Excise [1971] 1 G.L.R. 289 at p. 316 where I said:

“[T]his country has never in its history experienced so profound and imperial a constitutional provision as transcendent and supreme as article 1 (2) of the Constitution, reminiscent as it is of medieval, monarchical absolutism. Observe its language: ‘This Constitution shall be the supreme law of Ghana and any other law found to be inconsistent with any provision of this Constitution

[p.130] of [1981] GLR 104 shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void and of no effect.

It seems to me that this constitutional provision at once cast into a crucible… all the laws of the land and subjected them to the test of constitutional propriety. All those that failed the test became void and the task of an interpreter and therefore of a Ghanaian judge became to some extent simplified: It is to search in the crucible for the relevant remnants of the inconsistent provisions so that he can refuse to give effect to them.

Thus the concept of legislative supremacy, which necessarily colours judicial interpretation in England, can hardly apply here. Our legislature is a subordinate not sovereign institution and it bends to the supremacy of our Constitution as our courts must bow as well to our Constitution when construing any enactment of our legislature.”

I still stand by these views which I expressed nearly ten years ago. In clinging to these views I find persuasive support in the mighty words of Chief Justice Marshall in the celebrated American case Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) where the relationship between a legislature subordinate to a constitution was spelled out with overwhelming conviction at pp. 176-177:

“The distinction between a government with limited and unlimited powers is abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed, are of equal obligation. It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it.”

I am satisfied that by the provision of article 1 (2) of the Constitution, S.M.C.D. 172 is “void and of no effect” since it is inconsistent with article 17 (3) of the Constitution. What does this mean? In my view it means that on a claim by the plaintiffs that they are citizens of Ghana by naturalisation they cannot be challenged by any defendant praying in aid S.M.C.D. 172 and yet the only logical, and in the absence of the Constitution, the apparently lawful way of meeting such a claim, if it is intended to resist it, is by resorting to S.M.C.D. 172.

Holding as I do that the Decree is void, I think any court that countenances such a defence and at the same time accepts article 1 (2) will be paying lip-service to the supremacy of the Constitution as is postulated by article 1 (2) while renouncing the said article 1 (2) of the Constitution by giving effect to a provision which it has mandatorily directed must not be given any effect. This is a Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde approach to the construction of the Constitution which in my view should not be entertained as Chief Justice Marshall so clearly admonished.

[p.131] of [1981] GLR 104

The only arguments I am aware of, that have a doubtful and illusory tendency of sustaining the denaturalisation of the plaintiffs are two-fold and interrelated: The first is that the Constitution came into force on 24 September 1979 and the provision in article 1 (2) is forward looking and that the “shall be … void and of no effect” provision is intended to embrace the future operation of the law from 24 September 1979 onwards. Even if the argument is so conceived and so formulated, it can hardly be an argument to a claim by the plaintiffs in 1981 that they are citizens by naturalisation if the only answer is the citation of the said law as authority for their denaturalisation. It can only mean that in 1981 effect is being given to a law that the Constitution said should be void and of no effect.

The second argument is the effect of repeals on the previous operation of an enactment. Under the provisions of section 8 of the Interpretation Act, 1960 (C.A. 4), the previous operation of an Act is not affected by its repeal. In other words a repeal does not make an Act void, it only makes its future operation ineffective but its past operation perfectly effective and valid.

I am prepared to concede to the proposition that the Constitution is forward looking and does not invalidate the previous operation of repugnant statutes. It only invalidates their future operation. This means that the law recognises the legal position that between 1 August 1978 and 24 September 1979, the plaintiffs were not citizens of Ghana. It is their status after the 24 September 1979 that is in issue here.

It must be remembered that citizenship or no citizenship is a continuing status and the status is two and only two! When once the law begins to confer or deprive citizenship it can only at any one time create the “citizen” status or the “no citizen” status, there is never a third status and the destruction of one automatically invites the other, there is never a void. In my view it is failure to accept this, that animates the majority decision.

One point therefore that the argument regarding repeals singularly ignores is that citizenship is a status with a dynamic principle, its existence or non-existence is a continuing state of affairs. When once a person acquires or loses citizenship then that state of affairs continues for as long as it invites recognition by the law. Acquisition or loss of citizenship is therefore not a static physical occurrence at just one particular moment of time. A classic description of the concept illustrative of this point is found in the judgment of the British Mexican Claims Commission in Re Lynch Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases (1929-30) 221 at p. 222 where it is stated:

[p.132] of [1981] GLR 104

“A man’s nationality forms a continuing state of things and not a physical fact which occurs at a particular moment. A man’s nationality is a continuing legal relationship between the sovereign State on the one hand and the citizen on the other. The fundamental basis of a man’s nationality is his membership of an independent political community.”

This definition is in consonance with the view of the International Court of Justice in the Nottebohm Case (Second Phase) I.C.J. (1955) at p. 23. If the concept of citizenship as a status of a continuing nature is accepted, then the question that necessarily arises is, what is it that is inconsistent with the provision of the Constitution and which the Constitution, 1979, art. 1 (2) mandates should be of no legal effect? There can be no doubt that the status of “no citizen” which was conferred on the plaintiffs is what is said to conflict with the provisions of the Constitution and the Constitution directs that this “no citizen” status created by S.M.C.D. 172 is to be void and of no effect.

The status of “no citizen” is not to continue; its future operation is halted although its past operation is intact. In my view if the “no citizen” status disappears, the only status that will necessarily occupy the apparent vacuum will be the “citizen” status and since this is a continuing state of things the Constitution has conjured it up with effect from 24 September 1979 and it is to continue, until the law puts an end to it or otherwise disposes of it.

I have read the majority judgment in this case but with all due respect, I regret to say that I cannot in conscience subscribe to the conclusions arrived at nor do I accept as valid the steps in the reasoning supporting the conclusion. My brother Archer J.S.C. writing for the majority held at p. 114:

“… the provisions of section 10 of the Ghana Nationality Act, 1971 (Act 361), must be deemed to have been amended by S.M.C.D. 172 by virtue of the fact that section 10 of the Act conflicted with the provisions of the Decree which in the clear words of section 3 (3) of the Proclamation, 1972, must prevail over section 10 of Act 361. It is therefore not open to any court of law to declare S.M.C.D. 172 ultra vires and thus null and void.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

It must be noted that section 10 of the Ghana Nationality Act, 1971 (Act 361), is an attenuated form of article 17 (3). By this holding the majority in effect sees a conflict between section 10 of Act 361 and S.M.C.D. 172. The inference is that S.M.C.D. 172 is in conflict with article 17 (3). So far so good. In a further holding the

[p.133] of [1981] GLR 104 majority states, “There is no doubt that S.M.C.D. 172 is still on the statute book as part of the written laws of the land.”

This is also good and I accept it. In the course of the reasoning the majority drew attention to article 4 (4) of the Constitution, 1979, already referred to in this judgment, and like me concluded, “By this definition S.M.C.D. 172 is an existing law and forms part of the laws of Ghana as categorised in article 4 (1) of the Constitution.” This is equally good and, of course, I have already agreed with it. After this exercise the majority decision classified statutes into three “volcanic” categories of active, dormant and extinct. With all due respect, I think the volcanic classification is unrealistic. There are only two types of statutes for our purpose: (1) operative and (2) ineffective. There is not a third category. After holding, inter alia, that S.M.C.D. 172 is spent force, the majority came to this amazing conclusion at p. 118;

“The second legal issue for determination by the court must therefore be resolved in favour of the defendants’ contention that although the Decree under which the plaintiffs were deprived of their Ghanaian citizenship is still on the statute books as an existing law, yet it is not inconsistent with any provisions of the Constitution, 1979. Accordingly the declaration sought by the plaintiffs must be refused.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

I dissent most emphatically from this extraordinary holding. This volte-face cannot be justified in view of the earlier holding by the majority that S.M.C.D. 172 conflicted with section 10 of Act 361. which is the same as article 17 (3) (a). So that in effect S.M.C.D. 172 is in conflict with article 17 (3) (a) of the Constitution. I am afraid the decision is per incuriam and I cannot subscribe to it. But this is not all.

The Supreme Court in one single sentence of the majority achieved a self-imposed limitation on its jurisdiction contained in the clear unmistakeable and peremptory provision of article 1 (2) when the majority held, “The court can nullify an existing law only if at the time it was passed it was invalid.” This is so unnecessary for the decision that I can only hope that this purported restriction of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court will without doubt be studiously ignored. This is because it is a restriction that is logically unsound. Now it seems article 1 (2) is to be read needlessly like this:

“1. (2) This constitution shall be the supreme law of Ghana and any other law, excluding any law valid at the time it was passed, found to be inconsistent with any provision of this Constitution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void and of no effect.”

[p.134] of [1981] GLR 104

So what happens to laws valid at the time they were passed but which are not consistent with the provisions of the Constitution? Can the Supreme Court not nullify them? I am firmly of the opinion that they are void and of no effect and the inserted words as emphasised above is therefore otiose.

I believe if a statute is amenable to two reasonable interpretations one favourable to the executive and the other favourable to the individual in a suit involving the individual and the executive, then the interpretation in favour of the individual must be preferred, for that will accord with the spirit of the Constitution, 1979, committed as it is to protecting the individual against excessive executive power.

It seems to me that loss of citizenship under our constitutional scheme can only be justified in terms of article 17 (3). Moreover, under the provisions of article 15 (2) of the Universal Declarations of Human Rights approved by the United Nations on 10 December 1948, it is provided, “No man shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.” We are a part of the United Nations.

We are therefore committed to uphold this not only by the international obligations we undertook when we joined the United Nations, but also by virtue of the municipal constitutional mandate contained in article 11 of the Constitution, 1979. The arbitrary deprivation of citizenship by a group of persons temporarily in control of the legislative apparatus is invidious and I am inclined to agree with the view expressed by Mr. Justice Hugo Black in Afroyim v. Rusk 387 U.S. 253 at p. 268 when he said, “The very nature of our free society makes it completely incongruous to have a rule of law under which a group of citizens temporarily in office deprive any group of citizens of their citizenship.”

From the nature of the arguments advanced and from a study of the cases of the parties, it seems to me that the government entertains serious apprehension that the activities of the plaintiffs have been undermining the revenue and subverting the public interest. For instance there is an apparent suspicion that the plaintiffs were concerned with “false declarations and evasion of import duty” involving the colossal sum of ¢6,339,442.72 and that there were “irregularities connected with the motor vehicles imported between 1968 and 1970” into the country presumably by or on behalf of the plaintiffs. Are these caught within the purview of article 17 of the Constitution? I will not wish to deprive the government of the right to canvass this in the proper forum and I make no pronouncement on them.

The duty of our government under the very first article of

[p.135] of [1981] GLR 104 our Constitution is to protect the public interest: The government is specifically enjoined to exercise its powers for the welfare of the people in the manner and within the limits laid down in the Constitution. Limits of the power and the repository of the power to deprive a person of citizenship are clearly laid down in the Constitution. In view of this and having regard to the peremptory language of articles 1 (2) and 17 of the Constitution, I hold that S.M.C.D. 172 is inconsistent with the Constitution and is null and void.

There was also a very startling pronouncement about the plaintiffs in the judgment of the majority which I cannot ignore. It was said that S.M.C.D. 172 does not constitute a perpetual injunction restraining them from applying for naturalisation.” I am afraid as long as S.M.C.D. 172 continues as an existing law on the statute books then since its provisions have been held by the majority not to be inconsistent with any provision of the Constitution, the plaintiffs are perpetually restrained from being Ghanaians.

In all the circumstances of this case, I will not grant the first declaration designated (a) but I will grant the other declarations, namely (b) and (c) subject to the right of the government if it so pleases to institute the proper proceedings to deprive the plaintiffs of their citizenship if their alleged acts and the public interest warrant it.

I do not think it is proper to make any declaration in regard to (d). If declarations (b) and (c) are granted, it means the plaintiffs are entitled to return to Ghana. In my view, their deportation lapsed on 24 September 1979, after that date there was no such thing as their continued deportation. The proper declaration will be that they are entitled to return to Ghana as citizens of Ghana. I would declare accordingly.

DECISION

Action dismissed.

D. R. K. S.

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