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[1981] SLR (SC) 6Supreme Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1981

MEKKAOUI vs. MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS [1981] GLR 664

26 June 1981 · CHARLES CRABBE JSC · ≈ 99 min read

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OSCOLAMEKKAOUI v MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS [1981] GLR 664 [1981] SLR (SC) 6
APAMEKKAOUI v MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS [1981] GLR 664, [1981] SLR (SC) 6 (Ghana).
BluebookMEKKAOUI v MINISTER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS [1981] GLR 664, [1981] SLR (SC) 6 (Ghana Sup. Ct. 1981).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Magor and St. Mellons Rural District Council v. Newport Corporation [1952] A.C. 189; [1951] 2 All E.R. 839; [1951] 2 T.L.R. 935; 115 J.P. 613, H.L.; affirming [1950] 2 All E.R.1226, C.A.

(2) R. v. Wimbledom Justices; Ex parte Derwent [1953] 1 Q.B. 380; [1953] 2 W.L.R. 350; [1953] 1 All E.R. 390; 117 J.P. 113; 97 S.J. 116; 51 L.G.R. 432, D.C.

(3) Sam v. Comptroller of Customs and Excise [1971] 1 G.L.R. 289.

(4) Shannon Realties Ltd. v. St. Micheal, Ville De [1924] A.C.185; 93 L.J.P.C. 81; 130 L.T. 518, P.C. (5) Grey v. Pearson (1857) 6 H.L.C. 61; 10 E.R. 1216.

(6) Lauri v. Renad [1892] 3 Ch. 402; 61 L.J.Ch. 580; 62 L.T. 275; 40 W.R. 678, 8 T.L.R. 637; 36 S.J.

572, C.A.

(7) Ward v. British Oak Insurance Co., Ltd. [1932] 1 K.B. 392; 101 L.J.K.B. 240; 146 L.T. 323; 48 T.L.R. 13, C.A.

(8) Fattal v. Minister for Internal Affairs [1981] G.L.R. 104, S.C.

[p.668] of [1981] GLR 664 (9) Asamoah v. The Republic [1972] 1 G.L.R. 117.

(10) Jennings v. Kelly [1940] A.C. 206; [1939] 4 All E.R. 464; 109 L.J.P.C. 38; 162 L.T. 1; 56 T.L.R.

154; 84 S.J. 131, H.L.

(11) Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Dowdall, O’Mahoney & Co., Ltd. [1952] A.C. 401; [1952] 1 All E.R. 531; [1952] 1 T.L.R. 560; 96 S.J. 148; [1952] T.R. 85; 45 R. & T.T. 204; 33 T.C. 259; 31 A.T.C. 126, H.L.

(12) Panter v. Attorney-General (1772) 6 Bro. P.C. 486; 2 E.R. 1217.

(13) R. v. Bailey (1800) Russ. & R.1.

(14) Fisher v. Bell [1961] 1 Q.B. 394; [1960] 3 W.L.R. 919; [1960] 3 All E.R. 731; 125 J.P. 101; 104 S.J. 612.

(15) Republic v. Director of Special Branch; Ex parte Salifa [1968] G.L.R. 646.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION by the plaintiff for, inter alia, a declaration that his purported denaturalisation by the Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 42), was null and void. The facts are fully set out in the judgment of Charles Crabbe J.S.C.

COUNSEL

B. E. Kwaw-Swanzy, E. D. Kom and G. Thompson for the plaintiff.

C. H. A. Tetteh, Solicitor-General, for the defendants.

JUDGMENT OF CHARLES CRABBE J.S.C.

(The judgment of his lordship was read by Archer J.S.C.). The plaintiff was a Lebanese by birth. He was born on 29 October 1930, at Tripoli, in the Lebanon. He has been resident in Ghana for the past 24 years. He came to the Gold Coast in 1956. In June 1976, he lawfully acquired citizenship of Ghana by naturalisation. The naturalisation was acquired under the terms of the Ghana Nationality Act, 1971 (Act 361). This was after the plaintiff had necessarily renounced his Lebanese nationality by birth. He claims that he thus acquired the protection and rights conferred by the Act, as well as by treaties governing the status of citizens and naturalised persons to which the Government of Ghana is a party.

On or about 3 January 1980, a public announcement, purporting to emanate from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, was read on Radio Ghana. Certain persons, including the plaintiff, were requested to report by 14 January 1980, to the Chief Immigration Officer of the Ministry of Internal Affairs with their passports. The announcement was published in the national newspapers on 4 January 1980. On the faith of that announcement, the plaintiff

[p.669] of [1981] GLR 664 handed over his passport to the Chief Immigration Officer. In return, he was given a letter which, in effect, informed him that he had ceased to be a citizen of Ghana by naturalisation, on the strength of the Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 42). That Decree purported to deprive certain persons of their citizenship by naturalisation. He was among those affected. He had to leave Ghana by 21 January 1980.

He stated further that on 26 September 1979, he was arrested by officers of the Ghana Police Force. He was incarcerated at the Legon Police Station cells. In October 1979, while still under arrest, he was informed that he was to be deported because his citizenship of Ghana by naturalisation had been revoked by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. An order of habeas corpus, issued on 2 October 1979, by the High Court of Justice, Accra, led to his unconditional release by the police.

On 21 January 1980, he appeared before the Implementation Committee, set up by the government, of which the first defendant was the chairman and the second defendant a member. The committee declared that the government was committed to implementing A.F.R.C.D. 42, but that he should apply for an extension of the time permitted for him to reside in Ghana. Following this meeting, he called on the Chief Immigration Officer for the necessary extension. He was informed by the officials that there was no possibility of any extension of time as he was no longer a citizen of Ghana nor a citizen of any known country. He had been rendered stateless. Hence this action, seeking a declaration:

“(a) That the Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 42), in so far as it purports to deprive the plaintiff of his status as a citizen of Ghana by naturalisation without obtaining a judicial order of the High Court of Justice in that behalf:

(1) is ultra vires the powers conferred on the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council;

(2) is null and void and of no effect whatever as being contrary to law and in particular to the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1979, and the Constitution, 1969, of the Republic of Ghana;

(3) is inconsistent with or in contravention of the provisions of chapters 5, 6, 9 and 12 of the Constitution, 1979, of the Republic of Ghana.

(b) That the said A.F.R.C.D. 42 was published after 24 September 1979, and is therefore null and void and of no effect whatever.

[p.670] of [1981] GLR 664

(c) That the said A.F.R.C.D. 42 is not an executive, legislative or judicial Act of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council which assumed the reins of government on 4 June 1979 and vacated office or ceased to exist on 24 September 1979.

(d) That the plaintiff is a citizen of Ghana by naturalisation, the Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 42) notwithstanding.”

In essence, the plaintiff is seeking a declaration that he is a citizen of Ghana by naturalisation. The defendants contend that:

“(a) A.F.R.C.D. 42 was not published after the coming into force of the Constitution, 1979. Since it was made on 17 September 1979, it came into force on 4 September 1979, and was in fact, published in the gazette on 22 September 1979.

(b) A.F.R.C.D. 42 was not enacted by Parliament and cannot therefore be deemed to be a legislative judgment for purposes of article 89 of the Constitution, 1979.

(c) A.F.R.C.D. 42 was not enacted by parliament and though it was given retrospective effect by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (A.F.R.C.), it cannot be invalidated by virtue of article 89 (1)

(b) of the Constitution, 1979, since it is the valid legislative act of the A.F.R.C.

(d) A.F.R.C.D. 42 cannot by any means whatsoever be deemed to be ultra vires the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1979.

(e) Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979, apply, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the said Constitution, by virtue of article 217 of the said Constitution.

(f) Further by virtue of the provisions of section 15 (2) of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979, the plaintiff cannot question the legislative act of the A.F.R.C. in any court including this honourable court. The plaintiff’s claim is misconceived and the court should therefore decline jurisdiction.”

In view of the defence set up by the defendants, Mr. George Thompson, junior counsel for the plaintiff, swore to an affidavit in which he deposed, inter alia, that:

“3. Following a letter dated 24 February 1981, written by B. E. Kwaw-Swanzy, Esquire, and addressed to the

[p.671] of [1981] GLR 664

General Manager of the Printing Division of the Ghana Publishing Corporation, a meeting was held at the office of the said General Manager at which I was present in the company of B.E. Kwaw-Swanzy, Esquire.

4. At that meeting, the General Manager informed us that he could not comply with our request in writing because it was not backed by a court order.

5. The General Manager, however, informed us orally that: (a) The first proof of the Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 42), was sent to the Attorney-General’s Office on 9 October 1979.

(b) The said proof was returned to the press on 11 October 1979.

(c) Amendments made on the proof included an insertion relating to the ‘date of commencement’ of the Decree.

(d) The date of commencement thus inserted was ‘4 September 1979.’ (e) There was a minute on the proof written and signed by Mr. G. Nikoi, a Principal State Attorney, and dated 10 October 1979 which read as follows, ‘Approved for publication subject to amendment indicated on the proof.’ (f) The Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 42), was published in Gazette No. 45 of 22 September 1979.

(g) The Gazette No. 45 of 22 September 1979 was published and despatched on 8 November 1979.”

To that affidavit, a senior legislative officer deposed to an affidavit in which he stated, inter alia:

“3. That I am informed and verily believe the same to be true that the Attorney-General’s Office was instructed on 4 September 1979, by the A.F.R.C. to draft a Decree denaturalising the persons listed in A.F.R.C.D. 42.

4. That on 5 September 1979, the A.F.R.C. confirmed in writing its instructions to the Attorney-General’s Office, as aforesaid to the effect that all the persons named in A.F.R.C.D. 42 should be denaturalised with immediate effect. A copy of the A.F.R.C. letter dated 5 September 1979 is attached and marked ‘A’.

5. Action was taken by the office on the aforesaid instruction and a draft Decree was submitted on 10 September 1979 for the signature of the Chairman of the A.F.R.C.

[p.672] of [1981] GLR 664

6. On 17 September 1979, the Chairman of the A.F.R.C. duly signed A.F.R.C.D. 42 and returned it to the Attorney-General’s Office for appropriate action.

7. Acting on the earlier instructions of the AFRC to denaturalise the persons named ‘with immediate effect,’ this office inserted 4 September 1979, being the date on which the A.F.R.C.’s instructions to denaturalise the named persons were first communicated to this office. (This is in consonance with practice.)

8. The printing and publication of the Decree (A.F.R.C.D. 42) thereafter went through the normal processes.”

Citizenship is a relationship that exists between a state and an individual. That relationship is prescribed by law. There are certain rights and duties attendant upon the status of being a citizen of a state. But there are obligations. For the purposes of this case, I need not go into all that. It is sufficient to state that the modern concept of citizenship is the creation of the law. Formerly, a man had the status of a subject in relation to his monarch. That is the ancient English theory. In continental Europe, the concept was an historical notion of a relationship to a city, to a borough—with its attendant liberties. In the social contract doctrine of Rousseau, the citoyen—the citizen—was a participant in the formation of the general will. That was in contra-distinction to the sujet—the subject. Citoyen denoted civic freedom. The American concept stresses the idea of a republican emancipation.

But nationality is a broader term. It comprises relationship to a state which does not necessarily confer political rights. However, there are privileges, such as protection abroad. Thus ships and aircraft possess nationality.

Originally, with us, the idea of citizenship was unknown. A person always belonged to a family. Families made up the clan. Whether one belonged to the matrilineal system or to the patrilineal system, the family was the basis. Where with pride, Marcus Tullius Cicero claims, Civis Romanus sum —”I am a Roman Citizen” —a Ghanaian would refer, with equal pride, to his clan relationship—Asona, Twidan, Aduana, Ada, Ekuona, Oyoko, Agona, etc.

With the British administration of the Gold Coast, came the idea of a British subject. With independence came the status of a citizen of Ghana. The Ghana (Constitution) Order-in-Council, 1957—the 1957 Independence Constitution—did not contain any provision regulating citizenship. It was left to an Act of Parliament—the Ghana Nationality and Citizenship Act, 1957 (No. 1 of 1957). That was the first Act of the sovereign legislature of Ghana.

[p.673] of [1981] GLR 664

Following the Republican Constitution, 1960, the 1957 Act was repealed by the Ghana Nationality Act, 1961 (Act 62). The Constitution, 1969, provided in article 10 thereof that:

“10. (1) Parliament may make provision for the acquisition of citizenship of Ghana by persons who are not eligible or who are no longer eligible to become citizens of Ghana under the provisions of this Chapter.

(2) Save as otherwise provided in article 8 of this Constitution, no person shall be registered to be a citizen of Ghana unless at the time of his application for registration he is able to speak and understand a Ghanaian language.

(3) The High Court of Justice may, on an application made in that behalf by the Attorney-General, deprive any person who is a citizen of Ghana, otherwise than by birth, of that citizenship on the ground that the activities of any such person are inimical to the security of the state or prejudicial to public morality or the public interest.

(4) Parliament may make provision for the renunciation by any person of his citizenship of Ghana.”

These provisions became the bedrock upon which the Ghana Nationality Act, 1971 (Act 361), is based. Act 361 is the law under which the plaintiff acquired his citizenship of Ghana by naturalisation. With that acquisition, came the loss of his nationality by birth. With that acquisition were predicated the political rights of the plaintiff. That is the significance of the acquisition. And that is the pain of the loss of his citizenship of Ghana. And since the acquisition was by law, the loss of the consequences of that acquisition should be by law.

Act 361 provided, in section 10 thereof, the method by which the loss could be occasioned. That method was not used in the case of the plaintiff. The wording of that section is based on article 10 (3) of the Constitution, 1969. Indeed, the wording is identical. Instead, some other method was used. That is to say, the Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 42), was used to deprive the plaintiff of the predicates of his citizenship. And now, he calls in question the validity of that Decree.

He bases his challenge both on facts and on the law. But the facts lead to the law. The facts that lead to the law emanate from the evidence of an officer of the Ghana Publishing Corporation. To resolve the doubts created by the conflicting statements as contained in the various statements and affidavits about the promulgation of A.F.R.C.D. 42, the plaintiff called evidence on oath.

[p.674] of [1981] GLR 664

In view of the importance of that evidence by Mr. Aryee, I quote it in full, as I was able to take it down:

“I am a Superintendent of Works in charge of costing and estimating, Printing Division, Ghana Publishing Corporation. Whenever a manuscript comes to the division, it first comes to me, and I estimate how much, in the case of Decrees and instruments and the Gazette, they are to be priced. After pricing the manuscript, I send it to the factory. It does not come back to me. It goes back to the author. From the author it comes back to me. When there are no major alterations in the proof I send it to the factory for printing. But if there are corrections which need to be returned to the author for his final approval, it is returned back [sic] to me.

I have in front of me A.F.R.C.D. 42. I have worked on it. The first time the manuscript of the Decree came to me from the Attorney-General’s Department was on 19 September 1979. The commencement date was not on the manuscript. The manuscript was not signed. I have the proof of the manuscript. I wish to tender it in evidence. [No objection, admitted as exhibit SC1.] The date on which I received the proof was on 11 October 1979. The date ‘4 September 1979’ is written in ink. That had been inserted at the time I received the proof. The Decree was published with the main Gazette.

The Decree was published in the Gazette No. 45 for 22 September 1979. At the back of the Gazette is the job number GPC/A780/4,700/10/79. The GPC stands for the Ghana Publishing Corporation. The A780 means Assembly Press job No. 780. The 4,700 represents the number of copies printed. The 10 represents the month in which the Gazette was printed, and the 79 represents the year 1979.

Even though the Gazette is saying ‘22 September 1979’ it, in fact, was printed in October 1979. The Decree came out with the Gazette. I have a copy of the Gazette. I wish to tender it in evidence. [No objection, admitted as exhibit SC2.] The first proof [of the Decree] was sent to the Attorney-General’s Department on 9 October 1979. There was no signature on the manuscript. The proof was sent back on 11 October 1979.

Therefore if there was any amendment that would have been done between 9 and 11 October 1979.” It should be noted that after a few directed questions from the Bench, it turned out that when the witness received the manuscript it had been signed. His explanation was that when he said

[p.675] of [1981] GLR 664 that the manuscript was not signed he was referring to the printer’s note.

The cross-examination, as I was able to record, is as follows:

“Q. You say this is the manuscript which was sent to you?

A. Yes.

Q. Did it have the date on which it was made when it was given to you?

A. The date was on the manuscript as 17 September 1979.

Q. You say it was signed by the then Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council?

A. Yes.

Q. And you say this is the manuscript?

A. Yes.

Court:

Mr. Tetteh tenders the document in evidence through the witness. [No objection, admitted as exhibit SC3.] Q. The manuscript was sent on 19 September 1979?

A. Yes.

Q. The first proof was sent to the Attorney-General’s Department on 9 October 1979?

A. Yes.

Q. Does it mean that it took you eighteen days to print a two-page document?

A. There were other Decrees to come out in the one Gazette so that this particular Decree was delayed because of the others.

Q. You printed it at the earliest opportunity?

A. Yes.

Q. The proof was returned on 11 October 1979?

A. Yes.

Q. When was the final Decree printed?

A. It was printed on 22 October 1979.

Q. Can you look at the code and tell us what it means?

A. The serial number of the job card is what is printed here: GPC/A712/4920/9/79. This is on the Decree.

The Decree was printed in October, but the manuscript was received in September 1979. But for the work load we would have printed the work in September. The Assembly Press always dated the Gazette. I give the date and the numbers to the Gazettes and the Decrees.

[p.676] of [1981] GLR 664 Court:

Q. You could not have dated it 22 September 1979?

A. That is so. It was an extraordinary Gazette. In the present case there was an instruction from the

Attorney-General’s Department. I received the instructions about September 1979.

Q. You have the instructions to print the Decree in September 1979. But having regard to your work load you could not?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you receive the manuscript before 24 September 1979?

A. Yes.

Q. Why did you not publish and print the Decree?

A. Because of the work load.

Q. Was it irregular?

A. Yes.

Q. Why do you say so?

A. As it is not the normal practice.”

The purpose of a cross-examination is to diminish the effect of evidence given in chief, to obtain evidence favourable to one’s client. It is of great importance in a case such as this one. But the cross-examination of the superintendent of works did nothing of the sort. It did not weaken, it did not destroy the value of the evidence-in-chief given by the superintendent of works. It did not introduce anything new by way of rebuttal. It strengthened the salient facts of that evidence. It elicited answers favourable to the case for the plaintiff and adverse to that of the defendants. Its brought out explanations which were favourable to the case for the plaintiff, and adverse to that of the defendants. And one is left to ask the question, why? This cross-examination bears out the truth of the statements deposed to in the affidavits filed on behalf of the plaintiff. And the evidence speaks for itself. And the upshot of this evidence is that there is something fishy about A.F.R.C.D. 42 and its publication. The Solicitor-General, counsel for the defendants, did not lead any evidence. The evidence of Mr. Aryee was thus the only oral evidence before the court. The manuscript of the Decree, exhibit SC3, tells its own story. Up to the time it was produced from the custody of the Attorney-General’s Department and tendered in evidence in court, there

[p.677] of [1981] GLR 664 was no commencement date on the manuscript.

It was made on 17 September 1979. If that is accepted — and that cannot be challenged— then when the Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council signed that document, as it is alleged he signed it, and that also is not challenged, that document became the Decree. For my purposes, for the moment, it had no commencement date.

Here is the relevant portion of the manuscript, that is, without the schedule:

“[GHANA NATIONALITY (AMENDMENT) DECREE, 1979] WHEREAS the persons specified in the Schedule to this Decree are citizens of Ghana by naturalisation;

AND WHEREAS the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council deems it necessary in the public interest to deprive the said persons of citizenship of Ghana by naturalisation previously granted them;

NOW THEREFORE, BE IT ENACTED by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council as follows:— 1. The persons specified in the Schedule to this Decree shall cease to be citizens of Ghana by naturalisation and accordingly any certificates of naturalisation as citizens of Ghana granted to them under section 7 of the said Act are hereby cancelled.

2. This Decree shall be deemed to have come into force on the day of 1979.

Made this 17th day of September, 1979.

(Sgd.) Flt.-Lt. J.J. Rawlings Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.”

So when the Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (A.F.R.C.) signed that document and signified that it was made on 17 September 1979, he, himself, did not know precisely when the Decree was to take effect. It could not in law, be said to have come into force when it was signed on 17 September 1979, for under the provisions of section 3 (7) of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1979, in the absence of a commencement date inserted in the body of a Decree or otherwise provided for, the Decree would “come into force on the date of publication of that decree in the Gazette.” In other words, under such circumstances the Decree would take effect from the date of its publication in the Gazette.

When then was the date 4 September 1979 inserted? And by whom? A comparison of exhibit SCI—the printer’s proof of the Decree—with exhibit SC3—the manuscript—clearly shows that

[p.678] of [1981] GLR 664 some other person, not the Chairman of the A.F.R.C., had inserted that date. There is thus a very important difference between the Decree as published and the Decree as signed by the Chairman of the A.F.R.C. And that difference is the crux of the whole matter in this case. Indeed, there are in existence two Decrees: The one signed by the Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, and not published, and the other published in the Gazette as A.F.R.C.D. 42, but not made by the council.

According to Mr. Aryee, the representative of the Government Printer, “the proof was sent back on 11 October 1979. Therefore if there was any amendments, that would have been done between 9 and 11 October 1979.” As at that date, that is to say, between 9 and 11 October 1979, the Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council had no legal authority to authorise the insertion of a date—let alone insert a date—in a Decree. He did not even have the capacity as Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. The simple reason is that by 24 September 1979, there was no Armed Forces Revolutionary Council in being of which he could be a chairman.

This brings into prominence the significance of exhibit SC4.

It is reproduced in full:

“MINISTRY OF JUSTICE P. O. Box M.60, My Ref. No. P.C. 55/Vol.II ACCRA.

Your Ref. No. 27th September, 1979.

PUBLICATION OF DECREE I wish to draw your attention to the fact that the Chief Parliamentary Draftsman has directed that all the outstanding Decrees duly signed on or before Friday, 21 September should be published in an extraordinary issue of the Gazette dated Friday 21st.

He further states that all the Decrees signed on Saturday 22 September, should also be published in an extraordinary issue of the Gazette dated Saturday 22 September; all Decrees signed on Sunday, 23 September should be published in an extra-ordinary issue of the Gazette dated Sunday 23 September 1979 and finally the “Confiscated Assets Recovery and Disposal Committee Decree, 1979” is to be published as A.F.R.C.D. No. 25. This was published in the same extraordinary Gazette as the Constitution on 19 September 1979.

(Sgd.) G. NIKOI PRINCIPAL STATE ATTORNEY for: CHIEF PARLIAMENTARY DRAFTSMAN

[p.679] of [1981] GLR 664

THE BRANCH MANAGER, GHANA PUBLISHING CORPORATION, ASSEMBLY PRESS, ACCRA.

(Attention: Mr. W. R. Quansah)

Note the above instructions and comply accordingly pls.

(Intd.)

BRANCH MANAGER 27/9”

This letter from the Attorney-General’s Department confirms the truth of the evidence of the superintendent of works. It confirms the truth of the statements deposed to in the affidavit of the junior counsel for the plaintiff. This letter places an ominous, cumulus cloud of doubt on the veracity of the affidavit of the senior legislative officer of the Attorney-General’s Department. The letter is dated 27 September 1979. It is directing the Assembly Press to give a “retroactive date” to a Gazette—irrespective of the real or the actual date of the publication of the Gazette.

To describe this letter as an act to perpetrate a fraud on the people of this country would, indeed, be very strong language. It was written, I believe, with the best intentions. Its motivating factor could well have been an honest—though a mistaken—desire to see that what ought to have been done, had been done. But on reflection, and, with the benefit of hindsight, I think the author himself would agree that had the present action not been brought, perhaps all Ghana would have been deceived. And perhaps very great injustices could have been done— and in such an important area as enacting laws for the governance of the people of Ghana. The road to hell is often paved with good intentions.

It is reprehensible to think—and one shudders at the thought—that an important document of state could be tinkered with in the way that the evidence of the superintendent suggests, and the affidavit of the senior legislative officer confirms. It is equally reprehensible that such instructions were given. The imagination runs wild as to the dangers inherent in this type of approach to such important acts of state or official documents. But one must leave the spheres of speculation and imagination. One must come down to the cold facts of this case. And the facts become cold indeed! Yet there is no need to condemn. There is the absolute need to understand the anxieties, the soul-searching that must have gone on in the hearts and minds of those responsible before the letter was written. The times were harsh and hard. Events were happening

[p.680] of [1981] GLR 664 that gave a traumatic experience to many. I sympathise with those responsible. I do not approve of their actions. The honour and reputation of a legislative draftsman must not be rooted in dishonour. Nor must he allow faith unfaithful to make him falsely true.

A Decree in our setting enjoys the privileges of, and the respect accorded to an Act of Parliament. We equate a Decree with an Act of Parliament. It could be a sheer mistake that the date for the commencement of the Decree was not inserted at the time that the chairman of the A.F.R.C. signed the Decree on 17 September 1979 and he inserted the date 17 September 1979. It could be a deliberate act. I do not know. I never can tell. A bill becomes an Act of Parliament when it receives the assent. The draft Decree became law immediately it was signed by the Chairman of the A.F.R.C. Once it had become the law, if there be a mistake, if there be an omission, the remedy lay, not with a subordinate official to make an insertion to correct the mistake or to supply an omission.

A court of law, it is well settled, has no authority to supply a casus omissus in an Act of Parliament. This is no longer open to discussion. But if authority were needed, I would, without hesitation, cite Magor and St. Mellons Rural District Council v. Newport Corporation [1952] A.C. 189, C.A. and R. v. Wimbledon Justices; Ex parte Derwent [1953] 1 Q.B. 380, D.C. The clerk to Parliament has no authority to make insertions in a bill after the bill had passed through the third reading stage. Much less could he make an insertion draftsmen of the bill make an insertion after the president had given his assent. Much less could the draftsman of the bill made an insertion in the Act before publication.

The issue here is not one of an accidental slip. Nor a typographical error. Nor a mere printer’s error. Nor can it be attributed to the ignorance of the draftsman. Indeed, he, quite rightly, made due provision for the retroactive operation of the Decree. The imperfections which emerged after the Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council had signed the draft Decree were not of the making of the draftsman.

It is contended that the letter of instructions from the council was “that all the persons on the enclosed list should be denaturalised with immediate effect.” That letter is dated 5 September 1979. “With immediate effect,” I would have thought means immediately. So if at all, the date 5 September 1979, is the date which should have been inserted. There is no authority, on the showing of the defendants that the date 4 September 1979, should be inserted. The insertion of that date was the arbitrary act of the draftsman.

[p.681] of [1981] GLR 664

Paragraph 7 of the affidavit from the Attorney-General’s Department states:

“Acting on the earlier instructions of the A.F.R.C. to denaturalise the persons with immediate effect, this office inserted the 4th day of September, 1979 being the date on which the A.F.R.C.’s instructions to denaturalise the named persons were first communicated to this office. (This is in consonance with practice.)”

The letter relied on in that paragraph of the affidavit states:

“1. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council directs that all the persons named on the enclosed list should be denaturalised with immediate effect.

2. Please take necessary action to have the decree published.”

This letter means what it says. It is dated 5 September 1979. It does not make any reference to a previous communication—by whatever means effected—or to previous instructions to take steps—to draft a Decree. Indeed, in paragraph 3 of that affidavit, the senior legislative officer of the Attorney-General’s Department himself states that the alleged instructions of 5 September 1979 were “to draft a Decree.” Who received the instructions on 4 September 1979 has not been mentioned. The officer who swore to the affidavit states that he was “informed and verily believe the same to be true.” He was deposing to facts about what he had been informed. The officer who personally received the instructions on 4 September 1979 has not so deposed to an affidavit. Nor had he been called to give evidence. If it is accepted that there were instructions on 4 September 1979, then the instructions were to the effect that the Attorney-General’s Department should draft a Decree—immediately.

That draft was prepared. It was duly submitted to the Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. On 17 September 1979, the chairman signed the draft Decree. And he inserted the date, 17 September 1979, as the date on which the Decree was made. Section 2 of the draft Decree had blank spaces to be filled in to indicate the date for the coming into force of the Decree, as law. But the chairman filled in the date on which the Decree was made. He left the blank spaces blank in section 2 of the draft Decree. I do not think that if the Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council did not fill in those blank spaces any other person had the right to fill in those blank spaces. After the chairman had signed the Decree, no other person had the right to make an insertion in the Decree as signed.

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It could well be argued, as was argued by counsel for the plaintiff, that since the Chairman left blank, the blank spaces in the draft Decree, on such an important issue as the retroactive operation or commencement of the Decree, then it was not the intention of the Council that the Decree should have retrospective effect. That may well be so. It could have been mere oversight. It could be that his attention was not drawn to it. But when the matter became clear that there was such an important omission, the matter ought to have been referred to the appropriate authorities.

It could also be argued that since provision was made in the draft Decree for the retroactive operation of the Decree before it was signed by the Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, “it must be presumed that he intended the Decree to have retroactive effect.” This is a contention of counsel for the defendants. He argues that:

“Failure to put in the commencement date [was] an obvious omission, but since it was clear that the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council had intended the Decree to have retroactive effect, the draftsman [was] entitled to correct the obvious omission by filling in the commencement date as the date the decision was first communicated to him.”

This argument is untenable. The letter of 5 September 1979, did not instruct those responsible to draft a Decree and provide for a retroactive operation. Providing for the retroactive operation of the Decree was the draftsman’s own technique, out of the abundance of caution, and out of experience. As the Latin maxim makes it clear, acta exteriora indicant secreta – “exterior actions indicate interior secrets.” The moral of the maxim is that in some cases, at least, a man’s previous intentions are judged by his subsequent conduct. The law thus takes cognisance of the original intention with which an act was done by reference to the subsequent act of the person concerned. The devil himself, we are all aware, “knoweth not the mind of man.” Hence we do not try the mind of man. We can only judge the state of the mind by the actions of the man. The facts here are that instructions were given for the drafting of a Decree “with immediate effect.”

The expression “with immediate effect” in the context in which I find it used in the letter of 5 September 1979, from the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, means that a Decree must be drafted immediately. It contained no reference whatsoever to any retrospective operation of a Decree. Immediate action was what was called for, that is to say, the drafting must be undertaken immediately. If immediate action had been taken between 5 September

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1979 and 24 September 1979—a period of about twenty days—the Decree would have been published in time and there would be no need for a retroactive operation of the Decree. Indeed, it is not impossible for a one-page—or a two-page Decree of only two section to be drafted, signed and published the same day.

And so if we take the subsequent action of the Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, in inserting the date on which the Decree was made, but omitting to insert the date for the coming into force of the Decree, it seems to me that, the more logical conclusion is that, the Decree should take its normal course.

The difficulty is that, between 9 and 11 October 1979 when—apparently—the omission was detected, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council had ceased to be in being. Hence the desperate attempt to insert the date 4 September 1979, and the anxiety to have the Decree published as if everything had been done correctly, and properly, and regularly, before 24 September 1979.

This desperation—the insertion of the date—and the instructions of 27 September 1979, exhibit SC4—indicates that those concerned knew that if they did not take the steps which they took, albeit irregular, the fate of the Decree would be in the air. They appreciated the difficulties. The method of their solution was wrong.

In the circumstances, it is quite clear that the Decree which was signed by the Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council on 17 September 1979 was not the Decree that was published. The Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree, 1979 (AFRCD 42), is not the Decree that was signed by the Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. It is therefore not a legislative act or action of that council. And I so declare. And the provisions of section 15 (2) of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979, cannot be called in aid by the defendants.

More importantly, the Decree which was signed by the Chairman of the Council which is the law which governs the denaturalisation of the plaintiff has not been published. It, therefore, as such, has not come into force. It remains a Decree duly made. With all its imperfections, it is the law. But in terms of its enforcement, it is of no avail by virtue of the provisions of section 3 (7) of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1979, which states that, “A decree made by the Revolutionary Council shall, unless otherwise provided in that decree, come into force on the date of publication of that decree in the Gazette.”

That Decree, made by the Revolutionary Council did not otherwise provide for the date for the coming into force of that Decree. That Decree made by the Council has not been published in the

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Gazette. That Decree is therefore not in force. No legitimate action could, as such, be taken by a reliance on that Decree which is not in force. Exhibit SC3, the Decree of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council which has not been published, is valid law. It had been duly made. The problem is that it is not yet in force.

And since it is not in force, it has not as yet, taken away from the plaintiff the status—and the attendant consequences of that status—lawfully acquired by the plaintiff in June 1976. That Decree is a sword of Damocles over the head of the plaintiff. But it does appear that the string holding that sword is made of a secure, strong steel.

It has been demonstrated that the Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 42), is not the act of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. Not being a legislative act of that council, it is not a valid piece of legislation. It is thus null and void. It does not have any legal effect. It could not have any legal effect. The plaintiff is thus entitled to the declaration he seeks and, I do declare that the plaintiff is, and continues to be, a citizen of Ghana by naturalisation until such time that circumstances permit of his being deprived of that status by the operation of the provisions of article 17 (3) of the Constitution, 1979.

JUDGMENT OF ARCHER J.S.C.

I agree that the plaintiff is entitled to a declaration that he has not been denaturalised by the Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 42). The facts have been mentioned by my brother Charles Crabbe J.S.C. and I do not wish to repeat them.

The legislative acts of military regimes are always unpredictable. No memoranda or bills are published beforehand. There is always an element of surprise, if not shock, when these Decrees are enacted.

These Decrees have the force of law and the ordinary courts are bound to apply them whether they are obnoxious or pernicious. Nevertheless, the courts have a corresponding duty to ascertain whether or not a particular Decree was in fact enacted by the military regime in the first place. The courts also have to find out when the particular Decree came into force before applying it. In this respect, some military governments are liberal enough to indicate how they intend to enact their Decrees and when the Decrees should commence or come into force. Such liberalism was clearly demonstrated in the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1979.

The Proclamation, as amended by section 3 (5) of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Establishment Proclamation (Amendment) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 11), provided:

[p.685] of [1981] GLR 664

“(5) The exercise of the power of the Revolutionary Council to make a decree, if not signified by the whole Council may be signified under the hand of the Chairman or, in the absence of the Chairman, by any other members of the Council authorised by the Council.”

Section 3 (6) and (7) of the Proclamation, 1979, also enacted that:

“(6) Every decree made by the Revolutionary Council shall, as soon as practicable after it is made, be published in the Gazette.

(7) A decree made by the Revolutionary Council shall, unless otherwise provided in that decree, come into force on the date of publication of that decree in the Gazette.”

An A.F.R.C. Decree was made by the then Armed Forces Revolutionary Council on 17 September 1979, after it had been signed by its Chairman. It is not in dispute that the Decree was valid on 17 September 1979, when it became law and it is not the concern of this court to ascertain whether or not the Revolutionary Council deliberated on the contents of the Decree before it was made. Indeed, section 3 (11) of the Proclamation provides:

“(11) Any document purporting to have been printed or published by the Government Printer and purporting to be a decree of the Revolutionary Council (including this Proclamation) duly made in accordance with the provisions of this Proclamation shall be prima facie evidence of the due making thereof.”

It must be pointed out at this stage that this subsection speaks of “prima facie evidence of” and not “conclusive evidence of” the due making of a Decree. As such a Decree is open to challenge if it can be shown that it was not made by the Revolutionary Council. The prima facie evidence referred to is only a presumption based on the maxim: omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta a presumption that is generally rebuttable. The A.F.R.C. Decree signed by the chairman on 17 September 1979, became law on that date. That Decree cannot be challenged now as null and void and of no effect on the ground that its contents appear to conflict with the provisions of the Constitution, 1979. The real substance of the plaintiff’s case is that there was no date of commencement in the Decree signed by the chairman. Both parties agree that when the chairman signed the Decree, its paragraph 2 was incomplete or blank in that the actual date of commencement had been left out. The plaintiff therefore maintained that any date of commencement [p.686] of [1981] GLR 664 which appeared in the published and gazetted A.F.R.C.D. 42 was inserted after the Constitution, 1979, had come into force and when the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council had ceased to exist and the Proclamation which conferred legislative powers on the council had also been repealed by the Constitution (Consequential and Transitional Provisions) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 56).

Relying on this obvious legal truth, the plaintiff’s lawyers, with assiduity, mental incisiveness and what may aptly be described as commendable investigatory prowess succeeded in unearthing vital pieces of evidence to buttress the plaintiff’s claim for the declaration sought. The plaintiff adduced cogent oral evidence during the trial to demonstrate that the insertion of the date of commencement was made by the office of the Chief Parliamentary Draftsman after the Constitution, 1979, had come into force. Notwithstanding this damaging piece of evidence, the defendants contended that their oral instructions from the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council on 4 September 1979 and confirmed in a letter dated 5 September 1979 were to denaturalise the persons listed in the schedule “with immediate effect.”

The interesting question one is compelled to ask is why did the draftsman omit the date of commencement when they were aware of the Revolutionary Council’s intention that the Decree was to take immediate effect? What prevented the draftsman from inserting 4 September 1979 or 5 September 1979, when the oral instructions and the written confirmation were received respectively? What even deterred the chairman from inserting the date of commencement? I must confess that if the Constitution, 1979, had not intervened and had not come into force before the Decree’s date of commencement was inserted, I would have had no hesitation whatsoever in dismissing the plaintiff’s claim.

The proclamation of 4 June 1979, gave the Revolutionary Council legislative powers but these powers were repealed by the Constitution (Consequential and Transitional Provisions) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 56), and therefore on and after 24 September 1979, neither the Revolutionary Council, nor its chairman, nor its members or its agents could make any insertions into the Decree signed by the chairman on 17 September 1979 which was valid law before the Constitution came into force. In truth, it was an existing law but without a date of commencement. Such laws can be found on Ghana’s Statute Books. I shall mention only two as examples: The Chattels Transfer Ordinance, 1952 (No. 51 of 1952) and the Insolvency Act, 1962 (Act 153). Section 1 of the 1952 Ordinance provided that the Ordinance shall come into force on such date as the Governor may by notice in the Gazette appoint. Up till

[p.687] of [1981] GLR 664 now no date has been appointed by successive governments. The Insolvency Act, 1962, also provided that the Act shall come into operation on such date as the Minister responsible for Justice may by legislative instrument, appoint and different dates may be appointed for different provisions. No leglislative instrument has as yet been made to bring the Act into force. However, both the Ordinance and the Act are valid laws still on the statute books but not in force.

The A.F.R.C. Decree signed on 17 September 1979, did not reserve power to anybody to appoint a date for its commencement. Paragraph 2 of the signed Decree merely provided, “This Decree shall be deemed to have come into force on the… day of … 1979.” This is what the Chairman of the Revolutionary Council signed on 17 September 1979. The Proclamation itself provided that where the date of commencement has been stated in the Decree then it shall take effect from that date. But where no date has been stated, then it shall take effect from the date of publication. The evidence unmistakably shows that the insertion of the date of commencement was made after the Constitution, 1979, had come into force. The date of notification in the Gazette is stated as 22 September 1979 whereas in fact A.F.R.C.D. 42 was published in a Gazette in October 1979. The Decree contained an insertion in paragraph 2 which was made by a person with no legislative powers. It follows that what was published in October 1979 is null and void. A.F.R.C.D. 42 is therefore of no legal consequence. As from 24 September 1979, the people of Ghana had said adieu to revolutionary methods of enacting laws and only one body, that is Parliament, had the right to enact, amend and repeal laws. There is no evidence that Parliament had anything to do with A.F.R.C.D. 42 which was published in October 1979.

We are then left with the original Decree signed by the chairman but without a date of commencement and without any power reserved to any person or body to appoint a date of commencement. That Decree can best be classified as an unnumbered, ungazetted and unpublished law without a date of commencement. Indeed, the Decree is vacuous, an empty barrel that has made a lot of noise in the past but which should be silenced today. I would therefore hold that what was published in October 1979, that is, A.F.R.C.D. 42, was not the Decree signed by the chairman. However, what the chairman signed is still valid law but without a date of commencement. That Decree has never been published so as to bring it into operation. This is my approach to this case which in my view is constitutionally valid and proper. My reasoning is

[p.688] of [1981] GLR 664 not characterised by any Kantian categorical imperatives or dominated by Hegelian dialectics. I have not introduced any esoteric jurisprudence nor do I think I have been called upon to solve a Chinese puzzle. There is no technicality involved in this approach. I have followed a straight path that leads to constitutional and eternal justice.

The evidence has established that there has been an omission of fundamental importance. I would not say that there has been a dereliction of duty on the part of anybody. Suffice it to say that there has been an oversight which this court cannot remedy. It is not open to this court to insert the date of commencement in the Decree signed by the chairman. The court has no power to do so. It is also not open to this court to expunge the insertion irregularly made so as to make the date of publication, the date of commencement. The oral and written instructions did not contemplate the date of publication as the date of commencement.

It seems to me that the legal consequences of the oversight must inevitably be upheld by this court. Any previous attempt, whether surreptitious or honest, to remedy the oversight after the Constitution, 1979, had come into force must not be tolerated. In my view, that is the only way to proclaim the supremacy of the Constitution. Constitutio non novit patrem, nec matrem, nec magistratum, solam veritatem et qued constitutuo dicet meaning “the Constitution knows neither father, nor mother, nor government; only the truth and what the Constitution says.”

In conclusion, I would hold that none of the 107 persons including the plaintiff listed in the schedule to the signed Decree has ever been denaturalised by any Decree. The plaintiff is therefore still a Ghanaian citizen by naturalisation according to the certificate of citizenship granted him in June 1976.

JUDGMENT OF SOWAH J.S.C.

On 5 September 1979, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (A.F.R.C.) gave the following directive to the Attorney-General:

“DENATURALISATION 1. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council directs that all the persons named on the enclosed list should be denaturalised with immediate effect.

2. Please take necessary action to have the Decree published.”

On 17 September the Chairman of the A.F.R.C. approved of the draft legislation giving effect to the directive and,

[p.689] of [1981] GLR 664 appended his signature. Paragraph 2 of the Decree reads, “This decree shall be deemed to have come into force on … day of … 1979.” The decree thus became law without a commencement date. The legal draftsman responsible for the implementation of the AFRC directive inserted 4 September 1979 as the date of commencement, after proof of the Decree has been received from the printer. The reason given for that date is contained in an affidavit sworn to by one Paul Owusu Appiah. He deposes, inter alia:

“3. That I am informed and verily believe the same to be true that the Attorney-General’s Office was instructed on 4 September 1979, by the A.F.R.C. to draft a Decree denaturalising the persons listed in A.F.R.C.D. 42.

4. That on 5 September 1979, the A.F.R.C. confirmed in writing its instructions to the Attorney-General’s Office as aforesaid to the effect that all the persons named in A.F.R.C.D. 42 should be denaturalised with immediate effect. A copy of the A.F.R.C. letter dated 5 September 1979 is attached and marked A.

7. Acting on the earlier instructions of the A.F.R.C. to denaturalise the persons named ‘with immediate effect’ this office inserted 4 September 1979, being the date on which the A.F.R.C.’s instructions to denaturalise the named persons were first communicated to this office. (This is in consonance with practice).”

This is the explanation for the insertion of the date 4 September 1979.

Counsel for the plaintiff contends that immediately the Chairman of the A.F.R.C. signed the draft Decree, it became law and that any changes or additions or alterations made thereafter was tantamount to an amendment of the Decree and that only the A.F.R.C. has the self-imposed mandate to effect such amendments or alterations. He contends further that the reason given for the insertions of 4 September 1979 is unacceptable because the directive contained in the letter of 5 September made no reference to any prior instruction. It is explicit and no gloss should be placed on it.

Counsel further contends that in as much as an amendment was made to the Decree already signed by the Chairman of the A.F.R.C., that Decree, the Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 42), which was published in Gazette No. 45 on 22 September 1979 containing the amendment is not a Decree of the A.F.R.C. The Decree of the A.F.R.C, though law, has yet to be published.

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The Solicitor-General, counsel for the defendants, maintained that the date 4 September was the correct date and was inserted in pursuance of instructions given to the Attorney-General’s Office.

The question I do ask myself is: Whether the date 4 or 5 September so really material or of such fundamental importance as to disable this court from giving effect to the real intentions of the law givers? The instructions contained in the letter dated 5 September has been exhibited. It is a peremptory order. Whether it took effect on 4, 5 or 17 to me is not fundamental. I think in interpreting this Decree this court ought constantly to have in view the manifest intentions and purpose of the AFRC and endeavour not only to harmonise all its provisions but also to give effect to it. The court must not adopt that interpretation which would make the Decree ineffective.

Try as much as I can, I am not persuaded that in the context of the directive and the Decree, the date is of any essence or of such fundamental significance as to undermine the integrity of the Decree. Indeed, the legal draftsman says that it is the normal practice to insert dates after proof has been received. We should not forget that between the period 4 June to 24 September we were not living in normal times, in fact, we lived under revolutionary and violent conditions. We cannot really equate standards of behaviour and conduct in a revolutionary era with those that do obtain in more settled times under a constitutional democracy.

The mechanism by which laws are promulgated under the two different regimes bears no semblance to each other, they may well be described as antagonistic in principle. It is common knowledge that before a bill becomes law in a constitutional democracy there are well-defined procedures through which the bill passes. The bill is presented to Parliament either by the executive or on a private member’s motion; it goes through the necessary stages in Parliament during which it is debated upon, amendments if any or necessary, are made and finally a vote is taken. If passed, the bill receives the presidential assent and becomes the law of the land. The motive of the law is manifested ex facie; the Act itself – in cases of doubt, the memorandum accompanying the bill, may also provide additional aid to interpretation. No such mechanism or procedure exists for the promulgation of a Decree. There are not the checks and balances in the making of a Decree which are inherent in the passing of a bill into law.

In the A.F.R.C. period the law officers were given directives and were expected to draft the appropriate Decree. Thereafter the Chairman of the A.F.R.C. appended his signature to the draft. By analogy with the constitutional practice it is said, a Decree becomes

[p.691] of [1981] GLR 664 law after signature, but nowhere in any of the A.F.R.C. Decrees has it been so postulated.

The present dispute is whether or not the date 4 September inserted in A.F.R.C.D. 42 was fraudulently made. The plaintiff asserts the affirmative and the defendants disavow fraud. It seems to me that it is to the directive of the A.F.R.C. that the answer lies. The directive is self-explicit. There is no dispute that the Attorney-General’s Office received a directive from the A.F.R.C. to draft a Decree. There is equally no dispute that no specific date on which the Decree should take effect was indicated in it; the only pointer to a date was “with immediate effect.” The Attorney-General’s Office had the mandate to insert a date either before or after the draft Decree has been signed; it is not bound to follow any ordained constitutional procedure or practice.

In any event, this Decree, in my view, comes under the umbrella of the new iron-clad provision of section 15 (2) and (3) of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979, which reads:

“15. (2) For the avoidance of doubt it is hereby declared that no executive, legislative or judicial action taken or purported to have been taken by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council or by any person in the name of that Council shall be questioned in any proceedings whatsoever, and, accordingly it shall not be lawful for any Court or other tribunal to make any order or grant any remedy or relief in respect of any such act.

(3) The provisions of subsection (2) of this section shall have effect notwithstanding that any such action as is referred to in that subsection was not taken in accordance with any procedure prescribed by any law.”

(The emphasis is mine.)

I would hold that the insertion of the date does not amount to an amendment nor has it the effect of violating the integrity of the Decree signed by the chairman. Accordingly, this Decree takes effect from 4 September. In conclusion, I will refer to the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1979, s. 3 (7) which states, “A decree made by the Revolutionary Council shall, unless otherwise provided in that decree, come into force on the date of publication of that decree in the Gazette.” In consonance with the view I have taken, the date on which the Decree came into force was 4 September and I hold so accordingly.

It is, however, with the greatest regret that I am unable to agree with the majority decision of the court.

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The plaintiff, Mohammed Mekkaoui, is a Lebanese by birth, born in Tripoli, Lebanon, in October 1930. On his application, he was naturalised as a Ghanaian citizen, and issued with certificate No. 49/1976, dated 14 June 1976. He was one of 121 persons naturalised in that one year alone. Until 1976, the highest number of aliens ever naturalised in any one year was 41; this was in 1974. Otherwise, the numbers had been, in the main, single figures throughout the nineteen-year period – 1959 to 1978.

In 1979, by the Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree, 1979 A.F.R.C.D. 42, Mekkaoui was deprived of his Ghanaian citizenship, along with 106 others. The said A.F.R.C.D. 42 reads:

“GHANA NATIONALITY (AMENDMENT) DECREE, 1979 WHEREAS the persons specified in the Schedule to this Decree are citizens of Ghana by naturalisation;

AND WHEREAS the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council deems it necessary in the public interest to deprive the said persons of citizenship of Ghana by naturalisation previously granted them;

NOW THEREFORE, BE IT ENACTED by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council as follows:— 1. The persons specified in the Schedule to this Decree shall cease to be citizens of Ghana by naturalisation and accordingly any certificates of naturalisation as citizens of Ghana granted to them are hereby cancelled.

2. This Decree shall be deemed to have come into force on the 4th day of September, 1979.

SCHEDULE [of 107 names] Made this 17th day of September, 1979 (Sgd.) FLT.-LT. JERRY JOHN RAWLINGS Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council Date of Gazette notification: 22nd September, 1979.”

The plaintiff’s name appears as No. 22 in the Schedule.

On 21 January 1980 the plaintiff filed the present writ, invoking the original jurisdiction of this court, to claim a declaration:

“(a). That the Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 42), in so far as it purports to deprive the plaintiff of his status as a citizen of Ghana by naturalisation without obtaining a judicial order of the High Court of Justice in that behalf:

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1. is ultra vires the powers conferred on the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council;

2. is null and void and of no effect whatever as being contrary to law and in particular the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1979; the Constitution, 1996; and 3. is inconsistent with or in contravention of the provisions of chapters 5, 6, 9 and 12 of the Constitution, 1979.

(b) That the said AFRCD 42 was published after 24 September 1979 and is therefore null and void and of no effect whatever.

(c) That the said A.F.R.C.D. 42 is not an executive, legislative or judicial Act of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council which assumed the reins of government on 4 June 1979 and vacated office or ceased to exist on 24 September 1979.

(d) That the plaintiff is a citizen of Ghana by naturalisation, the Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree, 1979 (AFRCD 42), notwithstanding.”

The contention that A.F.R.C.D. 42 is null and void was originally based on the reasons stated in paragraph 7 of the plaintiff’s statement of case, viz:

“7. `The plaintiff will contend at the trial of this action that A.F.R.C.D. 42 is null and void and of no effect whatever for the following reasons:

(a) It was published after 24 September 1979 when the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1979, was in full force and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council had ceased to exist, giving way to the P.N.P. Administration headed by Dr. Hilla Limann.

(b) It has the effect of a legislative judgment and constitutes an usurpation of the judicial power of the State which is vested in the judiciary alone.

(c) It is intended to operate retrospectively.

(d) It is ultra vires the powers conferred on the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council by the

Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1979.

(e) It is inconsistent with or in contravention of the provisions of the Constitution, 1979, of the Republic of Ghana.”

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As far as grounds (b), (c) and (d) are concerned, it is sufficient to refer to section 3 (1) of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Establishment) Proclamation Decree, 1979:

“3. (1) Until such time as a new Constitution is promulgated and comes into force, the Revolutionary Council shall have power for such purposes as they may think fit to make and issue decrees which shall have the force of law in Ghana.”

Reference may also be made to section 1 (3) of the same Proclamation as inserted by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Establishment) Proclamation (Amendment) (No. 2) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 26):

“(3) For the avoidance of doubt both the executive and legislative powers of the State shall be vested in the Revolutionary Council.”

The combined effect of these provisions is that the contentions raised in paragraph 7 (b), (c) and (d) of the statement of case cannot be sustained. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council could pass a Decree having the effect of a legislative judgment; the said Council could pass a Decree to operate retrospectively; and all this would be inter vires, not ultra vires the powers conferred on the Council by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1979. As I have reason to believe that these conclusions are not open to challenge, I say no more about them.

But the contention in paragraph 7 (a) echoing paragraph (b) of the writ of summons deserves attention, as it raises an interesting issue of interpretation. Is a Decree published in a Gazette which is printed after 24 September 1979, when the Constitution had come into effect, necessarily void and of no effect? I shall return to this question shortly.

On 11 March 1981 the plaintiff swore to a supplementary affidavit to which was attached a statutory declaration made by Mr. Thompson, a Barrister-at-law. These two documents raised a new set of issues unconnected with the original statement of case as verified by the affidavit of 25 January 1980. No attempt was made to amend the statement of case, but from then on, the trial proceeded almost entirely on the basis of this new case. Evidence was called in support of the new case, and addresses, in particular the plaintiff’s, built and woven around this new case. The new case swung from a reliance on publication after 24 September 1979 (see paragraph (b) of the writ of summons and paragraph 7 (a) of the

[p.695] of [1981] GLR 664 statement of case) to one of an alleged unauthorised insertion of a commencement date, thus making A.F.R.C.D. 42 a new document, unrelated to the true A.F.R.C. document, exhibit SC3.

I think the practice in this court ought to be strictly controlled. Parties should not be encouraged to speculate and fish for grounds: they must be forced to plead with sufficient particularity, and when once they have so pleaded, they must be held to their pleadings, subject only to the court’s discretion to allow amendments. In this case, the plaintiff never at any time amended his statement of case. I am of the view therefore that any affidavit or evidence not connected with the statement of case as filed or amended is irrelevant and ought to be struck out; it is not part of the case. Since, however, this case was heard without any firm Practice Direction from the Supreme Court, I shall proceed to consider the new matter raised in the supplementary affidavit, and hope that we shall be spared this experience in the future.

The new matter appears in paragraph 5 of the statutory declaration of Mr. Thompson, filed with the affidavit of 11 March 1981 as follows:

“(a) The first proof of the Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree, 1979, was sent to the Attorney-General’s Office on 9 October 1979.

(b) The said proof was returned to the press on 11 October 1979.

(c) Amendments made on the proof included an insertion relating to the ‘date of commencement’ of the Decree.

(d) The date of commencement thus inserted was ‘4 September 1979.’ (e) There was a minute on the proof written and signed by Mr. G. Nikoi, a Principal State Attorney, and dated 10 October 1979 which reads, ‘Approved for publication subject to amendment indicated on the proof.’ (f) The Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree, 1979 (AFRCD 42), was published in Gazette No. 45 of 22 September 1979.

(g) The Gazette No. 45 of 22 September 1979 was published and dispatched on 8 November 1979.”

Based on this new matter, the plaintiff in his supplementary affidavit filed on 11 March 1981 says: “6. It is obvious from exhibit MM2 that the Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree, 1979, as it now stands, was neither the act of the A.F.R.C. nor made on 17 September 1979.

[p.696] of [1981] GLR 664

7. It is obvious that the said Decree, as it now stands, could not have been signed by the Chairman or any member of the A.F.R.C. since the A.F.R.C. had ceased to exist as at 10 October 1979 when the amendment was made.

8. It is also obvious that the Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree, 1979, as it stands now, was made and published after 24 September 1979.

9. I am informed by counsel and I verily believe the same to be true, that Mr. Nikoi, Principal State Attorney, of the Attorney-General’s Office, was not an agent of the A.F.R.C. on 10 October 1979 when he set out to amend the Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree, 1979.”

In answer to this contention, the defendants in an affidavit filed on 24 April 1981 argue:

“3. That I am informed and verily believe the same to be true that the Attorney-General’s Office was instructed on 4 September 1979 by the A.F.R.C. to draft a Decree denaturalising the persons listed in A.F.R.C.D. 42.

4. That on 5 September 1979, the A.F.R.C. confirmed in writing its instructions to the Attorney-General’s Office as aforesaid to the effect that all the persons named in A.F.R.C.D. 42 should be denaturalised with immediate effect. A copy of the A.F.R.C. letter dated 5 September 1979 is attached and marked A.

5. Action was taken by this office on the aforesaid instructions and a draft Decree was submitted on 10 September 1979, for the signature of the Chairman of the A.F.R.C.

6. On 17 September 1979 the Chairman of the A.F.R.C. duly signed A.F.R.C.D. 42 and returned it to the Attorney-General’s Office for appropriate action.

7. Acting on the earlier instructions of the A.F.R.C. to denaturalise the persons named ‘with immediate effect’ this office inserted the date, 4 September 1979, being the date on which the A.F.R.C.’s instructions to denaturalise the named persons were first communicated to this office.

(This is in consonance with practice.)

8. The printing and publication of the Decree (A.F.R.C.D. 42) thereafter went through the normal processes.

[p.697] of [1981] GLR 664

9. A.F.R.C.D. 42 is therefore a legislative action of the A.F.R.C. having been made on 17 September 1979 with retrospective effect to 4 September 1979.”

The question to be resolved as a result of these rival pleadings is whether the date, 4 September 1979, appearing in A.F.R.C.D. 42, was inserted by or on the instructions of the A.F.R.C. prior to their vacating office on 24 September 1979. On the defendants’ own admission, the date was not inserted by the A.F.R.C. But they contend it was inserted on their instructions.

A public statute normally does not require to be proved; it is judicially noticed. Its very existence is prima facie evidence that it has been duly and regularly made. If, as in this case, the statute is challenged, then I believe evidence is admissible to displace the presumption of regularity, the burden being on the challenger: see also section 13 (3) of the Proclamation, 1979. The challenger must satisfy the court, on the balance of probabilities, that the statute was not duly made. Even so, the degree of probability required to displace the presumption is higher than that needed to retain it; which is another way of saying that the burden on the person seeking to displace the presumption of regularity must be higher than that on the one in whose favour the presumption is raised; due account is being taken of all the circumstances. With the above principles in mind, I now proceed to evaluate the evidence relating to the introduction in A.F.R.C.D. 42 of the date 4 September 1979.

In addition to the statements in the plaintiff’s supplementary affidavit earlier referred to, the plaintiff called Mr. Ebenezer Aryee, the Superintendent of Works at the Printing Division, Ghana Publishing Corporation, Accra. He gave evidence on 25 May 1981. The relevant portions of his evidence reproduced from my notes, read:

“I first saw the manuscript of (A.F.R.C.D. 42) on 19 September 1979. When I had the manuscript, there was no commencement date. The manuscript was not signed. At the back of the Decree there is a date 17 September 1979. I have the proof which I sent to the Attorney-General’s Office. (Tendered as exhibit SC1.) I see the commencement date 4 September 1979 written in ink. It was done at the Attorney-General’s Office.

Paragraph 2 of exhibit SC1 was in the original manuscript, but the date had not been inserted.

These Decrees are published along with the main Gazette. [Gazette No. 45 tendered. No objection. Accepted as exhibit No.2]… I am in charge of keeping the manuscripts. I am holding the manuscript of A.F.R.C.D. 42. The signature of the manuscript is that of the Chairman of A.F.R.C., Flt.-Lt. J. J.

Rawlings. I know his signature very well.”

[p.698] of [1981] GLR 664

Under cross-examination, Mr. Aryee says:

“I identify this as the manuscript I sent to the Attorney-General’s Office. The date 17 September 1979 was on the manuscript. It had already been signed by J.J. Rawlings. This is the manuscript. (Tendered. No objection. Accepted as exhibit SC3.) It was sent to me on 19 September 1979. We delayed action on it because there were several other Decrees we were working on, which were to come out in the same Gazette; so work on this particular Decree was delayed because of the others. We printed it at the earliest opportunity.

The proof came back on 11 October 1979. It was sent for printing on 12 October 1979, but it was finally printed on 22 October 1979.

The legend at the foot of the Decree is GPC/A712/4920/9/79. This is the number of the job card. But for the workload we could have executed this contract in September … We had instructions to produce this Decree and the Gazette in September, but because of the workload, we could not come out till October.” There was no re-examination, and the case was adjourned for addresses. Thus by calling Mr. Aryee, the plaintiff introduced material, additional to that already on file (and verified by affidavits), from the totality of which the court must find out whether, on the crucial issue of the date 4 September 1979, the probabilities favour the plaintiff or the defendants. The defendants do not deny that the date 4 September 1979 was inserted at the Attorney-General’s Office, “being the date on which the A.F.R.C.’s instructions to denaturalise the named persons were first communicated to this office. (This is in consonance with practice.)” (See paragraph 7 of the affidavit of 24 April 1981.) Let it be noted that the letter from the A.F.R.C. which the defendants say was sent to confirm the earlier verbal instructions is dated 5 September 1979, barely 24 hours after the said oral instructions. It deserves to be reproduced in full:

“Office of the Chairman, Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, Arakan Barracks, Burma Camp, Accra.

Tel. 76111 Ext. 3332, Accra 5th September, 1979.

Reference No. AFRC/58

[p.699] of [1981] GLR 664 THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL AND COMMISSIONER FOR JUSTICE ACCRA.

DENATURALISATION 1. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council directs that all the persons named on the enclosed list should be denaturalised with immediate effect.

2. Please take necessary action to have the Decree published.

(Sgd.) H. C. APALOO LT.-CDR. (GN) for: CHAIRMAN/A.F.R.C.”

The tone of this letter is typically military and peremptory—a “direction” to denaturalise the named persons “with immediate effect.” This latter phrase, became, in the minds of the public, the registered trade mark of the A.F.R.C.

The plaintiff contends that the phrase “with immediate effect” appearing in the letter of 5 September 1979 means, at best, with effect from 5 September 1979, and no more, implying, in my understanding, that if A.F.R.C.D. 42 had contained 5 September 1979 instead of 4 September 1979, the plaintiff would have had no quarrel with it (except, of course, as to publication). As stated earlier, the time-distance between the date of this letter and the commencement date of A.F.R.C.D. 42 is a mere 24 hours at most; just one day.

So I ask myself: Why should the Attorney-General’s Office be interested to write 4 September, and not 5 September, unless, short of the alleged earlier oral instructions, that office had something to loose or to gain by putting 4 September 1979? Could it be that the plaintiff had been hastily, wrongfully arrested on 4 September 1979, or an over-zealous official had called for and torn to pieces the plaintiff’s certificate of naturalisation on that day, or some other unlawful act had been committed with respect to the plaintiff, and therefore it had been necessary to seek justification and legality for the act by making the Decree effective from 4 and not 5 September, to cover up the official lapses? Was there a special reason for writing in 4 instead of 5?

The plaintiff does not adduce any evidence of such motive or reason; not even evidence of circumstances, however remote, from which such motive or reason can be inferred, reasonably or unreasonably. We are therefore left with the only averment of the defendants, verified by affidavit, giving the reason or explanation for inserting 4 September. The draft Decree submitted on 10 September 1979 was signed and dated by

[p.700] of [1981] GLR 664 the Chairman on 17 September 1979, a good seven days before the A.F.R.C. left the scene. Again, if the Attorney-General’s Office were simply date-happy, they could have inserted any date between 5 and 17 September without, on the state of the evidence, losing anything whatever.

The plaintiff says that the Decree was not intended to have retroactive effect, at the time it was signed on 17 September 1979. If so, how does one account for the peculiar wording of paragraph 2 thereof, “This Decree shall be deemed to have come into force on the … day of … 1979.” (The emphasis is mine.) Paragraph 2 was part of the draft (exhibit SC3) when it was signed on 17 September 1979. On that date the Decree was deemed to have come into force, unquestionably on a date prior to 17 September 1979. If this earlier date had already, to the knowledge of the chairman, been communicated to the draftsman, that would be sufficient reason why the chairman would not find it necessary to fill it in, but to leave the matter of detail to be completed by the draftsman.

A contrary intention would have been signified by the chairman by either inserting another date (which might be different from the one already instructed) or else by crossing out the said paragraph 2 altogether, to show a clear intention on the part of the A.F.R.C. that the Decree was not intended to operate retroactively. Evidence internal to the draft (exhibit SC3) does not support the contention that the Decree was not intended to be retroactive.

The manuscript, exhibit SC3, was produced in court from the custody of the Solicitor-General, counsel for the defendants. It had been in the custody of the Attorney-General ever since it was returned by Mr. Aryee on 9 October 1979. This fact did not appear to have been known either to Mr. Aryee or to the plaintiff. When asked for the manuscript Mr. Ayee said in court that he had looked for it among his papers but he had not been able to trace it. He never tried the Attorney-General’s Office because he did not think it was there. If the Attorney-General’s Office had meant to play tricks as was insinuated, all they needed to do was to have inserted the date 4 September 1979 in the manuscript before releasing it, to establish to the world that the commencement date was inserted by J.J. Rawlings, or that it was in the draft before he signed it, or at least to throw doubt on the evidence of Mr. Aryee that the manuscript did not contain the commencement date. The relevant paragraph 2 was left as it had always been with the blanks.

The plaintiff was first arrested on 26 September 1979: see paragraph 8 of the plaintiff’s affidavit filed on 25 January 1980. If it was merely a question of trying to “legalise” the arrest, A.F.R.C.D. 42 could very well have been made effective from 17 September 1979

[p.701] of [1981] GLR 664 when it was signed, or from a day or two prior to the date of the arrest.

Why go all the way back to 4 September 1979?

Taking all the circumstances into consideration, and particularly that there is no evidence to establish any reason, other than the one given by the defendants, for the Attorney-General’s preference for 4 September 1979 rather than any other date, I am forced to the conclusion that in all probability, the date 4 September 1979 was inserted for the only reason advanced by the defendants, i.e on instructions, as alleged by reference to the date of the oral communication. On balance, the probabilities favour the defendants, rather than the plaintiff. I find that the date 4 September 1979 was properly and regularly written on the proof, exhibit SC1, in the normal course of official duties.

Here is a situation where there is a presumption of regularity in favour of the defendants. This presumption, in present circumstances, extends to cover, inter alia:

(a) that the Decree was regularly made; and

(b) as regards the “offending” date, that it was regularly inserted in the normal course of official duties (with all that this entails, i.e proper authority, proper instructions etc.).

The plaintiff sets himself the task of displacing this presumption and he produces the evidence of Mr. Aryee. Closely studied, Mr. Aryee’s evidence simply says, (a) the Decree was made and signed by the A.F.R.C; and (b) the date was inserted in the proof by the A.F.R.C.’s law office (a fact which has never been denied anyway). Without more, (b) can only be interpreted as an act done in the normal course of official duties (again with all that this phrase entails, i.e. proper authority, proper instructions, etc.). So that at the end of the day, Mr. Aryee’s evidence tends, not to displace the presumption of regularity, but rather, in biblical language, to “fulfil” it. I think the plaintiff has failed to displace the presumption. In the circumstances, I find that A.F.R.C.D. 42 is the legislative act of the A.F.R.C. It is neither a fraud nor a forgery. I dismiss claim (c) of the writ of summons. Accordingly, A.F.R.C.D. 42 takes effect according to its tenor, i.e. from 4 September 1979: see section 3 (7) of the Proclamation, 1979.

Having found that A.F.R.C.D. 42 is the legislative act of the A.F.R.C., it is my opinion that this action is caught squarely by section 15 (2) of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979. A.F.R.C.D. 42 therefore cannot “be questioned in any proceedings whatsoever, and, … it shall not be lawful for any Court … to make any order or grant any remedy or relief in respect of any such (legislative) act.” The action therefore abates, and should be dismissed.

[p.702] of [1981] GLR 664

This should normally dispose of this case. But there is an issue raised as to publication which, out of deference to learned counsel, deserves to be commented upon. The issue is raised in general terms in paragraph (b) of the writ of summons, and echoed in paragraph 7 (a) of the statement of case, viz that “A.F.R.C.D. 42 was published after 24 September 1979 and is therefore null and void and of no effect.” Section 3 (6) of the Proclamation, 1979, says, “Every decree made by the Revolutionary Council shall, as soon as practicable after it is made, be published in the Gazette.” In other words, what is required to be published in the Gazette is a “Decree made by the Revolutionary Council,” which implies that a Decree is a Decree before publication. It does not require publication to make it a Decree.

It is already a Decree. It is law, but it may not be in force: see section 3 (7) of the Proclamation. It will enjoy the same status as the Insolvency Act, 1962 (Act 153), to which learned counsel for the plaintiff drew the court’s attention. Made in 1962 this Act is not yet in force, but it is on the statute book, yet to be activated. It is law, I do not think it is ever contended that the Insolvency Act, 1962, is void.

Now the Insolvency Act, 1962, requires to be brought into force by a certain method, i.e. a minister must nominate the date of its coming into force, by a legislative instrument: see section 70 of the said Act. And different dates may be appointed for different sections of the Act. The act of the minister in nominating a commencement date is a legislative act, via a legislative instrument, and under present circumstances, will require the participation of Parliament.

With the A.F.R.C. Decree, unless otherwise provided, they come into force upon publication in the Gazette. Publication is not a legislative act. It does not require the exercise of the legislative powers of the A.F.R.C. It is purely an administrative matter. The A.F.R.C. has nothing to do with it. Section 3 (7) of the Proclamation, 1979, states “A decree made by the Revolutionary Council shall, unless otherwise provided in that decree, come into force on the date of publication in the Gazette.” (The emphasis is mine.)

The plaintiff in paragraph (b) of the writ of summons, complains that “A.F.R.C.D. 42 was published after 24 September 1979 and is therefore null and void and of no effect.” This exhibits a complete misreading of the relevant provision of the Proclamation. The said section 3 (7) speaks of publication of the Decree in the Gazette, not publication of the Decree simpliciter, nor publication of the Gazette (in which the Decree appears. The plaintiff’s contention, to be valid, will necessitate a change in the language of section 3 (7) from “publication in the Gazette” to “publication of the Gazette” in which the Decree appears. The choice of the proposition “in” in section 3 (7) is not accidental: it serves a purpose. It helps to overcome a misunderstanding such as has arisen in this case. In my view, the date of publication would be relevant if the language had been “publication of the Gazette.” By choosing “in,” the date of publication of the Gazette becomes irrelevant.

But Mr. Kom, senior counsel for the plaintiff, argues, in the last paragraph of his written address filed on 26 May 1981 that, “All Decrees published in the Gazette after 24 September 1979 are null and void and it is immaterial they were made to take effect before 24 September 1979. A.F.R.C.D. 42 is one of such Decrees.” The factual basis for this contention is that Gazette No. 45/1979 in which A.F.R.C.D. 42 appears was printed in October 1979. It is known that the Hansard, the record of proceedings in Parliament, is many months in arrears. Supposing the Hansard of 10 February 1979 is printed on 10 June 1979, will the Hansard of 10 February 1979 cease to be Hansard of 10 February 1979, and the Hansard of 10 June 1979? I think not. It will still be the Hansard of 10 February 1979, no matter when it is printed. In other words, the material, the events encompassed by that Hansard took place on 10 February 1979; this can never change. If paper, man-hours, machines, etc. had been available and ready, the Hansard could have been printed on 10 February 1979. Otherwise, printing depends on a number of external factors. As Mr. Aryee put it, the printing of Gazette No. 45 delayed:

“because there were several other Decrees we were working on, which were to come out in the same Gazette, so work on this particular Decree was delayed . . . We printed it at the earliest opportunity . . . But for the workload we could have executed this contract in September.”

Supposing the Gazette of 22 September 1979 had in fact been printed and released for sale on 19 September 1979 when it was first received by Mr. Aryee, would the date of printing have made any difference to the date it bears? Would the Gazette of 22 September 1979 printed and published on 19 September 1979, have ceased to be the Gazette of 22 September 1979? The answer obviously is No! In other words what makes the Gazette of 22 September 1979, the Gazette of 22 September 1979 is not the date on which it is printed: it is, like the Hansard of 10 February 1979, the date it bears. The Gazette can be printed some days before or some days after the date it bears, but it will still be the Gazette of the date it bears. To hold otherwise,

[p.704] of [1981] GLR 664 and interpret the preposition “in” in section 3 (7) of the Proclamation, 1979, as though it means “of” will be to introduce uncertainty into the administration of the law. For we shall be making Decrees effective from the date of publication of the Gazette.

From Mr. Aryee’s evidence, the legend at the foot of a Gazette only tells us, at best, the month and the year in which the Gazette was printed; it never tells us the date on which it was printed. So that a legend reading “9/79” would only indicate to us that the Gazette was printed in September 1979. There are 30 days in September as regards on which of these 30 days the Gazette was printed, the legend is hopelessly unhelpful. So we shall never know for certain when a particular Decree came into force, unless Mr. Aryee is at hand to assist.

But publication must be distinguished from printing. Mr. Aryee’s job card told the story of the printing of the Gazette. It did not tell us when the Gazette was published. Therefore the interpretation recommended by the plaintiff would make it impossible, in a large number of cases, to fix with certainty the date on which a Decree became operative. But the bait has been attractively laid, and unfortunately the majority opinion in this court has, respectfully but regrettably, fallen prey to this bait. As Taylor J. (as he then was) observed in Sam v. Comptroller of Customs and Excise [1971] 1 G.L.R. 289 at p. 306:

“There is always a danger, inevitable when past precedent is applied to a new situation, to abandon thinking out the problem anew and to seek succour in a previous thinking said to apply to the new situation … The mind no doubt recoils from the inevitable effect implicit in a meticulous examination of the new situation, an examination which may reveal differences and discourage (sic) the natural inclination to pursue the line of least resistance by merely applying the new found panacea.”

In other words, too ready a recourse to precedent and authority may discourage the application of native intelligence to a given problem. A careful analysis of the interpretation designed by the plaintiff will show that this could not have been the intention of the law makers. Section 3 (7) of the Proclamation, 1979, as it stands, is clear enough and must be interpreted and enforced as such. “Publication in the Gazette” does not and cannot mean the same as publication of the Gazette. A change in the language of section 3 (7) or any other mode of interpretation will lead to absurdity.

In construing statutes, there is always a presumption against absurdity. Therefore statutes must be construed as far as possible

[p.705] of [1981] GLR 664 to avoid absurdity. Odgers tells us in Construction of Deeds and Statutes (4th ed.), p. 188:

“The presumption against absurdity, or the leaning of the Court against a construction which would produce such, is only a branch of the larger rule that a statute, like a deed, should be construed in a manner to give it validity rather than invalidity — ut res magis valeat quam pereat.”

Thus in Shannon Realties, Ltd. v. Ville de St. Michel [1924] A.C. 185, P.C. Lord Shaw observed at pp. 192-193:

“Where the words of a statute are clear they must, of course, be followed; in their Lordships’ opinion, where alternative constructions are equally open, that alternative is to be chosen which will be consistent with the smooth working of the system which the statute purports to be regulating; and that alternative is to be rejected which will introduce uncertainty, friction or confusion into the working of the system.”

Or in Lord Wensleydale’s language in Grey v. Pearson (1857) 6 H.L.C. 61 at p. 106, that alternative should b e rejected which will “lead to some absurdity or some repugnancy or inconsistency . . .”

Upon Mr. Kom’s silent invitation, I have studied Gazette No. 45/79 (exhibit SC2). The said Gazette “published”:

26 Decrees . . . (A.F.R.C.D. 42-66); twelve Legislative instruments . . . (LI 1221-1232); and six Executive instruments . . . (EI 89-94).

Among the 26 Decrees are:

(a) A.F.R.C.D. 45, which authorised the release forthwith from custody of all persons who at the commencement of the Decree, were held in custody by virtue of N.R.C.D. 2 or any instrument made thereunder;

(b) A.F.R.C.D. 52, which forfeited to the State the assets of Mr. and Mrs. Drevici;

(c) A.F.R.C.D. 55, which transferred to the State the shares and other interests of the Fattals, in the Fattal Group of Seventeen Companies;

(d) A.F.R.C.D. 56, i.e. the Constitution (Consequential and Transitional) Provisions Decree, 1979;

(e) A.F.R.C.D. 57, which merged Auto Parts, Japan Motors and Ghamot into the Ghana Motors Corporation and distributed the shares of the new body in the ratio of 55 per cent to the State, 22 1/2 per cent to each of Auto Parts and Japan Motors;

(f) A.F.R.C.D. 59, which transferred to the State the shares and other interests in nine companies including Reese & Co., Fruko-Gold, Savyen, Pentenia, Buildustry, etc.

(g) A.F.R.C.D. 60, which transferred to the State the interests of E.K. Owusu of Kowus Motors, in three companies, and also seized the shares of certain named persons in those companies; and

(h) A.F.R.C.D. 64 and 65, which prohibited a number of companies (including the G.E.A. Group of Companies) and their officers, from engaging in any commercial or business activity in Ghana.

All these Decrees, and others besides, we are told, are void, because although made and sent to the printers in September 1979, the printers could not print the relevant Gazette until October 1979. Of special interest, for the purposes of Mr. Kom’s submission, is the Constitution (Consequential and Transitional) Provisions Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 56). Section 1 of A.F.R.C.D. 56 dissolved the A.F.R.C. Section 2 repealed the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1979; and by section 8, A.F.R.C.D. 56 came into force on 24 September 1979.

If, as Mr. Kom argues, this Decree, among others, is null and void, then the A.F.R.C. has not been dissolved, and the A.F.R.C. (Establishment) Proclamation, 1979, has not been repealed. The logical conclusion from this state of affairs is that the A.F.R.C. is still in existence (perhaps, unknown to them, on involuntary holidays), co-existing with Dr. Limann’s administration, since 24 September 1979. So all that the members need to do now is to re-assemble, issue a “corrective” Decree to repeal A.F.R.C.D. 24 (which promulgated the Constitution and brought it into force), and we shall be back to “those days.” All this will be, on Mr. Kom’s argument, perfectly legal; there is no need for a gun at all, except, of course, in some stubborn cases, to compel obedience. I find such a situation clearly absurd, an absurdity to which the court must not lend its weight. The result is simply repugnant to public polity and commonsense.

We may not like A.F.R.C.D. 42. It may offend our sense of justice and fair-play. But that is no reason why we should force an interpretation of the law that will get rid of it, even though such interpretation is, on the face of the law, not called for, and in any case leads to an absurdity or repugnancy. I cannot be party to such an exercise.

For this additional reason, I am of the opinion that the phrase “publication in the Gazette,” appearing in section 3 (7) of the Proclamation, 1979, has nothing to do with the date on which a Gazette itself is printed or published. The relevant date is the date the Gazette

[p.707] of [1981] GLR 664 bears; which may be likened to the name of that Gazette, not when the name was given. I reject Mr. Kom’s contention appearing in his written address filed on 26 May 1981 that “all Decrees published in the Gazette after 24 September 1979 are void.” I find therefore that Gazette No. 45 /1979 is a perfectly lawful Gazette; the enactments and instruments named in it were properly published in accordance with section 3 (7) of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1979. They have all been duly published “in the Gazette” of 22 September 1979.

Granted that A.F.R.C.D. 42 is perfectly good law, the plaintiff says that the said Decree “is inconsistent with or in contravention of the provisions . . . of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1979”; see paragraph (a) 3 of the writ of summons and paragraph 7 (e) of the statement of case. I do not find anything in the statement of case in explanation of this contention, and none of the two senior counsel for the plaintiff addressed us on it, either orally or in the two written addresses filed on 26 May 1981. The court can only assume therefore that the matter was nakedly raised, only to be abandoned.

The contention, however, has a familiar ring about it. I therefore propose to take it at its face value, and limit my comments on it as such. In that light, I can only say that A.F.R.C.D. 42 made on 17 September 1979 could not have been made in contemplation of the Constitution, 1979, which came into force on 24 September 1979; it was not expressed so to be (see e.g the Constitution (Consequential and Transitional Provisions) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 56)). And there is nothing appearing on the face of the Decree to lead anyone to any form of inference that it was so made. In the circumstances, I do not see how it can be legitimately appropriated to the Constitution and be struck down as inconsistent. The Constitution does not operate backwards, it operates forwards: see Lindley L.J. in Lauri v. Renad [1892] 3 Ch. 402 at p. 421, C.A. where he said:

“It is a fundamental rule of English law that no statute shall be construed so as to have a retrospective operation, unless its language is such as plainly to require such a construction…”

And Lord Scrutton L.J. also said in Ward v. British Oak Insurance Co., Ltd. [1932] 1 K.B. 392 at p. 397, C.A., “prima facie an Act deals with future and not with past events.”

But the above does not fully answer the question, since it may be contended that the method by which the plaintiff was deprived of his citizenship is not the method now sanctioned by the Constitution, 1979, and that since AFRCD 42 is on the statute book,

[p.708] of [1981] GLR 664 it is an “existing law” as defined by article 4 (4) of the Constitution, 1979; it conflicts with the Constitution, and therefore ought to be struck down as “void and of no effect” under article 1 (2). In fact the plaintiff comes near enough to arguing that much, when he said in paragraph 6 of the statement of case, “The plaintiff says that citizenship of Ghana once conferred cannot be revoked except by an order of the High Court …” (The emphasis is mine.) And in paragraph (a) of the writ of summons he also said:

“That A.F.R.C.D. 42 in so far as it purports to deprive the plaintiff of his status as a citizen of Ghana by naturalisation without obtaining a judicial order of the High Court of Justice in that behalf … is null and void.”

The plaintiff no doubt had in mind article 17 (3) of the Constitution. There is a fundamental fallacy in this kind of argument. It was peddled in Fattal v. Minister for Internal Affairs [1981] G.L.R. 104, S.C. This may not be the place to exhaustively discuss this matter, this judgment being already too long for my liking.

But let me comment briefly: Every enactment is designed to effect a purpose. It may achieve its purpose once and for all, within a certain time period. Or it may be the kind of law, which is applicable continuously so long as it is not repealed. An example of the latter kind of law, which readily comes to mind, is a penal law, regulating the conduct of prisons within the society, e.g. “If you do this, you commit an offence and you are liable to that penalty.” Such a law is of continuous application, and any time a person does the forbidden act, the law is called into action, and the penalty exacted.

The purpose for which a law is made can be gathered from the law itself. A.F.R.C.D. 42 set out to do just one thing: to let the persons named therein “cease to be citizens of Ghana by naturalisation” with effect from 4 September 1979. The Decree did not set out to do anything else. Therefore by 5 September 1979 the Decree had, retroactively, completed its task and for all practicial purposes might as well not exist. But it continues to be on the statute book, and therefore, we are told it is an “existing law” within the contemplation of the Constitution.

In order to properly understand a provision in an enactment, it is necessary to read all the subsections of that provision together. As Abban J. remarked in Asamoah v. The Republic [1972] 1 G.L.R. 117 at p. 120:

“It cannot be over-emphasised that in construing a section of an Act of Parliament, it is always necessary to explain the

[p.709] of [1981] GLR 664 meaning of the words by an examination of the purport and effect of the other sections in the same Act.”

Then citing Jennings v. Kelly [1940] A.C. 206, H.L., he quoted the dictum of Lord Wright at p. 229:

“But in the present case, not only is the first part of the section deficient in express definition, but the second part is complementary and necessary in order to ascertain the full intention of the Legislature. The proper course is to apply the broad general rule of construction, which is that a section or an enactment must be construed as a whole, each portion throwing light, if need be, on the rest.”

Article 4 (4) of the Constitution, read in isolation, will seem to give the impression that an enactment such as A.F.R.C.D. 42 is an “existing law,” being a law which existed immediately before the coming into force of the Constitution. But article 4 (4) must be read along with article 4 (5) and (6). Article 4 (5) says that “… the operation of the existing law after the coming into force of this Constitution shall not be affected by such commencement.” (The emphasis is mine.) You operate a law for the purpose of achieving the objectives of that law. If there are no objectives left to be achieved, a law is not liable to be operated, even though the law may be on the statute book, not repealed. Therefore taking article 4 (5) along with article 4 (4), we learn that the term “existing law” in article 4(4) is intended to apply to that kind of law which it is necessary to operate or implement after 24 September 1979 in order to realise all or some of its purposes. It is not intended to apply to that kind of law which it is not necessary to operate or implement or both. This is consistent with the character of the Constitution as a forward-looking document, rather than a backward-looking one. Laws which have, as it were, finished their assignments, are not within the contemplation of the Constitution; it is concerned only with laws which have yet to accomplish all or some of their purposes: laws which are “live.”

This again accords with reason, and is further supported by article 4 (6), which talks of construing existing law:

“. . . with such modifications, adaptations, qualifications and exceptions as may be necessary to bring it into conformity with the provisions of this Constitution, or otherwise to give effect to, or enable effect to be given to, any changes effected by this Constitution.”

[p.710] of [1981] GLR 664

If a law is not to be operated or applied, is there any necessity to make any modifications to it? The modifications and adaptations are necessary only in the course of applying the law— operating it. In my view, the term “existing law” used in article 4 (4) is intended to apply only to those laws which it is necessary to operate after 24 September 1979. Or better still, if I may be permitted to borrow terminology from the law of contract, the phrase “existing law” applies to “executory” enactments, not “executed” enactments. It is in this sense that the court spoke of the Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree, 1978 (S.M.C.D. 172), in the Fattal case (supra) as spent.

But then it may be asked: How can you say A.F.R.C.D. 42 is spent (executed) when, if Mekkaoui should land at the airport today, and claim citizenship, the immigration officers are going to use this enactment against him, and perhaps send him back, as an alien? The short answer to this question is that the officers will not be operating the Decree to deprive Mekkaoui of his citizenship by naturalisation; this has already been done, since 4 September 1979. The officers will be using the Decree, so to speak, for evidential purposes only, to show to the world that Mekkaoui is not a citizen of Ghana, having ceased to be a citizen at some point in time in the past, viz. 4 September 1979. So the Decree would only be supportive of the stand taken by the officers, that Mekkaoui is an alien.

If the Decree had been in terms that, “Any naturalised person who is outside Ghana shall, upon coming into Ghana be liable to have his certificate of naturalisation withdrawn and cancelled, and thereupon such person shall cease to be a citizen of Ghana.” And if the immigration officers had purported to implement this law against Mekkaoui after 24 September 1979, the complaint could legitimately be made that, that “existing law” conflicts with article 17 (3) of the Constitution, and is therefore void. The reason being that the immigration officers will be using the law after 24 September 1979, to denaturalise Mekkaoui, contrary to the method presented by the Constitution in article 17 (3).

A law such as that will fall under article 4 (6) to be “construed” with such modifications, … as may be necessary to bring it into conformity with the Constitution.” If paragraph 7 (e) of the plaintiff’s statement of case is based on the plaintiff’s understanding of the “existing law” in article 4 (4) of the Constitution, then for the reasons given above, it is my view that that contention is misconceived, should be rejected. I would accordingly reject it.

It is for these reasons that I find myself unable to agree with the majority in the conclusions they have come to. In the result,

[p.711] of [1981] GLR 664 for the reasons given, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff’s action fails in whole and ought to be dismissed .

JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.S.C.

I agree with the opinion of my brother Charles Crabbe J.S.C. as read by my brother Archer J.S.C., that the plaintiff succeeds in his action. I had decided originally to concur in that decision but unfortunately as I have not had the advantage of reading beforehand the said decision and the various judgments which have just been read and as I find that the matter is of extreme constitutional importance, I prefer and have decided to give a separate concurring opinion. Needless to say that I also agree completely with the reasoning and conclusions of my brother Archer J.S.C. and I accordingly concur in his judgment.

This case has some features not unlike Fattal v. Minister for Internal Affairs [1981] G.L.R. 104, S.C. It is in essence a case of an alleged Decree of the erstwhile Armed Forces Revolutionary Council by which the plaintiff with 106 other persons was said to have been denaturalised. The alleged Decree is the Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 42). In this suit the plaintiff invokes the original jurisdiction of this court under article 2(1) of the Constitution, 1979, for substantially a declaration that the Decree is null and void. In the light of my dissenting views in the Fattal case such a denaturalisation effected by a Decree will on or after 24 September 1979, be inconsistent with the provisions of article 17 (3) of the Constitution, and by virtue of the directive principle in article 1 (2) of the Constitution, the Decree will be void and of no effect. Although the principle in the majority judgment in the Fattal case has been reiterated by my brother Adade J.S.C., I do not think it will be necessary for me to go over the grounds again. It is, however, unnecessary to decide this case on that ground alone particularly as my view of the law did not find favour in the reasoning of the majority of the court in the Fattal case. I propose therefore to focus my attention on an alternate ground peculiar to this case and for that reason, I think the facts of the case need to be carefully considered.

The plaintiff, originally a citizen of Lebanon, having been born in Tripoli, Lebanon, on 29 October 1930 migrated to Ghana, the then Gold Coast, in 1956 when he was barely 25 years old and has since then been permanently resident in this country. Some time in January 1974 he applied for naturalisation as a citizen of Ghana, and on 27 May 1976, he was informed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs by a letter emanating from that ministry that his application had been approved by the Supreme Military Council, and that he would be issued with a certificate of naturalisation only if he gave

[p.712] of [1981] GLR 664 up his Lebanese citizenship. He accordingly renounced the said Lebanese citizenship and on 14 June 1976 he was duly issued with a certificate of naturalisation. He thus became a citizen of Ghana by naturalisation as from 14 June 1976. On 26 September 1979, he was arrested by the police and kept in cells prior to his deportation on the ground that his naturalisation had been revoked by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council.

He applied to the High Court on 2 October 1979 for a writ of habeas corpus, directed to the police to show cause why he should not be released from detention. Before the return day, 11 October 1979, the plaintiff was released by the police and he was informed that the Decree which they had hoped to rely on, was not in existence and on the return date the police did not appear and were not represented and consequently as the plaintiff was a free man, the habeas corpus action became abortive.

On 3 January 1980, the Ministry of Internal Affairs carried an announcement on the national radio requesting the plaintiff and 106 other persons to report to the Chief Immigration Officer of the ministry with their passport before 14 January 1980. When the plaintiff reported in accordance with the announcement, his passport was seized and he was informed that by virtue of the Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 42), hereinafter referred to as A.F.R.C.D. 42, he had ceased to be a citizen of Ghana and should leave Ghana by 21 January 1980. On 25 January 1980, the plaintiff took out a writ invoking the original jurisdiction of this court under article 2 (1) of the Constitution for a declaration that:

“(a) That the Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 42), insofar as it purports to deprive the plaintiff of his status as a citizen of Ghana by naturalisation without obtaining a judicial order of the High Court of Justice in that behalf:

1. is ultra vires the powers conferred on the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council;

2. is null and void and of no effect whatever as being contrary to law and in particular to the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1979, and the Constitution, 1969, of the Republic of Ghana; and 3. is inconsistent with or in contravention of the provisions of chapters 5, 6, 9, and 12 of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1979.

[p.713] of [1981] GLR 664

(b) That the said A.F.R.C.D. 42 was published after 24 September 1979 and is therefore null and void and of no effect whatever.

(c) That the said A.F.R.C.D. 42 is not an executive, legislative or judicial act of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council which assumed the reins of government on 4 June 1979 and vacated office or ceased to exist on 24 September 1979.

(d) That the plaintiff is a citizen of Ghana by naturalisation, the Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D. 42), notwithstanding.”

In this court evidence was led as to the circumstances surrounding the alleged promulgation, printing and publishing of A.F.R.C.D. 42. It is said that the person challenging a Decree has the onus of leading evidence to challenge the presumption of regularity which all Decrees enjoy. I accept this position, but with all due respect, this is a court of justice and on the available evidence there can be no doubt as to the relevant and uncontroverted facts which we now possess and on the basis of which this case can be decided, onus notwithstanding.

Apparently a draft Decree was sent to the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, hereinafter referred to as the A.F.R.C., and on 17 September 1979, Flight-Lieutenant J.J. Rawlings, the Chairman of the Council signed the said draft Decree. The commencement date of the said Decree was left blank. The draft Decree so signed by the said chairman with the commencement date left blank was sent to the Government Printer on 19 September 1979. The Government Printer caused it to be printed as submitted and on 9 October 1979 (a couple of weeks after the A.F.R.C. had handed over power to the civilian government and had ceased to have legislative powers) the proof with no commencement date was sent to the Attorney-General’s Office for approval.

On 11 October the proof was returned to the Government Printer and it would seem that one Mr. Nikoi, a Principal State Attorney, in the Office of the Attorney-General, inserted a commencement date as 4 September 1979, with instructions that the Government Printer should print the Decree as thus amended by the officer of the Attorney-General’s Office. The affidavit evidence before us gives an indication as to the reasons why Mr. Nikoi of the Attorney-General’s Office, purported to insert a date in the Decree after it had been signed. Apparently on 4 September 1979, the Attorney-General’s Office was instructed to draft a Decree denaturalising, inter alia, the

[p.714] of [1981] GLR 664 plaintiff. On 5 September, a written instruction of that date sent to the Attorney-General directed:

“The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council directs that all the persons named on the enclosed list should be denaturalised with immediate effect.

Please take necessary action to have the Decree published.

(Sgd.) H.C. Apaloo Lt.-Cmd. (G.N.)

For: Chairman/A.F.R.C.”

It is on the strength of this mandate, that some time between 9 and 11 October 1979, Mr. Nikoi inserted the date 4 September 1979 in the draft Decree which had already been signed by the Chairman of the Council.

The sole question is, has he authority to so insert the date, 4 September 1979? It is said that the date 4 September 1979 was probably inserted on the instructions of the A.F.R.C, but why should this be a probability? All the instructions given to the draftsman must be assumed to be given to the Attorney-General. The Attorney-General is a defendant in this suit; the evidence given on his behalf by affidavit, shows that he was carrying out on a date between 9 and 11 October 1979, instructions which had lapsed as the institution that gave the instructions was no more.

Looking at the affidavit evidence, it is clear that on 4 September 1979, the instructions given was for a Decree to be drafted denaturalising the plaintiff. The written instructions of 5 September 1979 was that the plaintiff should be denaturalised by Decree “with immediate effect.” Clearly “with immediate effect” must be 5 September 1979. I think since the Attorney-General’s Office does not legislate, the instructions given to them with regard to “immediate effect” has nothing to do with the commencement of the Decree. It only relates to the drafting. The question of commencement is a legislative act and it is for the A.F.R.C. Since the draft Decree was sent to the Office of the A.F.R.C. on 10 September 1979, but not on 4 or 5 September 1979, the inference is that the instructions of the A.F.R.C. were not carried out.

That is all, no more. No doubt, in signing the Decree, the chairman believed he was signing a Decree denaturalising the plaintiff with immediate effect probably on 4 September 1979 or 5 September 1979, and in inserting the date 4 September 1979, Mr. Nikoi of the drafting section of the Attorney-General’s Office, assumed that by virtue of the oral and written instructions which the Attorney-General’s Office had earlier received,

[p.715] of [1981] GLR 664 he has authority to insert a date. I am afraid these beliefs and assumptions are quite irrelevant as Lord Radcliffe delivering his opinion in Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Dowdall, O’Mahoney & Co., Ltd. [1952] A.C. 401 at p. 426, H.L. remarked, “The beliefs or assumptions of those who frame Acts of Parliament cannot make the law.”

I do not think that after an Ordinance or an Act of Parliament has passed through the legislative process and has received the assent in the case of an Ordinance of the Governor and in the case of an Act of Parliament of the President, any draftsman can then insert words which will receive the force of law. No draftsman in the history of our law whether under a military regime or a constitutional regime, has ever laid any claim to any such powers.

And therefore this power claimed by the Attorney-General’s Office in this case must be considered to be unprecedented in the annals of our laws. With all due respect, I cannot agree with the presumption that the interpretation of a statute is to be dependent on whether it is passed by a revolutionary government or a constitutional government. In my view, the principles of construction or interpretation of statutes apply to Decrees and Acts and I think the commencement date of a statute whether it was a Decree or Act is of extreme importance.

It seems to me that once the legislature, in this case the A.F.R.C, has passed a law, it will be functus officio and can only amend the law so passed by the same process by which the original law was passed. Radin, writing on statutory interpretation: see (1930) 43 Havard Law Review 863 at p. 871 had this in mind when he said, “When the legislature has altered the words of a statute, it is functus officio, not because of the Montesquieuan separation of powers, but because that is what legislating means.” On this reasoning even the legislature cannot ex post facto make insertions in a law already enacted without going through the same legislative process by which it enacts laws. And I would think the draftsman will have therefore less authority.

Be that as it may, the Decree as altered was actually printed on 22 October 1979 and was actually published in the Gazette in October, on or after 22 October 1979. That Decree as so published denaturalising 107 persons had a name “Mohammed Mekkaoui” listed as No. 22 therein. The plaintiff tendered a photo copy of his certificate of naturalisation: Certificate No. 49 of 1976 dated 14 June 1976 with file No. IN 3/1372. His name on the certificate and in these proceedings is “Mohamed Mekkaoui.” The two

[p.716] of [1981] GLR 664 names are obviously different.

The legislature has made a mistake. This point, however, was never canvassed before us and as the plaintiff must be taken to have accepted the listed name as his, I make no pronouncement on this aspect of the matter, except to say that in cases of this nature, where the file of a person with his name on it is with the authorities, it does no credit to make such errors as they are normally associated with incompetence.

The unchallenged evidence before us is that at a date when the A.F.R.C. was no longer the legislature of this country, the Attorney-General’s Office by a letter dated 27 September 1979, instructed that the Decree as amended by it should be published in the Gazette dated before 24 September 1979 contrary to the practice of the Government Printer of dating the Gazette on the dates they are published. The letter is referred to in extenso by my brother Charles Crabbe J.S.C. in his judgment.

Following the said instructions, the Decree with a host of other Decrees, was published, as aforesaid, in a Gazette in October but dated 22 September 1979. The reason for dating the Gazette publication as 22 September 1979 was clearly to give the erroneous impression that the Decree was published before the A.F.R.C. handed over power and before the Constitution came into force. I cannot help being sympathetic to the submission of Alhaji Kwaw-Swanzy, counsel for the plaintiff, when in referring to the letter, he exclaimed, “The letter was seducing the Government Printer by inviting him to perpetrate a fraud on the people of Ghana.”

I think the letter was unfortunate. If, as it is now being urged on us, the amendment, printing and publication in October 1979, were irrelevant to the validity of the Decree, then what was the purpose of the letter? In any case, it is quite clear that the Decree which Flt.-Lt. J. J. Rawlings, the Chairman of the A.F.R.C. signed, was not the Decree which was printed and published. What was printed and published was the draft of an amended Decree and that draft Decree as amended was not signed by Flt.-Lt. J. J. Rawlings or any person.

It would be recalled that the amendment was said to have been made some time between 9 and 11 October 1979. On 11 October 1979, when the plaintiff appeared in court to challenge his incarceration prior to his deportation on the ground that he had been denaturalised, the police who were under the Minister of the Interior, the first defendant, were not able to pursue their claim that, as at that date, the plaintiff had been denaturalised, thus enabling them to arrest and deport him. There can be no doubt that as at 11 October 1979, the authorities had no effective Decree

[p.717] of [1981] GLR 664 denaturalising the plaintiff. If that is so, then as from that date, any law denaturalising him must have its foundation in the constitutional provision governing denaturalisation.

At common law unless a contrary intention is expressed in the Act, an Act of Parliament comes into force from the first day of the session of Parliament in which it is passed and before an official print is made. This rule is adverted to, by Lord Coke in his Institutes: see Coke 4 Inst. 25, and was judicially recognised by the House of Lords in Panter v. Attorney-General (1772) 6 Bro. P.C. 486. The effect of the rule is that an Act of Parliament binds every subject of the realm even if it is not possible for the subject to know its terms. This result was stated by Lord Eldon in R v. Bailey (1800) Russ. & R. 1 at p. 4. Of course, the rule was recognised as clearly mischievous and manifestly unjust and down to the period of the reign of Henry VII, statutes passed were circulated to the sheriffs of the various counties with a mandate that they proclaim and ensure their observance in their respective bailiwicks. This procedure was clearly inconvenient and in 1793, the Acts of Parliament (Commencement) Act, 1793 (33 Geo. 3, c. 13), was passed which provided that:

“. . . the clerk of the Parliament shall endorse (in English) on every Act of Parliament which shall pass after the eighth day of April 1793, immediately after the title of such Act, the day, month and year when the same shall have passed and shall have received the royal assent; and such endorsement shall be taken to be a part of such Act and to be the date of its commencement where no other commencement shall be therein provided.”

This provision, clearly a statute of general application would seem to have been applied to the then Gold Coast with necessary modification down to 13 April 1935; from that date, until the coming into force of our First Republican Constitution on 1 July 1960, our own commencement provision was governed by the Ordinances Authentication Ordinance, Cap. 2 (1951 Rev.), which came into force on 13 April 1935. Under section 2 of the said Ordinance, the Government Printer was placed under an obligation to print every Ordinance enacted by the legislature and section 8 provided:

“8. Every ordinance shall be published in the Gazette and shall take effect from the expiration of the day preceding the date of such publication unless it be otherwise provided in the ordinance.”

[p.718] of [1981] GLR 664

This provision was repealed on the coming into force of the First Republican Constitution, 1960, by the Acts of Parliament Act, 1960 (C.A. 7). A provision regarding publication was made in section 9 thus, “Every Act shall be published by the Government Printer as soon as may be after the President’s assent has been signified, . . .” The new commencement provision contained in section 11 thereof is in the following terms:

“11. (1) Except so far as may be otherwise provided in an Act, the Act shall come into operation at the commencement of the day following the day on which the President’s assent is signified.

(2) A provision in an Act regulating the coming into operation of the Act or any part thereof shall have effect notwithstanding that the part of the Act containing the provision has not come into operation.”

When the First Republic was overthrown, the National Liberation Council (Establishment) Proclamation, 1966, without repealing those provisions, promulgated provisions governing the publication and commencement of the Decrees of the National Liberation Council and when power was handed over to the Parliament of the Second Republic, the publication and commencement provisions contained in the Proclamation, 1966, became obsolete with the revocation of the Proclamation, 1966.

The advent of the National Redemption Council (N.R.C.), on 13 January 1972 also saw new publication and commencement provisions in the Proclamation, 1972, for Decrees passed by the N.R.C. and later the Supreme Military Council (S.M.C.). When these two military regimes were superseded by the A.F.R.C. new publication and commencement provisions germane to the present proceedings contained in the Proclamation, 1979, but which were identical with the provisions in the Proclamation, 1966, were promulgated in section 3 (6) and (7) as:

“3. (6) Every decree made by the Revolutionary Council shall, as soon as practicable after it is made, be published in the Gazette.

(7) A decree made by the Revolutionary Council shall, unless otherwise provided in that decree, come into force on the date of publication of that decree in the Gazette.”

These are the provisions that determine the operative force of the Decree which was signed by Flt.-Lt. J. J. Rawlings in his capacity as Chairman of the A.F.R.C. That Decree, it would be recalled, had no commencement date and so it ought to “come

[p.719] of [1981] GLR 664 into force on the date of publication . . . in the Gazette.” Unfortunately the Decree has never been published in the Gazette and so until it is published, it cannot come into force. This was the state of the law at least from 4 June 1979 until 24 September 1979 and it was the A.F.R.C. which by its Proclamation, 1979, restated this legal position. I believe it is now trite law and there is no need to cite any authority to support it, that in all statutes, the legislature or the lawgiver is presumed to have legislated with reference to the existing state of the law. I think the decision of Lord Parker C.J. in Fisher v. Bell [1961] 1 Q.B. 394 is an admirable illustration of this elementary principle.

In this case therefore, having regard to the general law of the land, the question that arises is what is the status of a Decree which has been signed but which has not been published and which has no commencement date? Charles Crabbe J., as he then was, considered the similar provision in the Proclamation, 1966, in Republic v. Director of Special Branch; Ex parte Salifa [1968] G.L.R 646 at p. 663. He there said:

“It has been strenuously argued by learned counsel for the applicant that the document which was produced by the learned Attorney-General is not a Decree because it has not been published. But reading again paragraph 3 (6) I find that the words ‘as soon as practicable after it is made’ must be given some meaning …

It is my view that this paragraph makes it possible for a Decree to come into force and be operated or administered even though it has not been published in the Gazette. This, in my view, is reinforced by paragraph 3 (7) which states: ‘A decree made by the council shall, unless otherwise provided in that decree, come into force on the date of publication of that decree in the Gazette. Here again the words ‘unless otherwise provided in that decree’ are very important and must be given some meaning … They mean, in my view, that a Decree can come into force by some other way or mode of publication or even on some other day other than publication in the Gazette.”

I accept this reasoning and I think it is a respectful authority for the proposition that a Decree properly signed is a valid Decree even if it has not been published. And I would think this is equally so even if it has no commencement date. My brother Archer J.S.C., has in his learned appraisal given two examples: the Chattels Transfer Ordinance, 1952 (No. 51 of 1952) and the Insolvency Act, 1962 (No. 153 of 1962), which are on the statute book but which have

[p.720] of [1981] GLR 664 never had a commencement date. This view is supported by the constitutional provision contained in article 4 (4) of the Constitution, 1979, spelling out what the existing law is:

“(4). The existing law shall, except as otherwise provided … comprise the written and unwritten laws of Ghana as they existed immediately before the coming into force of this Constitution, and any act, Decree or statutory instrument issued or made before that date, which is to come into force on or after that date.”

It seems to me, though, that the provisions of section 3 (6) of the Proclamation, 1979, need further consideration. The section says a Decree of the Revolutionary Council “shall as soon as practicable after it is made, be published in the Gazette.” (The emphasis is mine.) Who is to publish the said Decree in the Gazette? The Proclamation is silent as to who has the responsibility of so publishing it in the Gazette. Under the Acts of Parliament Act, 1960 (C.A. 7), the Government Printer, it would be recalled, has the duty to publish the Acts of the Republican Parliament. However, a look at sections 3 (6) and 18 of the Proclamation, 1979, would seem to indicate that the primary responsibility to publish must be that of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council or presumably the institution of government responsible for printing the Gazette which in this case, according to evidence, is the Government Printer.

In any case, the authority of publish the Decrees of the A.F.R.C. is section 3 (6) of the said Proclamation, 1979. If that is so, then since the Proclamation, 1979, has been abrogated by section 18 (2) of the transitional provisions of the Constitution, 1979, there is after 24 September 1979, no legal authority sanctioning the publication in the Gazette and so any publication in the Gazette after 24 September 1979, will be without any legal authority whatsoever.

I hold therefore that the Decree which was signed by the Chairman of the A.F.R.C. on 17 September 1979, was a valid Decree when it was made; but it is a Decree which probably due to the negligence of the legal draftsman and the inadvertence of the A.F.R.C. was not given any commencement date. It is therefore clear that it is a Decree which has never come into force and which cannot come into force because the A.F.R.C., the legislative body, which can give it force is now no more. In any case as I have previously held in the Fattal case even if a proper commencement date had been put on the Decree and published, I would have been obliged

[p.721] of [1981] GLR 664 to hold that in view of the provisions of article 17 (3) of the Constitution, the said Decree is void and of no effect, since the law contained therein is inconsistent with and repugnant to the provisions of article 17 (3) of the Constitution.

With regard to the declarations sought, I am firmly of the view that the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council seized plenary powers on 4 June 1979 and as between 4 June and 24 September 1979 was the only sovereign legislature in the country. A.F.R.C.D. 42 is not a Decree of the council and the question of ultra vires does not therefore arise.

I will therefore make no declaration on declaration (a) 1. With regard to declaration (a) 2, I would delete all references to the Ghana Constitution, 1969, since that constitution was at the relevant time under suspension and since the A.F.R.C. had authority to legislate in terms contrary to its provisions. Subject to the deletion, however, I would make declaration (a) 2 because what is alleged to be A.F.R.C.D. 42 is in effect a document emanating from the Attorney-General’s Office, and under the Proclamation, 1979, s. 3 (1) it is only the council that could legislate by Decree, not the Attorney-General’s Office.

I would grant declaration (a) 3, because in my view this purported Decree made and published in October 1979, which is after 24 September 1979, ought to have been promulgated and published on the authority of the present legislature whose powers for legislation are contained in chapter 9 of the Constitution.

Its promulgation therefore violated chapter 9 of the Constitution, 1979. Even if it can be held that the A.F.R.C. authorised the amendment, that authority ceased to apply after 24 September 1979. Furthermore, since the Decree was made after 24 September 1979, it was a Decree that was incapable of depriving a naturalised citizen of his citizenship without a court order. By its provisions it flouted the provisions of article 17 (3) contained in chapter 5 of the Constitution, 1979, and usurped the powers of the judiciary in chapter 12 of the said Constitution. Moreover, it was a law discriminating against a citizen because of his place of origin and this is clearly against the provisions of article 31 of the Constitution contained in chapter 6.

For the reasons which I have already indicated, I would grant declaration (b). I would also grant declaration (c) and (d) as in my view the alleged A.F.R.C.D. 42 is not the act of the A.F.R.C.

I must add that nothing prevents the present government from denaturalising the plaintiff and the other 106 persons, if the public interest demands it and they can satisfy the provisions of article

[p.722] of [1981] GLR 664

17 (3) of the Constitution. I am also of the view that the provisions of sections 15 and 16 of the transitional provisions are inapplicable since the Decree is not the act or purported act of the A.F.R.C. It is the act of the Attorney-General’s Office.

I think the plaintiff succeeds in terms of the declarations I have made.

DECISION

Judgment for the plaintiff.

Declaration that AFRCD 42 is null and void accordingly granted.

D. R. K. S.

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