DAABOA DAGARTI vs. DORNIPEA [1982-83] GLR 594
11 May 1982 · EDWARD WIREDU JA · ≈ 12 min read
[1982] SLR (CA) 7Other citation styles and permanent link
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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from the judgment of the trial court wherein custody of a six-year old child was granted to the uncle, i.e. the child’s deceased father’s brother. The facts are fully set out in the judgment of Edward Wiredu J.A.
COUNSEL
Adumua-Bossman for the appellant.
No appearance for or on behalf of the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF EDWARD WIREDU J.A.
This appeal is from the decision of the Circuit Court, Wa, dated 2 April 1980. The decision upheld a claim by the plaintiff-respondent (hereafter referred to simply as the plaintiff) for the custody of a child he claimed was born to his deceased elder brother and the daughter of the defendant-appellant (also hereafter referred to simply as the defendant). In that same decision the plaintiff’s claim for the return of the dowry of the said marriage between his deceased brother and the daughter of the defendant was dismissed for reasons which cannot be justified by the evidence on record. But as there has not been any appeal from that order by the plaintiff, we refrain from interfering with same. The defendant’s daughter testified in the case as his second witness and will in this judgment be referred to simply as the second defendant witness when it becomes necessary to refer to her.
The facts which have provoked the present appeal as presented by the plaintiff may be briefly stated as follows: The plaintiff’s deceased brother married the defendant’s daughter, the second defendant witness, under customary law and the couple stayed for some time at Bibiani. The exact period of their stay is uncertain on the evidence but the undisputed facts reveal that in the course of this stay the second defendant witness ran away from her husband. It is the case of the plaintiff that at the time of leaving his brother’s house, the second defendant witness was under pregnancy and he was instructed by his brother to go and inform the second defendant witness’ uncle about the escape and the fact also that the second defendant witness was carrying the baby of the brother. The uncle of the second defendant witness to whom this message was to be delivered is the elder brother of the defendant. He was also the person to whom the dowry in respect of the marriage was paid. He testified in this case as the first witness for the plaintiff and will hereafter be referred to as the first plaintiff witness. The evidence of this witness, which confirmed the plaintiff’s story, shows that when he received the information about the second defendant witness’ escape from the plaintiff’s brother, he
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sent a message to Wogu where he learnt the second defendant witness had gone to stay with a man to whom she was betrothed. According to the first plaintiff witness, the Wogu people on receiving his message returned the second defendant witness to him in his village where the second defendant witness stayed and delivered the child in dispute about three months after her return. The relevant portion of his evidence reads:
“I was in the house when the Wogu people to whom the child had been betrothed also came with the daughter saying that the daughter was under pregnancy. They told me they could not keep a woman under pregnancy. The Wogu people brought the daughter to me. She stayed with me for three months when she delivered.”
The testimony of the first plaintiff witness further reveals that when the defendant returned home from Jumasi (where he was staying) he informed him about what had happened and advised him to acknowledge paternity of the child to the plaintiff’s family but the defendant refused and that resulted in two complaints being lodged first with the Bissa Na against the defendant by the plaintiff, and a second one to the Wa Na. The evidence brought by and on behalf of the plaintiff on the two complaints established that the defendant agreed before the two chiefs to hand over the child to the plaintiff. This he later on refused to do resulting in the action culminating in this appeal.
In all, three independent witnesses testified in support of the plaintiff. Apart from the first plaintiff witnesses, the other two witnesses were the sons of the Bissa Na and the linguist of the Wa Na, respectively. The evidence of the second plaintiff witness (the son of the Bissa Na) was that he was the person sent by the first plaintiff witness with a message to the Wogu people about the plaintiff’s family’s claim that the second defendant witness was carrying their child as a result of which the second defendant witness was returned to the first plaintiff witness.
He also supported the evidence of the first plaintiff witness that three months after her return, the second defendant witness delivered safely in the first plaintiff witness’ house after he, the witness, had called on the gods of their people. This witness further confirmed the complaints and the appearances of the parties before the Bissa Na and the Wa Na before whom the defendant agreed to surrender the child to the plaintiff. The last witness for the plaintiff testified only in respect of the meeting before the Wa Na and confirmed the evidence of the plaintiff’s witnesses as told by them.
On the face of such evidence which was not in any way challenged, it looks rather strange when the trial court expressed its
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inability to make a positive finding on this. If for nothing at all, it showed the consistency of the plaintiff’s claim and proved that the uncompromising conduct on the part of the defendant in fighting the claim in favour of a dormant and unconcerned father (who did not himself contest the claim) could not be genuine.
The defence case is one of a paucity nature devoid of any serious merit. The relevant part of the defendant’s evidence reads:
“My daughter was given to the plaintiff’s brother in marriage. There was a divorce. She married another man called Kuukuri. Kuukuri and my daughter delivered the child in question. The plaintiffs are now claiming the child, which I have refused to give up to them. The plaintiff dowried the woman but later came for their dowries. The plaintiff therefore has no dowries with me. Cross-examined by the plaintiff: The said Kuukuri comes from Wogu. Kuukuri never refused to marry my daughter because he got to know she was under conception from your brother. Kuukuri thrice appeared before the Wa Na when the case was going on.”
Two witnesses testified for the defendant. They were Abu Dagarti, the Wogu man with whom the second defendant witness went to stay after escaping from Bibiani, and the second defendant witness, the daughter of the defendant. According to the Wogu man the child was his. This witness admitted that the second defendant witness delivered in the house of the first plaintiff witness, but contended that his family sent a fowl to the second defendant witness when she delivered. He also admitted being present on all the the occasions when the plaintiff laid claim to the child without himself doing anything but stated that he considered the time of testifying in the court below as the proper time to challenge the plaintiff’s claim.
The second defendant witness in her evidence denied knowing the plaintiff. She was emphatic that the disputed child was the child of the first defendant witness. She admitted having divorced the first defendant witness and married one Kojopan and said she divorced the first defendant witness because of what the first defendant witness’ parents went and told the defendant which annoyed the latter.
Such was the nature of the evidence presented to the court below by the parties. The trial learned circuit judge, after considering the case presented by the parties, dismissed the plaintiff’s claim to the dowry but upheld and granted him the relief for the custody of the disputed child.
It is from this decision that this appeal has been brought to this court originally on the following grounds:
“(1) The judgment is unreasonable and cannot be supported having regard to the evidence.
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(2) Additional grounds to be filed on receipt of the record of proceedings.” No additional grounds of appeal were filed in this court but at the hearing of the appeal learned counsel for the defendant was given leave to amend the original ground to read: “The judgment is against the weight of the evidence.”
Arguing this ground, Mr. Adumua-Bossman for the defendant submitted that the learned trial circuit judge failed to consider the presumption in favour of the defendant, that a child born during the subsistence of a marriage was deemed to be the child of that marriage. He referred to the Evidence Decree, 1975 (N.R.C.D. 323), s. 32(1) to support his submission. He argued that the evidence showed that at the time of delivering, the second defendant witness had divorced the plaintiff’s brother and had got married to another man. He argued further that the claim by the plaintiff that the woman was pregnant merely showed consistency in the allegation of pregnancy.
Counsel submitted that whether the woman was pregnant or not was a matter that the woman alone could testify about. Learned counsel further submitted that the evidence that the woman delivered in the house of the first plaintiff witness and in the plaintiff’s presence she called the name of the first defendant witness before she delivered was a factor which strongly destroyed the plaintiff’s claim to paternity. Counsel finally submitted that on grounds of public policy the child who was about six years old should be given to the mother, the second defendant witness.
One would have had no quarrel with the submission by learned counsel for the defendant had the facts of this case been as simple and clear cut as they were presented by him. The evidence on record does not appear to support him. The evidence about the second defendant witness’ marriage with the plaintiff’s brother was that she escaped from the house of her husband. The evidence about the dissolution or otherwise of that marriage was provided by the first plaintiff witness and the defendant. The first plaintiff witness was emphatic that he paid back the dowry presented by the Wogu people to them but that he was still in possession of the plaintiff’s dowry.
Against this was the evidence of the defendant that the plaintiff had collected the dowry presented by his family. In view of the varying evidence provided on this issue, a finding on it by the trial learned circuit judge was a sine qua non to the determination of the question: which marriage was subsisting legally at the time of delivery by the second defendant witness? The finding by the learned trial circuit judge that the dissolution of the first marriage was not in dispute is not supported by the evidence. His decision one way or the other on the issue would have made the application of section 32(1) of N.R.C.D. 323, easier.
Be that as it may, the issue raised for determination before the court was one of fact and the evidence which the judge appeared to
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have accepted, and rightly in our view, was the case presented by and on behalf of the plaintiff. Much emphasis was laid on the evidence of the first plaintiff witness (the uncle of the second defendant witness and the elder brother of the defendant) who gave the second defendant witness out in marriage to the plaintiff’s elder brother.
The evidence of this witness was supported in material details by the two other independent disinterested witnesses, i.e the son of the Bissa Na and the linguist of the Wa Na. The evidence of the plaintiff’s witnesses presents two points of significance: First, their testimonies show that the Wogu people returned the second defendant witness and gave up the alleged marriage between her and the first defendant witness on receiving the message of the second defendant witness’ pregnancy for which the first defendant witness could not have been responsible. It is significant to note here that when the second defendant witness was sent back she did not deny the plaintiff’s family’s claim, and it is not likely that she was not told about this.
Secondly, as learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted, the conduct exhibited by the plaintiff in laying claim to the pregnancy soon after the second defendant witness’ escape shows some consistency on the part of his deceased brother’s conviction of this claim. On the other hand the conduct of the defendant in agreeing before both the Bissa Na and the Wa Na to hand over the child to the plaintiff only to refuse thereafter and the indolent and unconcerned attitude of the first defendant witness towards the contest for the custody of the child waged between the parties to this suit, and only to make a belated claim in his evidence, justify the trial judge in rejecting their evidence as a fabrication.
The conduct of the second defendant witness in standing by the defendant who has been resisting the plaintiff’s claim is not far to find. Her reason for leaving the first defendant witness for a third man as testified by her, shows that her stand in her association with any man was dictated by the attitude of the defendant towards that association. If as stated elsewhere in the judgment, it is true that she did not leave the house of the plaintiff’s brother with the pregnancy, one would have expected her to have denied this when the Wogu people sent her back to the first plaintiff witness.
On the overwhelming evidence of the factual situation of this case, one cannot see how section 32 (1) of N.R.C.D. 323 could have availed the defendant. Even on the issue as to whether the marriage between the plaintiff’s brother and the second defendant witness had been dissolved at the time of the delivery of the disputed child, it looks as if the stand taken by the learned trial circuit judge on the testimony of the first plaintiff witness as against that of the defendant that he would have preferred the evidence of the first plaintiff witness that the dowry was still with him to that of the defendant who claimed that the dowry of the first marriage had been returned to the plaintiff.
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Receipt of a dowry by a husband or his family is conclusive evidence of a dissolution of a customary marriage unless good reasons exist for the retention of the dowry by the woman’s family.
On the submission that on grounds of public policy custody of the child should be given to the second defendant witness, we find no substance in it. The general principle on which this public policy is founded is consideration of the welfare of the child which must be the paramount factor for determining who should have custody. Nothing has been urged in favour of the second defendant witness as against the plaintiff to form the basis for such an award. On the contrary, we feel that the interest of the six-year old child would be best served if the custody of the child was given to the plaintiff who has shown on the evidence to be responsible and affectionate. It is doubtful whether in such a straightforward contest there will be a justification in making any such order in favour of the second defendant witness.
The appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.
JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS J.A.
I agree that the appeal should be dismissed.
JUDGMENT OF COUSSEY J.A.
I also agree.
DECISION Appeal dismissed. J. A. A.
