REPUBLIC vs. DARKWA [1982-83] GLR 126
8 June 1982 · APALOO CJ · ≈ 4 min read
[1982] SLR (SC) 6Other citation styles and permanent link
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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION by the Republic under the Supreme Court Rules, 1970 (CI 13), r. 66 for extension of time within which to file a statement of case under rule 13 (1). The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling.
COUNSEL
Mrs. Zwennes (Mrs. Campbell with her) for the Republic.
S. Kwame Tetteh for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF APALOO C.J.
Apaloo C.J. read the ruling of the court. During the era of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (i.e. June – September, 1979), a committee popularly called the “Huppenbauer Committee” conducted investigations into some aspects of the Ghana Police Service. Adverse findings were apparently made against the respondent by the committee which recommended her retirement. This was accepted by the government and the respondent together with other police officers similarly circumstanced, were retired from the Police Service on 22 September, 1979.
The respondent contested the adverse findings made against her in the Court of Appeal. It appears that in that court, the applicant disputed the competence of the court to entertain the appeal. The Court of Appeal found against that contention and heard the appeal on its merits. On 26 February, 1981, the court set aside the adverse findings made against the respondent and as that was the basis of her enforced retirement, advised the applicant to reinstate her.
The applicant claimed to have been aggrieved by the decision of the Court of Appeal and appealed against it to this court. In due course, the record of appeal required by rule 12 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1970 (CI 13) was transmitted to this court. On 2 June, 1981 the registrar of the court below in obedience to that selfsame rule duly notified the applicant of the transmission of the record.
The applicant came under an obligation to file a statement of its case based on the grounds of appeal within three weeks of receiving
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such notice. On the facts of this case, the applicant should have filed that case on or by 23 June, 1981. It did not do so.
As by 2 July, 1981 it had not then filed such a case, the appeal was deemed to have been struck out by the force of rule 13 (2). The registrar incurred an obligation under this rule to inform the parties of this position. The record shows that at 11.55 a.m. that very day, i.e. 2 July, 1981, the notice of striking out was served on the applicant through the then Deputy Attorney-General, Mr. Djabatey, at the Attorney-General’s Office.
The applicant did nothing further about this appeal. There is evidence that just six weeks after being notified of the striking out, the Police Council which is the constitutional body charged with this matter, caused it to be announced in the media that it would not reinstate the respondent but would instead pay her arrears of salary and other entitlements. The respondent accepted this position and in October, 1981, received payment of salaries due her from September 1979 to July, 1981. She is now awaiting payment of her gratuity and other entitlements.
On 10 March, 1982, the applicant sought to resurrect the appeal. This was over eight months after it was struck out. The method it employed was to invite us to waive its breach of rule 13 (2) and permit it to file a statement of case as required by rule 13 (1). Its avowed reason was that the appeal involves some unspecified constitutional issues and that its failure to file a statement of case was not wilful nor was it intended to overreach. It claimed that the interest of justice demands that we exercise our discretion in its favour under rule 66 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1970.
The respondent, for her part, resists this. She said the applicant had publicly announced that it would not accept the advice of the court below to reinstate her. It offered her instead, her arrears of salary and other entitlements. She was therefore no longer interested in the suit and hardship would be caused her if, notwithstanding this, this apparently dead litigation were resurrected.
The question is: Who has the greater justice and where does the balance of hardship lie? The applicant who is praying for the exercise of our discretion has not given us any reason for its initial default. The obligation on it to file its statement of case was laid down in mandatory terms by rule 13 (1). Although it was apprised of the striking out of its appeal as long ago as July, 1981, it went to sleep thereafter. No reason was given us as to why it did not seek to reopen this matter before now. We think it is a fair inference from the facts that the reason is because it decided instead of obeying the court’s judgment, to pay off the respondent, so to speak. The applicant has not disclosed to us what the complex constitutional question it seeks to agitate is,
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nor has it shown us anything which prima facie suggests that the court below fell into error in its decision. In these circumstances, to reopen this matter in the teeth of opposition by the respondent would be wrong and unjust.
In our judgment, greater hardship would be caused in granting this application than in refusing it. We accordingly decline to exercise our discretion in the applicant’s favour and dismiss this application with costs.
DECISION
Application dismissed.
D. R. K. S.
