MAMUDU WANGARA vs. GYATO WANGARA [1982-83] GLR 639
24 January 1983 · ABBAN JA · ≈ 16 min read
[1983] SLR (CA) 8Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Cobblah v. Gbeke (1947) 12 W.A.C.A. 294.
(2) Dompreh v. Pong [1965] G.L.R. 126, S.C.
(3) Thomas v. Sorrel (1673) 1 Fream. K.B. 85, 137; 2 Keb. 790; 3 Keb. 264; Vaugh. 330; 1 Lev. 217;
124 E.R. 1098.
(4) Richardson v. Methley School Board [1893] 3 Ch. 510; 62 L.J. Ch. 943; 69 L.T. 308; 42 W.R. 27;
9 T.L.R. 603; 37 S.J. 670; 3 R. 701.
(5) Redland Bricks Ltd. v. Morris [1970] A.C 652; [1969] 2 W.L.R. 1437; [1969] 2 All E.R. 576; 113 S.J. 403, H.L.; reversing sub nom. Morris v. Redland Bricks [1967] 1 W.L.R. 967; [1967] 3 ALL E.R. 1; 111 S.J. 373, C.A.
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(6) Adji & Co. v. Kumaning [1982-83] G.L.R. 1382, C.A.
(7) Nkyi XI v. Kumah [1959] G.L.R. 281, C.A.
(8) Dove v. Wuta-Ofei [1966] G.L.R. 299, S.C.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from the judgment of the High Court, Sunyani, reversing the decision of the trial district court in an action for, inter alia, declaration of title to a house. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment of the court.
COUNSEL
Dr. Seth Twum for the appellant.
No representation by or for the respondents.
JUDGMENT OF ABBAN J.A.
Abban J.A. delivered the judgment of the court. The appeal is from the judgment of the High Court, Sunyani, delivered on 24 February 1981. The judgment allowed an appeal from the judgment of the District Court, Dormaa-Ahenkro, dated 20 July 1979. In the district court, the respondent, hereafter called the plaintiff, had asked for two reliefs against the appellant, hereafter called the defendant, namely a declaration of title to house No. AB 18, Dormaa-Ahenkro and ¢1,000 damages.
The parties were not Ghanaians. They were strangers from Upper Volta now renamed Burkina Faso. The plaintiff’s case was that the land on which the house was built was granted to him and one Chemogo by the Moshiehene at Dormaa-Ahenkro for services rendered to the said Moshiehene. The plaintiff and the said Chemogo built the house on the land. The plaintiff occupied part of the house while Chemogo occupied the remaining part. At the time the house was built, no house rates were being levied by the authorities. But when payment of these rates was introduced in the area, the plaintiff and Chemogo agreed that the whole house should be registered in the name of Chemogo alone for the payment of house rates.
Chemogo fell foul with the law and was deported from the country. Thereafter the plaintiff started paying the said house rates himself. However, the defendant, some time after the departure of Chemogo from Ghana, called upon the plaintiff to pay rent of ¢4 a month for the portion of the house he, the plaintiff, was occupying. The defendant threatened to eject the plaintiff from the house if he, the plaintiff, failed to accede to that request. The demand for the payment of rent sparked off the litigation.
The defendant did not deny demanding rent from the plaintiff. The basis for his demand was that the defendant had been made the caretaker of the whole house, including the portion of the house being occupied by the plaintiff. The defendant contended that the whole house was built by one Sirikye Wangara and his son Chemogo. On the death of Sirikye, his son, Chemogo, took over the control of the
[p.643] of [1982-83] GLR 639 house and paid all the rates which were exigible on the house. Chemogo, before he left Ghana on the deportation order, handed over all documents on the house to the defendant as there were no relations of the late Sirikye or Chemogo living in the area. But later a grandniece of Sirikye, called Sita turned up. Being the only close relation of both Sirikye and Chemogo, Sita took possession of the house.
According to the defendant, at the time Sita arrived at Dormaa-Ahenkro, the portion of the house occupied by Chemogo had been locked up. So Sita caused it to be opened and to be rented out to tenants. Sita left the caretakership of the house to one Amara. But Amara for one reason or the other could not collect the rents and the lot fell on the defendant. It was under those circumstances that the demand for payment of rent was made on the plaintiff by the defendant.
It must be observed that the plaintiff was neither a relation of the late Sirikye nor of Chemogo. Amara and Sita – son and grandniece respectively of the late Sirikye – and one Seidu Moshie, gave evidence which supported the contention of the defendant that the land was originally acquired by the late Sirikye from the Moshiehene, and was never granted to the plaintiff and that after the house had been built by the late Sirikye and his son, Chemogo, the plaintiff who happened to be a friend of Chemogo was invited to come and stay in the house without paying rent. So the plaintiff could not lay a claim of ownership to the house.
On that evidence, the learned district magistrate dismissed the plaintiff’s action on the ground that he had failed to prove title and that the whole house was owned by the late Sirikye. He also found that after the death of Sirikye, the house passed on to his son, Chemogo. The learned district magistrate further held that on the deportation of Chemogo from Ghana, the only identifiable members of the family of the late Sirikye in Ghana were Amara and Sita and “they alone had immediate right to ownership and possession of the house and that the presence of the plaintiff in the house was that of a tenant at will paying no rent.”
The plaintiff appealed to the High Court, Sunyani. While the appeal was pending, the High Court, on the application of the plaintiff, ordered additional evidence to be adduced on behalf of the plaintiff. Chemogo had then returned to Ghana after the filing of the notice of appeal. The additional evidence came from Chemogo. Chemogo’s evidence at the High Court was that it was his late father Sirikye who originally acquired the land on which the house in dispute was built. The father acquired it from the Moshiehene. The father was old so he, Chemogo, started to build the house alone. Later on, Chemogo, with the consent of his father, solicited the assistance of the plaintiff on the
[p.644] of [1982-83] GLR 639 understanding that after its completion, the plaintiff would be permitted to occupy a portion of the house. The plaintiff neither paid rent to the late father Sirikye or to Chemogo in respect of his occupation of the house.
On the evidence of Chemogo, the High Court reversed the decision of the learned district magistrate and entered judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant was aggrieved by that judgment. Hence the present appeal.
Learned counsel for the defendant abandoned the original grounds filed and argued only the two additional grounds. They were:
“1. The learned High Court judge failed to evaluate and assess the additional evidence called by the plaintiff and so failed to balance the totality of the evidence led for the plaintiff against that led for the defendant and so made wrong findings of facts or wrong inferences for the facts on record.
2. The learned High Court judge erred in law by basing his judgment on a case wholly at variance with the plaintiff’s case.”
The two grounds were argued together. Learned counsel contended that the learned High Court judge reviewed only the evidence given at the High Court and failed to consider the evidence which was before the district court. Counsel submitted that by that omission the learned judge was unable to assess the case for each party and could not therefore base his judgment on the totality of the evidence. Since, argued counsel, he failed to evaluate the whole of the evidence, he erred in making wrong findings of facts. Counsel contended that if the learned judge had adverted his mind to the evidence before the district court as well, he would have come to the conclusion that the evidence of Amara and Sita, members of the immediate family of the late Sirikye, was the truth and that Chemogo, a fifteen-year old boy at the material time, could not have taken part in building the house.
Counsel further argued that it was contrary to law for the High Court to grant the plaintiff a declaration of title to half portion of the house when that was not what the plaintiff asked for. The plaintiff asked for a declaration of title to the whole house and the learned judge, having found that the plaintiff was only a licensee, ought to have dismissed the claim and affirmed the learned district magistrate.
A casual look at the judgment of the High Court will not fail to reveal that the learned High Court judge restricted himself solely to the additional evidence that was adduced before him to the exclusion of the other evidence offered by the plaintiff and his witnesses before the district court. We are of the view that this was an unfortunate error on his part. He ought to have considered and evaluated the additional evidence alongside with all the other pieces of evidence given before
[p.645] of [1982-83] GLR 639 the district court. An appeal is by way of rehearing and rehearing means having a look at and taking into consideration all the relevant evidence on record. The appellate court, so far as appeals are concerned, is virtually in the same position as if the rehearing were the original hearing and may review the whole case and not merely the points as to which the appeal was brought.
In the present case, as we have already noted, the learned judge concentrated on the additional evidence as if no other evidence existed on the record. To ignore all the evidence on record and then use only the evidence of Chemogo at the High Court, as the basis for reversing the decision of the district magistrate, was unfair.
The case of the plaintiff was supposed to have been supported not only by Chemogo, but also by Nana Banda, Chaba and Kwaku Donkor. The evidence given by those witnesses together with that of Chemogo and the plaintiff himself ought to have been considered together to find out whether the plaintiff was able to establish his claim of ownership to the house. The learned judge failed to do so. This court will now undertake the exercise.
The plaintiff claimed title to the house and ¢1,000 damages. He could only win by the strength of the sum total of the evidence which he and his witnesses put forward before the court and not by the weakness of the defendant’s case. In the well-known case of Ayitey Cobblah v. Gbeke (1947) 12 W.A.C.A. 294 at p. 295, Harrigan C.J. stated the principle as follows:
“It is a recognised principle in land cases and it does not admit of argument that the plaintiff, when claiming a declaration of title, must succeed on the strength of his case…”
The principle was approved by the former Supreme Court in Dompreh v. Pong [1965] G.L.R. 126. At p. 128, Mills-Odoi J.S.C. said:
“As Qthe claim was substantially for a declaration of title, it was undoubtedly the responsibility of the plaintiff, on whom the onus lay, to satisfy the court by evidence that the ownership thereof was vested in him. It has been held that the plaintiff” must rely on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the defendant’s case. If this onus is not discharged, the weakness of the defendant’s case will not help him.’ Per Webber C.J. in Kodilinye v. Odu [(1935) 2 W.A.C.A. 336 at p. 337].”
The question then is, was the plaintiff able to discharge the burden that lay on him? The plaintiff in discharging this burden relied, among other things, on the grant made to him and Chemogo. This is what the plaintiff said under cross-examination?
“Q. From whom did you acquire the land before you built the house?
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A. The land was given to us by Moshiehene in appreciation of good done to him.
Q. Do you know that the land belonged to Chemogo’s father?
A. It was not correct, the land was acquired by Chemogo and me.”
The evidence of the plaintiff’s witnesses – Nana Banda and Chaba – did not give any indication as to how the plaintiff came by the land on which the house was built. They did not know the person or persons who granted the land to the plaintiff, so the two witnesses could not support the evidence of the plaintiff in respect of ownership. As for the evidence of Kwaku Donkoh, it was most useless and irrelevant. It only touched on repairs he once made on the house for the plaintiff.
The evidence of Chemogo, the star witness, was rather damaging to the plaintiff’s case, so far as title to the land was concerned. Chemogo categorically stated that the land was not granted to him and the plaintiff; but that it was acquired by his (Chemogo’s) late father, Sirikye. His father was then old and could not build. So he, Chemogo, started building the house. He asked the plaintiff to assist. The plaintiff readily agreed to the request. With the permission of the father, it was arranged that after completion of the house, the plaintiff was to occupy a portion of it with a separate entrance. The plaintiff neither paid money to Chemogo nor to the late Sirikye in respect of his occupation. Incidentally, the evidence of Amara, a witness of the defendant, tended to corroborate the evidence of Chemogo that the land was granted to the late Sirikye and not to the plaintiff and Chemogo.
It was therefore clear that the evidence of the plaintiff was in direct conflict with that of Chemogo as to the ownership of the land. As we have already stated, no witness of the plaintiff, in effect, supported his claim of ownership. In our opinion, the evidence offered by the plaintiff to prove his title was most unsatisfactory. It was weak and nowhere did it reach the standard required to prove a declaration of title to land. The claim for a declaration of title ought to have been dismissed.
The evidence, however, established that the plaintiff was granted leave and licence to occupy, rent free, a portion of the house in the construction of which he assisted; and the plaintiff had been so occupying his portion for years. But the leave and licence could not under any circumstances amount to ownership as the plaintiff erroneously assumed it did. We may here refer to the classic definition of licence formulated by Vaughan C.J. in Thomas v. Sorrel (1673) Vaugh. 330 at p. 351 where he said: “A dispensation or licence properly passeth no interest, nor alters or transfers property in anything, but only makes an action lawful, which without it had been unlawful.” Thus,
[p.647] of [1982-83] GLR 639 the licence only made the plaintiff’s presence in the house lawful. Furthermore, on the plaintiff’s own showing the defendant had not yet ejected the plaintiff from the house; neither had the defendant committed any acts of trespass or caused any damage to the plaintiff’s portion of the house. In short, the plaintiff never offered any evidence to prove his claim for ¢1,000 damages. In the circumstances, the claim for damages was also misconceived.
However, the leave and licence gave the plaintiff the right to be in possession and occupation of his portion of the house without paying rent of any kind; and there was sufficient evidence on record showing that the defendant had intended to disturb the plaintiff’s said possession by ejectment. The defendant himself admitted that he did threaten the plaintiff with eviction from the house. Even though the plaintiff had no interest in the land, the leave and licence granted to him by the late Sirikye, the owner of the land entitled him to be in occupation of a portion of the house. So long as the licence had not been revoked the plaintiff could not be ejected from the house. In fact, the licence could not be revoked at will.
Since the plaintiff had a right to occupy a portion of the house rent free, that right ought to be protected against intruders like the defendant by an injunction. Where there is a legal right which can be asserted either at law, or in equity, a court of equity has jurisdiction to grant an injunction in protection of that right: see Richardson v. Methley School Board [1893] 3 Ch. 510. The court’s jurisdiction to grant injunction is practically unlimited, and can be exercised in any case in which it is right or just to do so. The defendant’s threats to eject the plaintiff from the house for non-payment of rent amounted to undue interference with the plaintiff’s occupation, and was therefore unlawful inasmuch as the plaintiff was under no legal or equitable obligation to pay rent to the defendant or even to the successors of the late Sirikye.
In the circumstances, the proper remedy which the plaintiff ought to have sought in his writ of summons was quia timet injunction. The plaintiff should have asked for that type of injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the occupation of his portion of the house; and since there was a strong probability of interference with the plaintiff’s rights over the house by the defendant, any court of justice would definitely have granted the plaintiff that remedy.
In Redland Bricks Ltd. v. Morris [1970] A.C. 652. H.L., Lord Upjohn in the course of his judgment at pp. 664-665 said:
“But to prevent the jurisdiction of the courts being stultified equity has invented the quia timet action, that is an action for an injunction to prevent an apprehended legal wrong, though none has occurred at present, and the suppliant for such an injunction
[p.648] of [1982-83] GLR 639 is without any remedy at law . . . quia timet actions are broadly applicable to two types of cases: first, where the defendant has as yet done no hurt to the plaintiff but is threatening and intending (so the plaintiff alleges) to do works which will render irreparable harm to him or his property if carried to completion.”
This passage was cited with approval by the Court of Appeal in the recent case of Adji & Co. v. Kumaning [1982-83] G.L.R. 1382, C.A.
Since the plaintiff’s proper remedy was an order for an injunction the question then is, should the plaintiff be turned out to go back and issue a fresh writ in respect of that relief? In order to settle the matter in controversy between the parties herein and to avoid multiplicity of suits, we think this is a proper case, on our own motion, to amend the plaintiff’s writ of summons by adding a claim for an order of injunction.
The appellate court, in order to avoid multiplicity of actions, can amend any writ of summons where it is appropriate to do so, and where it would not cause injustice to the other party. The right of the appellate court to make such an amendment is well established. In Nkyi XI v. Kumah [1959] G.L.R. 281, the Court of Appeal amended the writ of summons by adding a claim for a declaration of title. At p. 285, van Lare J.A., reading the judgment of the court, said:
“In our opinion the trial-Judge properly directed himself that the main issue raised on the pleadings was one of title. However, following the practice laid down in the case of England v. Palmer, we granted leave to the plaintiff to amend his claim by adding a claim for declaration of title. This amendment did not raise any issue on which evidence had not already been taken, consequently no injustice could be done by granting the amendment.”
In Dove. v. Wuta Ofei [1966] G.L.R. 299, S.C. the former Supreme Court of its own motion amended the title of the suit by adding the words “for himself and on behalf of his wife Mrs. Ofei.” At p. 317 of the report, Apaloo J.S.C. (as he then was) said:
“That would put an end to that objection and will obviate any necessity of the plaintiff’s wife bringing an action of her own to seek protection in respect of that part of the building that lies on her plot. I believe the court has often expressed itself as having a duty to avoid multiplicity of suits and indeed in the case of Akyirefie v. Paramount Stool of Breman-Esiam [(1951) 13 W.A.C.A. 331], the West African Court of Appeal of its own motion amended the title of the suit on appeal to conform with the justice of the case and with the avowed object of avoiding multiplicity of litigation. Such cases as England v. Palmer [(1955) 14 W.A.C.A. 659], Ababio IV v. Quartey [(1916) P.C.
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‘74 – ‘28, 40], Seklin v. Little [[1890] 6 T.L.R. 366] and numerous others established the right of this court to make amendments such as this. In my opinion, this is eminently a case in which such amendment should be made if it is made, there will be an end of this appeal”.
As we have observed, the justice of this case demands the proposed amendment, and we accordingly amend the plaintiff’s writ of summons by adding the following: “An order for injunction.” By this amendment, the case between the defendant and the plaintiff can now be disposed of finally. That is to say, in all the circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the appeal should be allowed. The judgment appealed from, together with the order for costs, and the judgment of the district court are hereby set aside; and in substitution therefor, the plaintiff is granted injunction restraining the defendant and his privies from interfering with his occupation of the house in dispute in any manner whatsoever. DECISION Appeal allowed.
Order accordingly.
D.R.K.S.
