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[1983] SLR (CA) 9Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL I)

SASU AND ANOTHER vs. AMUA-SEKYI AND ANOTHER [1982-83] GLR 772

28 November 1983 · APALOO CJ · ≈ 10 min read

Cite as[1983] SLR (CA) 9
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OSCOLASASU AND ANOTHER v AMUA-SEKYI AND ANOTHER [1982-83] GLR 772 [1983] SLR (CA) 9
APASASU AND ANOTHER v AMUA-SEKYI AND ANOTHER [1982-83] GLR 772, [1983] SLR (CA) 9 (Ghana).
BluebookSASU AND ANOTHER v AMUA-SEKYI AND ANOTHER [1982-83] GLR 772, [1983] SLR (CA) 9 (Ghana Ct. App. 1983).

SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION to set aside a judgment of the court (differently constituted) based on fresh evidence led at the instance of the court and in the absence of the successful party at the trial court. The facts are sufficiently set out in the ruling of the court.

COUNSEL

Anane (Kom leading him) for the applicant.

Ohene-Ampofo for the respondents.

JUDGMENT OF APALOO C.J.

[p.774] of [1982-83] GLR 772

He delivered the ruling of the court. The parties own land near or contiguous to each other at South Odorkor, a suburban building area in Accra. It is common knowledge that title to that area is vested in the Akumajay stool. Both parties derive title from that stool or its grantees. They obtained written grants. The areas covered by their respective grants are delineated on site plans.

The plaintiffs, hereafter called the respondents in the instant proceedings, apparently felt that the first defendant, hereafter called the applicant, had trespassed upon their land. So they brought a suit against him in the High Court for damages and for possession. It appears that the only real issue between them was the identity of their land. For this reason, a surveyor was appointed by the court to make a composite plan to show their respective areas. As is the usual practice, he was called as a witness by the court. He then tendered the plan and gave evidence. The learned trial judge, no doubt, influenced by the neutral evidence provided by the surveyor, felt satisfied that no trespass had been committed. He therefore dismissed the action. The respondents aggrieved by this judgment, appealed to this court. In the court below, for reasons which are not now material, neither party had the assistance of counsel.

The appeal came for hearing before this court on 16 November 1980. The record exhibited in this application shows that the plaintiffs’ as the appellants, were represented by counsel. But the respondents to the appeal, i.e the applicant in the instant proceedings, was not. He was also recorded to be absent. On that day, counsel for the appellants addressed oral argument to the court in support of the appeal. The court’s mind seems to have been afflicted with some doubt about the accuracy of the plan on which the judgment of the court below was based. So on its own motion, it ordered the surveyor who prepared the plan to testify before it. It also ordered that the Chief Lands Officer be summoned to assist the court to resolve that doubt.

On 5 May 1982, the surveyor appeared before the court and in evidence, conceded to some error in the preparation of the plan and offered to rectify it. On 18 May 1982, a representative of the Chief Lands Officer also appeared in answer to the subpoena and gave evidence before the court. After his evidence, the surveyor was recalled and tendered a corrected plan. All this time the successful party at the trial court, i.e. the applicant in the instant case, was absent and the proceedings were undoubtedly ex parte. The court must have considered that this new evidence was required for the furtherance of justice. On a proper reading or construction of rule 26 of LI 218, this court has power to require this evidence on its own motion. The rule

[p.775] of [1982-83] GLR 772 provides, “the Court may allow or require new evidence to be adduced.” The word “allow” implies that such new evidence is sought by a party while “require” clearly means that the court itself desired such evidence.

After the evidence of the representative of the Chief Lands Officer and the surveyor, the appellant’s counsel addressed further argument to the court. It then adjourned indefinitely for judgment. It appears that the court after concluding its consideration of the appeal fixed 5 July 1982, for judgment. Judgment was not, in fact, delivered on that day. The applicant in the meantime, became aware not only that the appeal had been heard in his absence but that a date had actually been fixed for the delivery of judgment. Accordingly, on 4 August 1982, he sought to arrest the judgment by applying to the court for leave to apply or test the further evidence led by cross-examination.

This application came before the court on 18 October 1982. The court did not deal with the motion on its merits. It directed that this matter should be placed before the appropriate tribunal. The court as then constituted had jurisdiction to deal with the motion but by remitting it to the “appropriate tribunal” the court must have considered that it would be more convenient for the same judges who dealt with the appeal originally to deal with the motion as they were better placed to appreciate it. At that date, one of the three judges who heard the appeal was no more.

However, the motion was not placed before the court again until the appeal was again fixed for judgment on 11 July last. On that day, the applicant appeared by counsel and drew the court’s attention to the pendency of the motion and prayed that the delivery of judgment be withheld until the motion was dealt with and an opportunity was given to the applicant to reply to the new evidence given in his absence. This plea was opposed by the respondents’ counsel. The court declined to defer the delivery of judgment any further. It said the applicant was not vigilant and that the motion was then not on the list. It then proceeded to give judgment and in the result, reversed the decision of the court below. It seems plain that in differing from the trial court on what is essentially an issue of fact, the court must have been considerably influenced by the new evidence which was led ex parte at the court’s own behest.

The applicant now invites us to set aside that judgment and rehear the appeal. He relies on rule 25(1) of LI 218, as authority for taking the course he now adopts. That rule provides, in so far as material, that:

“25. (1) Where an appeal has been heard ex parte … and any judgment has been given therein adverse to the respondent,

[p.776] of [1982-83] GLR 772 he may apply to the Court to set aside such judgment and to rehear the appeal.”

The time limited by sub-rule (2) for bringing this application is 21 days from the date of the judgment sought to be set aside. The judgment in this case was delivered on 11 July 1983. On the very day, this application was lodged. It appears therefore that this motion is properly before us. Whether it should be granted or refused, is a matter entirely for the exercise of our discretion.

The rule on which reliance is placed did not prescribe in what circumstances the motion to set aside should be granted or denied. So it sends us back to general principles. Although a judicial discretion must be exercised judicially, it has often been said no fixed rules can be laid down for its exercise and each case must be decided on its own merits. The question we have asked ourselves is; will greater hardship be caused in granting this application than in refusing it?

It is clear that no fault can be attributed to the present respondents in pressing for the hearing of their appeal and in the process, in having the judgment reversed in their favour. But the applicant excused his absence in court by swearing that he was out of the jurisdiction and did not know of the listing of the appeal. He, like the respondents, conducted his own case in the court below and did not then appear to have instructed counsel. The respondents dispute this and swore to their belief that he was within the jurisdiction.

We can only resolve this conflicting issue of fact by balancing the probabilities. The applicant won the case in the court below and did so unaided by counsel. It was said he was present at the setting of the record. So reason suggests that something must have prevented him from coming to court on the four or five occasions that the case came before the Court of Appeal. It is a reasonable inference that he came to know of the hearing of the appeal and the adduction of fresh evidence when the original judgment date was fixed. His reaction was swift. He sought to arrest the judgment by a timeous application to the court. The fact that the court that dealt with the matter on 18 October 1982, remitted it, apparently to the original panel can hardly be said to be his fault. On the date the judgment was actually going to be delivered, he was again in court and by counsel not only drew the court’s attention to his pending motion, but prayed to be allowed to be heard. That plea was not acceded to. On the very day, he filed the instant application before the court. It is a fair inference that the applicant has shown himself ready and anxious to participate in the hearing of the appeal and he must have had some genuine reason for being absent during the initial hearings.

The respondents assert in their opposing affidavit that the applicant was not diligent but it is difficult to see what evidence there is to [p.777] of [1982-83] GLR 772 show his lack of diligence. All the evidence seems to point the other way. In this court, it was said he did not prove the averment that he was absent from the jurisdiction by production of his passport. Had he produced this, it would have lent easy evidence to his claim that he did not know of the hearing of the appeal because he was out of the country. It would not be right to reject the inherently credible evidence of his unavailability in the country because of the only fact that he did not produce his passport. The respondents for their part, produced nothing to show that his assertion on this issue was false. So on the question whether he was in the country or out of it during the hearing of the appeal, the evidence seems evenly balanced. What however seems clear, is that he cannot have been aware of the listing or hearing of the appeal.

Now on these facts, where does the balance of hardship lie and who has the greater justice? As we said, on the only issue of identity raised between the parties, the applicant was adjudged right. That judgment must have proceeded on the evidence led before the trial court. The appellate court’s ordinary function is to determine whether on the evidence available to the trial court, its conclusion was right or wrong. It adopted the perfectly legitimate but seldom used course of calling for new evidence. It did so in the absence of the successful party. Before it could pronounce itself on the new evidence, that party sought to show that that additional evidence ought not to make any difference to the result. He was not offered an opportunity of doing so. There is affidavit evidence that the applicant, to the knowledge of the respondents, has a substantial building on the land and he stood to lose this or at least a substantial portion of it by reason of the judgment of the Court of Appeal. It can hardly be gainsaid that greater hardship would be caused to the applicant if this application were refused. Indeed, he would be left with a rankling sense of injustice.

As against this, the only apparent “hardship” that the respondents would suffer is a repetition of the argument which they urged successfully in this court. That is really more of an inconvenience than hardship properly so-called. The judgment in their favour may well be sustained and they will have every opportunity of meeting any new evidence that the applicant may be permitted to bring. It is difficult to see what injustice they would suffer by the allowance of this motion. A consideration of all these matters leads us to think that greater hardship would be caused in refusing this application than in granting it and that of the two, the applicant has the greater justice. Any inconvenience to the respondents can be compensated in costs.

We think therefore that this is eminently a case in which we should exercise our discretion in the applicant’s favour on terms. The judgment of this court dated 11 July 1983, is hereby set aside and it is

[p.778] of [1982-83] GLR 772 ordered that the appeal be reheard on a date to be notified in the cause list. The applicant will, however, pay to the respondents the ¢500 costs awarded in their favour after the abortive hearing of the appeal. The said costs shall be paid not later than a fortnight from today. Although the applicant succeeds in this motion and although costs normally follow the event, we have decided to make no order for costs on this application.

DECISION

Application to set aside judgment of the Court of Appeal granted.

J. A. A.

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