SuperLawGHEngage · Educate · Empower
← All decisions
[1983] SLR (HC) 11High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1982-83 (VOL I)

KARIYAVOULAS & ANOTHER vs. OSEI [1982-83] GLR 658

6 May 1983 · TWUMASI J · ≈ 20 min read

Cite as[1983] SLR (HC) 11
Other citation styles and permanent link
OSCOLAKARIYAVOULAS & ANOTHER v OSEI [1982-83] GLR 658 [1983] SLR (HC) 11
APAKARIYAVOULAS & ANOTHER v OSEI [1982-83] GLR 658, [1983] SLR (HC) 11 (Ghana).
BluebookKARIYAVOULAS & ANOTHER v OSEI [1982-83] GLR 658, [1983] SLR (HC) 11 (Ghana High Ct. 1983).

SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.

[Editorial Note: For earlier proceedings involving the estate of the deceased intestate in this case: see In re Kariyavoulas (Decd.); Donkor v. Greek Consul-General [1973] 2 G.L.R. 52.]

CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Bassil v. Honger (1954) 14 W.A.C.A. 569.

[p.661] of [1982-83] GLR 658 (2) Ababio v. Kanga (1932) 1 W.A.C.A. 253.

(3) Carr v. London & North Western Rail Co. (1875) 10 L.R.C.P. 307; 44 L.J.P.C. 109; 31 L.T. 785;

39 J.P. 279; 23 W.R. 747.

(4) Greenwood v. Martines Bank, Ltd. [1933] A.C. 51; 101 L.J.K.B. 623; 147 L.T. 441; 48 T.L.R. 601;

76 S.J. 544, H.L.

(5) Algar v. Middlesex County Council [1945] 2 All. E.R. 243; 173 L.T. 143; 109 J.P. 213, 89 S.J.

371; 43 L.G.R. 155, D.C.

(6) Hoystead v. Taxation Commissioner [1926] A.C. 155, P.C.; 94 L.J.P.C. 79; 134 L.T. 354; 42 T.L.R. 207, P.C.

(7) Koenigsberg, Re; Public Trustee v. Koenigsberg [1949] Ch. 348; [1949] 1 All E.R. 804; [1949] L.J.R. 1098, C.A.

(8) Attorney-General for Trinidad and Tobago v. Eriche [1893] A.C. 518; 63 L.J.P.C. 6; 69 I.T. 505;

L.R. 440, P.C.

(9) 1Amoah v. Poku [1965] G.L.R. 155, S.C.

(10) Golightly v. Ashrifi [1961] G.L.R. 28, P.C.

(11) Priestman v. Thomas (1884) 9 P.D. 210; 53 L.J.P. 109; 51 L.T. 843; 32 W.R. 842, C.A. (12) Ritchie v. Malcolm [1902] 2 L.R. 403.

(13) Hill v. Clifford; Clifford v. Timms; Clifford v. Phillips [1907] 2 Ch. 236; 76 L.J.Ch. 627; 97 L.T.

266; 23 T.L.R. 601, C.A. affirmed sub nom. Clifford v. Timms, Clifford v. Phillips [1908] A.C. 12, 15; 77 L.J.Ch. 91, 93; 98 L.T. 64, 65; 24 T.L.R. 112; 52 S.J. 92, H.L.

(14) London Freehold and Leasehold Property Co. v. Suffield (Baron) [1897] 2 Ch. 608; 66 L.J.Ch.

790; 77 L.T. 445; 46 W.R. 102; 14 T.L.R. 8; 42 S.J. 11, C.A.

(15) Malm v. Lutterodt [1963] 1 G.L.R. 1 S.C.

(16) Bissah v. Gyampoh III [1964] G.L.R. 381, S.C.

(17) C.F.A.O. v. Archibold [1964] G.L.R. 718, S.C.

(18) Abowaba v. Adeshina (1946) 12 W.A.C.A. 18.

(19) Robertson v. Reindorf [1971] 2 G.L.R. 289, C.A.

(20) Yiboe v. Duedu (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 293.

(21) Padstow, In re (1882) 20 Ch.D. 137, C.A.

(22) Punjabi Brothers v. Namih [1962] 2 G.L.R. 46, S.C.

(23) Peniana v. Affram [1966] G.L.R. 221, S.C.

(24) Okai II v. Ayikai II (1946) 12 W.A.C.A. 31 affirmed (1950) 12 W.A.C.A. 37, P.C.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

ACTION by the administrators of an estate per their lawful attorney, claiming, inter alia, the unpaid consideration for leasehold lands sold by the deceased wherein the defendant pleaded the defence

[p.662] of [1982-83] GLR 658 of estoppel per rem judicatam. The facts are sufficiently set out in the ruling.

COUNSEL

James Mercer for the plaintiffs.

Adumua-Bossman for the defendant.

JUDGMENT OF TWUMASI J.

On 2 May 1979 the plaintiffs herein issued a writ of summons couched in the following terms:

“(1) ¢48,000 (forty-eight thousand cedis) being the total consideration for the assignment of 4 (four) parcels of land situated and lying at Essipun, Sekondi and covered by deeds of assignment registered Nos. DR 1187/70; DR 1188/70; DR 1189/70 and DR 1190/70 conveyed by the late Andreas

Kariyavoulas to the defendant in 1970 at ¢12,000 (twelve thousand cedis) each;

(2) interest on the sum of ¢48,000 (forty-eight thousand cedis) at the rate of twelve per cent per annum from 1971 to the date of judgment; and (3) a declaration in the alternative setting aside the said assignments for failure of consideration.”

In their statement of claim, the plaintiffs averred in paragraph 4 thereof that the total consideration of ¢48,000 was not, in fact, paid though the deeds of assignment expressed it to have been paid. They also averred in paragraph 5 that Andreas Kariyavoulas died in Greece shortly after the assignment of the deeds and they were granted letters of administration on 5 May 1977 after they had attained their majority; and accordingly, as stated by them in paragraph 1 of their statement of claim, they brought this action in their capacity as the personal representatives of the late Kariyavoulas and they did so per their lawful attorney, Madam Adjuah Donkor.

In his answer to the plaintiffs’ claim, the defendant averred in paragraph 3 of his statement of defence that the late Andreas Kariyavoulas assigned the residue of the terms of 4(four) leases and orally agreed to make two further assignments covered by Sdi 54/52 and Sdi 369/51, relating to his factory, bungalow, workshop, stores and offices, to the defendant at the total purchase price of ¢12,000 (twelve thousand cedis).

From this vantage point we can easily see the stark fact in issue on the pleadings which is also incidentally stated in a fit and convenient manner in the plaintiffs’ summons for directions and it is: Whether or not the total consideration for the 4 (four) assignments is ¢12.000 (twelve thousand cedis) or ¢48,000 (forty-eight thousand cedis). The answers to other issues on the pleadings would be mere corollaries to the answer to this major issue posed above.

On this issue the

[p.663] of [1982-83] GLR 658 defendant by paragraph 7 of his statement of defence pleaded estoppel rem judicatam and this is set out in the summons for directions. The main keg on which this defence was perched consisted of three rulings and a judgment itemised as follows:

(i) The ruling on 24 April 1972 by Edusei J. (as he then was) in land suit No. 4/70, Sekondi.

(ii) The ruling on 19 June 1972 by Edusei J. (as he then was) in land suit No. 4/71.

(iii) The ruling by Quashie-Sam J. in suit No. 179/72 on 28 June 1976.

(iv) The judgment of the Court of Appeal in civil appeal No. 179/72 dated 22 July 1976.

On 13 April 1983 when the case came on for hearing, the stage was set for legal polemic to inquire whether the dispute could be disposed of on the basis of estoppel per rem judicatam. For a crystally clear conception of what the plea of estoppel per rem judicatam involves, I have found a passage in the judgment of the West African Court of Appeal in Bassil v. Honger (1954) 14 W.A.C.A. 569 at p. 572 of invaluable assistance. Speaking through Coussey J.A. (as he then was) the court said:

“It is as well to have clearly in mind the distinction between the pleas of estoppel and res judicata.

Estoppel prohibits a party from proving anything which contradicts his previous acts or declarations to the prejudice of a party, who, relying upon them, has altered his position. It shuts the mouth of a party. The plea of res judicata prohibits the Court from enquiring into a matter already adjudicated upon. It ousts the jurisdiction of the Court.”

And in Ababio v. Kanga (1932) 1 W.A.C.A. 253 at p 254, the court explained res judicata as follows:

“Estoppel per rem judicatam is the rule that a final decision of a Court of competent jurisdiction once pronounced between parties cannot be contradicted by any one of such parties as against any other of such parties in any subsequent litigation between them respecting the same subject-matter. The word parties must be taken as including privies.”

See also Carr v. London & North Western Rail Co. (1875) L.R. 10 C.P. 307; Greenwood v. Martines Bank, Ltd. [1933] A.C. 51 at p.57, H.L; Algar v. Middlesex County Council [1945] 2 All E.R. 243, D.C.; Hoystead v. Taxation Commissioner [1926] A.C. 155, P.C.; Re Koenigsberg Public Trustee v. Koenigsberg [1949] Ch. 348, C.A. and Attorney-General for Trinidad and Tobago v. Eriche [1893] A.C. 518, P.C.

[p.664] of [1982-83] GLR 658

The main burden of this ruling is therefore to determine who the parties were in the earlier proceedings, what issues arose between them and the final decision arrived at in the judgment and rulings pleaded by the defendant herein. At page 207 of Vol. 15 of Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), the following Practice Note appears:

“In order to ascertain what was in issue between the parties in the earlier proceedings, the judgment itself must of course be looked at . . . and the verdict, if any, on which it is founded . . .; and where there have been pleadings, these should also be examined . . ., being in fact part of the record.”

In the light of this practice directive, I rejected the submission of Mr. Adumua-Bossman, counsel for the defendant, that only the judgment and rulings should be looked at, and proceeded according to Mr. Mercer, counsel for the plaintiff’s insistence, upon my examining the whole record of proceedings in land suit No. 4/70 from which the judgment and rulings emanated. I shall endeavour to demonstrate presently that, ironically enough, the record of proceedings in land suit No. 4/70 throws brighter light on the rulings and judgment tendered by Mr Adumua-Bossman than the rulings and judgment standing in isolation. It is as well to state that in order to ascertain whether the parties in the earlier proceedings are the same and also the import of the decision in that earlier proceedings, the whole record of proceedings ought to be examined if a proper determination on the issue of res judicata can be made.

I would first inquire into the issue of who were the parties in the two suits because if the parties are not the same, all labour expended on inquiry as to the issues raised and the subject-matter would be an exercise in futility. The first suit, land suit No. 4/70, was between James Welbeck Osei and Adjuah Donkor, alias Adjuah Kariyavoulas and the plaintiff’s claim was for: (1) possession of all that quarry and land subject-matter of four leases; (2) damages against the defendant for trespass; and (3) perpetual injunction. The pleadings in the first case show that while the plaintiff claimed that he had acquired the quarry and land from Kariyavoulas by purchase in the sum of ¢12,000 and therefore was entitled to possession thereof, the defendant disputed the claim by contending that each of the four parcels of land comprised in the “Kariyavoulas quarry and land” was offered to the plaintiff for ¢12,000, making a total of ¢48,000.

It can be seen that even though there is an identity of interest between Adjuah Donkor and the plaintiffs in the instant proceedings, there is no evidence that during the earlier proceedings, the plaintiffs herein identified themselves with Adjuah Kariyavoulas on the specific issue of whether the total consideration was ¢12,000 or ¢48,000. If they had so identified

[p.665] of [1982-83] GLR 658 themselves they would have been treated as privies to Adjuah Donkor on that issue and be estopped from relitigating it if a final decision was reached on it: see Amoah v. Poku [1965] G.L.R. 155, S.C. As things stand now, the plaintiffs in this second suit are in no way privy to Adjuah Donkor. To avoid obfuscation it ought to be pointed out that Adjuah Donkor appears in this second suit in a different capacity as the lawful attorney of the plaintiffs. Where a party appears in one capacity in an earlier suit and in another capacity in a subsequent suit touching the same subject-matter, no issue of res judicata arises to defeat his claim; see Golightly v. Ashrifi [1961] G.L.R. (Pt. I) 28 at p.31, P.C.

Mr. Adumua-Bossman intuitively sensing the vulnerable position of his client on the question of whether the parties in the two suits were the same, submitted that the judgment and rulings relied upon by the defendant were judgments in rem. There are two types of judgments to be considered when determining issues of res judicata: judgments in rem and judgments in personam. A judgment in rem settles all issues as to the status of the persons or things or as to the right or title to the things and the disposition of them or the proceeds of their sale and it operates as estoppel per rem judicatam against all persons domiciled within the jurisdiction of the court pronouncing it, whereas a judgment in personam is one inter partes and raises an estoppel against the parties to the suit: see Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol. 15 at pp. 191-195. In Amoah v. Poku (supra) the following headnote appears at p. 157:

“Where a person’s title depends on the validity of a sale for the title, a general declaration that the sale was void is a judgment in rem as to the status of the sale and not a judgment in personam.”

See also Priestman v. Thomas (1884) 9 P.D. 210, C.A.; Ritchie v. Malcolm [1902] 2 I.R. 403 and Hill v. Clifford [1907] 2 Ch. 236, C.A. Conversely, I cogitate that where a person’s title depends on the validity of a sale for the title, a judgment that the sale was valid is a judgment in rem as to the status of the sale and not a judgment in personam. How then do the facts in the land suit No. 4/70 relate to this principle of law?

When the plaintiff asserted in his statement of claim that he has acquired by purchase, the four parcels of land, the subject-matter of the action, and had paid to the late Kariyavoulas the agreed total price of ¢12,000, the defendant’s immediate gambit was a direct attack on the validity of the sale on grounds, alleged by him, of fraud. The plaintiff counter-attacked the plea of fraud by a motion to strike it out for want of adequate particulars and in the ensuing legal arguments the defendant’s counsel, Mr. Aidoo, suffered a traumatic reverse in that Edusei J. expressed no difficulty in striking out the plea: see ruling dated 8 December 1971.

[p.666] of [1982-83] GLR 658

With the main bastion of the defence completely disintegrated, defence counsel adopted a new strategy to revamp his shattered defence by introducing certain amendments attacking the validity of the sale agreement, i.e., that it infringed statutory provisions in the Administration of Lands Act (Act 123), and the Concession Ordinance, Cap. 136 (1951 Rev.) The proposed amendment also contained paragraphs alleging that there had been no full payment of the contract price and therefore the contract was an escrow and of no legal effect. An escrow is a writing under seal delivered to a third person to be delivered by him to the person whom it purports to benefit upon some condition. Upon the performance of the condition, it becomes an absolute deed; but if the condition be not performed, it never becomes a deed.

It is not delivered as a deed, but as an escrow, i.e. a scrow or writing which is not to take effect as a deed till the condition be performed: see London Freehold and Leasehold Property Co. v. Suffield (Baron) [1897] 2 Ch. 608, C.A. This proposed amendment turned out to be the coup de grace of the defendant’s case for Edusei J. remained doggedly impervious to defence counsel’s submissions respecting the validity of the contract. In other words, the amendment courted disaster as its failure was pregnant with serious consequences. In determining whether the amendment was admissible in helping to resolve the real issues between the parties, documentary evidence consisting of letters which had passed between the solicitors of Kariyavoulas and the solicitors of the defendant, Mr. James Welbeck Osei, was tendered by the consent of both counsel.

The decision reached by Edusei J. on the strength of those letters was that in actual fact Mr. James Welbeck Osei had paid the full purchase price for the four assignments to Kariyavoulas and that the purchase price was ¢12,000. Consequently no question of an escrow arose: see ruling dated 24 April 1972 tendered as exhibit 1. This finding was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in the judgment dated 22 July 1976 in suit No. 179/72 tendered as exhibit 3. In the circumstances, the defendant was completely denuded of the last sediment in his defence to the action and a judgment against her became a necessary sequitur.

This came about in a final ruling by Edusei J. dated 28 June 1976 upon an application by the plaintiff for final judgment on the ground that the defendant’s statement of defence, in its attenuated form, could not afford a valid answer to the plaintiff’s claim. The upshot of all these events was that a judgment in rem in favour of the plaintiff declaring the status of the sale of the property was entered.

Mr. Mercer who did not appear in the first suit (land suit No. 4/70 under consideration) argued with characteristic force that both decisions of the High Court presided over by Edusei J. and the Court of Appeal touching on the purchase price of the alleged sale and the

[p.667] of [1982-83] GLR 658 payment of the said purchase price were null and void and could not operate as res judicata because in his view no issue arose in the summons for directions as to the value or purchase price of the property (subject-matter in the earlier proceedings) warranting a finding on it. 3For legal authority, he placed considerable reliance on Malm v. Lutterodt [1963] 1 G.L.R. 1 at p. 15; Bissah v Gyampoh III [1964] G.L.R. 381 at pp. 387-398, S.C. and C.F.A.O v. Archibold [1964] G.L.R. 718 at p. 732, S.C.

It can fairly be stated that the decisions in all these cases were epoch-making for they all in unison overruled the decision in the famous case of Abowaba v. Adeshina (1946) 12 W.A.C.A. 18, a Nigerian case, decided by the former West African Court of Appeal, which held that a court was bound to consider evidence on a matter not pleaded but nevertheless admitted without objection. The law now seems clearly to be that a court is bound to consider only the issues settled within the orbit of the summons for directions or appearing in the pleadings. For Adumua-Bossman J.S.C. (as he then was) in delivering the unanimous decision of the Supreme Court of the First Republic in C.F.A.O. v. Archibold (supra) overruling Abowaba v. Adeshina (supra), said at p. 733:

“Unfortunately, however, no authority was cited or referred to in support of confirmation of such an important and far-reaching proposition; and what is more important is, that it appears to be plainly in conflict with a number of local as well as English authorities, both prior and subsequent to it, which have established the rule that a court in determining or deciding the issues in a case, is in the last resort, bound to have regard to and decide only those issues, or material controversial facts, of which notice has been given in or by the pleading of a party and thereby raised for determination.”

With this forthright stand of the Supreme Court, the case of Abowaba v. Adeshina (supra) shorn completely of its pristine authority on admissibility of matters not pleaded, now remains only a shibboleth in our law reports.

Nevertheless, looking at the pleadings and issues set down in the summons for directions in the first suit (land suit No. 4/70), I cannot claim to be entirely free from doubt on whether these authorities cited by Mr. Mercer made the case of the plaintiff’s a whit better. Speaking for myself, I should have thought and indeed inclined to the opinion that the case rather supports Mr. Adumua-Bossman because the issue as to whether the total purchase price was ¢12,000 or ¢48,000 was conspicuous on the pleadings. Perhaps it bears emphasis that it is not only matters expressly set out in the summons for directions that ought to be determined by a court but all issues arising across the

[p.668] of [1982-83] GLR 658 entire spectrum of the pleadings. It therefore seems otiose for a party setting out issues in a summons for directions to add a rider to wit, “any other issues arising from the pleadings.”

The only limitation on the court determining all issues arising from the pleadings is want of evidence on those issues. In the instant case, both the High Court and the Court of Appeal had perforce to consider the evidence on the price of the four assignments, and its payment, the subject-matter of land suit No. 4/70, because the determination of that issue was a necessary adjunct to the determination of the validity of the sale agreement. The rule of law as I understand it is that where the determination of a particular issue appearing on the pleading is a necessary step in determining what are the rights and duties of the parties, that determination operates as estoppel on the issue or, put in its legal terminology, issue estoppel: see Robertson v. Reindorf [1971] 2 G.L.R. 289 at p. 304, C.A. and Yiboe v. Duedu (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 293 at p. 297 where the following passage appears:

“To operate as res judicata the judgment relied upon must, conclude not merely as to the point actually decided, but as to a matter which it was necessary to decide, and which was actually decided, as the ground-work of the decision itself, though not then directly the point at issue.”

The legal analysis I have endeavoured at length to make must serve as an eloquent testimony of my disagreement with Mr. Mercer’s submission that the High Court presided over by Edusei J. as well as the Court of Appeal exceeded their jurisdiction in taking a decision on the issue relating to the purchase price of ¢12,000 or its payment. In making this statement, I do not pretend to sit here as an appellate tribunal over the decision of the High Court, Sekondi and the Court of Appeal, much less claim that I possess such authority.

Even if I disagreed with those decisions I would still consider myself tightly hamstrung by sheer principle of law, which is that as long as a judgment of one court remains unreversed on appeal it remains in full force and effect and it is not competent for another court of superior or co-ordinate or even subordinate jurisdiction to pronounce against its validity, however erroneous it may appear to be: see In re Padstow (1882) 20 Ch.D. 137, C.A. approved in Punjabi Brothers v. Namih [1962] 2 G.L.R. 46, S.C. The only circumstance under which a court can legitimately refuse to accept a decision of another court for the purpose of res judicata is where there is a lurking ambiguity in the decision: see Peniana v. Affram [1966] G.L.R. 220, S.C. Despite all my endeavours, I was unable to detect any ambiguity in the decisions reached in the rulings and judgment tendered as exhibits 1, 2, 3 and 4. For purposes of placing the matter beyond peradventure, I simply

[p.669] of [1982-83] GLR 658 quote from exhibit 3, the Court of Appeal decision, the following passage:

“Exhibit C, a letter from a firm of solicitors acting for Andreaws Kariyavoulas, acknowledges receipt of ¢4,000 from the plaintiff and is insistent on the payment of a balance of ¢8,000. Exhibit D certifies that the said Andreaws Kariyavoulas had received the full payment of ¢12,000 but at that state had had second thoughts on proceeding with the transaction.”

And the letter read as follows:

“We have no desire to enter into prolonged correspondence on this matter but only to inform you in no uncertain terms that our client is unwilling to continue with the alleged sale. To this end we have today paid your client’s ¢12,000 to his bankers.”

The point which is of paramount importance is that Andreas Kariyavoulas could not in law repudiate the contract as indeed the Court of Appeal stated in exhibit 3. Of much more paramount importance, however, is the legal effect of the patent admission made by Andreas Kariyavoulas through his solicitors. In this regard, two types of privies must be recognised: privies in blood and privies in law. Ancestors and their heirs are privies in blood while testators and intestates are privies to their executors and administrators: see Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.) Vol. 15. pp. 196-197 and Wharton’s Law Lexicon (13th ed.) at p. 686.

Since the plaintiffs herein bring this action as administrators of the estate of Andreas Kariyavoulas they are bound by any admission he ever personally or through his solicitors made touching the issue before this court. In Cross on Evidence (3rd ed.) at p. 439 it is stated:

“Admissions by those in privity with a party to litigation may be given in evidence against him. The phrase “in privity” as used here is not a technical term. It includes predecessors in title, referees, all manner of agents and sundry other miscellaneous cases. The statement received under these heads were generally against the interests of the declarant when they were made . . .”

The policy rationale is that a statement made by a deceased against his interest is bound to be true. If this rule is designed to avoid glossing over the truth of a matter, then it should always be open to a court to determine whether a particular admission by a deceased should be accepted as true or not having regard to the circumstances under which it was made; see Okai II v. Ayikai II (1946) 12 W.A.C.A. 31 at p. 32, where Beoku-Betts J. made the following pertinent statement of the law:

[p.670] of [1982-83] GLR 658

“Admissions are therefore no estoppels and are not conclusive against the party whom they are tendered. He always has the right to prove the circumstances or to show that they were due to erroneous conception of the law, or ignorance of the real facts or other circumstances which sufficiently explain them. It is, however, for the trial Court to decide the issue and to give due weight to the alleged admissions and the explanatory facts or circumstances.”

In the circumstances under which Kariyavoulas made the admission, he had the benefit of the guiding hand of a competent and able firm of solicitors from whom he took advice and to whom he gave instructions as to facts within his knowledge. There can be no suggestion whatsoever that the statements made in exhibit D were made under erroneous conception of the law or ignorance of the real facts or other circumstances which could negate their truth. My finding is that the contents of exhibit D in land suit No. 4/70 constitute an admission which operated as estoppel against the plaintiffs herein that the total consideration of the four assignments was ¢12,000 and not ¢48,000, and the plaintiffs being privies to Andreas Kariyavoulas must keep their mouths shut on that issue and stop relitigating it all over again. It follows therefore that quite apart from the fact found by me that the ruling and judgment (exhibits 1, 2 and 3) are judgments in rem on the status of the four leases, there is also an estoppel by representation against the plaintiffs (call it estoppel inter partes). The plea of estoppel therefore succeeds.

The plaintiffs are therefore entitled only to ¢12,000. Accordingly, I enter judgment for the plaintiffs in the sum of ¢12,000 with twelve per cent interests from 5 May 1977 to the date of judgment. There will be ¢2,500 costs for the plaintiffs.

DECISION

Defence of estoppel per rem judicatam upheld.

Plaintiffs entitled to only ¢12,000 and not ¢48,000 claimed.

J. A. A.

Scroll to Top