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[1984] SLR (CA) 1Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL I)

ABOTSI (AN INFANT), IN RE; KWAO vs. NORTEY AND OTHERS [1984-86] 1 GLR 144

5 March 1984 · APALOO CJ · ≈ 22 min read

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OSCOLAABOTSI (AN INFANT), IN RE; KWAO v NORTEY AND OTHERS [1984-86] 1 GLR 144 [1984] SLR (CA) 1
APAABOTSI (AN INFANT), IN RE; KWAO v NORTEY AND OTHERS [1984-86] 1 GLR 144, [1984] SLR (CA) 1 (Ghana).
BluebookABOTSI (AN INFANT), IN RE; KWAO v NORTEY AND OTHERS [1984-86] 1 GLR 144, [1984] SLR (CA) 1 (Ghana Ct. App. 1984).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Addo v. Manko [1976] 2 G.L.R. 454, C.A.

(2) West of England and South Wales District Bank, Re; Ex parte Dale & Co. (1879) 11 Ch.D 772. (3) Tijani v. Secretary, Southern Nigeria [1921] 2 A.C. 399, P.C.

(4) Ahoklui v. Ahoklui (1959) P.C.L.L.G. 212.

(5) Nelson v. Nelson (1932) 1 W.A.C.A. 215.

(6) Ruttmern v. Ruttmern (1937) 3 W.A.C.A. 178.

(7) Ansah-Addo v. Addo; Ansah-Addo v. Asante (Consolidated) [1972] 2 G.L.R. 400, C.A. (8) Tamakloe v. Attipoe, West African Court of Appeal, 22 June 1953, unreported. (9) Quartey v. Martey [1959] G.L.R. 377.

(10) Yirenkyi v. Akufo (1905) Ren. 367.

(11) Thompson v. Mensah (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 240.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL by the appellant, the sole beneficiary of his deceased intestate father, from the decision of the trial court dismissing his action for account against members of his patrilineal family. The facts are set out in the judgment of the court delivered by Apaloo C.J.

COUNSEL

Agyare Koi-Larbi for the appellant.

Archampong for the respondent and second co-respondent.

Akrasi for the first co-respondent.

JUDGMENT OF APALOO C.J.

Apaloo C.J. delivered the judgment of the court. The main questions to be decided on this appeal are whether a fiduciary is liable to account to his principal on matters within the scope of their relationship either in accordance with the rules of equity or customary law and whether if the fiduciary improperly converts the trust property into some other form, the beneficiary can recover such property from the fiduciary or from third parties to whom he may have transferred it. These are the reliefs which the appellant sought unsuccessfully in the court below. Hence this appeal.

Before attempting an answer to these questions, it is necessary to relate the facts which are not in issue. In 1965 a man called Issiah Nii Tawiah obtained a government scholarship to train in England on licensing duties. He was apparently a police officer. It appears that after his training, he decided to remain in England. It does not appear that he got married there. But before leaving here, he had one issue—an only son. He is the appellant before us. He was only three years old when his father left this country. Mr. Tawiah died intestate in London on 15 September 1975, possessed of movable and immovable property. [p.147] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 144 It is not in dispute that succession to his estate is governed by Ghana law, in this case the customary law of Ghana. That law is defined by the Constitution, 1979, art 4 (3) as “the rules of law which by custom are applicable to particular communities in Ghana.” With special reference to estate devolution, section 49 (1), r. 2 of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372) provides that: “In the absence of any intention to the contrary, the law applicable to any issue arising out of the devolution of a person’s estate shall be the personal law of that person.” The learned trial judge held, and we think correctly, that the personal law of the late Tawiah is “the customary law of Kpone in the Greater Accra Region.” The judge also held, again correctly, that: “The inheritance in Kpone is patrilineal and children do inherit their fathers. “

The holding was based on the evidence governing the rules of customary succession in Kpone given to the court by the chief of Kpone. In other words, the succession is, unlike the greater part of Ghana, patrilineal not matrilineal. The decision of this court in Addo v. Manko [1976] 2 G.L.R. 454, C.A. shows that in this type of succession, the legal and beneficial title to an intestate’s estate, vests in his children. On the particular facts of this case, as the appellant was the only child of the deceased, there is no gainsaying the fact that he became for all purposes the owner of all the movable and immovable property which his father died possessed of. The fact that some or all of these assets may be subject to incumbrances does not affect the legal position. Indeed, this fact was very well appreciated in England because the only immovable property owned by the deceased, that is house No 193 Harvist Road, London, to which one Miss Lydia Ago at one time laid claim, was eventually transferred by her to Mr. and Mrs. J.A. Amah of 65 Balmoral Road “to hold in trust for the only minor Samuel Nuertey Abotsi (meaning the appellant) now seventeen years old and presently schooling in Ghana.”

At the date of his father’s death, the appellant was only thirteen, not seventeen years old as was wrongly believed in London (see exhibit A). Anybody who stands possessed of the deceased’s property or deal with it in any way, cannot but be dealing with the property of an infant. Mr. and Mrs. Amah expressly acknowledged themselves as his trustees. If the appellant’s patrilineal family take possession of the deceased’s property or deal with it in any way, it cannot be in any other capacity. In this country, they would be described by the more familiar terminology of “caretakers.” In either case, both the Amahs and the family will stand as fiduciaries in relation to the infant beneficiary.

It is in this capacity that the appellant sought to compel the Ghana family or, more accurately, some members of it, to account to him of their dealings with his patrimony. A great deal of the argument

[p.148] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 144 presented to us on this appeal turned on the concept of a fiduciary and his obligation vis-à-vis the principal. The question then is: who is a fiduciary? Professor Scott defines it thus in his article, “The Fiduciary Principle” (1948-49) 37 Calif. Law Rev. 539 at 540 quoted at 85 of Asante’s Property Law (1975):

“A fiduciary is a person who undertakes to act in the interest of another person. It is immaterial whether the undertaking is in the form of contract. It is immaterial that the undertaking is gratuitous.”

That definition is as helpful as it goes but it does not take account of trusts which arise by operation of law. The American Restatement of Trusts, para. 2, comment b, provides a more comprehensive definition. It says: “A person in a fiduciary relation to another is under a duty to act for the benefit of the other as to matters within the scope of the relation.” This definition is wide enough to cover constructive trusts.

In West of England & South Wales District Bank (Re); Ex parte Dale & Co. (1879) 11 Ch.D 772 at 778, Fry J. attempted the definition from a procedural standpoint. He asked:

“What is a fiduciary relationship? It is one in respect of which if a wrong arise, the same remedy exists against the wrong-doer on behalf of the principal as would exist against a trustee on behalf of the cestui que trust.”

The well-known fiduciary relations in the English common law concept are: trustee and beneficiary; guardian and ward; agent and principal; executor or administrator and legatees and next-of-kin of decedent; corporate directors and the corporation, etc. Cases and treatises on West African customary law abound with pronouncements which designate various customary functionaries in particular the chief, the head of family and the caretaker as “trustees” or fiduciaries.

In the well-known case of Tijani v. Secretary, Southern Nigeria [1921] A.C. 399 at 404-405, P.C., the Privy Council said:

“. . .In every case the Chief or Headman of the community or village, or head of the family, has charge of the land, and in loose mode of speech is sometimes called the owner. He is to some extent in the position of a trustee, and as such holds the land for the use of the community or family.”

Sarbah’s Fanti Customary Law (3rd ed., 1968) contains numerous references to the chief and head of family as trustees. He says at 89. “In this country the head of a family holds family possessions in trust for himself and members of the family.” He again says at 65-66:

[p.149] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 144

“At most the King or headchief is but a trustee, who is as much controlled in his enjoyment of public lands by his subordinate chiefs and councillors as the head of family by senior members thereof.”

A customary caretaker is a fiduciary agent appointed by another person to administer property in the interest of a beneficiary or principal. Caretakership resembles the common law agency in many respects. Another customary fiduciary, is the well-known successor. In Ahoklui v. Ahoklui (1959) P.C.L.L.G. 212 at 213, Ollennu J. (as he then was) said: “A successor according to native custom, is in the position of a trustee and holds the estate to which he had succeeded in a fiduciary capacity.”

In the context of this case, in which category of fiduciaries do the late Tawiah’s patrilineal family fall? They are in no sense beneficiaries. On the undisputed evidence, only the appellant fitted that description. On their own showing, they appointed members of the family to deal with the deceased’s estate which they well knew solely belonged to an infant. Accordingly, they are on a proper analysis of their customary status, caretakers. The fact that they are self-appointed does not affect the position.

The position therefore is, whether a fiduciary is acknowledged as such by the English common law or by customary law, he is obliged to act in the interest of his principal. That brings us to the question, what remedies are open to an aggrieved beneficiary if he commits a breach of this duty? To determine this, one must acknowledge a possible duality of reliefs which can be sought against him, one developed by the English Chancellor which goes by the name equity and the remedy provided by customary law. There is legislative fiat for the application of both or either of these laws because article 4 (2) of the Constitution, 1979 as preserved by section 61 of the Provisional National Defence Council (Establishment) Proclamation (Supplementary and Consequential Provisions) Law, 1982 (P.N.D.C. 42) defines the common law of Ghana as comprising “the rules of law generally known as the common law, the rules generally known as the doctrines of equity and the rules of customary law. . . “

Under the rules developed in equity, there can be no doubt that a trustee is an accounting party. As Dr. Asante put it in his book Property Law and Social Goals in Ghana 1844-1966 (1975) at p. 110:

“A trustee in Anglo-American law is under a duty to keep accurate and clear accounts in respect of the administration of the trust property, showing receipts and expenditure, accretions and losses. The duty to account may be described as the handmaiden

[p.150] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 144 of the duty of loyalty; it translates the lofty incantations of the duty of loyalty into the harsh realities of financial liability. The duty to account is so fundamental that in some jurisdictions an express exemption therefrom is adjudged contrary to public policy.”

As the deceased’s family were in this case fiduciaries vis-à-vis the infant appellant, there should be no difficulty in holding them accountable to him. They had taken it upon themselves to manage his property and authorise alienations of some of it. And on their own showing expended the proceeds of the sale of his house for various purposes. A clearer case of liability to account cannot be imagined.

What is the position in customary law? We think it is correct to say generally that the right to account is available in a principal-fiduciary relationship. In Nelson v. Nelson (1932) 1 W.A.C.A. 215, some of the children of a deceased brought an action for accounts against a brother of theirs who had been appointed by the deceased on his death bed to look after their interests in his estate. He was held accountable to them. Michelin J. who spoke for the court said at 217-218:

“In my opinion, this is not the case of an action by a junior member of a family against the head of a family but is brought by brothers and sisters of the defendant against him in his fiduciary position as a caretaker on their behalf, not only at the request of the deceased but also at the request of the head of family, to look after their interests in the property of the deceased.

He was therefore clearly liable to account to the plaintiffs.”

In Ruttmern v. Ruttmern (1937) 3 W.A.C.A. 178, a member of a family who acted as agent for the family in conducting its affairs was held accountable to his brothers and sisters. In Ansah-Addo v. Addo; Ansah-Addo v. Asante (Consolidated) [1972] 2 G.L.R. 400, C.A. the defendant and co-defendant acted for a syndicate of farmers who pooled their resources together and purchased land. They received rents and moneys in that capacity. It was held that they were fiduciaries and were accountable to the syndicate. The Court of Appeal, inter alia, said at 441, C.A.:

“The liability to account is indeed one of the main vehicles by which a court of equity enforces the trustee’s fiduciary duty. That principle of the received common law is wholly in consonance with our indigenous conceptions of justice.”

A case which is peculiarly apposite to this one is Tamakloe v. Attipoe, West African Court of Appeal, 22 June 1953, unreported. Like this case, it involves the succession to an intestate in a patrilineal

[p.151] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 144 family. The facts are as follows: T died intestate leaving substantial immovable property at Pagan Road, Accra. He was survived by nine children. On his death, the wider family appointed two persons, one from the paternal and one from the maternal branch of the family as joint heads to administer his estate. The children thereafter appointed their eldest brother as their father’s successor and the property was transferred to him.

Three of the children then sued the joint heads and their brother, the successor, for account. Jackson J. held them all accountable and so ordered. The heads of family appealed against the order for account and it was urged on their behalf that in accordance with native custom the children being junior members of the family, have no right to call upon the heads to account. Coussey J.A. in whose judgment Foster- Sutton P. and Windsor-Aubrey J. concurred, disposed of that argument as follows:

“I can see no difference in principles in their liability to account both by English law and by the customary law once it is appreciated that the first and second defendants (meaning the joint heads) have no beneficial interest in the estate of the deceased, and that their true function as the heads of the larger family is advisory and protective, i.e. to watch the interests of the children and if necessary, to convene meetings in matters affecting the deceased’s estate . . .”

That is another way of saying that as caretakers and fiduciaries of the children, they are accountable to them. The only factual difference between the Tamakloe case (supra) and this one is that in the former case there were nine children while the appellant is the only issue in this suit. That decision seems to us, if we may respectfully say so, to make good sense.

As we said, the head of a family is a fiduciary vis-à-vis the family, and should, on principle, be accountable like other fiduciaries to the beneficiaries. But the wealth of judicial authority is that he is not accountable to junior members. That would seem to imply that he can be called upon to account by senior members. On this, the position is less than satisfactory. The orthodox statement of that position is by Sarbah in Fanti Customary Law at p. 78 who says: “If the family therefore find the head of family misappropriating the family possessions and squandering them, the only remedy is to remove him and appoint another instead.” That statement would seem to confer on him complete immunity from rendering accounts. The policy justification for this is anything but clear but it would seem to be founded on status and privilege. But it would seem that the head’s immunity from liability to account is not absolute; it attaches to him

[p.152] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 144 only while he is actually in office. As soon as he ceases to be a head, he has to hand over to the family assets and the hand over must be accompanied with adequate accounting for such items and proceeds as may not be available.

As Ollennu puts it in his book Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana at p. 139:

“. . . While the occupant of the Stool or head of family cannot be sued for accounts, because that is tantamount to a claim by the Stool against itself or by the family against itself, the ex-occupant of the Stool or an ex-head of the family may be sued for accounts.”

An examination of the customary law position shows that with the exception of the immunity that is accorded to a family head or chief while he holds office, all customary fiduciaries are accountable.

That brings us to a consideration of the reason why the learned trial judge denied the appellant this remedy against the respondents. It was submitted to the judge that on the facts of this case, the patrilineal family of the appellant were accountable to him. Counsel for the appellant took his stand firmly on the doctrines of equity. As we said, the application of equitable principle is statutorily permissible. The judge felt the force of that submission but declined an invitation to apply these principles. He said: “If the deceased had died testate and had in his will named the plaintiff as sole beneficiary , these submissions of counsel might prevail. . . “ With respect, that view is hardly tenable. Although the deceased died intestate, the law which the judge was obliged to apply, that is the personal law of the deceased, points to the appellant as the sole beneficiary— in the events which have happened. So that the same legal position resulted as if the deceased died testate and named the appellant as the sole beneficiary of his estate. We think, with respect, the learned judge was in error in denying the appellant the equitable remedy of accounts for the reason proffered by him.

The judge seems to have thought that the appellants’s right to the remedy of accounts can only be adjudged under customary law rules. We cannot agree. The law permits his rights to be determined by equitable principles whatever may be the customary law prescription on the matter. But the judge’s holding carried the clearest implication that customary law would have denied the appellant the remedy of accounts.

What is the judge’s reason for this? He seems to feel that the proceeds of the house sold in London belonged to the family and that having appointed a successor to the deceased, the latter was entitled to dispose of the deceased’s assets and was not accountable to the

[p.153] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 144 beneficial owner for it. The judge seems to isolate the successor from the family for the exercise of the power of sale. But the evidence in this case is clear. Whatever alienation the successor made of the deceased’s assets was done on the authority of the family. On the impugned purchase of the truck and crushing machine, the head of family testified in-chief that: “The defendant and Amankwa requested to be bought a vehicle and crushing machine by the family. At a family meeting, it was agreed to purchase them.” The successor died before this suit was brought. Had he lived, he would have been as accountable to the appellant as the family itself.

Although fully cognisant of the fact that the funds which were to be used in the purchases belonged solely to the appellant who was their ward, they treated it as family funds. In so expending the appellant’s money, the family acted against the appellant’s interest and not for his benefit and were guilty of a breach of their fiduciary duty towards him.

What legal remedies did the appellant have against the purchasers in equity and in customary law? The appellant contends that he is entitled to follow those properties not only in the hands of the fiduciaries but also third parties to whom they may have been transferred. The question is, are those remedies open to him according to the rules of equity or under customary law? With regard to Josiah, the first co-defendant, it was not suggested that apart from presiding at the family meeting and concurring in its decision to authorise the purchases, he was in possession of either of the properties which the appellant sought, namely the vehicle and the crushing machine.

Those claims were made against the defendant, Nortey, and the second co-defendant, Amankwa. It is necessary to consider how either of these stand in relation to the infant beneficiary. The defendant is a close member of the patrilineal family. He was the person charged by the family to oversee and protect the estate of the late Tawiah and he shuttled between England and this country to do this. He cannot but be fully aware that the funds from which he bought the vehicle belonged to the appellant by virtue of his position as the sole beneficiary of his father’s estate. He also knew or ought to know that the position in which the family placed him, he was a fiduciary of the appellant. In using the latter’s money to purchase a vehicle for himself, he committed a breach of his fiduciary duty to the appellant. We think the appellant was entitled under the equitable rules to recover that vehicle from him—the family authorisation notwithstanding. In authorising the purchase, the family were as guilty of breach of trust as he was himself. Since a fiduciary is precluded in equity from making a profit out of his office, he should also account to the appellant for the profits he made from the use of the vehicle.

[p.154] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 144

The next matter for consideration is: On the evidence, can it be said that the second co-defendant, Amankwa, also stood in a fiduciary relationship to the appellant beneficiary? He traces his connection with the deceased’s family through his mother. When he was asked whether he was a member of the family, he answered in the affirmative. His father was not a member of Tawiah’s family but his mother was. Strictly speaking, he cannot, in a patrilineal family, be fixed with responsibility for anything done amiss by the family qua family unless he was himself a party to such act.

He seems to have been brought into this transaction because he was a man of means and the family fell on him for financial assistance to meet the funeral expenses. His admitted presence at some of the family meetings is explainable on that ground. He said he asked for a refund of the ¢15,000 he advanced to the family. The latter did not have the means to do this. But they said the family’s representative was going abroad and would be buying a car. He said in that case, they should buy him a crushing machine.

We do not think that fact alone or his knowledge that in all probability, moneys from the appellant’s father’s estate would be used in making the purchase is sufficient to clothe him with the garb of a fiduciary of the appellant.

So the appellant’s right to recover the crushing machine from him must rest on a basis different from the one in which the defendant, Nortey, was adjudged liable to yield over the vehicle to the appellant. The position with regard to him is that the family in breach of trust bought for him out of trust funds a crushing machine. The evidence is that he gave value for it and was given the title to the machine. Looked at purely from the eyes of equity, he may be described as a bona fide purchaser for value. But he was not without notice that money belonging to an infant and held on trust by the family on his behalf was going to be used in purchasing the crushing machine. So he knew before the machine arrived and before it was transferred to him that the family bought and transferred that chattel to him in breach of their fiduciary duty to the appellant. In that case, the appellant is entitled to recover that machine from him also. The position therefore is that, as against both the defendant, Nortey, and the second co-defendant, Amankwa, the appellant was entitled to invoke equitable rules to recover both the vehicle and crushing machine from them and we think the judge was in error in declining to accord him that remedy.

What is the position at customary law? Like the rules of equity, customary law has identical remedies and seeks the restitution of property improperly appropriated by the fiduciary. The policy reason behind this is that the beneficial interest in the property is deemed to

[p.155] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 144 continue to reside in the beneficiary notwithstanding its improper appropriation or disposition by the fiduciary. For example, where the head of a family improperly disposes of family property, the proceeds if retained by him, is automatically impressed with the character of family property. In Quartey v. Martey [1959] G.L.R. 377 at 380, the High Court considering the effect of acquiring a house with the proceeds of a family plantation ruled: “In that case the house would be family property, because by customary law any property acquired with the proceeds of family property is itself family property.”

At least in respect of immovable property, customary law goes beyond equity in providing a remedy. A head of family commits a breach of his fiduciary duty if he alienates family land without the consent and concurrence of the principal members of the family. In such a situation, the family can avoid the sale by action provided they act timeously and in circumstances in which the purchaser can be restored to his former position. The fact that the latter is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice is of no moment. And if the items whose restitution the appellant sought were immovable properties, he has a well-articulated remedy in customary law.

The only problem in this case is that the trust res which the appellant seeks to recover, are movables. If a customary fiduciary, say a caretaker, disposes of valuable trinkets which he held on behalf of his principal in circumstances which amount to a breach of his fiduciary duty, can the beneficiary follow it in the hands of a third party? That he can have an action against the fiduciary himself is plain enough. Suppose the third party gave valuable consideration for it and was wholly unaware of the breach of trust? The rules of equity will protect him because he is, as is sometimes called, “equity’s darling”, that is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.

There is no reported case in which customary law conferred the right to trace in respect of movables. All the cases in which the family exercised a right in rem to recover family property alienated without proper authority or consent, relate to immovable property. If such a right existed in respect of movables, it would have to have certain safeguards to protect bona fide purchasers in a society with a growing commercial activity.

In the absence of decided authority, one must look at this matter on general principles. Native custom is said to consist in the performance of the reasonable in the special circumstances of the case: see Yirenkyi v. Akufo (1905) Ren. 367. In Thompson v. Mensah (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 240 at 248 Ollennu J. (as he then was) that learned judge and prolific exponent of customary law said:

[p.156] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 144

“Native custom, quite apart from the principles of equity, which are applicable to this country, abhors greed and ill-gotten gain. Therefore, where, with full knowledge of a breach of condition of a grant made in accordance with native custom, a grantor sits by and allows a third party to occupy land openly in the belief that he has acquired good title . . . native custom will not look favourably upon a claim to forfeiture; it will refuse it.”

By analogy, if a purchaser of chattels bought it from X well knowing that he held it in trust for Y, and that the sale was in breach of his fiduciary duty to Y, there seems no policy reason why customary law should not give Y a right in rem to follow and recover the article from the purchaser. Such remedy already exists with regard to immovables. A problem will only arise if the purchaser bought the chattel in good faith in complete ignorance of the fact that X held the chattel as a trustee for Y. In a situation where there is no distinct parallel customary law remedy, it would, we think, be wise to content ourselves with the equitable rules which protect a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.

As the principles of equity are, in any event, concurrently administered with customary law rules in our courts, this somewhat exhaustive analysis would seem to be academic. But the importance of this comparative examination is to disprove the basic philosophy which seems to have underlain the refusal of the learned judge to apply the doctrines of equity and to conclude the case by the application of customary rules. Even on that basis, we think, with respect, he erred because customary law has remedies both in rem and in personam against fiduciaries who breached their fiduciary duty.

Notwithstanding the great respect we feel for the experienced judge who dealt with this case, and who attempted to be scrupulously fair to the parties, we think he slipped. We felt we had a duty to put him right. And we did so on the completion of argument on 25 January last.

DECISION

Appeal allowed.

D. R. K. S.

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