BIO vs. YEBOAH [1984-86] 1 GLR 745
5 March 1984 · APALOO CJ · ≈ 22 min read
[1984] SLR (CA) 9Other citation styles and permanent link
SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.
CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Logs & Lumber Ltd. v. Oppon [1977] 2 G.L.R. 263, C.A.
(2) Yao v. Kome (1945) D.C. (Land) ‘38-’47, 179.
(3) Nsuta v. Mensah [1961] G.L.R. 232, S.C.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from a decision of the High Court, Sunyani wherein the trial judge wrongly admitted into evidence a letter of a vital witness who was not called to testify. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
Thompson for the appellant.
Ahenkorah for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF APALOO C.J.
Apaloo C. J delivered the judgment of the court. There used to live in a town called Bomaa in Brong Ahafo a man called Nana Kwasi Ansu. He was the chief of that town and the evidence suggests that he was a man of means. He died in or about 1969 possessed of a cocoa farm situate on Bomaa stool land at a place variously called Biaso or Gambia. He died intestate and by well-known canons of customary law, that farm became family property. As is customary, the family appointed one Kwaku Bio as his customary successor. In that capacity he stood possessed of the farm. He is the appellant before us.
In February 1978 one Kwaku Yeboah (hereinafter called the plaintiff) issued out a writ in the High Court, Sunyani and invited the court to declare that a transaction took place between him and the late Ansu in respect of the cocoa farm succeeded to by the appellant (hereinafter called the defendant) and that that transaction constituted a customary pledge of the farm. He sought an order to recover the farm on payment of the pledge money from his successor, the defendant. The latter denied that any such transaction as the plaintiff alleged took place. His position was that the plaintiff merely sold his farm to his predecessor Ansu and that that transaction was evidenced by a written document which he produced in evidence. The defendant said in 1970 the plaintiff appealed to the regional commissioner to use his good offices to get back the farm. He was unsuccessful in this. About five months after this, he made another appeal to Nana Dormaahene to get him (the defendant) to agree to a resale of the farm to him.
[p.747] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 745
According to the defendant, he consulted his family on this and he was authorised to offer the farm to the plaintiff for ¢55,000 but the latter declined to repurchase it at that price as he claimed it was far too much. For this reason, he resisted the action.
The plaintiff, of course, admits that Ansu was in possession and in beneficial enjoyment of the farm until his death. According to him, the transaction of pledge which he made with Ansu arose in this way: He had borrowed money from a man from Ejisu and granted a mortgage of the farm to his creditor as security. He could not meet repayment of the loan on the due date. So the mortgagor exercised his power of sale and sold the farm by auction. He said the farm was purchased by an unnamed Ashanti man. The plaintiff said he pleaded with Nana Ansu to buy back the farm from the purchaser at the price the latter paid for it so that he Ansu could take over the farm. According to the plaintiff, Nana Ansu fell in with that suggestion and paid off the purchaser and as he put it “retrieved the farm.”
According to the plaintiff, he then approached the Dormaahene “to approach Nana Kwasi Ansu on my behalf to have the farm handed over to me for a pledge.” He said Nana Ansu agreed to this but asked him to prepare a document to record the “pledging.” He said he complied and prepared such a document. He said it was a promissory note which was signed by himself, Nana Dormaahene and Kwasi Ansu. Having apparently signed this written “pledge” the plaintiff said he went back to Dormaahene, this time to solicit his assistance to appeal to Ansu “to hand over the land to me.” This was apparently an oral transaction and according to him, Ansu again obliged and this agreement was sealed with a customary drink. Nana Ansu was prepared to release the farm to him anytime he paid £3,800.
The defendant’s reply is that that story was entirely false. He said the plaintiff did not in fact mortgage his farm to anyone, no auction took place and that there was no question of retrieving the farm. Although the defendant did not witness the actual transaction, he produced a former linguist, one Opanin Kwasi Kyeremeh, who said he was present when the plaintiff offered the farm to the late Ansu “for an absolute sale.” After Nana Ansu received a satisfactory report from a bearer whom he sent to inspect the farm, he agreed to purchase it and requested the plaintiff to prepare a written document to record the transaction. The plaintiff did so and the purchase price was paid in his presence. He was one of the signatories to the document. He identified that document which was already admitted in evidence as exhibit 1.
On the rival stories presented to the court, issues of fact were joined on a number of matters. In particular did an auction of the plaintiff ‘s farm actually take place and if so who were the auctioneer
[p.748] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 745 and purchaser? The latter at any rate would be material because it must be from him that according to the plaintiff, the farm was “retrieved.”
The plaintiff’s story, to say the least, bristles with difficulties. On his own showing, without any one’s intercession, he got Nana Ansu to agree to retrieve the farm. Thereafter, he sought the intercession of Dormaahene to let him have back the farm as a pledge. Nana Ansu agreed to the pledging. Apparently, to provide a record of the transaction Nana Ansu asked him to produce a document. The plaintiff did so. According to him, he only made one document on this transaction and it was signed jointly by himself presumably as pledgor, Nana Ansu as pledgee and Nana Dormaahene probably as witness. A document, exhibit 1, signed by these three parties and testifying to some transaction about the farm was produced by the defendant. It records not a pledge but an absolute sale.
The Dormaahene who is literate, signed the document and certified that the plaintiff himself owned the farm and transferred it to Nana Kwasi Ansu. He said he did this in consideration of the sum of £2,300 “being the cost and expenses the said Kwaku Yeboah incurred in connection with the aforesaid cocoa farm.” He said he gave his “consent and approval to the said transaction.”
The reason why the plaintiff was disposing of the farm to Nana Ansu which the Dormaahene recorded ante litem motam, must have been told him by the plaintiff. He must have ran into debt and sold off the farm to meet his indebtedness. That precisely was what the only eye-witness, Kyeremeh, swore the plaintiff gave the late Ansu as his reason for offering him the farm to buy. Kyeremeh said, “the plaintiff came to say that he owed a debt and that Nana should buy the farm to enable him pay off his indebtedness.”
In our opinion, that document which the plaintiff himself caused to be prepared and which he proceeded to execute, gave a lie to his “pledge story.” The plaintiff then said after executing this document which he must have believed, if he was a witness of truth, to be a pledge, he then again sought the intercession of the Dormaahene to get Nana Ansu “to hand over the land to me.” He said the latter agreed and he stamped it with a bottle of liquor. But if the farm was in pledge to Nana Ansu why should the plaintiff soon after executing a document attesting to this fact seek a hand over of the farm unless he was minded of redeeming the “pledge.” It is elementary that in customary law, it is the pledgee who enjoys uninterrupted possession until redemption when he is obliged to surrender it.
Can this transaction have been as the plaintiff alleged and as the judge found, a pledge? What then is a pledge as that term is used in customary law? We have no less an authority than Ollennu to tell us.
[p.749] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 745
At 94 of his Customary Land Law in Ghana, the learned author posed the question what is a pledge and proceeded to record the following answer, “Pledge in customary law is the delivery of possession and custody of property, real or personal, by a person to his creditor to hold and use until the debt due is paid.. .”
That is the one thing that on the plaintiffs own showing did not happen in this case. He himself said his title was extinguished by reason of the sale and his right to possession went with it. That is why he said he sought Nana Ansu’s assistance
There is also one factor in this case which makes the plaintiff’s story of auction sale difficult to credit. He said the mortgagor realised the security and sold the farm by auction. The sale was to a person whose name he did not know and whom he did not put in the witness-box. But granted that there was an auction sale, the plaintiff’s equity of redemption would have been extinguished and he would have no title to pass. Indeed, the only person who could pass a valid title to Ansu would be the mythical purchaser. Yet the plaintiff contracted in a document which he himself caused to be made, describing himself as vendor and purporting to convey to Nana Ansu as purchaser an estate “in fee simple in possession free from all incumbrances except the rights of the Dormaa Ahenkro stool over its lands. . .” That conduct makes sense only if the plaintiff believed himself still to be the owner of the farm and had unincumbered title and possession which he could pass to Nana Ansu. And if that is so, the story of an auction sale and the loss of his title to the farm must be a concoction—just as the defendant claimed.
The one high personage and an individual who would have shed light on this matter as to what his understanding of the transaction between the parties was, was the Dormaahene. It is to him that two appeals were allegedly made by the plaintiff and who was an “approving party” to the sale document executed between the defendant’s predecessor Ansu and the plaintiff. But he was not called by the one person who vitally needed his evidence to make out his case, namely the plaintiff. It is true he wrote a letter to the district chief executive on 31 December 1975 in reply to an inquiry the latter made of him on some aspects of this case. For a reason that we will hereafter give, that letter was not admissible evidence.
Not having called the auctioneer. the purchaser and the Dormaahene who should be important witnesses, the only other relevant evidence produced by the plaintiff was by one Kumi who testified to his recollection of an appeal made to the Dormaahene by the
[p.750] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 745 plaintiff and what transpired as a result of it. Kumi said he was present when the plaintiff called on the Dormaahene. He continued:
“What he (meaning the plaintiff) said was that he had his farm with Nana Kwasi Ansu and that he should give it back to him. He said Nana Ansu had bought the farm from him and that he should give him back the farm and collect his money.”
(The emphasis is ours.) Pausing there for a moment, that fact clearly fits in with the defendant’s case, and suggests plainly that the plaintiff knew he had sold his farm, repented the transaction and was desirous of having the farm back. That would not have been news to the Dormaahene because he was himself a witness and “approving party” to the sale.
It is what he said the Dormaahene did that was important. According to Kumi, the Dormaahene sent for Nana Ansu and when he came “Nana Dormaahene asked Nana Kwasi Ansu to release the farm to the plaintiff and Nana Ansu after some discussion agreed.” This agreement was said to have been stamped with liquor. By what stretch of imagination can this agreement, even if truly made, be said to be tainted with “a right to redeem?” If there had been no pledge in the first instance, can this so-called agreement turn it into one and confer on the plaintiff a right of redemption? At best, it can only be a contract by Ansu to resell the farm to the plaintiff. The impression Kumi sought to give was that the plaintiff was in funds and was ready and willing to repurchase, or to use the judge’s words “to redeem forthwith.” Yet it is common ground that though Ansu lived many years after this so-called agreement, the plaintiff did not offer any money to him or try to get him to implement his promise to resell. What makes that story an unlikely one, is that no time was fixed for the plaintiff to produce the money and buy back the farm. So was the plaintiffs object only to put Nana Ansu under a permanent one-sided obligation to resell his farm and halt all developments and improvements to it? And further that the plaintiff secured a right to carry out his part of the bargain any time he fancied, or possibly by his successors after his own demise? In the known circumstances, this story is unworthy of credit.
It would seem the defendant was close to his uncle. He protested his complete ignorance of this pledge or repurchase story. He had physical possession of the farm and being a nephew of Ansu, he must have been thought to be a likely successor whom his uncle Ansu would keep up to date on matters appertaining to the farm. So the plaintiff alleged that he was present at the palace (ahenfie) before the Dormaahene when his uncle Ansu agreed to release the farm. Indeed, he said he took part in the drink which was consumed to seal the bargain. The defendant vehemently denied this. He said he was never
[p.751] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 745 there. At least on this issue, he had the truth of his evidence verified by the plaintiff’s own witness Kumi. He said in cross-examination. “Kwaku Bio was not at the ahenfie when we discussed the transaction.” Was it an honest mistake by the plaintiff or was it deliberate falsehood? To allege not only that he took part in the transaction which he sought to enforce against him, but also partook in the drink cannot be an honest error of recollection. The probabilities are that it was deliberate falsehood. There is nothing in Kumi’s evidence which makes it inherently more probable than the defendant’s or Kyeremeh’s who was shown to be an eye-witness to the original transaction.
Apart from the evidence of Ofosu Amankwa who testified as to some transaction between the parties which the plaintiff relied on, perhaps unsuccessfully as an arbitration, the only other evidence of apparent value which has a bearing on this case, is a letter dated 31 December 1975 written by Nana Dormaahene and addressed to the District Chief Executive, Sunyani. Some portions of it tend to support the defendant’s story. But the letter was prompted ex facie, by a petition the plaintiff addressed to the district chief executive. His representative tendered it in evidence and it was not objected to. It was admitted and marked exhibit B. In so far as that letter was tendered in evidence as a substitute for the evidence of Nana Dormaahene and to prove the truth of the matters alleged, it transgresses the hearsay rule and was inadmissible at common law. It is equally inadmissible under section 117 of the Evidence Decree, 1975 (NRCD 323) which was in force when it was admitted. Although the learned judge did not expressly refer to it in his judgment, the fact that he admitted it in evidence would suggest that like the parties’ lawyers, he also thought it was good legal evidence on which a valid conclusion could be founded.
The only counsel who appeared to have appreciated that the admission of that letter offended the hearsay rule was Mr. Ahenkorah, the plaintiff’s counsel. Mr. Thompson, counsel for the defendant who could have made a serious issue of its admission, did not appear to have the slightest clue of its legal worthlessness and vacillated in argument before us as to its admissibility.
Mr. Ahenkorah sought to justify the admission of that documentary hearsay evidence by reliance on Order 37, rr 60 and 61 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A). Subject to certain conditions, such evidence may be admitted under rule 60 in spite of the hearsay rule if the oral evidence of the maker could have been admitted and the maker had personal knowledge of the matters dealt with in the statement and provided also that the maker of the statement is himself called as a witness. His attendance can, however, be excused and the statement admitted subject to certain provisos. These are that the maker is dead, or unfit by reason of his bodily or mental condition to attend as
[p.752] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 745 a witness, or if he is beyond the seas and it is not reasonably practicable to secure his attendance, or if all reasonable efforts to find him have been made without success. Rule 61 further permitted the admission of that statement even if all the circumstances of the case were not fulfilled if the court “having regard to all the circumstances of the case, is satisfied that undue delay or expense would otherwise be caused” by fulfilment of that condition.
It seems clear that a party who takes shelter behind these rules and seeks the admission of an otherwise inadmissible evidence must satisfy the conditions laid down in either rule. The plaintiff did not even begin to satisfy any of the conditions prescribed in rule 60 of L.N. 140A. He did not even appear to appreciate the inadmissibility of that statement from the point of view of the law of evidence. As the court’s attention was not drawn to rule 60, it was itself in no position to exercise its discretion under rule 61 and waive those conditions on the grounds specified in that rule. It follows that exhibit B was wrongly admitted in evidence.
What legal consequence resulted from this? In Logs & Lumber Ltd. v. Oppon [1977] 2 G.L.R. 263, C.A. the Court of Appeal held that hearsay evidence was inadmissible per se and could not form the basis of a judgment; and if such inadmissible evidence was received with or without objection, it was the duty of the judge to reject it when giving judgment and if he had not done so, it would be rejected on appeal since it was the duty of the courts to arrive at their decisions upon legal evidence only.
The upshot of this was that on the main issues of fact which the plaintiff undertook the onus of establishing, namely that in truth an auction took place resulting in the loss of his title, his subsequent successful persuasion of Nana Ansu to take the farm on pledge, the reduction of that agreement into writing reflecting their true intention, the much later contract before the Dormaahene in which Nana Ansu again agreed to relinquish his title to the land, rested on his oral assertions and the sole evidence of his witness, Kumi.
The learned judge made no assessment or evaluation of that evidence or of the contrary evidence marshalled against him including the deed of “pledge” which turned out to be one of outright sale. The learned judge found to be customary pledge what on a most charitable view of the plaintiff’s case can only have been a customary contract to repurchase at an unspecified time. It is difficult to resist the observation that the trial judge’s consideration of this case was somewhat perfunctory and his eventual conclusion impossible of support.
But Mr. Ahenkorah, with his acknowledged ability, made a valiant attempt at persuading us to support this otherwise indefensible conclusion. In particular, he cited and relied on two cases which he
[p.753] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 745 submitted aided the plaintiff’s case. The first of these is Yao v. Kome (1945) D.C. (Land) ‘38-’47, 179 decided by Coussey J. (as he then was) on 14 December 1945. In that case, one Ampofo bought the appellant’s cocoa farm at an auction in 1930. Shortly afterwards, he promised in writing to return the farm to the judgment debtor after he had enjoyed it for twelve years. He died before the promised date and when the time arrived, the written promise was sought to be enforced against his successor. The latter claimed that that promise amounted to a gift which was not accepted by offering of customary aseda, and was therefore unenforceable. The native court found this as a fact. On appeal, Coussey J. (as he then was) affirmed this finding with great reluctance. The ratio of the decision was that the High Court sitting on appeal would not disturb a finding of fact based on the trial court’s view of a witness’ demeanour.
It is difficult to see how this decision assists the plaintiff. It was not claimed that the voluntary promise by the purchaser to return the farm after twelve years turned it into a customary pledge or conferred on the judgment debtor a right to redeem. The suit was brought to enforce a promise which was clearly reduced into writing. The voluntary offer to return was not construed as a pledge or anything remotely resembling it. The case in no way advanced the plaintiff’s argument.
The second case to which Mr. Ahenkorah drew our attention, was the Supreme Court decision in Nsuta v. Mensah [1961] G.L.R. 232, S.C. The facts of that case are a trifle long but the gist of the case is that N bought a farm at an auction and obtained a certificate of purchase. Subsequent to this, there was a family meeting at which N was requested to surrender his acquired title to B; both N and the judgment debtor, B, being members of the same family. According to N himself, he agreed to the familys request and surrendered his title to B the original owner and the judgment debtor. This agreement was stamped with a bottle of gin according to customary law. Subsequent to this, N changed his mind and successfully sued in the trial native court for a declaration of ownership to the farm. On appeal, the Asantehene’s Court held that the agreement by which he surrendered his title having been stamped according to customary law was binding and was one from which N could not resile. Having lawfully surrendered the title he acquired at the auction sale, he could not thereafter successfully obtain a declaration of title to the self-same farm. The Supreme Court affirmed that decision.
The facts of that case are vastly different from the instant case. N the original purchaser at the auction was alive. He conceded that he surrendered his title to the judgment debtor to whom he was related. That surrender was accepted and stamped with customary drink. It is obvious that he can only claim the return of his purchase price. He
[p.754] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 745 could no longer assert his title which was extinguished by the surrender.
In this case, the original purchaser Nana Ansu was dead. There was no suggestion that he surrendered his ownership in his lifetime. It was conceded that he was in beneficial enjoyment until his death. The agreement alleged and disputed in this case, was to sell back the farm to the so-called judgment debtor at an unspecified time. The so-called agreement to resell, rested on the evidence of an apparently untruthful and highly interested witness _ the plaintiff himself and one solitary witness with whom he was in conflict at least on one important point, namely the presence at the meeting of the deceased’s nephew and heir-apparent, so to speak. Useful as that decision is, it in no way advanced the plaintiff’s case. While we are not unappreciative of Mr Ahenkorah’s industry in “digging” up these two somewhat allied cases, we are bound to say we do not find ourselves helped by them.
We feel constrained to hold that a customary agreement by the late Ansu to resell the farm in dispute to the plaintiff has not been established. Even if it had been proved, what impact would it have made on relief sought in this action? On the plaintiff’s own showing, no time to repurchase was agreed upon. That must import an implied condition that this right would be exercised within a reasonable time so that neither Nana Ansu nor his successor could be prejudiced thereby. The plaintiff admitted that he still had a farm contiguous to the one in dispute and well knew that the farm had, over the years, undergone considerable improvement and enlargement. Cottages were established on it to his full knowledge. Would it be equitable to permit the plaintiff to sit back and watch Nana Ansu and his successor expend money on this farm for years and then order the latter to surrender the farm to the plaintiff for the ridiculous purchase price that was allegedly agreed upon nearly a quarter of a century ago? To think that such a thing could be possible, offends against one’s sense of propriety and fairness. At least in a customary pledge, a pledgee who expends money in making substantial improvements to the pledged property does this with full knowledge that the pledgor can exercise his right of redemption at any time he is able to raise funds to repay the original loan.
According to the plaintiff, the customary contract to repurchase was entered into in 1959. Nana Ansu lived for ten years after this. He died only in 1969. The plaintiff said in evidence that he tendered the agreed purchase price to his successor “about five or six years ago.” He was giving evidence in 1981. This shows that he only sought to perform his part of the alleged contract in 1975. Is it reasonable to accept that an oral contract to repurchase a farm entered into in 1959 should be performed in 1975? The plaintiff contended that he was
[p.755] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 745 entitled to exercise his right to “redeem” because he claimed Nana Ansu told him, “If I brought the money to him at any time he would give the farm to me.” It is hard to believe that Nana Ansu who was prudent enough to ensure that the only proved contract between himself and the plaintiff was reduced into writing, would enter into an oral agreement which obliges him and his successors in perpetuity, so to speak, to sell back to the plaintiff a farm he had purchased and improved upon. The fact that he obliged the plaintiff to make and produce to him a written record of their first transaction (exhibit 1) suggests that he was anxious to put their contractual relationship in a permanent form as an insurance against bad faith and treacherous memory.
As was to be expected, the plaintiff was pressed in cross-examination with the written document (exhibit 1) and it was put to him that the transaction thereby recorded was a sale. His answer was, “No it was a pledge.” This was his consistent position. The judge uncritically accepts this and holds that the plaintiff was entitled “to redeem the farm which as I have found, is the subject of a pledge.” That holding flies in the face of the evidence and is wholly and manifestly against it.
We do not need to go into any further details. We believe we have said enough to indicate the process of reasoning which leads us to the firm conclusion that the judgment appealed from was wrong and ought to be reversed. We note that the defendant also counterclaimed for a declaration of title to the cocoa farm, recovery of its possession and the sum of ¢8,200 which he alleged represented the value of cocoa illegally carried away by the plaintiff. The learned judge omitted to make any order on this claim. Having concluded that there was a pledge whose redemption he ordered, the counterclaim could not stand. But he should formally have dismissed it. We believe this aspect of the claim must have escaped the judge. But in view of our holding that there was neither a pledge nor a valid contract to repurchase, the defendant ought to succeed on his counterclaim and is entitled to the declaration of title and recovery of possession which he seeks.
With regard to the cocoa allegedly carted away by the plaintiff, the defendant’s evidence was extremely sketchy. All his evidence on this was that the plaintiff and his workmen entered his farm and took cocoa away on six occasions. Without providing any particulars, he estimated their total value as ¢8,000. Although the plaintiff may indeed have carried away some cocoa from the defendant’s farm, we are unable to hold that he has proved this claim which was in the nature of special damage. We accordingly find no basis on which we can allow either the whole or part of the sum claimed in paragraph 2 of the counterclaim.
[p.756] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 745
But in view of what we said earlier, we allow the appeal and set aside the judgment appealed from. In lieu of it, we order that the plaintiff’s claims do stand dismissed and judgment thereon be entered for the defendant. We also make a declaration of title in favour of the defendant of the farm in dispute and also make, as prayed, an order that the defendant do recover its possession with costs here and below.
DECISION
Appeal allowed.
J. A. A.
