ADEKURA vs. THE REPUBLIC [1984-86] 2 GLR 345
12 December 1985 · OSEI-HWERE JA · ≈ 27 min read
[1985] SLR (CA) 2Other citation styles and permanent link
SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.
CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith [1961] AC 290; [1960] 3 WLR 546; [1960] 3 WLR 546; 3 All ER 161, HL
(2) Mensah v The State [1963] 2 GLR 25, SC.
(3) R v Lumley (1911) 22 Cox cc 635; 76 JP 208.
(4) R v Ward [1956] 1 QB 350; [1956] 2 WLR 423; [1957] 1 All ER 565, CCA.
(5) Akorful v The State [1963] 2 GLR 371, SC.
(6) Hyam v Director of Public Prosecutions [1975] AC 55; [1974] 2 WLR 607; [1974] 2 All ER 41, HL.
(7) R v Hopkins – Husson (1949) 34 Cr App R 47, CCA.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from a conviction for murder in a jury trial at the High Court, Bolgatanga. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment of the court delivered by Osei-Hwere JA.
COUNSEL
Oduro for the appellant.
Osafo Sampong, Principal State Attorney, for the Republic.
JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE J A.
He delivered the judgment of the court. The appellant was the operations officer of the Bolgatanga branch of the people’s militia. He was arraigned before the criminal assizes holden at Bolgatanga for the offence of murder and he was out in charge of a jury of seven of his ordinary countrymen. By the unanimous verdict of the jury, he was found guilty of murder and the court sentenced him to death according to law. Aggrieved by this verdict he brought this appeal wherein he has relied on no less than nine grounds of appeal, of which some are but variations of the same theme.
The brief facts of the prosecution’s case were these: The fourth prosecution witness, an internal controller of the Tono Irrigation Project, Navrongo, was assigned a Land Rover with registration No GN 7084 to travel to Accra on duty. He instructed his son, the first prosecution witness, to drive the vehicle ahead to Navrongo and hand it over to the regular driver. At about 5:30 am on that fateful day the first prosecution witness took off from Tono with eight passengers (including the second and third prosecution witnesses and the deceased Augustine Klakani, a student of Navrongo Secondary School) towards Navrongo. When he got to the Navrongo-Sandema main motor road from the Tono Junction he slowed down and as he negotiated the curve [p.349] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 345 towards Navrongo there was a gunshot. The first prosecution witness thought it was a tyre-burst and he stopped the vehicle. Augustine Klakani was hit in the stomach by a bullet as the result of the gunshot and his intestines gushed out. He was wailing and the first prosecution witness was about to rush him to the hospital when they discerned two men in khaki-overall standing at a distance who warned that if he moved the vehicle he would be fired at again. After some time the two men ordered that the first prosecution witness should drive on. That same day Augustine Klakani succumbed to his injury at the Bolgatanga Hospital towards the end of a three-hour operation. The police visited the scene of the incident and recovered five empty shells fired from an AK 47 rifle.
The appellant’s defence was that he was one of a group of militiamen on operational duty to track down illegal fuel deals at the site of the Tono Irrigation Project. The operation was conducted with the prior approval of the district defence co-ordinator, the acting regional co-ordinator of the defence committee and the PNDC District Secretary of Navrongo. The appellant who was armed with an AK 47 rifle, was in command of the operation and their instructions were that any person carrying a pan should be searched and any vehicle coming from the Tono Project area or the Sandema Road should be stopped and searched. The appellant and one other took their positions at the Tono Junction whilst the others were driven away to take positions elsewhere.
Some twenty minutes after they had been at their post they spotted a vehicle coming from the Tono Irrigation Project site. The appellant went to the middle of the road and raised the rifle and stopped the vehicle. The driver also blew on his horn. This was at a junction and so he gave him way to pass. The vehicle came to the junction without stopping but slowed down and negotiated the curve. What followed is best told in the appellant’s own words as follows:
“I thought the driver was going to stop, but he did not. I therefore cocked the rifle and aimed at the back sight of the rifle to see the tyre of the moving vehicle. By then the car was still moving. I was aiming at the back right side tyre. When the car did not stop my colleague was going to look at the registration number of the vehicle and the bullet nearly hit him. My colleague stopped and I started to give rapid firing. That is a continuous firing to ensure that the vehicle stopped. After releasing five bullets we saw that the vehicle had stopped.”
It was then that the appellant heard that someone had been shot. He heard the driver trying to start the vehicle and he ordered, “Don’t move, if you move again I will open fire.” They started trotting towards the
[p.350] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 345 vehicle when they saw it moving away but they abandoned the chase and decided to trace it to Navrongo.
The first onslaught against the trial judge’s directions is that he failed to draw the jury’s attention to discrepancies and inconsistencies in the prosecution’s evidence which impaired the credit of the witnesses.
It was argued that if the inconsistencies and discrepancies had been highlighted they would have led the jury to accept an aspect of the appellant’s defence that he tried to stop the approaching Land Rover in the manner he described but that the driver ignored him. Some of the discrepancies pointed out to us related to the evidence of the first and second prosecution witnesses. The latter is a bank manager who was seated in the driver’s cab with the first prosecution witness. The second prosecution witness said that he heard gunshots behind them before the vehicle was pulled to a stop whilst the first prosecution witness said that he stopped the vehicle because he thought there was a tyre-burst. The first prosecution witness said that they put the injured boy on the ground. The second prosecution did not support that evidence, although the third prosecution witness supported it. Counsel pointed out that the first prosecution witness lied about his employment by the Tono Irrigation Project.
Whilst it is true that a judge is bound in his summing up to direct the jury on material conflicts and discrepancies so as to lead them to a critical approach on relevant issues, he is absolved from directing them on immaterial conflicts and discrepancies. If the evidence is offered to prove a proposition which is not a matter in issue or probative of a matter in issue, the evidence is properly said to be immaterial. We find these conflicts immaterial and they could not be used either to bolster the defence or to impeach credibility. The prosecution’s account of the event at the scene of the shooting and that of the defence is merely the choice between tweedledum and tweedledee and the judge did not err, as alleged, in summing up the evidence for both sides and leaving the jury to choose which side to believe.
The trial judge’s directions were, to say the least, over generous in their compass. Murder, manslaughter, provocation, accident and justification were all kept well within his ken. The appellant’s complaint is that the directions were either wrong or insufficient. In directing the jury on justification, for instance, the learned judge referred them to justifiable harm as provided in sections 30 and 31 of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act) 29, and told them that the appellant could not avail himself of the defence of justification under those sections. This direction was specifically made a ground of appeal to the effect that the
[p.351] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 345 judge erred in finding that sections 30 and 31 of Act 29 were not applicable to the case.
It was argued that the appellant could derive justification under the provisions of section 31 (d), (e) or (f) of Act 29. They provide as follows:
“31. Force may be justified in the cases and manner, and subject to the conditions, hereinafter in this
Chapter mentioned, on the ground of any of the following matters, namely:….
(d) authority to arrest and detain for felony; or
(e) authority to arrest, detain, or search a person otherwise than for felony; or
(f) necessity for prevention of or defence against crime…”
The question that necessarily obtrudes is: “What is the authority of the appellant to do any of those acts specified in (d) and (e)?” In spite of the high public-spiritedness which the peoples’ militia, without doubt, are expected to exude there does not seem to be any law that regulates the functions of the peoples’ militia qua an organ of the revolution. At least the appellant’s counsel could not point at any such law. This is an unfortunate omission which calls for rectification. Otherwise a gun-toting and trigger-happy militiaman like the appellant may be tempted to ride on a high horse above the legitimate agencies of law and order in the name of the revolution. Whether or not the appellant had any such authority must therefore be considered in the light of his capacity as a private person.
The authority of a private person to make an arrest is very limited. Under section 12 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), he may arrest any person who in his view commits a felony or misdemeanour or any offence involving the use of force of violence, or whom he reasonably suspects of having committed a felony provided that the felony has been committed. Owners of property are also given certain powers of arrest under section 13; and under sections 17 and 18, a magistrate, in the circumstances provided, may direct a private person to arrest. At the time the appellant shot at the vehicle no felony had been committed to ground any suspicion. In fact no crime was being committed which necessitated its prevention or its defence. It is true that unknown to the appellant the vehicle was carrying an extra allocation of 45 gallons of petrol and some lubricants but this was not without authority. It is clear from the foregoing that the trial judge was right in saying that justification under sections 30 and 31 of Act 29, could not apply.
[p.352] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 345
The only ground of some substance argued by the appellant’s counsel is ground (3) of his original grounds of appeal. The ground states:
“The learned judge misdirected the jury when he directed them to apply an objective test in deciding whether or not the appellant had the intention to kill the victim.”
To buttress this ground, his ground (5) of the additional grounds also stated that the appellant’s evidence that he aimed at the back tyre of the vehicle and that he never had any intent to kill stood unchallenged and negatived the requisite “intent” required in a charge of murder. In support of his argument the appellant’s counsel referred to the following passage in the judge’s directions:
“If you find that the harm in question was intentionally or negligently caused then you should conclude that it was unlawful. In this case, the prosecution is also saying that the harm inflicted on the deceased was caused unlawfully and intentionally. The important question you have to decide is this-did the accused cause the death of the deceased intentionally? The intention mentioned in the definition of murder is not capable of positive proof and may be implied or presumed from acts and surrounding circumstances. However the provisions of section 11 of Act 29 should give you a guide as to how that intention can be found. [Section 11 read and explained.] Under the law therefore, every man of age and sanity is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his actions. For example if A throws a stone at a glass window, the natural consequence of his act would be to break or damage the glass so that if the glass breaks he cannot be heard to say that he did not intend to cause damage to the glass.”
Counsel also referred us to the following passage:
“I must remind you again here that in our law every man of age and sanity is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his actions. If you think after hearing the evidence, that the accused did not intend to shoot or wound Augustine Klakani in particular but without aiming at any one person, just fired into the vehicle to stop it, then if you come to the conclusion that he ought to have foreseen the possibility of killing or wounding any person in the vehicle and that death, in fact, resulted to one of the passengers in the vehicle from his acts, he is guilty of murder. It is sufficient if you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew that it was probable that
[p.353] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 345 his acts would result in the causing of injury or harm to someone in the vehicle.”
Counsel argued that by the above directions the trial judge adopted the objective test and that this was insufficient as he ought to have directed the jury also on the subjective test exemplified by section 11(3) of Act 29.
To be fair to the trial judge it will be pertinent to focus also on his directions from the angle of the defence. I quote for that purpose the following passages:
“… According to the accused when the driver failed to stop he cocked his AK 47 rifle and through the back sight of the rifle aimed at the back right tyre of the vehicle. He said the road was bumpy and rough. He fired the first bullet and saw that the vehicle was still moving. When the vehicle did not stop, he started to give rapid firing to ensure that the vehicle stopped. After releasing five bullets, he saw that the vehicle had stopped.”
Under cross-examination by the court he gave the following evidence:
“Q Did you fire all the five bullets at the right back tyre of the vehicle?
A I fired the first bullet at the tyre and when I missed it, I released the four other bullets. I did not know whether or not the five bullets went to the same place.”
Under cross-examination by the jury, the accused also gave the following answer:
“Q During your rapid firing, did you still look through the sight of the rifle?
A No I did not.
Q You have told the court that the incident happened at dawn and you could not see well. Why then did you aim at the tyres?
A I was making an attempt to see whether I could bring the vehicle to a stop.
You will remember that in answer to a question about visibility at the time he said that he could only see the vehicle by the taillight. Again asked if he gave a warning shot, he said No! And added that he felt because the vehicle was moving, it would have been a waste of bullet to fire a warning shot… He told the court that the road was bumpy and rough and he could only see the vehicle by the taillight. You would therefore
[p.354] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 345 want to ask yourself whether under the circumstances, he ought to have known that it was probable that his rapid shooting and releasing of five bullets at the vehicle would result in causing bodily harm to someone even though he did not desire to bring about that result. On the other hand if you are not satisfied that the accused intended to cause harm to whoever was on the vehicle when he fired the gun that day when the incident occurred and that the killing was purely accidental then you must return a verdict of not guilty of murder and completely acquit and discharge the accused. If you entertain any reasonable doubt on the whole of the evidence, you must give the benefit of the doubt to the accused and acquit him of the charge of murder. He gave evidence that after he had fired the first bullet at the back right tyre of the vehicle by looking through the back sight of the rifle and missed it, he released all the remaining four bullets in an attempt to demobilise [sic] or stop the vehicle. If you accept this version of the accused that his intention was to destroy the tyre of the moving vehicle which is in itself an unlawful act but was indifferent and careless as to the manner in which he handled the gun, not caring whether the deceased or anybody in the vehicle was injured or hit then he will be guilty of manslaughter…”
(The emphasis is mine.) The trial judge then read the definition of manslaughter contained in section 51 of Act 29 and continued as follows:
“This means that if you cause the death of another person by applying an unlawful harm you are guilty of manslaughter. But if the unlawful harm complained of was a result of negligence, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the said negligence amounted to a reckless disregard for human life … so that if the evidence convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt that the handling of the gun by the accused at the time of the incident was done negligently and that his general conduct suggests negligence on his part and that the said negligence amounted to reckless action or conduct or a reckless disregard for human life, then he is guilty of manslaughter . .”
In his Criminal Law in Ghana at pp, 221 and 235 Mr Justice Twumasi has correctly classified manslaughter in three types, viz.
(a) murder reduced to manslaughter by extenuating circumstances or other matter of partial excuse (section 52 of Act 29);
(b) homicide which is caused by unlawful harm without intention to kill (section 51 of Act 29); and
[p.355] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 345
(c) homicide caused by negligence which is of such a high degree as to amount to a reckless disregard for human life (proviso to section 51 of Act 29).
It will be noted that the direction on manslaughter quoted above favoured the appellant because it related to the third type of manslaughter where there is clearly no intention to kill-(see also the provisions relating to negligence in section 12 of Act 29). Again, the direction postulates that the appellant’s act in discharging his rifle was not aimed at anyone because if it was then the act could be murder and not manslaughter by negligence. This was brought out in the opinion of Lord Kilmuir in Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith [1961] AC 290 at 327, HL when in explaining murder he said:
“The unlawful and voluntary act must clearly be aimed at someone in order to eliminate cases of negligence or of careless or dangerous driving.”
In spite of all these directions, the jury ultimately returned a verdict of guilty of murder.
As noted before, it is alleged that the trial judge failed to direct also on the subjective test of criminal intent. The pertinent provisions in section 11 (3) of Act 29 to which counsel has referred us to prop the appellant’s grievance are:
“11. (3) If a person does an act of such a kind or in such a manner as that, if he used reasonable caution and observation, it would appear to him that the act would probably cause or contribute to cause an event, or that there would be great risk of the act causing or contributing to cause an event, he shall be presumed to have intended to cause that event, until it is shown that he believed that the act would probably not cause or contribute to cause the event, or that he did not intend to cause or contribute to it.”
But what is all this fuss about the objective and subjective tests? It is this, that in the application of the criminal law in the cases where the acts of an accused are judged by objective standards, the principle applies that one can never demand more from an accused than that which is reasonable, and reasonable in this context means that which can be expected of the ordinary, average person in the particular circumstances. The ethics of judging by the subjective standard on the other hand, looks at the intention from the standpoint of the accused himself with all his defects.
This court has, unfortunately, not spoken with a consistent voice in these matters. And, here again, Twumasi’s opus referred to provide a ready source material at pages 81-85. For instance, in Mensah v The
[p.356] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 345
State [1963] 2 GLR 25 at 31-32, SC the court applied the objective test in the interpretation of section 11 (3) of Act 29 and stated that:
“Evidence of intention within subsection (3) of section 11 of the Criminal Code, 1960, is proved by applying the test of the standard of the ordinary and reasonable man. It really denotes an ordinary man capable of reasoning who is responsible and accountable for his actions.”
The court quoted with approval the direction of Avory J in R v Lumley (1911) 22 Cox CC 635 at 636 on the objective test and also the judgment of Lord Goddard CJ in R v Ward [1956] 1 QB 351 at 356, CCA where he stated:
“Of course, the test must be applied to all alike, and the only measure that can be brought to bear in these matters is what a reasonable man would or would not contemplate. If the act is one as to which the jury can find that a reasonable man would say: ‘It would never occur to me that death would result or grievous bodily harm would result,’ then the jury can find him guilty of manslaughter; but if the jury come to the conclusion that any reasonable person, that is to say, a person who cannot set up a plea of insanity, must have known that what he was doing would cause at least grievous bodily harm, and the death is the result of that grievous bodily harm, then that amounts to murder in law and a verdict of murder is justified.”
The court in Mensah v The State (supra) was constituted by Adumua-Bossman, Mills-Odoi and Ollennu JJSC.
Some five months later that same court, coram Crabbe, Mills-Odoi and Blay JJSC, held the opposing view and condemned the objective test by holding in Akorful v The State [1963] 2 GLR 371 (as stated in the headnote) that:
“(1). the proposition that a jury in a murder trial need not consider what an accused person in fact contemplated as the probable result of his act once they are satisfied that the act was unlawful and voluntary, and that any reasonable man in the position of the accused would appreciate the consequences of his act is not applicable to the law of murder in this country. In this case the learned judge in directing the jury to apply an objective test in determining the intention of the appellant had seriously misdirected the jury on this issue.”
The court specifically disapproved of Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith [1960] 3 All ER 161, HL and declaimed the
[p.357] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 345 monstrosity evidenced by the objective test that the idiot or the stupid man should hang simply because he had not the intelligence and the foresight of the reasonable man.
A sane and humane system of criminal justice does not exact retribution by way of capital punishment for murder from a person who infringes the substantive provisions of the Code without proof of a real or wicked intention to kill or that the circumstances were such that he was aware that the result of his act would be death. In England the law made a fresh start in this humane movement in 1957 by section 1 of the Homicide Act of that year which abolished what was commonly called “constructive malice” but retained “malice aforethought (express or implied)”.
The next relevant statutory provision is section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1967 which deals, not with the substantive law, but with the means of proof of intention and foresight in criminal law in general. By that section, it is provided that:
“a court or jury, in determining whether a person has committed an offence,-(a) shall not be bound in law to infer that he intended or foresaw a result of his actions by reason only of it being a natural and probable consequence of those actions; but (b) shall decide whether he did intend or foresee that result by reference to all the evidence, drawing such inferences from the evidence as appear proper in the circumstances.
Section 8 of the English Criminal Justice Act, 1967 has replaced the objective approach by a subjective one. Our section 11 (3) of Act 29, also ensures that the presumption of intention prescribed by the circumstances in that section is rebuttable and not absolute. In other words if the jury believed the explanation of the accused person that he believed that the act would probably not cause or contribute to cause the event, or that he did not intend to cause or contribute to it then the criminal intent shall not be presumed against him. The same result would follow if the jury found the evidence of the accused person relating to his intention probable or that it raised a reasonable doubt.
It is evident from the above directions quoted that even though the trial judge made reference to the general legal proposition that every man of age and sanity was presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his actions, yet he went on to direct the jury that if they were not satisfied that the appellant intended to cause harm to whoever was on the vehicle when he fired the gun and that killing was purely an accident then they were to return a verdict of not guilty. Indeed, the trial judge has stated in his notes on the summing up that he read and explained section 11 to the jury. What reasons have we to say that he did not explain section 11 (3) to them?
[p.358] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 345
The case of Hyam v Director of Public Prosecutions [1975] AC 55, HL is of interest. The appellant, moved by jealousy, drove to the house of Mrs Booth where she was sleeping with her son and two daughters, taking half a gallon of petrol and some newspaper with her. When she got to her door she poured the petrol through the letterbox and ignited it by means of the newspaper and a match. There was a tremendous blaze, yet she did not alert the occupants of the house, but drove away. Mrs. Booth and her son managed to escape through a window, but her two daughters were choked to death by the smoke, and the appellant was charged with murder. At the trial she denied the intention of causing death or grievous bodily harm to anyone, confessed her jealousy of Mrs Booth and asserted that her motive in starting the fire was merely to frighten her into leaving Coventry and going back to Newcastle. However, it was conceded on her behalf that she had been reckless; she admitted that what she had done was very dangerous to anyone living in the house, and she pleaded guilty to manslaughter, but her plea was not accepted.
Ackner J, directed the jury that knowledge of the accused that it was highly probable that her act would result in death or grievous bodily harm established the necessary intent to prove murder. The question of law certified by the Court of Appeal was:
“Is malice aforethought in the crime of murder established by proof beyond reasonable doubt that when doing the act which led to the death of another the accused knew that it was highly probable that that act would result in death or serious bodily harm?”
The House of Lords dismissed the appeal (Lord Diplock and Lord Kilbrandon dissented) and held that a person who, without intending to endanger life, did an act knowing that it was probable that grievous, in the sense of serious, bodily harm would result was guilty of murder if death resulted.
The speech of Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone LC was (in its prismatic analysis and panoramic review of the points raised in the appeal, in its learning and depth of thought) a monumental masterpiece, a veritable tour de force. The following passage from his speech may usefully be brought to bear on this appeal. He said at 77-78:
“But what are we to say of the state of mind of a defendant who knows that a proposed course of conduct exposes a third party to a serious risk of death or grievous bodily harm, without actually intending those consequences, but nevertheless and without lawful excuse deliberately pursues that course of conduct regardless whether the consequences to his potential victim take place or not? In that case, . . . there is not merely actual foresight
[p.359] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 345 of the probable consequences, but actual intention to expose his victim to the risk of those consequences whether they in fact occur or not. Is that intention sufficient to reduce the crime to manslaughter notwithstanding a jury’s findings that they are sure that it was the intention with which the act was done? In my opinion, it is not, and in this my opinion corresponds with the opinion of the Commissioners on the Criminal Law, Fourth Report (1839), when they said:
‘Again it appears to us that it ought to make no difference in point of legal distinction whether death from a direct intention to kill or from wilfully doing an act of which death is the probable consequence.’
And again in a later passage: ‘it is the willful exposure of life to peril that constitutes the crime.’ The heart surgeon exposes his patient to the risk, but does everything he can to save his life, regarding his actions as the best or only means of securing the patient’s survival. He is, therefore, not exposing his patient to the risk without lawful excuse or regardless of the consequences. The reckless motorist who is guilty of manslaughter, but not murder, is not at least ordinarily aiming his actions at anyone in the sense explained in Smith [1961] A.C. 290, 327. If he were, it is quite possible that, as in Smith, he might be convicted of murder. In the field of guilty knowledge it has long been accepted both for the purposes of criminal and civil law that … ‘a man who deliberately shuts his eyes to the truth will not be heard to say that he did not know it.’ (See per Lord Reid in Southern Portland Cement Ltd. v. Cooper [1974] A.C. 623, 638.) Cannot the same be said of the state of intention of a man who, with actual appreciation of the risks and without lawful excuse, wilfully decides to expose potential victims to the risk of death or really serious injury regardless of whether the consequences take place or not? This seems to me to be the truth underlying the statement of the law in Stephen’s Digest, the summing up of Cockburn C.J. in Reg v. Desmond, The Times, April 28, 1868, and of Avory J. in Rex vs. Lumley, 22 Cox C.C. 635 and of those phrases in Smith [1961] A.C. 290 in which it seems to be said that a rational man must be taken to intend the consequences of his acts. It is not a revival of the doctrine of constructive malice or the substitution of an objective for a subjective test of knowledge or intention. It is the man’s actual state of knowledge and intent which, as in all other cases, determines his criminal responsibility. Nor, for the like reason, does this set up an irrebuttable presumption. It simply proclaims the moral truth that
[p.360] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 345 if a man, in full knowledge of the danger involved, and without lawful excuse, deliberately does that which exposes a victim to the risk of the probable grievous bodily harm . . . or death, and the victim dies, the perpetrator of the crime is guilty of murder and not manslaughter to the same extent as if he had actually intended the consequence to follow, and irrespective of whether he wishes it. This is because the two types of intention are morally indistinguishable, although factually and logically distinct, and because it is therefore just that they should bear the same consequences to the perpetrator as they have the same consequences for the victim if death ensues.”
We respectfully adopt every word spoken by the able law lord which, in our opinion, amply answers whatever criticism there is that may be levelled against the trial judge’s directions that he followed the objective test and failed also to direct on the subjective test or that he set up an irrebuttable presumption of intention because he did not specifically direct them at the same time that the presumption that a sane person intends the natural and probable consequences of his act is rebuttable.
By their verdict, the jury obviously rejected the defence put up by the appellant that he did not have the intention to kill. They even rejected the verdict of manslaughter, which the judge thought was open to him. To shoot rounds of bullets at a moving vehicle at that time of the day when visibility was so poor and limited was an inherently dangerous act which exposed the occupants of the vehicle to a serious risk of death, although the desire was to immobilise the vehicle by deflating the tyre. A man who deliberately shuts his eyes to this obvious truth cannot, in law, be heard to say that he “believed his act would probably not cause or contribute to cause the event, or that he did not intend to cause or contribute to it.” After all the proviso in section 11 (3) of Act 29 which enures to exculpate the accused from any criminal intention is predicated upon the fact that he had used reasonable caution and observation. From the appellant’s answers to cross-examination the jury may well have taken the view that he knew his action exposed the passengers to a serious risk of death but that he shut his eyes to the truth.
Another aspect of the complaint that the jury was not fully directed stemmed from their inability to arrive at a unanimous verdict on the first occasion. A member of the jury then asked for redirection on the meaning of murder and manslaughter. For some 40 minutes, the learned judge carried them through his redirection. It was argued that the redirection was no more than a repetition of the previous direction. If a direction is correct and it is in plain language, we do not think that a
[p.361] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 345 redirection can be faulted merely because it repeats the former. All minds may not be equal in their reception of ideas. To some minds, the idea must be hammered home and repetition then becomes a virtue. We do not, however, find that the redirection was a mere repetition. The jury, thereafter, took only fifteen minutes to arrive at their unanimous verdict. This indicates, no doubt, that they benefited by the redirection
Where there is evidence on which a jury can act and there has been no misdirection or irregularity such as deprives an accused person of the substance of fair trial and protection of the law and it can be said that the verdict is one which a reasonable jury could arrive at, the Court of Appeal will not set aside the verdict of the jury: see R v Hopkins-Husson (1949) 34 Cr App R 47, CCA. We are satisfied that there was evidence upon which the jury could act and we are unable to disturb their verdict. For all the foregoing reasons, we find that the appeal ought to be dismissed.
DECISION
Appeal dismissed.
L K A
