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[1985] SLR (CA) 28Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL I)

LUTTERODT vs. MENSAH NYARKO AND OTHERS [1984-86] 1 GLR 277

5 February 1985 · APALOO CJ · ≈ 7 min read

Cite as[1985] SLR (CA) 28
Other citation styles and permanent link
OSCOLALUTTERODT v MENSAH NYARKO AND OTHERS [1984-86] 1 GLR 277 [1985] SLR (CA) 28
APALUTTERODT v MENSAH NYARKO AND OTHERS [1984-86] 1 GLR 277, [1985] SLR (CA) 28 (Ghana).
BluebookLUTTERODT v MENSAH NYARKO AND OTHERS [1984-86] 1 GLR 277, [1985] SLR (CA) 28 (Ghana Ct. App. 1985).

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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION to vacate an order of the Court of Appeal relisting an appeal struck out for want of prosecution. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Nii Amartei for the applicant.

Enoch D. Kom for the respondents.

JUDGMENT OF APALOO C.J.

Apaloo C.J. delivered the ruling of the court. Some time in 1976, the applicant instituted proceedings against the respondents for title, possession and kindred reliefs to a piece of building land situated at Dansoman in Accra. Six years later, that is in 1982, the High Court constituted by Mr Justice Adadevoh gave judgment for the applicant and granted him not only title to the land and house then built on it but the ancillary reliefs of possession, damages and perpetual injunction. Just a fortnight after the delivery of that judgment, the respondents appealed against it to this court and prayed for its vacation.

[p.279] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 277 When the appeal was called for hearing before this court on 7 November 1983 the respondents, as appellants, failed to appear. Accordingly, this court in exercise of its jurisdiction under rule 23 (1) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1962 (L.I. 218) dismissed it for want of prosecution. The way was thus clear for the successful applicant to reap the fruits of his judgment. At his behest, the deputy sheriff levied execution, ejected the respondents from the land and thereafter installed the applicant into possession. There can be little doubt that that course was perfectly lawful.

Although the judgment of the High Court stood, the respondents took what was described as a complaint to the National Defence Committee. That body was brought into being by section 31 of the Provisional National Defence Council (Establishment) Proclamation (Supplementary and Consequential Provisions) Law, 1982 (P.N.D.C.L. 42). Its functions were carefully spelt out in the section that created it. It is plain beyond the possibility of controversy that it had no power to constitute itself into an adjudicating body and to exercise appellate, supervisory or any jurisdiction over a court of competent jurisdiction. But that is precisely what the respondents invited it to do. They claimed in their so-called complaint that the judge acted incompetently in giving an order which does not reflect the directive principle of “State Policy.” In the last paragraph of their complaint, they appealed to the N.D.C. to order that they re-enter the house in the interim while the N.D.C. settles the case. That body apparently responded to that appeal because the applicant swore in his supporting affidavit that acting on the orders of that body, the lawful process of execution which was completed, was reversed and the respondents were forcibly put back into possession of the house. The applicant’s plea to the High Court to punish the respondents for their undoubted contempt was unavailing.

After committing these grave illegalities and showing such blatant disregard for the order of a lawfully constituted court, the respondents on 18 December 1984 returned to this court and prayed that it exercise its jurisdiction under rule 23 (2) of L.I. 218 to re-enter the appeal for hearing. As we said, that judgment had already been executed and the process taken to do so, was, as we said, lawful. The application to relist was ex facie served on the applicant. The object was to give him an opportunity of arguing against it. We are now entirely satisfied on the affidavit evidence placed before us, that the application to relist was neither served on the applicant nor his solicitor and neither knew of its pendency in this court.

The applicant now invites us to vacate the order that relisted this appeal. It seems clear from the spirited argument that the applicant’s counsel presented to us that, had he known of the respondents’ motion

[p.280] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 277

to the court to relist the appeal, he would have argued vehemently against it and with good reason. This application is not founded on any specific procedural rule of this court but is based on the general principle that where an order is made against a party ex parte, he is entitled, ex debito justitiae to have it set aside.

So in the end, whether the order relisting the appeal should be vacated or suffered to remain is entirely a matter for the exercise of our discretion. As has often been said, in the exercise of this equitable jurisdiction there can be no fixed rules; the orthodox statement being that each case must be determined on its own special facts. It is plain that the full facts of this case that was disclosed to us both in argument and in the affidavit and other exhibits placed before us was not put and cannot have been put before this court when it dealt with the motion to relist ex parte and for the very sufficient reason that, contrary to what is indorsed in the motion paper, the application was not served on the applicant or his counsel.

We find it difficult to accept that this court would resurrect an appeal against a blameless party who has in his favour a court’s judgment—which judgment the court by its own officers lawfully and properly executed. We also asked ourselves whether the respondents who had flouted or instigated the flouting of the court’s lawful orders would have been thought deserving of the exercise in their favour of the court’s equitable discretion. Furthermore, in this area of equity jurisdiction, it is often said a suppliant must act timeously or put in the language of the Roman lawyers—”vigilantibus non dormientibus jur serveniunt.” The respondents’ appeal was dismissed for want of prosecution on 7 November 1983. Although the evidence shows that they became cognisant of this fact shortly afterwards, yet they chose to resort to the N.D.C., a non judicial body without statutory power, to reverse the lawful process of the court. They did not seek this court’s aid until 18 December 1984—just over a year afterwards. Although the rule under which an application to relist an appeal which was struck out did not prescribe any time limit when such application should be brought, time limits prescribed by the rules in cognate matters give an indication of what time the law considers reasonable. For instance, under rule 10 of L.I. 218, a person who is aggrieved by a judgment of the High Court and wishes to have it vacated by the court, must lodge his appeal within three months. If he did not do so within that period, he has a further three months’ grace but must show good and sufficient reason why he did not do so within the prescribed period. Also where an appeal was heard and decided ex parte against a respondent, he may apply to set it aside within 21 days under rule 25. If he failed to do so within that period, he has a further period of three months to apply to

[p.281] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 277

set it aside but this is on condition that he satisfied the court that good and sufficient cause exists for his being out of time.

So it is a fair inference that the legislative policy reflected in the rules is that after a period of six months from the delivery of judgment, the matter must rest for all time. This accords with the policy oriented maxim that it is in the public interest that litigation must have some end. On the facts, the respondents had no good or sufficient reason for their delay of over one year. It is plain they could not have had any, unless they were bold enough to assert their illegal activities with the N.D.C. to frustrate the operation of the judgment. We notice that this litigation commenced as long ago as 1976—a period of nine years.

A consideration of all these matters leads us to think that the respondents lost their right of appeal. Exercising, as we hope we are, the equitable jurisdiction of this court, we conceive it our duty to accede to this application. We accordingly grant the motion and set aside the order of this court dated 7 January 1985 restoring the appeal to the list. We reinstate the order of the court dated 7 November 1983 dismissing this appeal for want of prosecution with costs to the applicant fixed at ¢1,000.

DECISION

Application granted.

M. C. N. –N.

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