REPUBLIC vs. CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE, TAMALE; EX PARTE VOLTA, SENIOR GAME WARDEN [1984-86] 1 GLR 367
16 December 1985 · AMPIAH J · ≈ 6 min read
[1985] SLR (CA) 37Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASE REFERRED TO
Mosi v. Bayina [1963] 1 G.L.R. 337, S.C.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from the order of Sapong J. sitting at the High Court, Tamale granting certiorari to quash the decision of Dove J. sitting at the High Court Tamale wherein he refused an application to quash an order of restitution of the Circuit Court, Tamale in a prosecution under the Wildlife Reserves Regulations, 1971 (L.I. 710). The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of the court.
COUNSEL
Kwaku Baah for the appellant.
No appearance by or for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF AMPIAH J.
Ampiah J. delivered the judgment of the court. On 5 November 1985 we allowed the appeal in this case and reserved our reasons for the decision. We now proceed to give the reasons.
The appellant, Charles Zieche, was arraigned before the Circuit Court, Tamale charged with offences under the Wildlife Reserved [p.369] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 367
Regulations, 1971 (L.I. 710). He was found not guilty and was acquitted and discharged. Upon his acquittal, the trial circuit court judge ordered that “…all the equipment and apparatus found on him and seized by the officers of the Mole National Park, including the rifle, should be surrendered to the accused immediately.” It was stated in the proceedings before this court that the respondent herein appealed against the order of the circuit court to the High Court and that the said court dismissed the appeal. We are told that there is a further appeal to the Court of Appeal. We are not here concerned with that appeal. The instant appeal concerns the ruling by the High Court judge on an application to set aside an order of another High Court judge of the same court on an application for certiorari. On the order by the circuit court judge that the equipment seized from the appellant herein should be surrendered to him, the respondent applied for an order of certiorari to have the said order quashed on the ground that it had been made without jurisdiction. On 28 September 1983, Dove J. sitting at the High Court, Tamale dismissed the application. The respondent applied by a motion filed on 25 May 1984 in the same High Court to have the judgment of Dove J. set aside on the ground that the order was void. On 6 July 1984, Sapong J. granted the application and set aside the order of Dove J. which had confirmed the order of the circuit court. It is this order of Sapong J which is the subject matter of the appeal before us.
The grounds for this appeal were:
“1 The High Court judge erred in law in drawing the conclusion that the senior warden (game) had exercised his discretion to seize and confiscate the rifle when the evidence in the trial court was otherwise.
2 The High Court judge erred in law in holding that the trial circuit court had no jurisdiction to make a restitution order in respect of the rifle.
3 The High Court judge erred in law in holding that the order of the trial circuit court as confirmed by the High Court was null and void.”
It is not clear by what jurisdiction Sapong J. tried to set aside the order of Dove J. The law is that a court has an inherent jurisdiction to set aside its own void judgment: see Mosi v. Bagyina [1963] 1 G.L.R. 337, S.C. It could be argued therefore that if the order of Dove J. was void, then perhaps Sapong J., a judge of the High Court, and for that matter of the same High Court that made the order, would have jurisdiction to set aside that order.
The question is, was the order of the circuit court void? In his ruling on this, Sapong J. was of the view that since the subject matter of
[p.370] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 367
the restitution order was not before the court, the circuit court judge had no jurisdiction to make a restitution order.
Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30) provides that:
“145. Where, upon the apprehension of a person charged with an offence, any property is taken from him, the Court before which he is charged may order that the property or a part thereof be restored to the person who appears to the Court to be entitled thereto, and, if he be the person charged, that it be restored either to him or to such other person as the Court may direct, or that it be applied to the
payment of any costs or compensation directed to be paid by the person charged.”
It is our view that by this provision the court before which an accused person is charged may make an order of restitution. It is not necessary for the articles to be tendered in evidence or even produced in court before that order is made. It is sufficient if reference is made to the articles. Once the court is made aware of these articles, the court can under the provisions of section 145 of Act 30 make any order respecting the articles.
It was contended however that since power was also reserved to the game officer to seize any such articles, the court may not make any such restitution order once the game officer had exercised his power to seize and confiscate.
Regulation 3 (2) of the Wildlife Reserves Regulations, 1971 (L.I. 710) states:
“A Game Officer may seize and confiscate any equipment or apparatus brought into a Reserve which is in the opinion of the Game Officer capable of being used to hunt, capture or destroy any animal, and such equipment or apparatus may be disposed of in such manner as the Chief Game and Wildlife Officer thinks fit.”
This provision like the provision under section 145 of Act 30, only gives the officer concerned a discretionary power. The game officer therefore may exercise his power of seizure and confiscation. Thus, while the court may not make any order respecting the article found on the accused person in the reserve if it is informed that the game officer had already made a seizing and confiscatory order, the court is not precluded from making an order of restitution respecting the articles when no such order has been made by the game officer.
Dove J. found that the game officer had not made any such order of seizure and confiscation at the time the case was before the circuit court. Exhibit C which was referred to by the respondent was dated 7
[p.371] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 367
September 1977. It was a circular sent out by the Chief Game and Wildlife Officer to “All station, Department of Game and Wildlife.” It was only a circular drawing the attention of the officers of the Game and Wildlife Department to their powers under L.I. 710. Copies of these were sent to various bodies including the judiciary. We do not think regulation 3 (2) of L.I. 710 gives the game officer the power of “automatic confiscation” of the equipment as stated by the Chief Game and Wildlife Officer in his circular. In each particular case, there must be an expressed exercise of that power. In the absence of such exercise, the court may make any order respecting the equipment seized from the accused person. Since there was no evidence before the court that the officer had exercised that power of seizure and confiscation, the trial circuit court judge had jurisdiction to make the order he made. That order could therefore not be null and void.
Dove J. heard the application for certiorari and held that the order of the circuit court was not void. What the respondent should have done was to have appealed against the order if he was not satisfied. We think that the application to have the order of Dove J. set aside was wrong and misconceived. Sapong J. had no jurisdiction to entertain the application. It follows from the premises, that Sapong J was fundamentally wrong in setting aside the judgment of Dove J.
For the above reasons, we allowed the appeal, set aside the order of Sapong J. and restored the order of Dove J. which confirmed the order of the circuit court.
DECISION
Appeal allowed
J.A.A.
