ASAFU-ADJAYE AND OTHERS vs. AGYEKUM [1984-86] 1 GLR 382
25 July 1985 · OSEI-HWERE JA · ≈ 28 min read
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Lee v. Chou Wen Hsien [1984] 1 W.L.R. 1202, P.C.
(2) Antigen Laboratories Ltd., Re [1951] 1 All E.R. 110.
(3) Okudjeto v. Irani Brothers [1975] 1 G.L.R. 96.
(4) Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd. v. Meyer [1959] A.C. 324; [1958] 3 W.L.R. 404;
[1958] 3 All E.R. 66.
(5) Lundie Brothers Ltd., In re [1965] 1 W.L.R. 1051; [1965] 2 All E.R. 692.
(6) Five Minute Car Wash Service Ltd., In re [1966] 1 W.L.R. 745; [1966] 1 All E.R. 242. (7) Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd. [1897] A.C. 22; 66 L.J.Ch. 35 H.L.
(8) Parker and Cooper Ltd. v. Reading [1926] 1 Ch. 975; [1926] L.J.Ch. 23.
[p.386] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 382 (9) Duomatic Ltd., Re. [1969] 2 Ch. 365; [1969] W.L.R. 114;[1969] 1 All E.R. 161. (10) Cane v. Jones [1981] 1 All E.R. 533.
(11) Thomson, In re [1930] 1 Ch. 203.
(12) West Coast Dyeing Industry Ltd., In re; Adams v. Tandoh [1984-86] 2 G.L.R. 561, C.A. (13) Nurcombe v. Nurcombe [1985] 1 W.L.R. 370; [1985] 1 All E.R. 65.
(14) Towers v. African Tug Co. [1904] 1 Ch. 558; 73 L.J.Ch. 395, C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL against a decision of the High Court, Accra restraining the directors of a company from holding a meeting to remove the respondent as a director. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment of the court delivered by Osei-Hwere J.A.
COUNSEL
J. K. Agyeman (with him Agyeman Bempah) for the appellants.
K. Ohene-Ampofo for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE J.A.
Osei-Hwere J.A. delivered the judgment of the court. The genesis of Asakum Engineering and Construction Co. Ltd. remains a matter for speculation before us, just as it was before the court below. For the applicant-respondent (hereinafter referred to as the respondent) deposed in his affidavit that he is a founding member of the said company and that he has been a director and shareholder ever since its incorporation. This is not wholly accepted by the respondent-appellants (hereinafter referred to as the appellants). In the affidavit filed on their behalf they say that except for his being one of the first directors of the company the respondent was neither a founding member nor a shareholder at its inception but that after the company had commenced business he became a member and was allotted 500 shares. According to the same affidavit, at the inception of the company on 27 November 1971 there were only two member shareholders, namely the first and third appellants, with 500 shares each, and both of them together with the respondent were the first directors.
The answers to these conflicting claims could have been supplied by the company’s regulations. But these were never placed before the court. However, the company’s annual returns for 1974 shows that the members are the first and third appellants as well as the respondent, each holding 500 shares. The directors named are the first appellant, the fourth appellant and the respondent. The 1979 annual returns which were also placed before the court show a dramatic change in the membership of the company and the shareholding. The first appellant was stated to hold 11,000 shares; the third appellant 1,000 shares; the
[p.387] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 382 respondent 3,000 shares; the sixth appellant (but properly speaking a non-appellant as he was never served with the respondent’s motion and therefore took no part in the proceedings) 3,000 shares; the fifth appellant (also a non-appellant) 1,000 shares; and the second appellant, 1,000 shares. The directorship of the company, at the same time, was augmented by the addition of the sixth appellant.
Sometime in 1979 the respondent became an executive director of the company and was put in charge of their Weija Irrigation Project contract whilst the managing director (the first appellant) held direct responsibility for their Weija New Water Treatment Works contracts W/4/CE and W/4/L. Both the respondent and the first appellant, we were told, are engineers with individual specialisations. There were misunderstandings between the two concerning the management and operations of the company which exploded in an open confrontation in 1983. The respondent, on his part, gave full vent to his grievances in the letter he wrote in August 1983 which he addressed to the managing director (exhibit A). On 30th November 1983, a notice was circulated calling for a shareholders’ meeting on Friday, 6 January 1984. An item on the agenda was to pass a resolution removing the respondent as a director. This fuelled the dispute and excited the respondent to rush to court for redress. Wherefore the respondent brought his motion under sections 217 and 218 of the Companies Code, 1963 (Act 179), praying the court below for:
“(1) an order of injunction restraining the said company, its directors, Mr. George Kofi Asafu-Adjaye (managing director), Mr. James Bafour Boakye Asafu-Adjaye, Mrs. Mary Anobea Asafu-Adjaye, Mr.
E.P. Kyei, Mr. Boafo Ohene Asante and alleged secretary, Mrs. Juliana Theophilia Asafu-Adjaye, from holding shareholders’ meeting proposed for 6 January 1984, or any meeting; and
(2) an order declaring that the affairs of the said company are being conducted in a manner oppressive to the applicant and other shareholders of the said company and for any further order or orders as to the court may seem fit.”
The gist of the respondent’s complaints adumbrated in his supporting affidavit is that (a) the company had held only one meeting since its inception; (b) the company’s affairs were not run on business lines; (c) the annual returns were filed up to 1979; (d) the first appellant, without the respondent’s knowledge nor proper resolution of the board, increased his shareholdings to 11,000 contrary to their original verbal agreement that shareholdings should be equal between the founding shareholders; (e) the first and third appellants attempted to transfer him from the project he was handling to make him redundant
[p.388] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 382 and to make way for them to get hold of the funds of the contract when he brought the irregularities to their notice; (f) the first appellant diverted the company’s funds, materials and resources to build his private house estimated at ¢6 million whilst the company’s indebtedness stood at over ¢4 million and £1million sterling; (g) the sixth appellant, the accountant, siphoned funds estimated at ¢1.5 million to build his private house; (h) the sixth appellant embezzled £10,000 sterling of the company’s money; (j) the managing director (i.e. the first appellant) abandoned the Water Development Projects; and (k) the managing director’s inaction enabled the sixth appellants to bolt away from Ghana without the company’s funds being retrieved.
In the affidavit in answer filed by the first appellant on his own behalf and on behalf of the second, third and seventh appellants he specifically denied the respondent’s incrimination whilst he, at the same time, launched his recriminations at him. This was quite in conformity with the old adage that “he who lives in a glass house should not throw stones”; or, to prefer the Shavian witticism, “he who lives in a glass house should undress in the darkness.” The appellants say that the contents of exhibit A are wholly untrue. They also say, inter alia, that the alterations in the shareholdings were made by a verbal agreement of all directors and the respondent’s own shares were increased at the same time to 3,000; that it is not true that any funds, materials, e.t.c. of the company were diverted to build the first appellant’s house; that the company is not aware of any financial malpractices.
Paragraph 25 of the appellants’ affidavit deposes that the respondent has by his various deeds and words over the period done things directly against the interest of and embarrassing to the company, and listed many instances of such conduct. To prop up the accusations and counter-accusations the parties filed further or supplementary affidavits. In their further affidavit filed on 12 January 1984 the appellants made a significant expose. This is that the respondent, as a director of the company, has been in breach of his role as a trustee of the company by setting up his own private company, Landico, in competition with the company. Before us the respondent’s counsel complained that they were never served with this affidavit. Be that as it may, this allegation was repeated in the appellants’ affidavit filed on 27 February 1984 wherein they corrected the name of the respondent’s private company as Ladco Ltd. and not Landico. They supported their allegation by exhibiting a photocopy of the certified true copy of Form 4 filed with the Registrar of Companies and certified true copies of the registered regulations and Form 3 of the said Ladco Ltd.
In the ruling of the learned trial judge he, in effect, confessed that he was hamstrung in arriving at definite conclusions on the membership
[p.389] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 382 of the company at its inception and the meetings held by the company because of the failure to produce the registered regulations of the company and the minutes book. He however made the following findings:
(a) it was not possible without a properly audited accounts of the company to come to a proper conclusion on the allegations of embezzlement and diversion of sums from the company for private use;
(b) although the Weija New Water Development Project had not been abandoned, the authorities had expressed misgivings on the progress of the work and that this unfortunate situation had come about because of the non-meeting of either the board of directors or the shareholders and for non-preparation of proper accounts;
(c) the members or directors have taken advantage of the “improper doings of things” to take moneys from the accounts of the company without following the proper procedure;
(d) the respondent has formed a new company with other persons and that the objects of the company are in competition with those of the seventh appellant company;
(e) the issue of additional shares to the members did not comply with the provisions of section 202 of the Code;
(f) no share certificates have been issued as required under the law; and
(g) there is an oppression on the respondent in that the directors have acted in such a way that it has become impossible for the respondent to exercise his rights.
Following from the above findings, the learned judge granted the application and declared the conduct of the appellants as oppressive. He restrained the appellants “from holding meetings or conducting the affairs of the company without reference to the provisions of the Act and the regulations of the company.” Relying on subsection (2) of section 218 of Act 179, he proceeded to make orders covering a wide spectrum of the company’s affairs. Particularly he declared the increase of the shareholdings in the company null and void; ordered that the shareholdings of the members shall be as stated on 15 November 1974; ordered that a meeting be called within one month for the purpose of appointing new directors; declared the meeting called purposely for the removal of the respondent null and void; ordered that the accountant of the company prepared an audited accounts of the company up to date and that these accounts be presented to the meeting of the members at its annual general meeting and where the account discloses any debt
[p.390] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 382 owed to the company by any of the members, appropriate steps should be taken to retrieve such accounts; ordered that within two weeks the company issues to the shareholders as per the annual returns of 1974 share certificates as evidence of their shareholdings in that return, e.t.c. In conclusion, the learned judge said pragmatically:
“Since an inefficient manager cannot be imposed on the company the board of directors may decide to change such managers but only after a decision has been taken by the board of directors at a meeting properly called for the purpose. These orders are without prejudice to any other steps that any member of the company may like to take under the provisions of the Companies Code, 1963 (Act 179).”
Aggrieved by the ruling of the court below the appellants have appealed urging the following weighty additional grounds of appeal:
“1. That having regards to the affidavits filed the learned judge erred in law in not calling for oral evidence, especially when he himself realised that necessary documents were required by the court to enable the court come to a fair and just decision in the matter and the said documents were not before the court.
2. That having regard to the affidavit filed and placed before the court, the learned trial judge erred in law in not dismissing the application for the reasons that it was brought in bad faith:
(a) in that the complaints were brought before the court after the applicant had set up a rival company of which he was both majority shareholder and director as found by the learned trial judge himself;
(b) when there was credible evidence that the applicant was not only carrying on business for another company in competition with the appellants’ company but had also stated that he had his own men and equipment to carry on with one of the jobs already awarded to the appellants’ company and then being carried on by the appellants’ company;
(c) when, if there were irregularities practised on the seventh respondent company, the applicant was just as guilty of those alleged irregularities as the respondents.
3. That the learned trial judge erred in law in ordering share certificates to be issued per annual returns of 1974 when shareholding in the company was in dispute and there were other proper records and oral evidence that could have been adduced to show the true position.
[p.391] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 382
4. That the learned trial judge erred in law in making the various orders when no specific reliefs had been sought by the applicant who merely sought a declaration while the relief that injunction be sought restraining the company and its directors from removing him from office as director could not be properly granted having regard to the powers of removal of a director vested in the company.
5. That the application brought as it was against B.O. Asante was wholly misconceived since he was neither a director nor shareholder of the company, and by the applicant’s own showing the said B.O.
Asante was out of Ghana.
6. That the trial and decision resulting therefrom were unsatisfactory and unjustified in that no proper case was made out by the applicant to support a case for relief under sections 217 and 218 of the Companies Code, 1963.”
To be sure, the appellants filed original grounds of appeal but as they were largely consumed by the additional grounds there is no need to perpetuate them.
Section 217 of Act 179 is a useful weapon to restrain a company by an injunction from doing certain acts or declaring such acts to be of no effect. The relevant provisions are:
“217. (1) The Court on the application of any member may by injunction restrain the company from doing any act or entering into any transaction which is illegal or beyond the power or capacity of the company or which infringes any provision of its Regulations, or from acting on any resolution not properly passed in accordance with this Code and the company’s Regulations, and may declare any such act, transaction or resolution already done, entered into, or passed to be void and of no effect.”
It is, undoubtedly, under this power vested in the court that the respondent sought and obtained the order of the court to prescribe or nip in the bud the projected meetings scheduled for 6 January 1984.
But the scope of these provisions are clear. They can only be effectuated if the act, transaction or resolution complained of is illegal or beyond the power or capacity of the company or infringes any provisions of its regulations. On what basis then did the court act when it declared the meeting called for 6 January 1984 as null and void? There was nothing irregular or unlawful about the notice convening the meeting. It complied with section 185 (2) of Act 179 as to the requisite notice of 35 days. Counsel for the respondent could not point at any illegality or irregularity of the proposed meeting except that the meeting
[p.392] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 382 was to be held at the chairman’s house at Achimota and not on the company’s premises. The venue of the general meeting of a company at a place other than the company’s premises can in no way strike at the essential validity of the meeting because section 151 of Act 179 simply says that all general meetings must be held in Ghana, unless the company’s regulations otherwise provide.
Apart from the mandatory requirement to call an annual general meeting, the power to call general meetings is a fiduciary discretion vested in directors of a company or in any member who requisitions it. Where directors have properly called for a meeting of the shareholders, it would be contrary to the principles on which the court acted in controlling persons in the exercise of fiduciary powers to make at the instance of a member (or some only of the members) of the company an order directing the directors not to exercise their discretion in calling the meeting. In the absence of any illegality or of any infraction of the company’s regulations it was wrong to stigmatise the proposed meeting by declaring it null and void. Put shortly, the respondent failed to establish any of those matters as to enable him to invoke the equitable jurisdiction of the court to grant the injunction and the declaration under section 217.
What may be of some enlightenment here are the facts and decision in Lee v. Chou Wen Hsien [1984] 1 W.L.R. 1202, P.C. (coram: Lord Fraser of Tulleybelton, Lord Bridge of Harwich, Lord Brightman, Lord Templeman and Sir Robin Cooke); appeal from Court of Appeal of Hong Kong. The plaintiff and the other seven defendants in the case were directors of the defendant company. Article 73 (d) of the articles of association provided that the office of a director was to be vacated if he was requested in writing by all his co-directors to resign. In 1982 the plaintiff became suspicious about the sale of the company’s holdings in certain subsidiary and associated companies, and he asked the secretary to convene a board meeting. Two days before the date of the meeting the plaintiff was given a notice pursuant to article 73 (d) signed by all his co-directors requesting him to resign his office as director with effect from the date of the notice.
The plaintiff commenced proceedings in the High Court of Hong Kong in his personal capacity against his co-directors and the company claiming, inter alia, a declaration that the notice was void and of no effect, and that he remained a director. The defendant applied for the writ to be struck out and the action dismissed on the grounds that the action was irregularly constituted and the writ disclosed no reasonable cause of action. Fuad J. dismissed the action. The Court of Appeal of Hong Kong dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal. The plaintiff appealed to the judicial committee.
[p.393] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 382
Lord Brightman said that the power given by article 73 (d) to directors to expel one of their members from the board was fiduciary, in the sense that each director concurring in the expulsion had to act in accordance with what he believed to be the best interests of the company, and he could not properly concur for ulterior reasons of his own. The office of director was vacated if the director was requested to resign under article 73 (d), and bad faith on the part of any one or more of the directors did not vitiate the notice to resign and leave in office the director whose resignation was sought.
Even if a request made in breach of the fiduciary duty had been of no effect, the wrongly expelled director was not entitled to maintain an action in his own name to restore himself to office. The remedy would be a derivative action on behalf of the company to right a wrong done to it. The appeal was recommended to be dismissed.
This case, although dealing with the extreme case of expulsion that had been put into effect, forcefully illustrated that the directors had the discretion to decide what was good for the company and, if they thought that a director’s expulsion from the board was to be in the best interest of the company (as under section 203 of Act 179) the court would not probe the bad faith of the directors.
By bringing his motion also under the aegis of section 218 of Act 179 the respondent essayed to ask for remedy against oppression. That section provides as follows:
“218. (1) Any member or debenture holder of a company or, in a case falling within section 225 of this Code, the Registrar may apply to the Court for an order under this section on the ground;
(a) that the affairs of the company are being conducted or the powers of the directors are being exercised in a manner oppressive to one or more of the members or debentureholders or in disregard of his or their proper interests as members, shareholders, officers, or debentureholders of the company; or
(b) that some act of the company has been done or is threatened or that some resolution of the members, debentureholders or any class of them has been passed or is proposed which unfairly discriminates against, or is otherwise unfairly prejudicial to, one or more of the members or debenture holders.
(2) If on such application the Court is of opinion that either of such grounds is established, the
Court may, with a view to bringing to an end or remedying the matters complained of,
[p.394] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 382 make such order as it thinks fit: and, without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing may by order,
(a) direct or prohibit any act or cancel or vary any transaction or resolution; or
(b) regulate the conduct of the company’s affairs in future; or
(c) provide for the purchase of the shares or debentures of any members or debentureholders of the company by other members or debenture holders of the company or by the company itself and in the case of purchase of shares by the company without regard to the limitations imposed by sections 59 to 63, other than subsections (4) and (5) of section 59 of this Code.”
There is nothing in the affidavits filed by the respondent to buttress the ground in section 218 (1) (b) and it must be supposed that he relies on section 218 (1) (a). It was argued that insofar as the motion seeks for a declaration that the affairs of the company are being conducted in a manner oppressive to him and the other shareholders the motion cannot be entertained because the declaration sought should have been originated by a writ. The argument of the appellants’ counsel on this score is, undoubtedly, attractive. Without the motion setting out the reliefs sought we are inclined to hold that it will, as it were, disclose no cause of action. It was laid down in Re Antigen Laboratories Ltd. [1951] 1 All E.R. 110 that the petition under the equivalent section 210 of the English Companies Act, 1948, must state the general nature of the relief applied for under the section. We note that in Okudjeto v. Irani Brothers [1975] 1 G.L.R. 96 at 115 this court said that under our section 218 it is not necessary to set out the relief sought in the application itself. That observation, we may remark, was obiter dictum. The petitioner in the Okudjeto case carefully set down his reliefs and, indeed, one of the questions that fell for determination on appeal in that case was whether the court below could grant a relief in favour of the respondent before it who had not prayed for it. The answer was “no.” We dare say that it will be quite irregular for a petitioner to come to court with a blank sheet and expect the court to hear him in the hope of writing out his reliefs for him.
But mere pedantry should not deflect the course of justice when the merits will lead us directly to the same goal. To bring the petition at all under section 218 (1) there must be proof that the conduct complained of is oppressive to one or more of the members: see Okudjeto v. Irani
[p.395] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 382
Brothers (supra). Oppressive here means “burdensome, harsh and wrongful”, and a petitioner must establish not only that the affairs of the company have been conducted in an oppressive manner in this sense, but also that there has been some element of lack of probity or fair dealing to him in his capacity as a shareholder: see Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd. v. Meyer [ 1959] A.C. 324 and In re Lundie Brothers Ltd. [1965] 2 All E.R. 692 at 698-699, per Plowman J. In the latter case it was held that the ousting of the petitioner as a working director related to his status as director and not as shareholder and no oppression was established thereby to entitle him to relief under the relevant section 210 of the Companies Act, 1948. For the same reason conduct which was inefficient or careless would not in general amount to oppression; to do so it would be necessary to show that it was designed to achieve an unfair advantage over those claiming to be oppressed: see In re Five Minutes Car Wash Service Ltd. [1966] 1 All E.R. 242.
We now examine the complaints, reminding ourselves, as pointed out in In re Lundie Brothers Ltd. (supra), that the court should not travel outside the allegations in the petition, particularly in a case of this sort where the petition was based on the proposition that the respondents (i.e. the appellants in this case) to it had been guilty of some oppression of some of the members. In the first place it must be asked who are the other members oppressed alongside with the respondent before us who are stated on the motion paper to be victims of the oppression? Apart from the applicant himself, the respondents in his application include all the stated shareholders and directors in the 1979 annual returns. Plainly then there are no other shareholders complaining except the respondent himself.
Reading through the affidavit as well as the documents exhibited, particularly exhibit B wherein Mr. Yaw Agyei, sought to conciliate, it is evident that the conflict is between the respondent and the first appellant and that this centred mainly on the full management participation requested by the respondent. This obviously reflected on his interest qua director and was quite insufficient to ground an application under section 218 of Act 179. There was no allegation of oppression against the third appellant, the chairman of the company. Nor was there any such allegation against the second, fourth and fifth appellants.
On the allegation that the first and sixth appellants had siphoned the company’s funds, the learned trial judge found this not proved and rightly so. The allegation, if it did not actually charge them with embezzlement, bordered on that charge and the evidence required to sustain it (and so possibly prop up an application under section 218)
[p.396] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 382 must be legal evidence and not mere rumour or suspicion, be it ever so strong.
The mere holding of majority shares by the first appellant as disclosed in the 1979 annual returns, cannot constitute oppression unless he has used his majority shareholding to discriminate against the other members or to secure an unfair advantage to himself. The respondent’s complaint about the shareholdings was not so much as to how they came to be increased but rather as to the number allotted to the members. In declaring the shares contained in the 1979 annual returns null and void it would seem that the learned judge directed his mind to the mode of the increase which the appellants say was by oral agreement of the shareholders. The respondent did not deny that they had agreed that the shares could be increased verbally but his plaint is that they should be increased equally among the founding shareholders.
Although Act 179 contain many provisions empowering or requiring certain matters to be effected or authorised by the passing in general meeting of a particular resolution, it is established that all the shareholders acting together can do anything intra vires the company, even though the Code specifies a particular procedure by which the thing, may or is to be done. This principle was stated by Lord Davey in Salomon v. Salomon & Co. [1897] A.C. 22 at 57 when he said that “the company is bound in a matter intra vires by the unanimous agreement of its members.” Accordingly it has been decided: (a) that it is sufficient for all the members informally to ratify an act of the directors without a meeting: Parker and Cooper Ltd. v. Reading [1926] Ch. 975; (b) that it is necessary only that all the members entitled to vote should give their assent: Re Duomatic Ltd. [1969] 2 Ch. 365; and (c) that the articles of association may be altered by such an agreement of the shareholders, notwithstanding the provisions in section 10 of the Companies Act, 1948 that the alteration may be made by special resolution: Cane v. Jones [1981] 1 All E.R. 533.
Thus it was perfectly within the power of the members of the company to agree orally to issue shares without any resolution as in section 41 of the Code or alter the number of shares without any resolution to alter the company’s regulations as prescribed in section 57 of Act 179. The only debatable issue before the trial court was as to whether or not there was an agreement to allot those particular shares. This, like other matters, was left at large by the absence of any oral evidence to support the claim in the respective affidavits. It was therefore wrong for the learned judge, by a sweep of the pen, to proscribe the disputed shares when the true position and ownership of the shareholding had not been debated at his forum.
[p.397] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 382
The respondent used his letter (exhibit A) which catalogued his grievances to support his application. In eight paragraphs of their affidavit in reply the appellants refuted most of the allegations contained in exhibit A. However, in his supplementary affidavit which he filed in reply the respondent failed to comment on those refutals. At the least, issues were joined on those particular allegations which called for proof. The responsibility to carry out the company’s statutory duties was collective of the board of directors and the respondent could not use his own misfeasance to support his application. We find that such evidence as there was before the trial court could not in law support an application under section 218 (1) of Act 179, much less could he be justified in making those orders he made under section 218 (2).
The contention by the appellants that the respondent’s application was seethed in bad faith did not persuade the learned judge. That was quite unfortunate. Although he found that the respondent had formed a new company with other persons and that the objects of that company are in competition with those of the seventh appellant yet he seemed to have found nothing wrong with his conduct. He said:
“The law does not forbid a director of one company from being the director of other companies. All that is required of such a director is for him to disclose his said interest; he must refrain from voting on contracts in which he has an interest; or whose performance conflicts with his other interests”.
Section 203 of Act 179 defines the duties of directors. He stands in a fiduciary relationship towards the company and he is required to observe the utmost good faith towards the company in any transaction with it or on its behalf. He is to act in the best interests of the company to further its business and promote the purpose for which it was formed. Under section 205 he is not, without the consent of the company, to place himself in a position in which his duties to the company conflict or may conflict with his personal interests. Under section 206 he has no consent unless he makes full disclosure of all material facts, including the nature and extent of his interest, etc.
The respondent is not a mere dormant or cosmetic director. He is an executive director who has combined his skill and expert knowledge with those of the first appellant to promote the purposes of the business for which the seventh appellant company was formed. It is, in our view, the apogee of breach of trust for the respondent to set up a rival company unknown to the seventh appellant company. The ratio decidendi as gleaned from the case of In re Thomson [1930] Ch. 203 is that a trustee is not entitled to sever his connections with the business he controls in trust and compete in similar business.
[p.398] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 382
This is exactly what the respondent has prepared himself to do. In the Form 3 filed with the Registrar of Companies the directors of Ladco are the respondent, Peter Kwaku Sarfo, and John Kwaku Adjei. At the time the Form 3 was filed Peter Kwaku Sarfo was the purchasing officer of the seventh appellant company and John Kwaku Adjei was also the plant manager of the company’s irrigation project. This Sarfo, from the affidavits, is the gentleman against whom the first appellant as managing director had intended to take disciplinary action but the respondent had stoutly defended. The regulations of Ladco Ltd. were filed on 21 December 1982. It would seem, therefore, that the presentation of the names of Peter Kwaku Sarfo and John Kwaku Adjei as directors of Ladco Ltd. was to induce their breach of contract with the seventh appellant company.
It is significant to note that the respondent’s wranglings with the first appellant started from early 1983 after Ladco Ltd. had been registered and culminated in the respondent’s application filed on 15 December 1983. It becomes quite obvious, or at least one cannot escape the conclusion, that the application was filed for a collateral purpose detrimental to the interests of the seventh appellant company. In In re West Coast Dyeing Industry Ltd.; Adams v. Tandoh [1984-86] 2 G.L.R. 561, C.A., this court looked at the decided cases on the point when an application like this is ill-motivated and conceived in bad faith. The court is to make short shrift of it and dismiss the application. As pointed out in Okudjeto v. Irani Brothers (supra) the order or orders that the court can make, if in its judgment the application is made out, can go beyond those orders set out in section 218 (2). Consequently, it will be open to the court, in an extreme case where, for instance, the breakdown in management participation by the oppressed minority shareholder has gone too far and that participation is so fundamental to the very existence of the company, to order a “cure by sledge-hammer”, i.e. order a dissolution of the company. It is here that we may ask who stands to gain if the trial judge had ordered a winding-up of the seventh appellant company. Surely it is the respondent who will be served best in view of the company (Ladco) he has registered which by reason of the similarity of its object with the seventh appellant company’s, may then have no competitor in the field. In the circumstances of that situation no court will permit such a petition which is launched not with a genuine object of obtaining the relief given but with the object of exerting pressure in order to achieve a collateral purpose.
In Nurcombe v. Nurcombe [1985] 1 W.L.R. 370, C.A., Lawton L.J. referring to Towers v. African Tug Co. [1904] 1 Ch. 558, C.A said that the court was entitled to look at the conduct of a plaintiff in a minority
[p.399] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 382 shareholder’s action in order to satisfy itself that he was a proper person to bring the action. A particular plaintiff might not be a proper person because his conduct was tainted in some way which under the rules of equity might bar relief. In such manner was the respondent’s conduct tainted by his breach of trust and the trial judge ought to have dismissed the application.
The various orders made by the trial judge, as it were, merely sought to skim the surface of the misunderstanding that has torn them apart; and as he himself found that the company was controlled in the majority by family members, there does not seem to be any remedy open to the respondent except by buying off his shares by the company. It is an idea that we thought the justice of the situation demanded. But unfortunately our hands are tied in advancing that course. For having found that the respondent made out no case and therefore his application ought to be dismissed we are incompetent to make such order. That was exactly the point taken up by this court in Okudjeto v. Irani Brothers (supra) which decided that the dismissal of the applicant’s application meant that the trial judge had no jurisdiction to make the order for the purchase of the shares. Furthermore, the company is not entitled to institute an application under section 218 (1) of Act 179 whereby the company itself can pray for the purchase of minority shares.
Besides, the ownership of shares is in controversy, the respondent claiming that he owns 500 shares equally with the first and third appellants and thereby disputing the increased shares; whilst the appellants deny that the respondent paid for the original 500 shares.
There was no evidence from the respondent to prove otherwise. We must, accordingly let that call go with the wind because we cannot let the applicant go back to fight that issue.
It is for all the above reasons that we hold that the appeal ought to succeed and the judgment of the court below set aside.
DECISION Appeal allowed.
J. A .A.
