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[1986] SLR (CA) 10Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL I)

LARBI vs. SALLOUM [1984-86] 1 GLR 449

21 February 1986 · TAYLOR JSC · ≈ 7 min read

Cite as[1986] SLR (CA) 10
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OSCOLALARBI v SALLOUM [1984-86] 1 GLR 449 [1986] SLR (CA) 10
APALARBI v SALLOUM [1984-86] 1 GLR 449, [1986] SLR (CA) 10 (Ghana).
BluebookLARBI v SALLOUM [1984-86] 1 GLR 449, [1986] SLR (CA) 10 (Ghana Ct. App. 1986).

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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPLICATION for a stay of execution of an order for recovery of possession (after an earlier refusal by the High Court) pending appeal against the order for possession. The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling.

COUNSEL

Boadu for the applicant.

Acheampong for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.S.C.

Taylor J.S.C. delivered the ruling of the court. This is a motion on notice filed in this court on 4 February 1986 for a stay of execution in connection with a judgment obtained against the applicant at the district court grade I on 1 August 1985, and from which judgment he had on 19 August 1985 lodged an appeal to the High Court. A previous application to the High Court was also refused on 3 February 1986. From this refusal the applicant lodged an appeal to this court on 4 February 1986 and on the same day he filed his said motion for a stay.

The facts are hardly in dispute and they can be gathered from the judgment of the district court and the affidavits of the applicant and the respondent. By that judgment, the applicant who was the defendant in the action at the district court and a tenant of the plaintiff-respondent was ordered to surrender vacant possession of the premises on or before 1 October 1985 to enable the respondent to effect repairs which the City Engineer acting for the Accra-Tema City Council and proceeding apparently under the provisions of section 44 of the Local Administration Act, 1971 (Act 359), had ordered the respondent to undertake repair because the premises were in a ruinous and, in her finding, dangerous condition. Previously, officials of the Ministry of Health had visited the building and ordered the respondent to evict all tenants as the house was a health hazard and “not fit for human habitation.”

In ordering the defendant to give up the premises for the purpose of repairs, the learned district magistrate observed that in her opinion the house was in such a state of disrepair that construction work could not possibly be carried out with the applicant in occupation.

In the course of the trial the learned magistrate visited the locus in quo. This excerpt from her judgment shows her appraisal of the factual position:

The court visited the locus and the findings which were not in dispute were these:

“There were deep cracks in the outside wall; the cement floors were broken in the yard; the building in dispute comprised three floors. The top floor had all the iron-rods exposed and rusted;

[p.451] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 449 almost all the ceiling had peeled off, and there were large cracks, along the columns. As for the interior of the ground floor, there were no cracks in the walls of the rooms, but there were deep cracks at all the four corners of the building running deeply along the columns from the top to the very foundation of the building.”

In view of these findings when she visited the premises the learned district magistrate said:

“It is not in dispute that the building is two storey neither is it in dispute that there are deep cracks in the columns; having regard to the fact that buildings are constructed from the foundation, can it be reasonably argued that the defendant can remain downstairs while the columns are being reconstructed? It is my view that the premises cannot be renovated while the tenant remains downstairs.”

In resisting the order to give up possession so that repairs can be effected in view of these findings, the applicant by his counsel has argued very vigorously that under section 17 (1) of the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220), no magistrate or judge can by law order recovery of possession no matter how dangerous and ruinous the premises are unless the provisions of section 17 (1) of the Act has been satisfied. The relevant section provides:

“17. (1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2) of section 25 and of section 28, no order against a tenant for the recovery of the possession of, or for the ejectment from, any premises shall be made or given by the appropriate Rent Magistrate, or any other Judge of a court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of any other enactment for the time being in force, except in any of the following circumstances:…”

The section enumerates eleven circumstances each of which is inapplicable in this case and sections 25 and 28 of the Act are equally irrelevant to the case of the applicant. When counsel’s attention was drawn to the provisions of section 44 (1) of the Local Administration Act, 1971 (Act 359), he was undaunted in his argument. The said section 44 (1) of Act 359 is as follows:

“44.(1) If a District Council is satisfied that any building or anything affixed thereto is in a ruinous state or is dangerous to the occupiers of such building or neighbouring buildings or to the general public, the Council shall take such measures as it may think necessary by fencing or otherwise for the protection of the occupiers or the general public and may by notice in writing to the owner of the building, if he is known, and to the occupier

[p.452] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 437-449 thereof, if any, require the owner or occupier to take down, secure or repair the building or other thing.”

In his argument that this section does not envisage his ejection for the repairs to be carried out, he relied very strongly on the wording of section 17 (1) of Act 220 in his contention that Act 359 specifically excluded the application of “the provisions of any other enactment for the time being in force” in effecting his ejectment or recovery of possession from him.

Although the argument looks attractive and it would seem to be impressive, we think its consequences are so extravagant and absurd that it must be rejected. The argument would seem to suggest that assuming the only stairs to the top floor were collapsing and had to be pulled down for say three months to reconstruct the stairs, a tenant on the top floor to which the stairs lead must by law be left stranded for that period while the construction of the stairs proceed.

In our view, in order to arrive at the true construction of section 17 (1) of Act 220, the whole enactment must be looked at. Consider the preamble: “An act to consolidate and amend the law relating to the control of rents and the recovery of the possession of premises in certain cases . . .” We do not think it applies to the recovery of possession of premises in all cases. For there are some cases expressly excluded from its provisions. In our view, there are also cases that must be excluded from its provisions by necessary implication. In any case any premises’ in section 17 (1) must be one which in the case of a dwelling-house is fit for human habitation and in other cases is fit for the purpose for which the tenancy agreement was entered into, and which in any event is not being occupied or used in contravention of the laws of the Republic. If an occupier or a tenant of premises is in occupation in circumstances contravening the building regulations of the Republic or the tenancy requirements of the law, section 17 cannot save him from ejectment.

In the case before us for instance the applicant entered into a tenancy agreement with the landlord and in contemplation of law he must have bargained for premises that would be suitable for human habitation and that complied with the general law of the land and fulfilled the legal requirements imposed by the municipal or city councils and the health authorities in accordance with their statutory duties.

It cannot therefore be the law that when the building becomes dangerous and therefore unsafe and unfit for human habitation and necessitates taking remedial statutory action to make it safe and fit for human habitation an occupant can claim a legal right to thwart his

[p.453] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 449 statutory remedy by a reliance on the provisions of section 17 as authority for the proposition that, the peril to his life notwithstanding he must remain in occupation while dangerous work is undertaken to make the house habitable.

For these reasons, we do not think a stay of execution ought to be granted in the circumstances of this case and we accordingly refuse the application with costs which we assess at ¢1,000.

DECISION

Application dismissed.

M. C. N. – N.

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