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[1986] SLR (CA) 18Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL I)

REPUBLIC vs. AGBOKA VI; EX PARTE DEH III [1984-86] 1 GLR 581

29 January 1986 · FRANCOIS JSC · ≈ 9 min read

Cite as[1986] SLR (CA) 18
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OSCOLAREPUBLIC v AGBOKA VI; ex parte DEH III [1984-86] 1 GLR 581 [1986] SLR (CA) 18
APAREPUBLIC v AGBOKA VI; ex parte DEH III [1984-86] 1 GLR 581, [1986] SLR (CA) 18 (Ghana).
BluebookREPUBLIC v AGBOKA VI; ex parte DEH III [1984-86] 1 GLR 581, [1986] SLR (CA) 18 (Ghana Ct. App. 1986).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Republic v. Anlo Traditional Council; Ex parte Hor II [1979] 234, C.A.

[p.583] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 581

(2) R v. Hull Prison Board of Visitors; Ex parte St. Germain [1979] Q.B. 425; [1979] 2 W.L.R. 42;

[1979] 1 All E.R. 701, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from the decision of the High Court, Ho dismissing the applicant-chief’s application for an order of certiorari to quash the decision of his paramount chief to destool him. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Armstrong Ackuaku for the appellant.

No appearance by or for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS J.S.C.

The appellant occupied the senior divisional stool for the Leklebi Traditional Area and was chief of Leklebi-Fiape at the time the matters complained of erupted. He was then accused of violating the custom of his area by uttering sacred oaths in a spree of irresponsible abandon. It was urged that the desecration of the oaths amounted to a customary abdication and renunciation of the stool. Consequently, the paramount chief of the Leklebi Traditional Area, Togbe Agboka VI, the respondent herein, and his elders felt compelled to perform certain rites which put the final seal on that act of renunciation.

Had matters ended there, perhaps recourse would not have been had to the courts. But the respondent sent a letter to the registrar of the Volta Regional House of Chiefs, circulated to a number of other persons, intimating that the appellant had ceased to occupy the Leklebi-Fiape stool and urging an amendment of the chiefs’ register to delete the appellant’s name therefrom.

The appellant unsuccessfully sought an order of certiorari, as he put it “to quash the proceedings and decision of Togbe Agboka, Paramount Chief of Leklebi Traditional Area contained in a letter dated 24 January 1983 addressed to the Registrar, Volta Regional House of Chiefs.” The letter was couched as follows:

“Office of the Paramount Chief, Leklebi Traditional Area, P.O. Box 10, Leklebi Duga.

24 January 1983.

Sir,

Destoolment of Togbe Kwasi Deh III
Senior Divisional Chief of Leklebi Fiape
And
His Deletion from the Register of Chiefs of Ghana

[p.584] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 581

On my own behalf as the Paramount Chief of the Leklebi Traditional Area, and on behalf of all the divisional chiefs, sub-chiefs, elders, queenmothers and all those in connection with enstoolment and destoolment of chiefs in the Leklebi Traditional Area, I am very sad to write this very important letter, to officially inform you and for your necessary action that Togbe Kwasi Deh II alias George Harrison Kwasi Deh has been properly, and in accordance with the customary laws and usages of the Leklebi Traditional Area, destooled on 9 December 1982, for his gross violation of some of the customary laws and usages of the Leklebi Traditional Area, one of which was his deliberate and frivolous swearing of all the oaths of the traditional area, including the great oath of Leklebi on two consecutive times.

He therefore ceased to be a chief from the day of his destoolment. He was also banned by custom from posing himself as a chief, and also performing any duties as a chief either on behalf of the people of Leklebi Fiape or the Leklebi Traditional Area as a whole. He should therefore no longer be recognised or entertained at any quarters whatsoever as a chief of Leklebi Fiape.

I would therefore be grateful, if you would use your good offices to effect the deletion of his name from the register of chiefs, Volta Region, and also from the national register of chiefs.

Thank you.

Yours faithfully, (Sgd) Togbe Agboka VI, Paramount Chief, Leklebi Traditional Area Leklebi-Duga, Volta Region.

The Registrar, Volta Regional House of Chiefs, P.O. Box 3, Ho.”

The appellant urged in his application that he had not been heard at the meeting which purported to remove him as chief of Leklebi-Fiape; and that his elders and kingmakers were equally unaware of any meeting which had determined their chief’s status. He urged consequently a breach of natural justice ‘in that he had been condemned without being heard and his opponent, the respondent, had committed

[p.585] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 581

the unpardonable sin of acting as judge and jury in his own cause and exhibiting bias to boot.

In a supporting statement the appellant urged that some proceedings leading to his removal as chief took place before the respondent on 9 December 1982. These proceedings however were not exhibited. There was nothing that by any stretch of the imagination could be described as proceedings. If these proceedings existed it would have been necessary to order their production so that the court could quash them if the need arose.

The High Court, Ho which heard the application for certiorari dismissed it on two grounds. First, that the appellant had failed to establish his status as chief. The court expressed its reliance on the authority of Republic v. Anlo Traditional Council; Ex parte Hor II [1979] G.L.R. 234, C.A. The second reason posited was that there had been no proof that the respondent and his sub-chiefs had performed any judicial act against which certiorari could lie.

On the first issue, namely the rejection of the appellant’s prayer for failing to demonstrate capacity, I think the learned judge erred. In the letter recapitulated above (exhibit TDK 1), whose authorship was not in dispute, it was clear the respondent was alluding to the appellant as chief of Leklebi Fiape. The respondent sought a rectification of the register of the Volta Regional House of Chiefs, to delete the appellant’s name therefrom on the grounds that the appellant had ceased to be a chief. The necessity to remove his name could only arise if indeed the appellant bore that status and an event had occurred to justify a change thereof. In an affidavit he swore to and which he filed in these proceedings on 15 March 1983, the respondent did not recant or retract from this stated position, but rather confirmed it: see paragraph 5 (d). He should not be permitted to resile now. In my view, Hor’s case (supra) was misapplied. There are a number of situations where that authority would be clearly inapposite. Supposing an applicant sought an order of mandamus to get his name duly placed on the register of chiefs, he would be unable to produce an extract culled from the register to support his claim because it would not exist, but that could not be fatal to his application. The register in any event is only prima facie evidence; section 50 (a) of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), says the extract “may” be employed to prove status, consequently it is not the only mode of proving status. Elementary also is the principle that where an adversary accepts a given state of affairs, his opponent is not called upon to prove it again. Consequently, where the respondent has gone to the extent of urging a change in the appellant’s status to his detriment he cannot be heard to urge that the very status he was undermining did not exist. That would amount to the ambivalence of

[p.586] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 581

blowing hot and cold at the same time, a magical feat which the courts have always found difficult to swallow.

On the second limb of the decision appealed against, it must be conceded that if the material before the court does not demonstrate a setting where judicial or quasi-judicial powers were exercised wrongly by an inferior tribunal then the court is helpless to exercise any supervisory jurisdiction. The court’s jurisdiction arises from an infringement of the judicial or quasi-judicial duties of the inferior body.

It is also well established that certiorari does not lie in respect of purely administrative matters. On the record then, if proceedings of a judicial or quasi-judicial character had indeed terminated in his destoolment the appellant made a very poor effort of disclosing or substantiating it. The letter (TDK 1) sought indeed to undermine the appellant’s status and was a violation of his rights as chief, but it could not amount to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings nor could it be said to arise from the acts of an inferior tribunal. However injurious certiorari could not be invoked to quash a document that did not emanate from a judicial body nor derive from the performance of functions whose permanent record would exist as legal proceedings.

One must not lose sight of the fact that a prayer for the grant of certiorari must be considered from a very broad perspective. Being a discretionary power it must be shown that there is real justification for its grant. Where more appropriate remedies are available the odds against its grant automatically narrow. When set against the special constitutional position of chiefs and the history of legislation affecting chieftaincy in this country with the emphasis placed on the exclusiveness of jurisdiction in the traditional courts, the stakes for allowing relief become even less attractive.

That is not to say that the supervisory powers of the High Court cannot be invoked in appropriate cases, nor does it imply that where alternative remedies exist, the prayer would not be granted. The remedies available are not exclusive one against the other. The point however that is stressed is that where the results of granting the order achieves no real or just result, the discretion is not exercised: see Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd ed.), Vol.11, p. 141, para. 266.

This leads to a critical examination of the facts of this case. It Is clear on an objective analysis that the call for the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction did not really arise. There had been an attempt by a superior chief to disqualify and dethrone his subordinate chief. The aggrieved party could find his remedy under Act 370. He by-passed the exclusive forum indicated under Act 370 at his own risk.

In my view the appeal should be dismissed.

[p.587] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 581

JUDGMENT OF WIREDU J.A.

I have read in advance the judgment just read by the president of the court which judgment I am in full agreement with both as to the reasons and the conclusion and have nothing more useful to add.

JUDGMENT OF OKAI J.

I agree that this appeal should be dismissed, and since my reasons are identical to those which have been indicated in the judgment of Francois J.S.C., I do not propose to deal with them in detail. In particular, I agree that the learned judge erred in the rejection of the appellant’s prayer for failing to demonstrate capacity. Here was a case where a paramount chief and other chiefs met and destooled a chief; in my view, there was a purported destoolment not a real destoolment. They did not drive the power under the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370).

Lord Shaw, in speaking of the supervisory jurisdiction of the superior court in R. v. Hull Prison Board of Visitors; Ex parte Germain [1979] 1 All E.R. 701 at 717, C.A. said:

“Apart from status or specific contract there can be no external fetters on the exercise by the court of its jurisdiction to control the proceedings of bodies or individuals who have the power to deal with the rights and liberties or status of a subject. In my view the only necessary restraint on the exercise of this supervisory and solutary jurisdiction is an internal one, namely the discretion of the court from whom relief its sought.

This appears to be the philosophical approach which emerges from the opinions expressed by their Lordships in Ridge’s case [1963] 2 All E.R. 66 and which had been earlier stated in the judgment of Atkin L.J. in R. v.

Electricity Commissioners; Ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee Co., (1920) Ltd. [1924] 1 K.B.

171.”

I agree the aggrieved party could find his remedy under Act 370.

DECISION

Appeal dismissed.

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