ANANG vs. THE REPUBLIC [1984-86] 1 GLR 458
13 March 1986 · TAYLOR JSC · ≈ 27 min read
[1986] SLR (CA) 2Other citation styles and permanent link
SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.
CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Republic v. Halm, Court of Appeal (full bench), 7 August 1969; digested in (1969) C.C. 155.
(2) R v. Kassi (1939) 5 W.A.C.A. 154.
(3) R v. Onagbanjo (1936) 3 W.A.C.A. 43.
(4) R v. Adjei (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 544, C.A.
(5) R v. Francis (1959) 43 Cr. App. R. 174, C.C.A.
(6) R v. Weighill [1945] 2 D.L.R. 471.
(7) Asare alias Fanti v. The State [1964] G.L.R. 70, S.C.
(8) Ibrahim v. R [1914] A.C. 599, P.C.
(9) Nkegbe v. Africa Motors [1978] 1 G.L.R. 32.
(10) Haigh v. Belcher (1836) 7 C & P 389, H.L.
(11) Obeng alias Donkor v. The State [1966] G.L.R. 259, S.C.
(12) R v. Voisin [1918] 1 K.B. 531; 13 Cr. App. R. 89, C.C.A.
(13) R v. Wattam (1952) 36 Cr. App. R. 72, C.C.A.
(14) R v. May (1952) 36 Cr. App R. 91,C.C.A.
(15) R v. Grunshie (Abisa) (1955) 1 W.A.L.R. 36, W.A.C.A.
(16) Gyedu v. The Republic [1980] G.L.R. 480, C.A..
(17) Browne v. Dunn (1893) 6 R 67, H.L.
(18) R v. Feely [1973] Q.B. 530; [1973] 1 All E.R. 341; 57 Cr. App. R. 312, C.A.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL from a judgment of the High Court affirming the conviction of the appellant by a circuit court for stealing. The facts are fully set out in the judgment of the court.
COUNSEL
Narh for the appellant.
Osafo Sampong for the Republic.
[p.462] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 458
JUDGMENT OF TAYLOR J.S.C
Taylor J.S.C. delivered the judgment of the court. This is an appeal from concurrent findings of guilt by two courts presided over by learned judges and it is therefore necessary since we unanimously consider that the conclusions arrived at in these courts are erroneous in law, to set down fully the legal reasons which compel us to disagree with the judgments of these courts. It was for this reason that after hearing the arguments of counsel on 17 February 1986 we decided at once to give judgment allowing the appeal and adjourn to today to give well considered reasons for our decision.
The case commenced its unfortunate career to this court when the appellant, a private secretary employed by the State, was arraigned before the circuit court judge in Accra on 13 December 1984 on a charge of stealing ¢30,000, the property of a High Court judge, contrary to section 124 (1) of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29). The particulars which accompanied the statement of offence, quite important as will appear hereafter, read:
“Samuel Okpoti Anang: clerk for that you during the month of January 1983 at Accra in the Greater Accra Circuit and within the jurisdiction of this court did steal cash an amount of ¢30,000 the property of Justice Ashrifie Gogo.”
(The emphasis is ours.)
In order to appreciate the ratio decidendi of our judgment it is essential at this stage to keep firmly in mind the date and place of the alleged offence as well as the precise amount said to be stolen. This is because these are some of the stated particulars and the burden of establishing them was what the representative of the Republic undertook to discharge in mounting the prosecution.
Be that as it may, on 26 February 1985 after a trial lasting a few days the appellant was convicted and sentenced to a day’s imprisonment by the learned circuit judge. In addition the judge ordered him to enter into a bond of ¢2,000 with one surety to be of good behaviour for a period of two years or in default six months’ imprisonment with hard labour. His appeal to the High Court against his conviction was dismissed on 29 July 1985 by the learned High Court judge but on 17 February 1986 as we have indicated already, we allowed his appeal from the judgment of the High Court and we quashed his conviction and set aside the sentence imposed on him.
The decisive facts of the case devoid of irrelevant material are very simple indeed. The story begins some time in January 1983 when the complainant’s son in the United Kingdom remitted to him ¢30,000 through one Mr Prempeh. Towards the end of that month the said Mr Prempeh called at the offices of the appellant, an employee of the
[p.463] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 458
Judicial Service and private secretary of the Chief Justice, and left him a parcel containing the ¢30,000, to be given to the complainant.
This was in the presence of the colleague of the appellant, a lady employee also of the Judicial Service. Shortly after this, somewhere in February 1983, in order to apprise the complainant of Mr Prempeh’s mission to him, the appellant travelled to Sekondi where the complainant, a High Court judge, was then stationed, and he informed him that ¢30,000 had been left with him by Mr Prempeh for him. It would seem that he did not take the money along with him to Sekondi because of the apparent risk he anticipated in view no doubt of the revolutionary times and the military and police personnel at many barriers on the way. The complainant in the circumstances instructed the appellant to deposit the money in his account with the Tudu branch of the Standard Bank (Ghana) Ltd in Accra. A month later when the complainant called on his said bankers at Accra he found to his amazement that the money had not been paid into his account and so he contacted the appellant for the money. According to the appellant when the complainant called on him and he brought the parcel out, it was found that the money was short by ¢21,000. The complainant refused to accept the ¢9,000 and although he called on the appellant on seven more occasions the appellant was not able to produce the ¢30,000 and in the end the complainant reported the matter to the Chief Justice. Following the said report, the police were called in presumably at the instance of the Chief Justice and the police arrested the appellant. He was taken to the office of the Regional Criminal Investigation Department, and a statement, exhibit A, was collected from him by the police. During the course of the investigation the relatives of the appellant paid to the police the sum of ¢30,000 involved in the case and at the close of the case of the prosecution the said money was on the order of the court released to the complainant.
These are the salient and significant features of the case, which the prosecution put forth. From the evidence therefore it is clear that the appellant was not able to give any explanation whatsoever to the complainant as to what happened to a substantial portion of the money apart from the bare statement that when he brought the parcel out and it was opened he found that the money was short by ¢21,000. It is apparent on the record that neither the complainant nor the police were able to indicate what precisely happened to the ¢21,000.
The crux of the evidence led by the prosecution in proof of the charge would seem in the circumstances to be this: The appellant was given ¢30,000 for the complainant. The appellant kept the money in his house. The complainant called on the appellant for his money. The
[p.464] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 458 appellant brought the money out. It was short by ¢21,000. The complainant made several unsuccessful calls for his money. The appellant could not explain the cause of the shortage; who extracted the ¢21,000 and when it was so extracted were not established by any positive evidence from any source but because the appellant was the custodian of the money it was presumed he appropriated it on the date he received it, and because he could not give the money to the complainant on the several occasions he called on him, it was contended by the prosecution and accepted by the trial court and the appellate High Court that the presumed appropriation was dishonest although no specified act of the appellant was alluded to at any point of time in proof of the appropriation or demonstrative of his intention in respect of the money.
These conclusions of the prosecution and the courts must in the result be based on the circumstances of the case or what in well-known legal jargon is called “circumstantial evidence”, a specie of evidence the scope and ambit of which have been the subject matter of many decisions of the common law world. In this regard it is now trite learning and there is no need to quote any case law in support, that for circumstantial evidence to justify an inference of guilt that inference must in the nature of things be the one and only inference deducible irresistibly and inexorably from the circumstances. If the said circumstances are amenable to other innocuous conclusions, then the inference of guilt is logically non sequitur and consequently legally not valid.
We are therefore obliged to decide whether as a matter of law the circumstantial facts led in evidence by the prosecution in this case give rise to the offence of stealing under our Act 29. Now the ingredients of the offence of stealing are stated in section 125 of Act 29, and these ingredients have been authoritatively expounded by the full bench of the Court of Appeal in the case of Republic v. Halm, Court of Appeal (full bench), 7 August 1969; digested in (1969) C.C. 155 which is binding on this court. There Amissah J.A. in his inimitably lucid and impeccable manner delivering the unanimous and illuminating judgment of the full bench strongly constituted said as stated in the headnote at 263:
“The preliminary relationship for consideration in a charge of stealing is not so much a relationship between the person charged and some other, identified as owner, as a relationship between the person charged and the thing alleged stolen . . . For the offence of stealing to be constituted, therefore, the relations, act and intention to be proved in connection with ‘the thing’ are: (i) that the person charged must not be the owner of it; (ii) that he must
[p.465] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 458 have appropriated it; and (iii) that the appropriation must have been dishonest.”
(The emphasis is ours.)
In the case before us there is no doubt that abundant evidence was led that the “thing”, namely the ¢30,000 the subject matter of the stealing charge was not owned by the appellant. Ingredient (i) in the Halm case (supra) was therefore prima facie overwhelmingly proved by the prosecution, and in the circumstances we are thus left to examine the evidence preferred by the prosecution to satisfy ingredients items (ii) and (iii) of the yardstick adverted to in the said Halm case.
It is worthy of note in this connection that the charge of stealing was laid in “the month of January 1983 at Accra” in the particulars of offence as we have already indicated and yet no admissible evidence whatsoever was led specifying any overt act of the appellant in Accra or anywhere in the month of January 1983 or any month which would contain the appropriation element which is clearly the dominant actus reus in the definition of the offence of stealing under the Criminal Code. Admittedly at the close of the case for the prosecution the admissible evidence showed clearly that ¢21,000 had been taken from the ¢30,000 given to the appellant for the complainant. And in our opinion the only evidence led to show who took it, for what purpose, and with what intention in a bid to satisfy the Halm criteria encompassed as ingredients (ii) and (iii) above was a confession statement allegedly made by the appellant and which as we have indicated already was admitted in evidence as exhibit A. If the said statement in exhibit A is properly and legally admissible in evidence then there can be no doubt that the conviction of the appellant would be unexceptionable for exhibit A supplied both the actus reus as well as the mens rea of the offence. If, however, in law it ought not to have been admitted, then the conviction can hardly be justified having regard to the fact that on the record the prosecution on whom the onus of establishing ingredient (ii) and (iii) rested, produced no other evidence to show who actually appropriated the money dishonestly. It was apparently assumed as we have already pointed out that as the money was actually handed over to the appellant, his inability to produce the whole amount as a mere custodian when the intended owner, the complainant, asked for it, coupled with his putting off the complainant on the many occasions he called on him, is circumstantial evidence of dishonest appropriation of the entire sum.
We shall later in this judgment consider the logical foundation and the legal validity of this assumption. The statement exhibit A however is as follows:
[p.466] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 458
“RCID . . . Station Accra . . . Section 2 November 1984 Name: Samuel Okpoti Anang Address: Judicial Service, Accra Occupation: Civil Servant: Aged: 50 Sex: Male Native of Labadi.
I am investigating a case of stealing in which you are involved. You are not obliged to say anything unless you wish to do so but whatever you say will be taken down in writing and may be given in evidence. You are also reminded of your right to consult counsel of your own choice.
(Sgd) Samuel Okpoti Anang (Sgd) D/INSPECTOR I, Samuel Okpoti Anang make the following statement in the presence of Miss Sophia Orgle-Nartey. I have been told that I need not say anything unless I wish to do so, but whatever I say will be taken down in writing and may be given in evidence. I have also been reminded of my right to consult a counsel of my own choice.
(Sgd)
(Sgd) S.O. Anang I was the private secretary to the Chief Justice. Some time early last year, one Mr Prempeh came from London and gave me an amount of ¢30,000 to be given to Mr Justice Gogo who is in Sekondi. I went to Sekondi and told him about the money. He instructed me to pay it into his account at the bank. When I came back to Accra, I squandered the money as if I have been possessed by an evil spirit. The judge reported the matter to the Chief Justice who gave me a query on 16 October 1984. 1 am making frantic efforts to get money to refund the amount.
(Sgd)
(Sgd) S.O. Anang
[p.467] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 458
This is my true statement. I have been told that I can correct, alter or add anything I wish. I made it of my own free will in the presence of Miss Sophia Orgle-Nartey independent witness to my statement.
(Sgd)
(Sgd) S. O. Anang”
When the prosecution which was conducted by a lady police chief inspector obviously not learned in the law, sought to tender this statement through the police witness who obtained it, counsel for the appellant at the trial court as was his right so to do objected to the statement on five specified grounds which he formulated in his own words as follows:
“(1) this is a confession statement and it infringes section 120(1), (2) and (3) of the Evidence Decree, 1975 (N.R.C.D. 323);
(2) the accused was pressurised to write the statement about to be tendered in evidence;
(3) the said statement was obtained without the presence of an independent witness;
(4) the statement that the accused gave was dictated to him by the witness who is now in the witness-box; and (5) no written certificate was signed by the alleged independent witness.”
The prosecuting chief inspector, apparently permitted by the court to reply to these legal submissions in an attempt probably to help the judge to give a decision, said:
“This statement was written by a literate person and signed by the accused himself who is also a literate. The statement mentioned one Sophia Orgle-Nartey as the independent witness before whom he made the statement. This is sufficient enough to prove that the accused made a voluntary statement in the presence of an independent witness.”
And the learned circuit judge ignoring the submissions and apparently with no patience to examine the legal basis for the submissions, peremptorily gave the following ad hoc ruling on the admissibility of the statement:
“It is not in doubt that the accused had refunded the ¢30,000 given by one Mr Prempeh for onward transmission to the complainant. Here again I do not see any essence of this objection, because the prosecutrix had alleged that the statement
[p.468] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 458 was collected from the accused in the presence of an independent witness called Sophia Orgle-Nartey. The accused, from the proceedings, is a private secretary to the Chief Justice and has been working with the Judicial Service for almost 30 years. He is therefore presumed to know his civic rights. For the court to determine whether or not the statement to be tendered was dictated to the accused, such document must be tendered to enable the court to arrive at such a conclusion. Learned counsel’s objection is overruled and the accused’s statement is to be tendered and marked exhibit A.”
In our deliberation on this appeal, we have had to give some consideration to the role of prosecuting officers who are not trained in law appearing before learned judges at summary trials. The role of prosecuting officers is to assist the judge to arrive in accordance with law, at a just and fair decision in the case. Where the judge is a professional lawyer and the prosecuting officer has no training in law, then it is rather incongruous and virtually improper and imprudent for him to profess to make legal submissions in an attempt to elucidate the law for the professional judge. This is precisely what happened here. When the learned defence counsel made submissions to the learned circuit judge in this case and raised pure legal issues by invoking the provisions of section 120 of the Evidence Decree, 1975 (NRCD 323) the judge instead of examining the provisions and giving effect to the provisions if he found them relevant, relied rather on submissions in reply made by the prosecuting police officer, who probably for lack of the requisite training apparently revealed in her so-called reply that she had no idea whatsoever as to what learned counsel was driving at. This resulted in the layman’s erroneous view of the legal position, dictated, no doubt, by commonsense rather than the law, prevailing.
In our common law system of jurisprudence, the law as is practised in our Courts does not necessarily conform to abstract canons of so-called commonsense. In our view, in the circumstances of such cases as the instant appeal, if the learned judge requires assistance on the law, he ought to adjourn the proceedings for the lay prosecutor to consult the Attorney-General’s Office for professional assistance but if he does not need such assistance then he can himself examine the legal submissions of learned counsel in the light of his own knowledge of the law. He can even by virtue of section 3 (6) of N.R.C.D. 323 admit the statement provisionally and give himself ample opportunity to validate its final admission.
It is significant in this case, however, that the statement was not even admitted conditionally for the prosecution subsequently to produce evidence that it was a voluntary statement, as was done in the case of R.
[p.469] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 458 v. Kassi (1939) 5 W.A.C.A. 154 at 156, a procedure much criticised but not adjudged fatal to conviction.
Even before N.R.C.D. 323 as amended by the Evidence and Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Decree, 1979 (S.M.C.D. 237) put the process of the admission of confession statements of persons accused of crime on a statutory foundation and thus institutionalised the procedure in our criminal justice system as a civilised safeguard for the liberty of the citizen, an affirmative answer to the question as to whether a confession statement was voluntary has been a condition precedent to its admissibility and that question has for decades been determined in this country by the presiding judge as a preliminary issue: see in this connection R v. Onagbanjo (1936) 3 W.A.C.A. 43 at 44 per Kingdon C.J. and the judgement of our Court of Appeal delivered by Granville Sharp J.A. in R v. Adjei (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 544 at 546, C.A. The procedure is in accordance with the common law principle clearly canvassed by Lord Parker C.J in the English Court of Criminal Appeal in R v. Francis (1959) 43 Cr. App. R. 174 at 176. That principle was succinctly stated by O’ Halloran CJ speaking for the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Canada in R v. Weighill (1945) 2 D.L.R. 471 at 474 when he said:
“ . . . a confession is not evidence until the trial Judge decides that it is voluntary and admits it as evidence, and . . . the object of a ‘trial within the trial’ is to discover not . . . whether it is voluntary and hence admissible as evidence.”
(The emphasis is ours.)
Our erstwhile Supreme Court reiterated the principle in homely and clear language in Asare alias Fanti v. The State [1964] G.L.R. 70 at 74 S.C. when Ollennu J.S.C. delivering the judgment of the court said:
“ . . . where objection is raised to the admission of a statement made by a defendant in a criminal case on the grounds that the defendant did not make the alleged statement, or that the said statement was not a voluntary statement, or that it was made under duress, or procured by threats or promise, the said issues should be tried, and a court should not admit the statement until it is satisfied that it is a voluntary statement . . .”
The procedure contained in this view which was developed by the common law judges in the closing years of the eighteenth century and formulated with commendable clarity by the Privy Council in Ibrahim v. R [1914] A.C. 599, the locus classicus of the principle, rests now in this country in sections 3 and 120 of N.R.C.D. 323. It necessitates a prior trial within the trial often referred to in the books as the voire dire, to determine whether the statement is voluntary before it is admitted in evidence.
[p.470] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 458
In the case before us no evidence was taken on the voire dire. Section 3 of N.R.C.D. 323 provides, inter alia, that it is the province of the court to determine the existence or non-existence of a “preliminary fact.” A preliminary fact is defined, inter alia, as any fact upon which depends the admissibility or inadmissibility of evidence. The section provides further that the court may in its discretion admit evidence which requires proof of preliminary facts on condition that the preliminary facts will be proved later in the course of the trial with the proviso that such conditionally admitted evidence shall be disregarded if the court determines at the end of the trial that the preliminary facts were not proved. This is in consonance with the general law of evidence regarding evidence provisionally admitted: see Nkegbe v. Africa Motors [1978] 1 G.L.R. 32 at 41; and Phipson, Law of Evidence (10th ed.) 156 citing Haigh v. Belcher (1830) 7 C & P 389, H.L.
In our opinion, the single issue which faced the courts was whether exhibit A was voluntary in view of the objection by counsel first, that the appellant was pressurised to write the statement, an obvious allegation of duress; and secondly, that it was dictated to him by the investigating officer, an apparent plea of non est factum; and thirdly, that it infringed the provisions of section 120 of N.R.C.D. 323 as amended by S.M.C.D. 237.
The provisions of N.R.C.D. 323, s. 120 (1)-(3) as amended by S.M.C.D. 237, said to be breached and to which the learned circuit court judge was referred by counsel are:
“120. (1) In a criminal action, evidence of a hearsay statement made by an accused admitting matter which— (a) constitutes; or (b) forms an essential part; or (c) taken together with other information already disclosed by him is a basis for an inference of, the commission for which he is being tried in the action is not admissible against him unless the statement was made voluntarily.
(2) Evidence of a hearsay statement shall not be admissible under subsection (1) if the statement was made by the declarant while arrested, restricted or detained by the State unless the statement was made in the presence of an independent witness.
(3) The independent witness must be a person who— (a) can understand the language spoken by the accused;
(b) can read and understand the language in which the statement is made, and where the statement is in writing the independent witness must certify in writing that the statement was made voluntarily in
[p.471] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 458 his presence and that the contents were fully understood by the accused.”
In exhibit A, it is stated that the appellant confessed that he squandered the ¢30,000 as if he was possessed by an evil spirit. This statement cannot on the evidence be true because when the complainant contacted the appellant he produced ¢9,000 and the squandering if indeed there was one must be in respect of the ¢21,000. We are aware of course that on a charge of stealing money, the accused can on the evidence be convicted of stealing a lesser sum: see Obeng alias Donkor v. The State [1966] G.L.R. 259, S.C. The statement can however only be possibly true if it had referred to ¢21,000. Assuming he squandered ¢21,000 as alleged, then since he was not the owner of the money and had not the owner’s implied or direct consent or approval to use the money, this conduct of his contained in his confession would amount to “dishonest appropriations” and prima facie constitute the offence of stealing under section 124 (1) of Act 29, the section of the Act under which he was charged. However, under section 120 (1) (c) of N.R.C.D. 323, such a confession as was allegedly made by the appellant “is not admissible against him unless the statement was made voluntarily.” In his objection counsel for the appellant at the trial court challenged the voluntary nature of the statement and apparently submitted that it was made under duress. This preliminary matter was not resolved by the trial judge by taking evidence from the prosecution on the voir dire as he was statutorily bound to do.
The prosecution furthermore led evidence that exhibit A was made while the appellant was under arrest by the police and was being detained by the investigating police officer at the Regional Criminal Investigation Department in Accra. Under section 120 (2) of N.R.C.D. 323, a statement in such circumstances made by a person accused of crime as the appellant was, shall not be admissible in evidence unless the statement was made in the presence of an independent witness. Once again counsel who appeared at the trial court submitted at the trial that contrary to the provisions of section 120 (2) of N.R.C.D. 323, the statement was obtained without the statutory presence of an independent witness. This was also not resolved by evidence.
Exhibit A speaks for itself, it is to borrow a maxim familiar in civil cases, i.e. res ipsa loquitur for quite clearly there is ex facie no certificate in writing by an independent witness that the statement was made voluntarily in his presence and that the contents were fully understood by the appellant, as is also mandatorily required by section 120 (3) of N.R.C.D. 323.
It seems to us that all the relevant provisions of section 120 (1)-(3) of N.R.C.D. 323,applicable to the appellant and designed to protect him,
[p.472] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 458 were blatantly breachedby the police and nonchalantly ignored by the trial court and the appellate court in spite of the submissions of his counsel calling attention to these statutory requirements. These statutory provisions are, as the language of the enactment shows, imperative conditions precedent to admissibility and since in our opinion they were contravened, the ruling of the circuit judge admitting exhibit A and the judgment of the High Court sanctioning the admission are erroneous in law. Observe the language of section 120 (2) of N.R.C.D. 323,”Evidence of a hearsay statement shall not be admissible . . . unless the statement was made in the presence of an independent witness . .”
In our view, as a general proposition barring probably exceptional cases not easy to formulate a priori, on breach of the provisions of section 120 of N.R.C.D. 323, the trial or appellate court has no discretion or option in the matter and its clear mandatory statutory duty as a matter of law is to exclude the statement entirely. In this connection Ghana law would seem to have parted ways with the English system under which even on breach of the judges’ rules, the judge at a trial has a judicial discretion in appropriate cases to admit the statement leaving the weight to be attached to it to the trier of facts: see R v. Voisin (1918) 13 Cr. App. R. 89 at 96 per Lawrence J; R v. Wattam (1952) 36 Cr. App. R. 72 at 77 per Oliver J. and R v. May (1952) 36 Cr. App. R. 91 at 98 per Lord Goddard C.J.
In our opinion since 1 October 1979, when N.R.C.D. 323 came into force, the view of the law expressed by the West African Court of Appeal per van Lare J. in R v. Grunshie (Abisa) (195 1) 1 W.A.L.R. 36 at 39 and which was reiterated for this court by Mensa Boison J. (as he then was) in Gyedu v. The Republic [1980] G.L.R. 480, C.A. to the effect that the presence of an independent literate witness at the taking of statements of accused persons, is a rule of practice and not a rule of law is now no longer good law.
For this reason it is in our opinion necessary that all officers prosecuting criminal cases at trial courts or appearing as counsel in appeals appreciate the fundamental nature of the changes in the law relating to confessions that has now been effected by the provisions of N.R.C.D. 323 as amended by S.M.C.D. 237 as we have drawn attention to in this judgment.
In this case we think that the statement is not true because ¢30,000 was demonstrably never squandered, and so even if the statement were properly admissible its weight would have been negligible. Counsel appearing for the Republic in this appeal has in the best tradition of the legal profession conceded that the moment counsel at the trial court
[p.473] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 458 raised the objections specified in this judgment the trial court was obliged to hold a trial within a trial, a mini trial so to speak, in order to decide on the voluntary nature of exhibit A. Since this was not done he was prepared to accept quite frankly that exhibit A was wrongly admitted and conceded quite honourably that it should be excluded from the evidence on record in the consideration of this appeal.
He has submitted, however, as is his right so to do if the evidence warrants it, that the case of the prosecution did contain material supporting a finding of dishonest appropriation. In this connection he drew our attention to the fact that the appellant when he was called upon to give evidence said a number of things which were not put to the complainant when the complainant gave evidence and the submission of counsel in this regard is that the principle of law enunciated by Lord Herschell L.C. in the House of Lords in Browne v. Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 should be applied. By that principle counsel submits that the appellant is presumed to have accepted everything that the complainant said in his evidence-in-chief in the absence of cross-examination on his behalf directed at contradicting the complainant on the points on which the complainant’s evidence differed from his.
The short answer to this submission is that the complainant did not lead any admissible evidence whatsoever and we also found none showing that the appellant had dishonestly appropriated the money. On his evidence the appellant made no other admission except that the money was short. When pressed by this court in view of his submission for evidence on the record of the proceedings showing dishonest appropriation, the gravamen of the charge, counsel referred us to the following evidence of the complainant after he had first contacted the appellant:
“I went back to Sekondi and the following Saturday I came back to Accra and went to Labadi and when I saw him, he again said I should go and come in two weeks’ time as he was gathering the money.”
It is of some importance to note that the state attorney is here referring us to the only material in the prosecution’s case which apparently a meticulous examination of the record by him reveals and which is said to be the requisite evidence of dishonest appropriation. In view of this in order to understand the thrust of counsel’s argument, the ipsissima verba of his submission is pertinent and it is as follows:
“I submit that because he said he was gathering the money, he has used it, for that is what gathering connotes; if he had said he was trying to make up the money it would have been different as making up the money connotes genuine shortage.”
[p.474] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 458
If a finding of dishonest appropriation in this case is not based on any overt act of the appellant, but is to be deducible from and dependent upon one word “gathering” probably inadvertently selected instead of the suggested “make up” used by the appellant, then the tenuous content of the evidence led and the tendentious nature of counsel’s submission become very clear indeed. In our well-considered opinion dishonesty in the definition of stealing connotes moral obloquy as Lawton L.J in delivering the judgment of the English Court of Appeal Criminal Division in R v. Feely [1973] 1 All E.R. 341 at 346 apparently held in interpreting the somewhat corresponding analogous provision under the English Theft Act, 1968. As he put it:
“In our judgment a taking to which no moral obloquy can reasonably attach is not within the concept of stealing either at common law or under the Theft Act, 1968.”
Later on in his judgment in the case which was heard before a full bench of five judges of the Criminal Division, Lawton L.J. laid great emphasis on the moral turpitude inherent in stealing when he said further at 348: “We find it impossible to accept that a conviction for stealing, whether it be called larceny or theft, can reveal no moral obloquy.”
We are of opinion that to sustain a conviction for stealing there must be an act of the accused of such a nature as to cast a slur on his character revealing him as a person lacking in integrity or as a plainly dishonest person to use the language of section 125 of Act 29.
We have already pointed out in this case the circumstantial nature of the evidence from which counsel has urged us to find that the charge of stealing has been proved. We now proceed to examine its logical validity. Assuming for the purpose of the circumstantial evidence rule that an inmate of the appellant’s house had, in fact, clandestinely and without the knowledge of the appellant extracted ¢21,000 from the complainant’s ¢30,000 which was being kept by the appellant, will the fact that the appellant made frantic and fruitless efforts to “gather” or obtain money from various sources to replace the said ¢21,000 resulting in his putting off the complainant on each occasion he called on him, justify the inference that he is dishonest and guilty of stealing? It is illuminating in this connection to examine for instance the Old Testament account in the Revised Standard Version, Genesis chap 44, verses 1-16 where Joseph’s silver cup was deliberately put in the mouth of the sack of Benjamin by his steward on the instructions of Joseph himself without the knowledge of Benjamin and Judah and all of the other sons of Jacob. When it was designedly discovered by the said Joseph’s steward, the conclusion of Judah and the other brothers, clearly a non sequitur because we know who put the cup there, is
[p.475] of [1984-86] 1 GLR 458 reflected in the soul writhing lamentation of Judah before Joseph at verse 16:
“What shall we say to my Lord? What shall we speak? Or how can we clear ourselves? God has found out the guilt of your servants . . .”
(The emphasis is ours.)
Considerations of this nature must falsify the inference drawn by the trial judge and affirmed by the appellate High Court, that the absence of satisfactory explanation of the whereabouts of the ¢21,000 is evidence of dishonest appropriation capable of satisfying proof beyond reasonable doubt as is stringently demanded by the criminal law.
It is for this reason and the other reasons we have canvassed herein that in the judgment we delivered on 17 February 1986 we allowed the appeal in this case, quashed the conviction of the appellant, set aside his sentence, cancelled his bond and acquitted and discharged him.
DECISION
Appeal allowed
Conviction quashed and sentenced set aside.
