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[1986] SLR (CA) 22Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL I)

SEATEC LTD. vs. PENTON HOOK FARMS LTD. AND ANOTHER [1984-86] 1 GLR 605

12 June 1986 · ABBAN JA · ≈ 7 min read

Cite as[1986] SLR (CA) 22
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OSCOLASEATEC LTD. v PENTON HOOK FARMS LTD. AND ANOTHER [1984-86] 1 GLR 605 [1986] SLR (CA) 22
APASEATEC LTD. v PENTON HOOK FARMS LTD. AND ANOTHER [1984-86] 1 GLR 605, [1986] SLR (CA) 22 (Ghana).
BluebookSEATEC LTD. v PENTON HOOK FARMS LTD. AND ANOTHER [1984-86] 1 GLR 605, [1986] SLR (CA) 22 (Ghana Ct. App. 1986).

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CASE REFERRED TO

Hyams v. Stuart King [1908] 2 K.B. 696, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from three interlocutory rulings by the High Court, Accra delivered during the day’s proceedings of the hearing of a claim for, inter alia, specific performance of an oral contract. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment of Abban J.A.

COUNSEL

Thompson for Mrs. Phillips for the plaintiff-appellants.

Agyeman-Bempah for the defendants and co-defendant-respondents.

JUDGMENT OF ABBAN J.A.

The appeal is from three different rulings of the High Court, Accra given on 18 December 1985. The appellants (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiffs) had sued the respondents (hereinafter referred to as the defendants and co-defendant, respectively) for specific performance of an oral contract and for an injunction. There was an alternative claim for damages.

The hearing of the case commenced on 4 December 1985. On 18 December 1985 when the second plaintiffs witness was giving his evidence-in-chief, this witness attempted to give evidence in respect of matters which were not pleaded by the plaintiffs in any of their pleadings. Objection was promptly taken by learned counsel for the defendants and the co-defendant. The learned trial judge upheld the objection and ruled as follows:

“By court: It is not enough simply to deny an averment. If the intention is to lead affirmative evidence the necessary facts must be pleaded. In this case they were not. The objection is upheld.”

After this short ruling, learned counsel for the plaintiffs applied for an adjournment to enable her to amend the plaintiffs’ reply to the co-defendant’s amended statement of defence. Her reason was that the evidence of that second witness was not available at the time the reply was filed. The application was opposed and the learned trial judge held:

“This case is a rehearing of a suit began by my brother Ansah-Twum J. In my view the necessity for the amendment must have

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been clear to the plaintiffs’ legal advisers long ago. The application for adjournment is refused.”

There was yet a third short ruling. While learned counsel for the plaintiffs was re-examining the second plaintiffs witness, she tried to ask a question the answer to which would have brought in the very evidence which had earlier on been successfully objected to when this very witness was giving his evidence-in-chief. Consequently, the learned trial judge disallowed the question in the manner as follows:

“By court: I agree with Messrs da Rocha and Bempah that the question does not arise from the cross-examination. The objection is upheld and the question disallowed.”

These three short rulings given during the course of the proceedings of 18 December 1985 formed the subject matter of the present appeal.

Learned counsel for the plaintiffs argued the additional grounds of appeal only and they were argued together. Counsel submitted that under Order 28, r. 12 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A), an amendment can be applied for at any stage of the proceedings and the learned judge should have granted leave to the plaintiffs to amend their reply to enable the plaintiffs to adduce evidence on the matter. Counsel contended that the date: 6 June 1984 featured prominently in the pleadings of the parties and the evidence which the plaintiffs had intended to lead after the amendment would not have caused any injury to the defendants and the co-defendant; neither could it have taken the defendants and the co-defendant by surprise.

It was further argued that the learned judge erred in holding that there had been undue delay because the second plaintiffs witness, who was to give evidence on what happened on that 6 June 1984, was not met until after 21 October 1985 or he could have been met between 21 October and December 1984. In brief this was the substance of the submissions of counsel for the plaintiffs.

I should observe that the substantive case is still pending, and in the circumstances it would not be desirable to write a detailed judgment that might inadvertently lead to a review of the evidence so far adduced before the trial court. Any attempt to do so may have an unfortunate prejudicial effect on the case one way or the other.

I would therefore confine myself strictly to the merits or otherwise of the arguments of learned counsel. It was obvious that learned counsel for the plaintiffs appreciated that there was nothing wrong with the first ruling itself. Learned counsel seemed to acknowledge that the matters in respect of which the plaintiffs had wanted to lead evidence were not pleaded and that the objection was rightly taken and the

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learned judge was also right in upholding the objection. The quarrel of counsel was that the learned trial judge should have granted leave to amend the pleadings.

But learned counsel, with due respect, argued as if the plaintiffs’ application to amend was actually before the trial court and the same had been refused. There was no such application made to the learned trial judge. The plaintiffs never even formulated and stated in writing the exact amendment they were seeking to make. The practice is that the intended amendment must always be formulated in written form before it can be considered by the court: see Hyams v. Stuart King [1908] 2 K.B. 696 at 724, C.A. per Farwell L.J. So that the principles governing the granting of amendments and the arguments founded on Order 28, r. 12 of L.N. 140A about the refusal to grant the amendment, as put forward by learned counsel for the plaintiffs, were all misplaced. The learned trial judge did not rule on any intended amendment. What the learned judge refused to do was to adjourn the case to enable the plaintiffs to file notice of a proposed amendment of their reply to the co-defendant’s amended statement of defence.

Thus the most important question to answer was whether or not there were good reasons for refusing the adjournment. I think the answer must be an emphatic Yes! The granting of an adjournment is within the discretion of the trial court, and the learned judge quite properly exercised his discretion when he refused the adjournment. The suit had had a chequered career and further adjournment would have caused undue delay and hardship.

It is interesting to note that even though hearing had not yet been completed, the case had been to the Court of Appeal and the present appeal is the second occasion it has come before this court. The substantive case had been heard before another judge at one time, and it was being reheard before the trial judge. All this time the plaintiffs had not thought it fit to file notice of their intended amendment and the learned trial judge rightly felt it was unfair to grant an adjournment for that purpose.

Learned counsel for the plaintiffs could not tell this court the exact date on which the plaintiffs’ counsel became aware of the kind of evidence the second plaintiffs witness intended to give. Be that as it may, it was obvious that the plaintiffs’ counsel got to know of the so-called intended evidence some time before 18 December 1985; and instead of counsel filing notice of the said amendment for the court to consider, counsel chose not to but took a chance, hoping to get in that evidence if not objected to. In other words the necessity for the amendment became abundantly apparent to learned counsel for the

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plaintiffs at least some time before the hearing commenced. But counsel did not bother to file notice of the intended amendment. In my view, since the notice of the amendment could have been filed at a much earlier stage of the proceedings, the delay of the plaintiffs until after the plaintiffs and their first witness had given their evidence was unreasonable as well as unpardonable and the learned trial judge was right in refusing the application for adjournment.

I now come to the third and the last ruling which was given during the re-examination of the second plaintiffs witness. It states, among other things, that, “The question being sought is in fact a repetition of that which has already been disallowed. This question is also disallowed.”

It is surprising that this ruling should also be a subject of complaint. The very question had been properly objected to and rightly upheld earlier on in the proceedings when that particular witness was giving his evidence-in-chief. It was therefore improper for counsel to attempt to ask the same question in re-examination. What was more, the witness was not cross-examined on what happened on 6 June 1984 between the witness and the second defendant. So the plaintiffs had no right to re-examine the witness on that aspect of the matter since it did not arise out of the cross-examination.

I think the learned trial judge was right in all his three rulings. In the circumstances, I am of the opinion that the appeal has no merits and it ought to be dismissed.

JUDGMENT OF OSEI-HWERE J.A.

I agree.

JUDGMENT OF AMMAH J.

I also agree.

DECISION Appeal dismissed.

Ruling of trial judge upheld.

S. Y. B. – B.

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