MAHAMA AND ANOTHER vs. MOSHIE [1984-86] 2 GLR 708
1 September 1986 · BERKO AG J · ≈ 13 min read
[1986] SLR (HC) 11Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Moscati v. Lawson (1835) 174 E.R. 156.
(2) R. v. Denoel (1916) 12 Cr. App. R. 49, C.C.A.
(3) Khoury v. Khoury [1971] 1 G.L.R. 348.
(4) Mosi v. Bagyina [1963] 1 G.L.R. 337, S.C.
(5) Rossage v. Rossage [1960] 1 W.L.R. 249; [1960] 1 All E.R. 600, C.A.
(6) J. (An Infant), In re [1960] 1 W.L.R. 253; [1960] 1 All E.R. 603.
(7) Republic v. Greater Accra Regional Commissioner; Ex parte Naawu III [1976] 2 G.L.R.25.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION to set aside an order for the issue of a writ of possession issued in favour of the defendant. The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling.
COUNSEL
A. A. Luguterah for the applicants.
Ibrahim Mahama for the respondent.
JUDGMENT OF BERKO AG. J.
The applicants were plaintiffs in an action instituted against the defendant-respondent in this court for the following reliefs:
[p.711] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 708 (i) a declaration of title to that piece or parcel of land situated in Tamale with a building thereon and known as plot No. 46 in Ward A including title to the five rooms thereon—belonging to the co-plaintiff;
(ii) perpetual injunction restraining the defendant, his agents, successors and assigns from entering upon or doing anything on the said land and a further order restraining the defendant, his agents, successors and assigns from interfering with the co-plaintiff’s rights, title or enjoyment of her five rooms on plot No. 46, Tamale;
(iii) an order of account to be rendered by the defendant to the plaintiff for all rents and other moneys received by him due to the estate of the late Kurita Moshie;
(iv) damages for interfering with the estate of the late Kurita Moshie; and (v) an order revoking the letters of administration granted to the defendant either alone or with others in either May or July 1978.
On 4 July 1985 the plaintiffs’ claims against the defendant were dismissed. The court awarded costs of ¢600 against each of the plaintiffs in favour of the defendant. The plaintiffs appealed against the judgment of this court delivered on 4 July 1985 to the Court of Appeal by notice of appeal filed on 9 July 1985. The plaintiffs hereafter applied to this court on 15 July 1985 for stay of execution pending the determination of their appeal to this court of Appeal. This application was granted on 18 November 1985 subject to the payment of costs of ¢1,200 by the plaintiffs forthwith to the defendant. The plaintiffs applied to the court to review the conditional order of stay of execution granted on 18 November 1985 but that application was refused with costs of ¢100 in favour of the defendant. On 17 January 1986 the plaintiffs made a fresh application to the Court of Appeal for stay of execution.
At this stage it is relevant to state who have been solicitors for the parties from the commencement of the action. The original writ was issued in 1978 by E. D. Mahami as solicitor for the plaintiffs. Appearance was entered on behalf of the defendant by G. K. Mensa of Maligu Chambers, Tamale, who later on became known and called Mensa-Etsi. On 7 April 1981 A. A. Luguterah of Lugu Chambers, Tamale was appointed solicitor by the plaintiffs in place of E. D. Mahami. This is evidenced by the notice of change of solicitors filed by A. A. Luguterah on 7 April 1981. This is how the parties were represented when judgment was delivered on 4 July 1985, that is to say A. A. Luguterah as solicitor for the plaintiffs and Mensa-Etsi for the defendant.
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On 5 July 1985 entry of judgment was filed on behalf of the defendant by Ibrahim Mahama as solicitor for the defendant and this was signed by J. B. Domale for Ibrahim Mahama. It is significant to note at this stage that before filing the alleged entry of judgment on 5 July 1985, neither Ibrahim Mahama nor the defendant had filed anything in the registry of this court about change of solicitor in accordance with Order 7, r. 2 (1) and (2) of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1954 (L.N. 140A). The position was that not having satisfied the requirements of Order 7, r. 2, the former solicitor of the defendant, Mensa-Etsi, was considered the solicitor for the defendant till the final conclusion of the “cause or matter.” Therefore the purported entry of judgment filed by Ibrahim Mahama as solicitor for the defendant had no legal effect since he had never been so apointed by the defendant. I am fortified in this view by the fact that on 24 December 1985 F. G. Korbieh, Esq. filed in the registry of the court notice of change of solicitor in which he stated that “the defendant herein who had hitherto acted through his solicitor G. K. Mensa-Esti, will now act through me as his solicitor.” If it is accepted, for the purpose of argument, that Mensa-Etsi ceased to be the solicitor for the defendant the very day judgment was delivered on 4 July 1985, the fact still remains that Ibrahim Mahama was never the solicitor for the defendant when he purported to file the entry of judgment on the 5 July 1985. Therefore up to the time the plaintiffs’ application came on for hearing on 17 February 1986 at the Court of Appeal the representation of the parties were as follows: A. A. Luguterah for the plaintiffs; Francis Korbieh for the defendant.
The evidence of Francis Korbieh was that when the plaintiffs made the fresh application for stay of execution to the Court of Appeal, the motion papers were served on him as solicitor for the defendant. On the instructions of the defendant he filed an affidavit in opposition on behalf of the defendant. This was tendered as exhibit 2. When he realised that he could not represent the defendant personally at the Court of Appeal, he consulted his senior R. I. Alhassan who advised that he could arrange for counsel in Accra to represent the defendant if the defendant would be prepared to bear the cost of the transport of their clerk to Accra with the brief in the case. This proposal was put to the defendant by R. I. Alhassan and was agreed to by the defendant. Consequently, the defendant gave money to the clerk who went with the brief to one Lawyer Tagoe in Accra. The said Lawyer Tagoe agreed to hold Francis Korbieh’s brief at the Court of Appeal. In the meantime A. A. Luguterah had also instructed Lawyer E. D. Kom to hold his brief for him as well.
E. D. Kom having studied the brief might have realised that all that remained to make the conditional stay granted by this court complete
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was the costs of ¢1,200 which had not been paid. E. D. Kom therefore tendered the ¢1,200 to Lawyer Tagoe who accepted it on behalf of Korbieh. What followed was that when the motion came on for hearing at the Court of Appeal the application was dismissed as withdrawn. Both E. D. Kom and Tagoe were present at the Court of Appeal. Both Kom and Tagoe must have thought that with the payment of the costs of ¢1,200 the conditional stay of execution granted by this court had been perfected and was in full force and effect and therefore they did not see the need for urging the Court of Appeal to grant another stay when one was already in force.
According to the evidence of Francis Korbieh, Lawyer Tagoe communicated to him what had transpired in Accra. He said he passed on that information to the defendant. The fact that Francis Korbieh and the defendant were not satisfied with the way Tagoe handled the case is beside the point. Tagoe was given the brief and there were no specific instructions on the brief as to how he should handle the case. As far back as 1835, Alderson B. in Moscati v. Lawson (1835) 174 E.R. 156 stressed that once counsel has been instructed in a case, he ought to have full control over the case and conduct it throughout. In other words subject to the directions of the judge who has complete control of the trial of the case, learned counsel has a discretion where he is instructed to set up two inconsistent defences and he is entitled to decide which one to put forward: see R. v. Denoel (1916) 12 Cr. App. R. 49, C.C.A. I therefore do not see anything wrong in Tagoe accepting the cost of ¢1,200 on behalf of the defendant and that so far as it was a matter of discretion he had exercised it wisely. The order to pay the costs of ¢1,200 “forthwith” did not mean that it should be paid the very day the order was made. In the Dictionary of English Law (1959 ed.) by Earl Jowit, “forthwith” has been defined as follows at p. 828:
“When a defendant is ordered to plead forthwith, he must plead within twenty-four hours. When a statute or rule of court requires an act to be done forthwith, it means that the act is to be done within a reasonable time having regard to the object of the provision and the circumstances of the case.”
In Khoury v. Khoury [1971] 1 G.L.R. 348 at 353, C.A. the Court of Appeal defined “forthwith” as follows:
“Our order upon this motion that the receiver comply with the orders of 7 August 1970 ‘forthwith’ simply means that the acts he is required to perform are to be done as soon as it is reasonably practicable.”
The defendant with full knowledge of what had transpired at the Court of Appeal and its effect on the conditional stay granted by this
[p.714] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 708
court instructed Lawyer Ibrahim Mahama as his solicitor to file on his behalf an ex parte application for a writ of possession under Order 47, rr. 1 and 2. In support of the application for writ of possession this is what the defendant deposed to in paragraph 3:
“That the judgment was served on the plaintiff and the co-plaintiff and they filed an appeal against it. They also filed a motion for stay of execution of the judgment. The motion was dismissed by this honourable court.”
This is obviously a lie because the defendant knew that this honourable court did not dismiss the plaintiffs’ application for a stay outright. The truth of the matter is that this court granted the application subject to a condition that the plaintiffs should pay costs of ¢1,200 “forthwith” to the defendant. He also knew at the time of filing the application for writ of possession that the condition had been satisfied with the payment and the acceptance of the ¢1,200 by Lawyer Tagoe, his agent in Accra. He had also been informed by his solicitor Francis Korbieh that as a result of the payment and the acceptance of the ¢1,200 by Lawyer Tagoe the stay of execution granted by this court had become effective. It therefore follows that this court was misled by the defendant by concealing from the court vital information relevant to the consideration of the application before the court. A writ of possession issued when the judgment sought to be enforced has been stayed is a nullity. That being the case, what remedy is opened to the plaintiffs-applicants who are affected by the order?
It was not easy to appreciate why counsel for the plaintiffs-applicants relied on Order 47, rr. 1 and 2 for this application to set aside the writ of possession, for that provision was wholly inapplicable to the circumstances of the matter. In the case of Mosi v. Bagyina [1963] 1 G.L.R. 337 S.C. the Supreme Court in a judgment read by Akufo-Addo J.S.C. (as he then was) held (as stated in the headnote holding (4) at 338) that:
“Where a judgment or an order is void either because it is given or made without jurisdiction or because it is not warranted by any law or rule or procedure, the party affected is entitled ex debito justitiae to have it set aside, and the court or a judge is under a legal obligation to set it aside, either suo motu or on the application of the party affected. No judicial discretion arises here. The power of the court or a judge to set aside any such judgment or order is derived from the inherent jurisdiction of the court to set aside its own void orders and it is irrespective of any expressed power of review vested in the court or a judge; and the constitution of the court is for this purpose immaterial. Further,
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there is no time limit in which the party affected by a void order or judgment may apply to have it set aside.”
Therefore it is the inherent jurisdiction of the court that the plaintiffs have to rely upon.
The affidavit in support of the application to set aside the writ of possession was sworn to by A. A. Luguterah, solicitor for the plaintiffs. Learned counsel for the defendant has taken objection to the affidavit on the ground that it contained hearsay matters and that as the present application is not interlocutory, the application is based on hearsay evidence and should be disregarded. I have looked at the affidavit and I entirely agree with learned counsel for the defendant that paragraphs 8, 10 and 12 were hearsay matters. The rest of the paragraphs contained matters within the knowledge of A. A. Luguterah. These were matters that came to his knowledge during the long period he had been associated with the case. Order 38, r. 3 of L.N. 140A, deals with the contents of affidavits as follows:
“3. Affidavits shall be confined to such facts as the witness is able of his own knowledge to prove. The costs of every affidavit which shall unnecessarily set forth matters of hearsay, or argumentative matter, or copies of or extracts from documents, shall be paid by the party filing the same. Provided that on interlocutory proceedings or with leave under Order 30, Rule 2, or Order 37, Rule 1, an affidavit may contain statements of information and belief, with the sources and grounds thereof.”
In Rossage v. Rossage [1960] 1 W.L.R. 249, C.A. Barnard J. in the High Court granted custody of the child of the marriage to the father and granted the mother a right of access. Later the father applied to have the mother’s right suspended and in support of the application he filed an affidavit containing hearsay matters. Barnard J. had refused to expunge the hearsay matters on the ground that he would be able to put them out of his mind when considering the application; but the Court of Appeal took the view that the hearsay matters were inadmissible and ordered the affidavit to be expunged from the record. Cross J. did the same thing in In re J. (An Infant) [1960] 1 W.L.R. 253.
These English decisions were founded on the English Supreme Court Rules, the relevant rule being the same as our Order 38, r. 3. In my view our corresponding rule is subject to the same interpretation. If this is the case then clearly by our rules of court, hearsay matters should not be included in an affidavit. Paragraphs 8, 10 and 12 of the affidavit in support of the application become unnecessary and should be ignored. In this case however, the evidence contained in paragraphs 8, 10 and 12 are contained in the evidence given in court by Francis
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Korbieh, who was and from the record still is the solicitor for the defendant. In fact in Republic v. Greater Accra Regional Commissioner Ex parte Naawu III [1976] 2 G.L.R. 25, Taylor J. (as he then was) having expunged paragraph 4 of the affidavit in opposition, and having come to the conclusion that with the exclusion of paragraph 4 of the affidavit in opposition, there was no material before him showing the grounds by which the regional commissioner exercised his powers under the provisions of section 3 of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Decree, 1973 (N.R.C.D. 236) to detain Nii Adjetey Naawu III, the senior shippi and spokesman for Tema, he proceeded to examine the application brought under section 4 (1) of the Habeas Corpus Act, 1964 (Act 244), on the assumption that the arguments of counsel asserted the same ground.
It follows from the premises that Sapong J. was misled into granting the defendant’s application for writ of possession when there was in full force and effect an order for stay of execution. The order made by Sapong J. was consequently void. I would therefore set aside the order for the issue of writ of possession made on 28 July 1986 by Sapong J. and declare null and void the writ of possession issued in virtue of that order and all acts done in pursuance thereof.
DECISION
Order for the issue of writ of possession declared null and void and set aside.
J. A. A.
