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[1986] SLR (HC) 12High Court - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1984-86 (VOL II)

MAINOO vs. THE REPUBLIC [1984-86] 2 GLR 727

13 June 1986 · FRANCOIS JSC · ≈ 5 min read

Cite as[1986] SLR (HC) 12
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OSCOLAMAINOO v THE REPUBLIC [1984-86] 2 GLR 727 [1986] SLR (HC) 12
APAMAINOO v THE REPUBLIC [1984-86] 2 GLR 727, [1986] SLR (HC) 12 (Ghana).
BluebookMAINOO v THE REPUBLIC [1984-86] 2 GLR 727, [1986] SLR (HC) 12 (Ghana High Ct. 1986).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Nubour v. Ampadu, Court of Appeal, 31 May 1960, Cyclostyled Judgments, January-June 1960, unreported,

(2) Craven v. Craven (1957) 107 L.J. 505, C.A.

(3) Bruce v. Attorney-General [1967] G.L.R. 170, C.A.

(4) Asante v. Bogyabi [1966] G.L.R. 232, S.C.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL against conviction by a district court for the offence of careless driving contrary to section 18 (1) of the Road Traffic Ordinance, 1952 (No. 55 of 1952). The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment of Francois J.S.C. sitting as an additional judge of the High Court.

COUNSEL

Kwaku Baah for the appellant.

Kyei-Nti for the Republic.

JUDGMENT OF FRANCOIS J.S.C.

The appellant questions the legitimacy of his conviction based on his alleged failure to exercise due care and attention on the Dodowah road, when clear findings for such a conclusion were not made by the trial magistrate.

The facts are not complex. The appellant was negotiating a curve near Dodowah Zongo when his bus came into collision with a Peugeot caravan which was proceeding in the opposite direction. The caravan sped on and could only come to a stop when its progress was halted by a telegraph pole which was providentially in its way.

The prosecution led evidence that the appellant had hogged the road. This evidence ‘was partisan in the sense that it came from occupants of the Peugeot caravan whose non-neutrality could not be concealed. But the magistrate did not expressly rely on that evidence nor did he set it against the appellant’s contention that the excessive speed of the Peugeot caravan was the sole cause of the accident.

Though a sketch of the scene was available showing the dimensions of the road and the width occupied by both vehicles, and the magistrate had reinforced his mental image with a personal inspection of the locus in quo, it does not appear that much profit was derived either from the [p.729] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 727

wealth of material available or the exercise of inspection. The topography of a curve on a hillock just at the approaches of a town, would itself call for care and circumspection from vehicular road users, and one expected the magistrate to be unhesitant in the cataloguing facts that would support his conclusions on a finding of carelessness. On the contrary, however, the magistrate concerned himself with general observations whose tenor was a blanket condemnation of bus drivers. His ex cathedra pronouncement that municipal bus drivers vaunted the size of their vehicles and would therefore yield no room to other road users he termed “small fry”, was an extraneous comment irrelevant to the issue and unrelated to his duty of ascertaining the facts.

It was valiantly argued by counsel for the Republic, that since the magistrate had commended the driver of the Peugeot car for possessing the presence of mind not to brake in the circumstances and reserved all his disparaging and uncomplimentary epithets for bus drivers in general, and had moreover followed this with a conviction, the only permissible inference was a finding against the appellant of carelessness and inattentiveness in the control and management of his vehicle in breach of section 18 (1) of the Road Traffic Ordinance, 1952 (No. 55 of 1952). On that argument, the absence of the magical words, “I find”, should not vitiate the conviction. But the law prescribes a mandatory procedure for the due progress of a trial from the inception to its conclusion. A verdict at the end of a trial must be arrived at upon a consideration of the facts and arguments for and against. The magistrate as arbiter, must weigh the pros and cons and make his findings upon which his conclusions and reasons rest. Both findings and reasons are subject to analytical scrutiny on appeal. If there are no findings, an appellate court is disabled from determining whether the magistrate’s conclusions are justified, except in the rare cases where overwhelming evidence points only one way. Where no findings are made, the courts have regarded the trial as a nullity. Thus in Nubuor v. Ampadu, Court of Appeal, 31 May 1960, Cyclostyled Judgments, January-June 1960 at 97, the court held a trial unsatisfactory where findings of fact upon which a judgment should be based had not been made. The court adopted the English Court of Appeal decision in Craven v. Craven (1957) 107 L.J. 505, C.A. as decisive of the matter. In that case their lordships of the House of Lords held:

“the judicial process is a duty to resolve the facts in issue and facts relevant to the issue and then to apply the law to the facts. If the question — what were the facts found?, could not be answered with precision and particularity, the judgment ought to be held to be unsatisfactory.”

[p.730] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 727

The decision in Craven v. Craven (supra) has influenced our court ever since: see Bruce v. Attorney-General [1967] G.L.R. 170 at 187, C.A; and Asante v. Bogyabi [1966] G.L.R. 232, S.C.

As previously observed, closely related to the duty to make findings, the magistrate is equally obliged to state reasons for his judgment. None appear in this case. One recalls Lord Denning’s celebrated pun in an address to the Law Society of England; the Master of the Rolls there said:

“Give reasons for your decisions; for if you give no reasons, it will be construed as a judgment given without reason and an unreasonable one.”

On both counts therefore the magistrate’s decision is clearly defective. Having come to the view that the trial was unsatisfactory, two courses are open, either to allow the appeal simpliciter as was done in Bruce v. Attorney-General (supra) and Asante v. Bogyabi (supra) or order a retrial as occurred in Craven v. Craven (supra) which was followed in Nubuor v. Ampadu (supra). It seems to me that the discernible principle from the authorities which dictates the course to resort to, is the discovery of overwhelming evidence upon which a proper inference may be drawn on guilt or liability. If the evidence exists, then the appellate court can evaluate it. Unfortunately, in this case, no primary facts were established. It is not the duty of this court to make primary findings and to proceed thereupon to resolve essential issues. The prohibitions that fetter me did not assail the court in the Asante and Bruce cases. I find myself consequently bound by the other authorities. I shall accordingly allow the appeal but order a retrial before a different magistrate. All fines paid should be refunded.

DECISION

Appeal allowed.

Retrial ordered.

M.C.N.N.

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