REPUBLIC vs. AKIM ABUAKWA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL; EX PARTE ANTWI AND ANOTHER [1984-86] 2 GLR 756
22 September 1986 · ABAKAH J · ≈ 17 min read
[1986] SLR (HC) 13Other citation styles and permanent link
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Republic v. Akim Abuakwa Traditional Council; Ex parte Sakyiraa II [1977] 2 G.L.R. 115.
(2) Republic v. Judicial Committee of Kwahu Traditional Council; Ex parte Danso, High Court, Koforidua, 27 March 1980, unreported.
(3) R v. Electricity Commissioners; Ex parte London Joint Committee Co. (1920) Ltd. [1924] 1 K.B.
171, C.A.
(4) R v. Criminal Inquiries Compensation Board; Ex parte Lain [1967] 2 Q.B. 864; [1967] 3 W.L.R.
348; [1967] 2 All E.R. 770, D.C.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION for an order of certiorari to quash the decision of the Kyebi Executive Council in respect of a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy referred to it by the Akim Abuakwa Traditional Council. The facts are sufficiently set out in the ruling.
COUNSEL
M. Osei Nti for the applicants.
A. Asante Tannor for the third and fourth respondents.
JUDGMENT OF ABAKAH J.
By this application, the applicants want an order of this court to bring up to be quashed a decision of the Akim Abuakwa Traditional Council and/or the Kyebi Executive Council given on 8 April 1986 at Kibi in the suit entitled Opanin Kwasi Antwi and Lieutenant-Colonel (Rtd.) Isaac Osei Agyare v. Nana Kwakye Ababio II and Baffour Atta Yaw. The application is of course being opposed by the respondents.
The facts relied upon by the applicants in support of their application derive from the affidavit filed by them. They are stated thus: The royal Asona family of Kwabeng in the Akim Abuakwa Traditional Area is made up of three houses, namely Kokoben; Babaduam; and Akwanwenem. It has been the custom that the queenmother of Kwabeng is appointed from any of these three houses after the principal members of these houses and the chief of Kwabeng have entered into consultations. The first applicant who swore to the supporting affidavit on behalf of himself and on behalf of the second applicant claims to be the abusuapanin of Babaduam and the second applicant the abusuapanin of Kokoben. The third respondent, Baffour Atta Yaw, is the abusuapanin of the third house, Akwanwenem. In December 1985 the queenmother of Kwabeng died. This incident sparked off the strife which gave rise to this application. Another queenmother had to be installed. In disregard of the time-worn custom alluded to above, the second and third respondents on 17 March 1986
[p.759] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 756 in front of the palace of the second respondent before a public gathering proclaimed one Akua Broni the new queenmother of Kwabeng. Thereupon the applicants swore the great oath of Akim Abuakwa in registration of their taking exception to the conduct of the respondents and commenced proceedings in the Akim Abuakwa Traditional Council to challenge the proclamation of Akua Broni as the new queenmother of Kwabeng. The Akim Abuakwa Traditional Council, the first respondent, fixed the case for 8 April 1986 and notified the parties concerned accordingly. Before the hearing date the applicants amended their statement of claim by joining Akua Broni. The amending papers had not been served on the respondents who had not filed a statement of defence before the fixed date.
On 8 April 1986 the unexpected did happen. The matter before the first respondent was a chieftaincy matter and one would have expected it to be determined by a judicial committee appointed by the first respondent. Instead of the matter coming before a judicial committee appointed by the first respondent, it came before a body styled the Kyebi Executive Council appointed by the Okyenhene himself for the adjudication of the matter. The case was called on the appointed day and the Okyenhene Osagyefo Kuntunkununku II personally just dismissed the applicants’ case in these circumstances, breaching, as he did so, the rules of natural justice. Exhibited and marked exhibit E is the proceedings in question, before the Kyebi Executive Council.
The affidavit in opposition to the application was sworn to by the second respondent on behalf of himself and on behalf of the third respondent. No affidavit in opposition was filed on behalf of the first respondent and fourth respondents. The opposing affidavit states that the chieftaincy matter in question is before the judicial committee of the Akim Abuakwa Traditional Council. It is also deposed therein that the applicants have no blood relationship with the Akwanwenem family and therefore their claim to the stool is baseless. The affidavit goes on to defend the proclamation of Akua Broni’s appointment. The respondents’ contention with respect to the oath is that there was a reply in the form of the swearing of an oath to the swearing of the oath by the applicants and “that the same has been reported to the Kyebi Executive Council and the necessary rites have been performed for investigations as required by Akyem Abuakwa custom.” According to the affidavit, the first respondent fixed 8 April 1986 for investigations into the swearing of the oath. The Kyebi Executive Council whose function it is to do this investigation only met to do this; that the matter was still pending and that at the hearing of the application (on which is this ruling) the hearing notice evidencing the pendency of the matter dated 17 June 1986 and asking the parties to attend the hearing on 8 July 1986 would be tendered. The affidavit is emphatic that exhibit E is
[p.760] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 756 not an adjudication which can be quashed by certiorari and that the first and the fourth respondents have made no decision.
From the two affidavits filed in this application it would seem as if the two parties are speaking at cross purposes but I feel convinced that they can be brought to a common confluence and the real differences between them resolved by their determination. Before I come to the very crux of this matter let me deal with one or two points of difference between the parties although they are not, stricto sensu, relevant for purposes of determining the real issues.
The first is whether or not the Kyebi Executive Council is a public as distinguished from a domestic body. Mr. Asante Tannor for the respondents seemed to forge towards the school of thought that categorises it as a domestic body although he was not very articulate on this. Mr. Michael Osei Nti took his stand in the opposite camp and went at great length to trace the structure of the Akim Abuakwa Traditional council by reference to chapter 1 of the book, Akan Laws and Customs and the Akim Abuakwa Constitution by J. B. Danquah on the constitution of Akim Abuakwa at page 11 of that chapter. Being a creature of customary law, Mr. Osei Nti contended, the Kyebi Executive Council was a public body. Mr. Osei Nti wanted no doubt of any measure to persist on this position and went far out into article 4 (1) of the abrogated Constitution, 1979, as saved by section 61 of the Provisional National Defence Council (Establishment) Proclamation (Supplementary and Consequential Provisions) Law, 1982 (P.N.D.C.L. 42), as well as the case of the Republic v. Akim Abuakwa Traditional Council; Ex parte Sakyiraa II [1977] 2 G.L.R. 115 at 128-129 to insulate his contention from any uncertainty. As I have already observed, although Mr. Asante Tannor asserted that the Kyebi Executive Council was not a public body he did not answer the points of substance raised by Mr. Michael Osei Nti as supported by the authorities cited by him. I believe I heard Mr. Osei Nti also say that an unreported case Republic v. Judicial Committee of Kwahu Traditional Council; Ex parte Danso, High Court, Koforidua, 27 March 1980, decided by Apatu-Plange J. has made the judicial pronouncement to the effect that the Kyebi Executive Council was a public body. My quick look at that decision does not appear to support this fact.
I shall, however, resist the push into taking the trouble of making a pronouncement on whether or not the Kyebi Executive Council is a public as opposed to a domestic body in this ruling because I do not find the exercise terribly necessary for the purpose of dealing with the application before me. Perhaps a more appropriate opportunity may present itself for this at some future time. I jealously and tenaciously cling to the concept that a body, call it any name you like, which proceeds to determine matters which by statute are reserved to another
[p.761] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 756 body must be subject to review by certiorari. I feel confident in this view now because of two cases into which I have run during a brief research. They are: R v. Electricity Commissioner; Ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee Co. (1920) Ltd. [1924] 1 K.B. 171, C.A. R. v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board; Ex parte Lain [1967] 2 Q.B. 864, D.C. From these cases the notion is put forward that a body required to make a determination affecting individual interests in a judicial manner was subject to review by certiorari despite the fact that it was neither constituted by a statute nor endowed with jurisdiction by statute. The modern view is that certiorari did not lie against only bodies established by statute. Therefore if the Kyebi Executive Council, whatever its nature, proceeded to determine a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy, a matter whose jurisdiction is reserved to a different body, then certiorari should lie to quash its proceedings and decision since it is trite knowledge that it is traditional councils which have the exclusive jurisdiction to determine such matters as arise in their areas. It is now left to find out whether the Kyebi Executive Council did determine a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy.
The spark that set the magazine of this legal strife ablaze was the death in December 1985 of the queenmother of Kwabeng. It is common ground that: (a) a new queenmother stood to be installed; (b) that whether rightly or wrongly the second and the third respondents one Akua Broni the new queenmother; (c) that the applicants thereupon swore the great oath of Akim Abuakwa; and (d) that the applicants instituted proceedings in registration of their objection to the declaration of Akua Broni as the new queenmother. Since the two parties are agreed and I also do agree that the issue that erupted as a result of the exception taken by the applicants upon the declaration by the second and third respondents was a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy, I need not go very far into this. It will, however, be worth our while to mention that queenmother of Akim Abuakwa where the spotlight of this ruling is cast, is a chief within section 49(e) of the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), and that the question of the nomination, election, appointment or installation of a woman to fill a vacancy created by the death of a queenmother in this ethnic area is a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy within section 66 of Act 370. It was this issue that the applicants did submit to the Akim Abuakwa Traditional Council for determination. This they did by first swearing the great oath of Akim Abuakwa. Here lies a small point of difference between the parties and this has to be resolved. According to Mr. Asante Tannor it is the swearing of this oath that the Kyebi Executive Council set itself to go into and did go into, the result of which being exhibit E. This exhibit is a record of the proceedings before the Kyebi Executive Council on that day, i.e. 8 April 1986 . When one considers
[p.762] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 756 this argument by Mr. Asante Tannor one may be tempted to go in with it because paragraph 12 of the applicants’ own affidavit in support of this application states, “That the applicants herein, immediately commenced oath proceedings against the second and the third respondents in the Akyem Abuakwa Traditional Council and filed all the necessary papers which are exhibited as exhibits A and B.”
In the course of arguing the motion Mr. Osei Nti explained that the swearing of the oath was only the procedure adopted by the applicants in commencing action on the cause or matter affecting chieftaincy already referred to in the Akim Abuakwa Traditional Council. If, as Mr. Asante Tannor does agree, the matter being complained of by the applicants was one of chieftaincy then I am at a loss to appreciate why in the light of section 4 (1) of the Chieftaincy (Proceedings and Functions) (Traditional Councils) Regulations, 1972 (L.I. 798), Mr. Asante Tannor should, in another breath, argue that what was referred to the Akim Abuakwa Traditional Council by the applicants and which eventually came before the Kyebi Executive Council was a matter of an oath swearing that was to be investigated. Section 4 (1) of L.I. 798 states:
“4. (1) An action may be commenced in a Traditional Council in one of the following manner;— (a) by swearing a Chief’s oath or any other oath recognised within the area of authority of a Traditional Council.”
That section goes on to state two other additional modes of commencing action in a traditional council. It is unnecessary to reproduce these two other modes. Here is a statutory provision permitting the swearing of an oath to commence an action and here are the applicants who have done just that and here is Mr. Asante Tannor trying to convince the court to hold, in these circumstances, that the Kyebi Executive Council sat on 8 April 1986 to, as paragraph 14 of the affidavit in opposition puts it in part, “to go into the reasons for swearing the great oath.” In my view the claim of the second and the third respondents as deposed to in paragraph 14 of their affidavit, namely to go into the swearing of an oath which is permitted under the law, is ill founded and inasmuch as that body purported to wrestle with the provisions of this instrument, their action in this regard was even illegal. However, in view of the submissions addressed to me by both counsel I shall deal with how the Kyebi Executive Council became seised of the matter and what they did with it.
[p.763] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 756
Nobody disputes that the applicants referred a chieftaincy matter to the Akim Abuakwa Traditional Council for adjudication. It is also not disputed that the Akim Abuakwa Traditional Council gave notice to the parties to appear on 8 April 1986 for the adjudication in question. When 8 April 1986 arrived and the parties presented themselves, however, they found themselves, instead of before a judicial committee made up of three or five members appointed by the Akim Abuakwa Traditional Council, rather before the Kyebi Executive Council made up of as many as sixteen persons all of whom were members of the Akim Abuakwa Traditional Council. The president of the Akim Abuakwa Traditional Council, Osagyefo Kuntunkununku II, was one of the sixteen persons present. It is logical to conclude from the above that the reference to the Kyebi Executive Council of this matter could not have been done by any other than the Akim Abuakwa Traditional Council. In my view the matter was properly placed before the Akim Abuakwa Traditional Council by the applicants.
The question is what should the Akim Abuakwa Traditional Council have done upon receipt of the applicants’ process? For an answer the court has to turn to the provisions of sections 15 and 28 (2) of Act 370 and regulations 1-3 of L.I. 798. Section 15 of Act 370 is the provision which clothes the traditional councils with exclusive jurisdiction to determine causes or matters affecting chieftaincy and arising within their areas. Regulations 2 and 3 (1) of L.I. 798 reiterate in every material part section 28 (2) of Act 370 which states:”
“(2) The said jurisdiction [i.e. conferred by section 15 of Act 370 giving exclusive jurisdiction over chieftaincy causes or matters to Traditional Councils] shall be exercised by a judicial committee of the
Traditional Council comprising three or five persons appointed by that Council. . .”
There is no room for doubt that traditional councils have jurisdiction, exclusive jurisdiction for that matter, over chieftaincy causes or matters arising in their areas and they deal with them through judicial committees appointed by them. I take it, however, that the decisions arrived at by the judicial committees are to be regarded as the decisions of the traditional councils that appoint them. Nothing can be clearer. From the law governing the situation it is plain that the Akim Abuakwa Traditional Council’s reference of this chieftaincy cause or matter to the Kyebi Executive Council was done without jurisdiction as being an act contrary to the clear provisions of Act 370, and the instrument that was made thereunder. Consequently, the Kyebi Executive Council itself from the word go acted without jurisdiction.
[p.764] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 756
Its proceedings whether they culminated in any decision or not were, in like manner void and if they did, in fact, culminate in any decision, that decision was itself also void.
Mr. Asante Tannor, for the second and third respondents, has argued that apart from the fact that the Kyebi Executive Council sat to go into the circumstances that led to the swearing of the great oath of Akim Abuakwa and not to determine a chieftaincy matter, the Kyebi Executive Council did not give any decision that can be quashed by certiorari. Mr. Michael Osei Nti disagreed and countered Mr. Asante Tannor’s argument by contending that the Kyebi Executive Council made positive orders which were decisions. Mr. Asante Tannor said that the power to investigate the circumstances in which the great oath is sworn is vested in the Kyebi Executive Council. To determine this issue I have to examine the record of the proceedings of the Kyebi Executive Council held on 8 April 1986. This record is labelled exhibit E.
An examination of this record does not show that at that meeting the foggiest reference was made to any oath having been sworn by anybody to call for any investigation. [The court here after quoting the contents of the record of proceedings of the Kyebi Executive Council held on 8 April 1986, continued.]
The record speaks of no oath swearing at all. The interpretation put on the first and second paragraphs of exhibit E by Mr. Asante Tannor is that Osagyefo Kuntunkununku II merely stated a principle of customary law with regard to the appointment of a queenmother in Akim Abuakwa and then said that meeting was not going to poke its nose, so to speak, into that matter. In other words, Mr. Asante Tannor must be understood to have said that the meeting did not go into the chieftaincy matter in question. Mr. Osei Nti disagreed, arguing that those two paragraphs rather constituted a confirmation of the declaration made by the second and the third respondents.
Without more, I myself felt that the two paragraphs in question were capable of the two different interpretations put forward by both counsel. I must confess that Mr. Asante Tannor’s version attracted me the more at first but further down exhibit E are two orders made by the meeting. One was for the payment of “customary dispersing fee charged” and the other was for payment of a “fee of introduction of the new queenmother.” The first was ¢3,000 and the second ¢10,000. These were two clear cut orders made by the meeting. It was also ordered that the findings of the committee appointed be submitted to the council. I did ask Mr. Asante Tannor to explain the references to those sums of money as he had so attractively done in the case of the first and second paragraphs. Mr. Asante Tannor said that the meeting as a matter of administrative action only declared how much a new queenmother was required to pay but it did not mean that the election of a new
[p.765] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 756 queenmother had been confirmed and that she should pay that sum. With great respect to learned counsel for the second and the third respondents, I am utterly unable to join him in this stand. Exhibit E is clear. These sums were “ordered” and it stands to reason to take it that they were ordered to be paid. If they were ordered to be paid then certainly the second payment ordered was meant for, in the terms of the order, “introduction of the new queenmother.” In the light of this order therefore I do accept the interpretation put on the first two paragraphs of exhibit E by Mr. Osei Nti, namely that the proclamation by the second and the third respondents of Akua Broni as the new queenmother of Kwabeng was confirmed by the Kyebi Executive Council. Paragraph 3 of exhibit E shows that the president of the meeting proceeded to appoint a committee of five as the record states: “to investigate the case, so far as the three houses, namely Babaduam, Kokoben, and Akwanwenem which constitute the Kwabeng ruling Asona family are concerned.” I must remark that the hearing notice referred to by Mr. Asante Tannor was not tendered in this application.
From the affidavits filed in support of and in opposition to this application, from exhibit E, from the submissions of counsel and from all the circumstances the most logical interpretation to this paragraph is that the Kyebi Executive Council set up a committee of five to go into the historicity of the account of the three houses and how a queenmother can be elected, as given by the applicants. I rule out any contention that it was a judicial committee that was appointed because of the reference to the number “5”. I rule such a contention out because it is the Akim Abuakwa Traditional Council which has jurisdiction to appoint a judicial committee and not the Kyebi Executive Council.
In sum therefore I hold that the Kyebi Executive Council at its meeting of Tuesday 8 April 1986 did arrive at and made certain positive decisions which in my view can be quashed. In my respectful view therefore the following actions were null and void and of no legal effect: (a) the reference by the Akim Abuakwa Traditional Council of this chieftaincy cause or matter to the Kyebi Executive Council; (b) the entire proceedings of the Kyebi Executive Council which gave the following decisions: (i) appointing a committee of five to do what has been recounted above; (ii) ordering the payment of dispersing fee of ¢3,000; and (iii) ordering the payment of a fee of ¢10,000 as introduction of the new queenmother. It is therefore finally ordered that those proceedings together with the decisions into which they culminated shall be removed from the Kyebi Executive Council and brought up here for the purpose of their being quashed and they are hereby accordingly quashed and that it shall be illegal to act on any of them. [p.766] of [1984-86] 2 GLR 756 The applicants shall be entitled to their costs in this application fixed at ¢10,000.
DECISION Application for certiorari granted.
J.A.A.
