SOCIAL SECURITY BANK vs. BINEY AND OTHERS [1997-1998] 2 GLR 886

CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Michelletti Polla Ltd v Crabbe [1976] 1 GLR 108, CA.

(2) Armah v Addoquaye [1972] 1 GLR 109, CA.

APPLICATION for order of court entering judgment on admissions of facts against the defendants. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.

Oppong for plaintiffs.

Agbanu for defendants.

Quaye J. By their amended statement of defence in answer to the plaintiffs’ claim for debt in the sum of ¢16,308,807.22 together with interest from 29 February 1990 until date of final payment, the defendants denied the quantum of debt. In paragraphs 4 and 5 thereof, they averred that the plaintiffs caused investigation between them and the first defendant by the National Investigation Committee (NIC) of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) and that after thorough and painstaking investigations their liability to the plaintiffs was found and stated to be not more than ¢4,604,463,58 as at 30 June 1989. Having so determined, the NIC invited the first defendant to pay off the whole sum “on or before 30 August 1989 without fail.”

Following from the pleading of the defendants aforesaid, the plaintiffs filed the present application presumably under Order 32, r 6 of the High Court (Civil Procedure Rules), 1954 (LN 1 40A) for an order of this court entering judgment on admissions against the defendants “and that the outstanding balance between the plaintiffs claim and the sum admitted by the defendants to be tried.”

In reaction to this application, it is the contention of the defendants that the plaintiffs cannot in law ask for judgment upon admissions and also pursue further claim against the defendants.

[p.888] of [1997-1998] 2 GLR 886

The relevant portions of the defendants’ affidavit in opposition are reproduced:

“(3) The real point at issue is whether the plaintiffs having taken the matter to the committee of inquiry and the said com’mittee having determined that my liability was to the tune of ¢4,600,000 the plaintiffs were not bound by that decision.

(4) I therefore contend that the plaintiffs were estopped from claiming any amount in excess of the ¢4,600,000.

(5) The plaintiff’s motion and affidavit is therefore a trick to obtain a judgment for the legitimate amount ordered by the committee and further pursue the alleged balance of ¢20 million which I count is illegal.

(6) The plaintiffs are indirectly also asking for interest on my indebtedness to them, which on my pleadings I contend is not excisable.

(7) . . . the admission must be unequivocal and not subject to any legal defences . . .”

The law is unambiguous. In fact the relevant rules of procedure are found in Order 32, r1i of LN 140A which provides for a party admitting the truth of the whole or any part of the case of the other party. Rule 6 of the Order states:

“6 Any party may at any stage of a cause or matter, where admissions of facts have been made, either on the pleadings, or otherwise, apply to the Court or a Judge for such judgment or order as upon such admissions he may be entitled to, without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties; and the Court or a Judge may upon such application make such order, or give such judgment, as the Court or Judge may think just.”

These provisions have been tested in the courts in Ghana. The pnrinciple therein contained was upheld by the Court of Appeal per Sowah JA (as he then was) in Michilletti Polla Ltd v Crabbe [1976] 1 GLR 108, CA. In that case the trial court upheld an oral application for judgment upon admissions. On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the application ought to be by motion. In the earlier case of Armah v Addoquaye [1972] 1 GLR 109, another Court of Appeal decision, Anin JA (as he then was) delivering the judgment of the court, held that:

[p.889] of [1997-1998] 2 GLR 886

“. . . Under Order 32, r 6 any party at any stage may move for such judgment on admissions of fact made, either on pleadings or otherwise, as upon such admissions he may be entitled to, without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties.”

The principle therefore seems to be that, once there is material in the pleadings from which an inference can be made of admissions by the one party of any part or the whole of the other party’s claim, then the application may be made. In the instant case, the claim is for a debt. While the parties are not agreed as to the quantum, there is evidence from the pleadings that at least a part of what the plaintiff is claiming has been conceded by the defendants. I think the stage has been set for the invocation of Order 32, r 6. The condition being introduced by the defendants is not admissible under the rule. To uphold the defendants’ conten tion would be tantamount to introducing elements or ingredients into Order 32, r 6, which a careful reading of the words thereof does not import. I must say this, that the plaintiff’s claim is not automatic. The onus is upon him to prove to the requisite degree his claim; the defendant may lead evidence to disprove the claim. Where the plaintiff fails to satisfy the court, he would lose. Upon the foregoing, I hereby enter judgment in favour of the plaintiff for the recovery from the defendants the amount admitted by the defendants in their pleading, being ¢4,604,463.58. The balance outstanding being the amount disputed by the defendants will be determined after evidence has been led.

Application granted.

LSNA