REPUBLIC vs. HIGH COURT JUDGE, BOLGATANGA; EX PARTE ASANGALISA AND OTHERS [1999-2000] 1 GLR 467
2 June 1999 · AKUFFO JSC · ≈ 3 min read
[1999] SLR (SC) 13Other citation styles and permanent link
SLR is the Superlaw Reports citation series assigned by SuperLawGH. It is not an official law report. Suggested styles are a guide, so check your institution’s style guide.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
PRELIMINARY OBJECTION by the respondent-interested party to an application by the applicant to the Supreme Court to invoke the court’s supervisory jurisdiction for an order of certiorari to quash the ruling of the High Court, Bolgatanga on the ground that the application has been filed out of time and is therefore invalid. The facts are sufficiently stated in the ruling of the Supreme Court delivered by Akuffo JSC.
COUNSEL
E Ansah-Obiri for the respondent interested party
No representation by or for the applicant.
JUDGMENT OF AKUFFO JSC
Akuffo JSC delivered the ruling of the court. This is a motion by the applicant praying for an order of certiorari to quash the ruling delivered on 6 June 1997 by the judge of the High Court, Bolgatanga in originating summons No 1/1996. In his statement of case in opposition to the application herein, counsel for the interested party has raised a preliminary point of law challenging the competency
[p.468] of [1999-2000] 1 GLR 467
of the motion. The basis for the preliminary point is simple, though fundamental, and it is that the application is out of time and, there- fore, not in compliance with rule 62 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1996 (CI 16). Consequently, it is necessary for us to deal first with this preliminary point of law, since, in the event it is valid, there will be no need for us to embark upon the merits of the application itself.
According to the said statement of case, the application is out of time because, although the decision sought to be quashed was delivered on 6 June 1997, the motion herein was filed on 14 November 1997. These dates are borne out by the record.
Rules 61 to 66 of CI 16 govern the procedure for invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this court. Rule 62 of CI 16 is quite clear and it succinctly sets out, as follows, the time limits within which applications invoking the jurisdiction may be brought:
“62. An application to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court shall be filed within three months of the date of the decision against which the jurisdiction is invoked unless the time is extended by the Court.”
Additionally, rule 66 of CI 16 further clarifies the matter of time limits in the following manner:
“66. An application for the extension of time within which to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court under rule 62 shall not be made after the expiration of the three months period within which an application seeking to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction may be filed..”
The combined effect of these provisions is so clear as to require no lengthy expatiation. Suffice it to say that, by these provisions, a party seeking to invoke our supervisory jurisdiction must file his application within the stipulated time, unless we have specifically extended that time for him, which extension must have been obtained within the same three months period. Thus our discretion to adjust the time frame is tightly limited to extensions for which application is made within time. For the purposes of invoking our supervisory jurisdiction, time is clearly, a crucial factor, with which an applicant cannot be, and is not, permitted by the rules to play around as he pleases. Therefore, any application for our supervisory
[p.469] of [1999-2000] 1 GLR 467
jurisdiction, which is filed after the stipulated three months would not be an application properly before us. An application, which is not properly before us, is for all legal intents and purposes non-existent and we would have no jurisdiction to consider it.
The instant application ought to have been filed on or before 6 September 1997. Otherwise, before 6 September 1997, the applicant ought to have obtained from us an extension of the time within which to file the application. Thus, there is no doubt that the application before us is woefully and incurably incompetent and we have absolutely no jurisdiction to hear it. For that reason, it must be struck out.
DECISION
Application dismissed
SA
