REPUBLIC vs. THE REGISTRAR , HIGH COURT ADENTA EXPARTE ABEDNEGO TETTEH KWAOSURO

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE

IN THE SUPREME COURT

ACCRA – A.D.2026

CORAM: PWAMANG JSC (PRESIDING)

KWOFIE JSC

DARKO ASARE JSC

ADJEI JSC

SUURBAAREH JSC

CIVIL MOTION

NO: J5/70/2026

23RD JUNE, 2026

REPUBLIC

VRS

THE REGISTRAR

HIGH COURT ………… RESPONDENT

ADENTA

EX-PARTE:

ABEDNEGO TETTEH KWAOSURO ………… APPLICANT

THE DIVISIONAL POLICE COMMANDER ………… INTERESTED PARTY

GHANA POLICE SERVICE, DODOWA

RULING

ADJEI JSC:

On 23rd June, 2026, this Court quashed the ruling of the High Court, Adenta-Accra and adjourned to 9th July, 2026 for reasons to be filed at the Registry of this Court. The Applicant brought the action against the Registrar, High Court, Adenta, for an order of certiorari to quash the High Court’s ruling, which assumed jurisdiction over an ex parte application filed to initiate an action before it and granted a perpetual injunction against the respondent therein without a hearing. This Court found that the impugned ruling was delivered by the High Court Judge, not the Registrar of the High Court, and corrected the title. The trite position of law is that a misnomer is amendable either by an application by a party who alleges that there is a mistake in the naming of a party in a case, but that does not change the identity of the person who has been wrongly described or by the Court suo motu which is seised with jurisdiction. A misnomer shall not be corrected by an amendment where it seeks to substitute a new party for the original party to the suit.

The rule on misnomer provides that an amendment may be made by a court on its own motion or upon an application by a party to correct a mistake provided the intended person or thing is identifiable, and no one would be prejudiced. The power to apply the misnomer rule gives the courts authority to amend the name of a party or a thing that has been wrongly described, thereby avoiding invalidation of the entire process or rendering the judgment unintelligible if not corrected. The only proviso is that the correction should not prejudice any of the parties.

In Clark v Oceanic Contractors Inc 2 AC [1983]130; 2 WLR [1983] 685; 1 All ER [1983] 219, HL, the House of Lords was confronted with the appropriate instances in which to apply the rule of misnomer to do justice and to save a case from invalidation. The Plaintiff sued “Oceanic Contractors Inc” when the correct name was “Oceanic Contractors (UK) Limited”. The majority of the House of Lords held that the plaintiff did not sue a non-existing entity, that the defendant knew it was the one being sued, and that the writ could be amended. Lord Wilberforce made the following profound statement at 2 AC 130, 142-143:

“The question is whether the plaintiff has sued the right defendant under a wrong name or whether he has sued a wrong defendant altogether. If it is the former, and the defendant intended to be sued was aware that he was the intended defendant and has not been misled or prejudiced, the court will allow the error to be corrected. If the latter, the action fails.”

The order in question was made by the High Court, which the Supreme Court supervises under Article 132 of the Constitution, and not by the registrar of the High Court, who did not make it. The parties knew that it was the order of the High Court which is being challenged, and the amendment shall be made to correct the error without prejudicing any of the parties.

The title of the case is as follows:

“In the Matter of an Application Invoking

the Supervisory Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

The Republic

Vs

The High Court, Adenta- Accra

Ex Parte: Abednego Tettey Kwaosuro ——-Applicant

Secretary, Hiowe Gblaka, Doryumu

The Divisional Police Commander ——— Interested Party

Ghana Police Service, Dodowa”.

The basis for the application was that the Interested Parted filed an ex parte application before the High Court, Adenta-Accra for an order to prohibit the Respondents therein from holding special event, (Installation of chief) on 16th May, 2026 at the Nene Aku Djagbletey Palace, Dodowa and Hiowe Gblaka respectively pursuant to section 1(6) of the Public Order Act, 1994 (Act 491) and sections 22 and 23 of the Criminal and other Offences Procedure Act, 1960 (Act 30).

According to the Applicant herein, although the motion paper listed their names as respondents to the ex parte application, they did not hear anything about the application until they were served with an order restraining them perpetually from holding any special event on 16th May, 2026. The Applicant contends that the acts of the High Court amount to a breach of the rules of natural justice, and there is a patent error on the face of the record, and the ruling of the High Court dated 15th May, 2026 should be quashed.

This Court also found that the Interested Party invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court by an ex parte application when there was no substantive action pending and violates several of the grounds upon which certiorari shall lie, including: patent error on the face of the record, breach of the rules of natural justice, lack of jurisdiction, and procedural impropriety under the Wednesbury Principles. The impugned order, the Applicant prayed this Honourable Court provides thus:

“Upon Reading the Affidavit of D/ SGT Wisdom Kenny Dzokotoof the Criminal Investigation Department, Ghana Police Service Doryumu, the Applicant and Deponent herein filed on the 15th day of May, 2026 in support of Motion Ex Parte for an order to prohibit the Respondents from Holding Special Event,(Installation of Chief) on 16th May, 2026 at Nene Akuh Djagbletey’s Palace, Dodowa and Hiowe Gblaka respectively; AND Upon hearing Chief Inspector Ebenezer Addo with ACP Patience Akwetey ( Divisional Commander, Dodowa) and Chief Inspector Abdul Rahman for and on behalf of the Applicant herein; It Is HEREBY ORDERED that all parties involved are prohibited from holding any special event on 16th May, 2026 in relation to the installation of any Chief or Sub- Chief at Nene Akuh Djagbletey’s Palace Dodowa and Hiawe Gblaka respectively.”

The above order of the High Court was duly signed by the High Court Judge who granted the application for prohibition to restrain the respondents therein from installing any Chief or Sub-Chief on 16th May, 2026.

The law on certiorari as established in several decisions including Republic v High Court, Kumasi, Ex Parte Appiah and Others [ 1997-98] 1 GLR 503 and Republic v High Court, Ho, Ex Parte Diawuo Bediako II ( Odum & Others Interested Parties)[2011] 1 SCGLR 704 have established that certiorari is a discretionary remedy but may be granted in cases where there is breach of the rules of natural justice (audi alterem partem and nemo judex in causa sua) lack or excess of jurisdiction, patent error on the face of the record, and a breach of any of the four principles in Wednesbury Principles which were recently developed through administrative law. The grounds are not cumulative; effective proof of only one is sufficient, provided it has been demonstrated that there was a real justification for its grant.

The Applicant alleges that the respondents before the High Court were denied a hearing on the application, thereby offending the audi alteram partem rule. The High Court granted the application to last forever, even though the respondents had not been heard. The basic classifications of injunctions are three: interim, interlocutory, and perpetual or permanent. At common law, an ex parte injunction was granted upon an ex parte application to last for several days, for about a week, for service on the other party, and for the merits of the application to be determined. An ex parte injunction is temporarily granted under exceptional circumstances pending an inter parties hearing. The English Court of Appeal in the case of Ansah v Ansah [1977] 2 All ER 638 and at 642 stated thus:

“If an order is made ex parte, it must be strictly limited in time if the risk of causing serious injustice is to be avoided. The time is to measure in days, ie the shortest period which must elapse before preliminary hearing can be arranged, and the order must specify the date on which it expires, if difficulty in serving the other party is anticipated it may, exceptionally be permissible to fix longer period and to provide in the order that the other party may apply on 24 hours notice to discharge the injunction.”

The Order 25 rules (7)-(10) on ex parte application for injunction provides as follows:

“(7) In case of urgency, a party may make the application ex parte supported by an affidavit.

(8) An application ex parte under subrule (3) shall not be granted unless the applicant gives sufficient reasons for making it ex parte and specifies some irreparable damage or mischief which will be caused to the plaintiff if the plaintiff proceeds ordinarily.

(9) Where an order is made pursuant to an application made ex parte under subrule 3 it shall not remain in force for more than ten days.

(10) If no application is made on notice to extend the order it shall lapse after the expiration of ten days from the making of the order unless the Court otherwise directs.”

The bottom line for an ex parte application is that it is without the other party for now, due to the exigency of the matter to be addressed, but it is not without the other party forever.

An interlocutory injunction is an order made on notice to subsist until the final determination of the substantive action before the court, or until the court decides otherwise. It is determined and granted when it appears to the court to be just or convenient. A perpetual or permanent injunction is granted as part of a final judgment and subsists forever until the final judgment is reversed.

The High Court granted the ex parte injunction to subsist permanently, which is manifestly wrong and amounts to patent error on the face of the record. Furthermore, the High Court denied the respondents before it the right to be heard and breached the audi alteram partem rule; the breach itself vitiates the decision. The High Court granted the ex parte application under section 1 subsection 5-7 of the Public Order Act, 1994 (Act 491) which confers exclusive jurisdiction on the High Court and the Regional Tribunals to grant an order to prohibit the holding of a special event where the organizers of the event refused to co-operate with the police and the Court considers it to be reasonably required in the interest of public order, public defence, public safety, public health, the running of essential services or to prevent a violation of the rights and freedoms of any other persons. The relevant provisions of section 1 of the Public Order Act, 1994, Act 491 provide thus:

“(5) An organiser requested under subsection (4) to postpone or relocate the holding of a special event shall within forty-eight hours of the request, notify the police officer in writing of the willingness to comply.

(6) Where the organiser refuses to comply with the request under subsection (4) or fails to notify the public officer in accordance with subsection (5), the police officer may apply to a Justice or the Chairman of a Regional Tribunal for an order to prohibit the holding of the special event on the proposed date or at proposed location.

(7) The Justice or chairman may make an order that the Justice or chairman considers to be reasonably required in the interest of public defence, public order, public safety, public health, the running of essential services or to prevent a violation of the rights and freedoms of any other persons.”

The Act provides that where the organizers of the special event fail to heed suggestions by the police to postpone or relocate the special event, they may apply to the High Court or a Regional Tribunal for an order of prohibition on any of the grounds stated in section 1(7) of the Public Order Act. The Court has discretion to grant such an application when it considers it necessary and urgent. The purpose of the Act does not contemplate that such an application shall be made ex parte, in light of the trite learning that the requirement to hear is implied whenever a statutory power affects a right or obligation or imposes liability. In Ridge v Baldwin and Others AC [1964]40 HL, the House of Lords, speaking through Lord Reid, held that the requirement to hear is implied whenever a statutory power affects a right, imposes an obligation or liability and failure to observe the right to hearing renders the decision void, and not merely voidable.

The High Court Judge did not have jurisdiction to hear an ex parte application and grant a perpetual injunction without hearing the parties, and her order is void.

The second ground that this Court suo motu raised is whether the jurisdiction of the High Court shall be invoked by an ex parte application. The law on the invocation of the civil jurisdiction of the High Court, as in the instant case, is that a writ of summons shall commence actions unless an enactment provides for the contrary. Order 2 rule 2 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2004 (C.I. 47) provides thus:

“Subject to any existing enactment to the contrary all civil proceedings shall be commended by filing of a writ of summons.”

Under Order 82, rule 3 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2004 (C.I. 47), the interpretation provision of the rules provides that a writ includes a writ of summons and statement of claim or a petition in a cause or matter. The jurisdiction of the High Court may also be invoked by an originating motion on notice (application) in case of enforcement of fundamental human rights under Order 67 of the High Court Rules, jurisdiction in relation to infants, and jurisdiction in relation to persons of unsound mind under sections 18 and 19 of the Courts Act, 1993 (Act 459) and in all cases where a law provides that an application shall commence it. Order 19 rule 1(2) of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, C.I. 47 provides that proceedings by which an application is to be made to a Court or Judge under any enactment shall be initiated by a motion and where an enactment provides that an application shall be made by some other means, a motion shall make it.

In Ghana, the three modes by which the jurisdiction of the High Court may be invoked are a writ, a petition, and an application, and a party cannot substitute one for the other. Where an action is to be commenced by a motion, neither a writ nor a petition can be used as a substitute. If substituted, it will constitute procedural impropriety and render the entire process void.

The criminal jurisdiction of the High Court is commenced by a charge sheet in summary trials and a bill of indictment in trial on indictment. A charge sheet invokes the jurisdiction of the Regional Tribunals. In criminal cases, the prosecution may seek an ex parte order for an arrest and search warrant in urgent situations. Still, both are procedural orders to bring the accused to court and are not a substitute for a charge sheet. It is settled law that an ex parte order cannot be used to determine a party’s fate in either civil or criminal proceedings without affording the party a hearing. An application for probate, letters of administration with will annexed, and letters of administration are traditionally initiated by an ex parte application because there are only applicants to the application and no respondent to be heard until a caveat is entered, when a respondent (caveator) comes into the matter. The subsequent processes are made on notice.

Section 1 subsections (6) and (7) of the Public Order Act 1994 (Act 419) requires the applicant to file an originating motion on notice (application on notice) for the jurisdiction of the High Court or the Regional Tribunal to be invoked before filing either an ex parte application or application on notice in the pending proceedings to properly invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court or a Regional Tribunal.

In a case where an ex parte application is filed in pending proceedings, the respondent is not heard due to the urgency of the matter, but the order shall remain in force for up to 10 days. The ex parte order shall not determine the rights of the respondent until the main application filed to initiate the case is determined. However, where the ex parte order is about to expire and remains relevant to the applicant, the applicant shall make the application on notice to the respondent.

The common law position on “final in effect” is that the use of an interlocutory application like an injunction is to determine the main issue of a case in exceptional circumstances, but cannot be used where the application only seeks to restrain the doing of an act in the interim. The case of NWL Ltd v Woods [1979] 1 WLR 1294, where the Court held that the ratio in the case of American Cyanamid Co. v Ethicon was on the grant or refusal of an injunction, and not in the instances where an application for an injunction may be used to dispose of the action finally in favour of whoever is successful in the application. There would be nothing more to handle. The same position was stated in the Supreme Court case of Republic v High Court, Kumasi, Ex Parte Appiah and others, as an obiter, held thus:

“A Court may, on an interlocutory application dispose of the case by determining the main issue but that cannot be done where the application only seeks to restrain in the interim the doing of an act.”

The High Court used an interim application for an injunction to determine the matter before her that only seeks to restrain in the interim the doing of an act, which the High Court could not have used an interlocutory application for an injunction to grant and renders her decision a patent error on the face of the record, and without jurisdiction.

In the case at hand, the High Court entertained an ex parte application to determine the rights of the respondents therein. When it was determined and granted, it deprived the respondents of the opportunity to be heard, as no substantive action was pending before the High Court for determination.

The High Court lacks jurisdiction to make orders in matters in which its jurisdiction has not been properly invoked, and the order made by it on 15th May, 2026 to prohibit the respondents in the application filed before it was made without jurisdiction; the order made is patently wrong on the face of it, and it further violates the audi alterem partem rule. The order made by the High Court further violates the law on procedural impropriety, which is one of the four pillars of the Wednesbury Principles, namely: illegality, irrationality, procedural impropriety, and legitimate expectation as enunciated in the case of Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223; [1947] 2 ALL ER 680.

The above reasons are the basis for which the order of the High Court, Adenta, dated 15th May, 2026, was quashed by this Court on 23rd June, 2026.

(SGD.) D. ADJEI

(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

(SGD.) G. PWAMANG

(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

(SGD.) H. KWOFIE

(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

(SGD.) Y. DARKO ASARE

(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

(SGD.) G. S. SUURBAAREH

(JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT)

COUNSEL

EDWARD J. METTLE-NUNOO ESQ. FOR THE APPLICANT

NO LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR INTERESTED PARTY