REPUBLIC vs. JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE AHANTA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL; EX PARTE BOSOMAKORA II [1982-83] GLR 231
22 November 1982 · TWUMASI J · ≈ 13 min read
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CASES REFERRED TO
(1) Watson v. Winch [1916] 1 K.B. 688; 85 L.J.K.B. 537; 115 L.T. 1209; 80 J.P. 149; 32 T.L.R. 244;
14 L.G.R. 486.
(2) Allinson v. General Council of Medical Education and Registration [1894] 1 Q.B. 750. (3) R. (De Vesci) v. Queen’s County v. Justices (1908) 2 I.R. 285.
(4) R.v. Barnsley Licensing Justices; Ex parte Barnsley and District Licensed Victuallers’ Association [1960] 2 Q.B. 167, [1960] 3 W.L.R. 305; [1960] 2 All E.R. 703; 124 J.P. 359; 104 S.J. 583; 58 L.G.R. 285, C.A.
(5) R. v. Justices of Sunderland [1901] 2 K.B. 357.
(6) R. v. Rand (1866) L.R. 1 Q.B. 230; 7 B. & S. 297; 35 L.J.M.C. 157; 30 J.P. 293. (7) Adjaku v. Galenku [1974] 1 G.L.R. 198.
(8) Attorney-General v. Sallah, Supreme Court, 17 April 1970, unreported; digested in [1970] C.C. 54. (9) Kwofie v. Kakraba [1966] G.L.R. 229.
(10) R. v. Agricultural Land Tribunal for the South Eastern Area; Ex parte Bracey [1960] 2 All E.R.
518.
(11) Bakuma v. Ekor [1972] 1 G.L.R. 133.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
APPLICATION for an order of certiorari to quash the proceedings in a chieftaincy dispute. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.
COUNSEL
D. D. Gwira for the applicant.
Ahlijah, Chief State Attorney, for the respondents.
JUDGMENT OF TWUMASI J.
This application seeks an order of certiorari to quash the proceedings in a suit instituted before the judicial committee of the Ahanta Traditional Council. The applicant is the chief of Takoradi
[p.234] of [1982-83] GLR 231 and it would appear from the proceedings before the said committee that certain persons preferred destoolment charges against him and that the trial terminated in his disfavour. On the basis of a few grounds stated by him the applicant herein claims that the proceedings are amenable to certiorari and prays this court to quash same. The applicant assails the jurisdiction of the judicial committee. He alleges bias and denial to him of his right to be heard. He questions the compositions of the judicial committee. He pinpoints procedural errors. On the question of jurisdiction, counsel for the applicant submitted that the destoolment charges were not laid by the accredited kingmakers. Hence the charges were not properly laid before the committee and the latter had no right or jurisdiction to entertain them. He relied on sections 2-4 of the Chieftaincy (Destoolment Proceedings) Regulations, 1963 (L.I. 309). These sections require that destoolment charges must first be investigated by accredited elders before they are referred to the traditional council for adjudication. They also provide that only the accredited elders who investigate the destoolment charges are entitled to appear before the traditional council. This procedure was not followed. The Chief State Attorney, Mr. Ahlijah, submitted that the repeal of the Chieftaincy Act, 1961 (Act 81), spelt the demise of the L.I. 309, it being a statutory instrument made under Act 81. He argued that inasmuch as L.I. 309 was not saved by the Chieftaincy Act, 1971 (Act 370), that statutory instrument ceased to apply. He cited a number of statutes where express provisions are made saving statutory instruments made under repealed statutes. I entirely agree with the learned Chief State Attorney. In the English case of Watson v. Winch [1916] 1 K.B. 688 at p. 691 Sankey J. (as he then was) stated:
“When a statute is repealed any bye-law made thereunder ceases to be operative unless there is a saving clause in the new statute preserving the old bye-law. There appear to be two reasons for this: First, because otherwise there might be two inconsistent codes relating to the same matter … Secondly, because the usual practice is to insert in the later statute a section expressly preserving previously made by-laws if it is intended that they shall remain in force.”
If I may add to what Sankey J. stated, where bye-laws or statutory instruments are made under the new statute which repealed the old the clear intention of the legislature is that the new bye-laws have replaced the old bye-laws in the same manner as the new statute has replaced the old. The two statutory instruments if allowed to co-exist may create inconsistencies. For example, the provisions of L.I. 309 and those of the Chieftaincy (Proceedings and Functions) (Traditional
[p.235] of [1982-83] GLR 231
Councils) Regulations, 1972 (L.I. 798) are inconsistent. In my view, the most pertinent enactment on this issue is section 33 of Act 370 which provides that: “No person shall be deemed to be entitled by this Act to institute proceedings for destoolment of a chief unless he is entitled to do so under customary law.”
The issue here relates properly and closely to capacity of the persons who preferred the destoolment charges rather than to the jurisdiction of the traditional council. As a matter of fact, the applicant raised objection to the capacity of his accusers. The matter was gone into and the objection was overruled. It seems to me therefore that the applicant’s remedy lies in an appeal on this ground. Counsel for the applicant further argued that the composition of the judicial committee should not be less than five in order to have power to hear and determine chieftaincy disputes. Section 3 of L.I. 798 provides:
“3 (1) A judicial committee shall be appointed by a Traditional Council and shall consist of five persons all of whom shall be members of that Council.
(2) A judicial committee shall elect one of their number as Chairman, who shall preside over the committee.
(3) A judicial committee shall be duly constituted for the despatch of its business by not less than three members thereof.”
The true construction of section 3 of L.I. 798 is that the traditional council cannot appoint more than five members of the council to form the judicial committee of the council. But any three out of the five shall have legal authority to exercise the jurisdiction of the committee. It is, therefore, erroneous to suggest that for the despatch of its business the committee must consist of five members. Of course, five may sit if the committee so desires but in law they are not bound. The only circumstance under which the jurisdiction of the committee can be challenged for want of due constitution is when less than three of their members sit over a case.
With regard to alleged denial of his right to be heard, counsel for the applicant referred to a portion of the proceedings where the committee stated that they would proceed without the applicant. It is an elementary rule of natural justice that no man shall be condemned unless he has been given prior notice of the allegation against him and a fair opportunity to be heard. Compliance with the rule requires that a party liable to be directly affected by the outcome of a justiciable controversy should be given prior notice of the case against him and a fair opportunity to put his own case and to correct or contradict any allegation levelled against him by the party who brought the action. I gather from the Ahanta Traditional Council records marked exhibit B that on 8 December 1981 certain persons who purported to be
[p.236] of [1982-83] GLR 231 kingmakers filed destoolment charges against the applicant. By a letter dated 14 January 1982 the applicant informed the traditional council of receipt of a copy of the writ or claim. On 13 July 1982 the applicant wrote a letter raising a preliminary objection that the plaintiffs were incompetent to bring the action because they were not kingmakers. The objection was overruled and a hearing date was fixed, in the presence of the applicant. Then on 9 March 1982 the defendant wrote a letter asking for an extension of time up to six weeks to enable him to look for certain documents for the preparation of his defence. The defendant was served with a hearing notice to appear on 23 June 1982 but he failed to turn up and costs were awarded against him. Another hearing notice was served on him to appear on 14 July 1982. On the hearing date the applicant failed to appear. Instead, he wrote a letter raising preliminary objections which had previously been raised and adjudicated upon. In my opinion these facts clearly show that the applicant was given sufficient notice and was aware of the hearing date and he cannot complain that the case was tried without him.
However, there is one question most crucial to the trial itself. All along the applicant was asking for time to present his defence and he was looking around for all sorts of documents to enable him put up his case fairly and adequately. To this end he applied that the plaintiff make available to him the following documents:
(a) Official documents from the Ghana Government which determine Asafohenefo’s entitlement to a share of the alleged sum of money accruing from lands of the said village.
(b) A copy of the agreement paper drawn between the plaintiffs and the defendants’ predecessors as laid down policy to be followed.
(c) Any document about the Takoradi Harbour with the Ghana Government (Administration of Stool Lands) in respect of moneys collected and their apportionments.
(d) Any plan the plaintiffs had in their possession to substantiate their claims.
The tribunal caused the applicant’s letter to be served on the plaintiffs but, apparently, the plaintiffs did not furnish any documents as requested. The tribunal was of the view that the request was irregular because the defendant had no right to demand from the plaintiffs evidence, documentary or otherwise, which they intended to use at the trial. It seems to me that as the tribunal found it necessary to serve the plaintiffs with the notice to produce, fair-play required that the tribunal exercised a high degree of detachment for the plaintiffs themselves to reply to the “notice to produce.” Instead of exhibiting impartiality
[p.237] of [1982-83] GLR 231 the committee condemned the notice to produce as being irregular and thereby protected the plaintiffs. Or to put it bluntly they took sides with the plaintiffs.
This should take us straight to the applicant’s complaint against the tribunal that they were biased against him because the traditional council had some time in 1976 suspended him from attending meetings of the council. The suspension was the result of an emergency meeting summoned by the traditional council at which the applicant and two other divisional chiefs were condemned as destoolment contractors because they had levelled destoolment charges against the paramount chief of the Ahanta Traditional Area. It is clear that all the other divisional chiefs supported the paramount chief against the so-called destoolment contractors. From the tone of the resolution condemning the three chiefs, special condemnation was made of the applicant who was branded as the brain behind the destoolment plot. The suspension of the applicant and the other two chiefs had not been revoked by the council at the time the judicial committee of the traditional council was called upon to adjudicate upon the destoolment charges against the applicant. When the applicant submitted that the members of the committee would not give him a fair trial because he felt they would be biased against him having regard to the rift between them and the applicant since August 1976, the committee overruled the objection by saying that the applicant was legally entitled to file an appeal against their decision if he was not satisfied. It seems to me that the manner in which the committee delivered itself of the applicant’s objection could not and should not come from the lips of an impartial arbiter. It appears clear from the attitude of the committee that some personal animosity still existed between them and the applicant arising out of the events that led to the suspension of the applicant. The law on judicial bias has been settled by a long chain of cases including the following: Allinson v. General Council of Medical Education and Registration [1894] 1 Q.B. 750 at p. 758; R v. Queen’s County Justices (1908) 1 I.R. 285 at p. 306; R. v. Barnsley Licensing Justices; Ex parte Barnsley and District Licensed Victuallers’ Association [1960] 2. Q.B. 167 at p. 187; R. v. Sunderland [1901] 2 K.B. 57; R. v. Rand [1866] L.R. 1 Q.B. 230; Adjaku v. Galenku [1974] 1 G.L.R. 198 and Attorney-General v. Sallah, Supreme Court, 17 April 1970, unreported; digested in (1970) C.C. 54. The principle of law deducible from these decided cases is that the courts do not go far afield to discover whether in a particular case there was or has been actual bias; they have rather confined themselves, even where there is evidence of actual bias, to determining whether under any given circumstances a real likelihood of bias has been established against an adjudicator; and this question is answered
[p.238] of [1982-83] GLR 231 by drawing reasonable inferences from the circumstances of the case, such inferences being based on the reasonable apprehensions or suspicions of a reasonable man fully conversant with the facts. Therefore, a real likelihood of bias is a question of fact and any court having supervisory jurisdiction can set aside a decision of an inferior tribunal against whom a real likelihood of bias has been established.
In my opinion the facts of this case establish a real likelihood of bias against the judicial committee, the respondents herein. It is significant to observe that the traditional council found it necessary to condemn the applicant and his two colleagues for preferring destoolment charges against the Ahantahene rather than to look into the charges but they were quick in setting up a judicial committee to inquire into the destoolment charges against the applicant. Every reasonable man being apprised of the facts of this case would not hesitate to apprehend that the judicial committee of the traditional council would welcome the destoolment charges against the applicant as a fine opportunity to rid the council of the applicant, a man considered a danger to the security of the Ahantahene whom all the other divisional chiefs supported. Surely they would be prejudiced. The last and the least important point raised against the judicial committee was that it wrongly allowed one Kobina Yarfo to speak on behalf of the plaintiffs. It was said that the said Kobina Yarfo was not a signatory to the destoolment charges but on record it is shown that he was joined as a co-plaintiff upon his own application for joinder and the original plaintiffs by an affidavit headed “power of attorney” prayed the judicial committee to allow the said Kobina Yarfo to prosecute the case on their behalf. The practice in the inferior tribunals of this country which still persists is that a party to a suit may appoint someone else to prosecute his claim on his behalf. This is permissible and the evidence given by such a representative is admissible provided he testified to facts within his own knowledge but it would be inadmissible if he spoke as if he were the principal party because in the latter case his evidence would be hearsay: see Kwofie v. Kakraba [1966] G.L.R. 229. In the instant case, Kobina Yarfo averred in his affidavit that he had interest in the suit. This imposed an obligation on the judicial committee to find as a fact whether Kobina Yarfo was himself entitled by custom to institute destoolment charges against the appellant. The committee did not make any such finding. It is apparent however that the committee accepted him as spokesman for the plaintiffs.
In this regard even if it were established that his evidence was inadmissible that would not give rise to certiorari. Where a tribunal having jurisdiction to adjudicate over a cause or a matter makes errors of law for instance by admitting inadmissible evidence, certiorari
[p.239] of [1982-83] GLR 231 would not lie; the proper remedy is to appeal from the decision; see R. v. Agricultural Land Tribunal for the South Eastern Area; Ex parte Bracey [1960] 2 All E.R. 518 and Bakuma v. Ekor [1972] 1 G.L.R. 133. For this reason the submission by counsel for the applicant attacking the admission of the “power of attorney” on the ground that it was not registered or stamped was of no consequence. It is conceded that a power of attorney attracts stamp duty under section 1 and the First Schedule of the Stamp Act, 1965 (Act 311), but section 14 (2) of the Act provides that where it is required that an instrument which ought legally to be stamped is not so stamped a court may, nevertheless, admit it in evidence on payment of the duty required and the penalty payable. In the same vein the argument by the applicant’s counsel that the action filed by the plaintiffs did not conform to section 4 and the Second Schedule to L.I. 798 only goes to attack a procedural irregularity and makes it a ground of appeal rather than a ground for certiorari. Even so it is my view that the claim substantially conformed to section 4 of L. I. 798.
In the end therefore this court grants the application for certiorari on the grounds of bias and prejudice on the part of the judicial committee of the traditional council and hereby quash their decision. The applicant will have ¢1,500 costs.
DECISION
Application granted.
M. C. N.N.
