MENSAH v. THE REPUBLIC [1968] GLR 230

DIVISION: HIGH COURT, SEKONDI

DATE: 8 MARCH 1968

BEFORE: OWUSU AG.J.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from disqualification from driving imposed by the Circuit Court, Sekondi. The facts are sufficiently set out in the judgment.

COUNSEL

Gaisie for the appellant.

Forster, Assistant State Attorney, for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF OWUSU AG.J.

In this case the appellant was convicted on his own plea to a charge of permitting the use of a vehicle without third party insurance policy contrary to the Motor Vehicles (Third Party Insurance) Act, 1958 (No. 42 of 1958), s. 3 (1) and (2) at the Circuit Court, Sekondi, on 30 November 1967. He was sentenced to a fine of N¢25.00 or one month’s imprisonment; in addition he was disqualified from driving for twelve months. Against this disqualification he appealed to this court. It was argued on his behalf that at the trial it was explained that the appellant did not receive a renewal notice from his insurers and he was relying on that to let him know when he was to renew the policy; the insurers failed to do so in time, and that the explanation should have constituted a special reason to enable the trial circuit judge to waive the disqualification. The Motor Vehicles (Third Party Insurance) Act, 1958 (No. 42 of 1958), s. 3 provides:

“3. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act no person shall use, or cause or permit any other person to use, a motor vehicle unless there is in force in relation to the user of that motor vehicle by such person or such other person, as the case may be, such a policy of insurance or such a security in respect of third party risks as complies with the provisions of this Act.

(2) Any person acting in contravention of this section shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding [N¢400] or to imprisonment for one year or to both such fine and imprisonment and a person convicted of an offence under this section shall be disqualified from holding or obtaining a driving licence.

(3) A disqualification under the provisions of subsection (2), unless the court for special reasons to be recorded otherwise orders, shall be for a minimum period of twelve months from the date of the conviction . . .”

In the State v. Adams, High Court, Sekondi, 21 June 1965, unreported; digested in (1965) C.C. 185 the High Court, Sekondi, presided over by Koranteng-Addow J. set aside the sentence of disqualification for special reasons. In Pilbury v. Brazier 2 All [p.232] of [1968] GLR 230

E.R. 835, a policy was not renewed because of an oversight, and the court held this was special reason. In Lyons v. May (1948) 65 T.L.R. 51, the owner of a motor lorry sent it to a garage to be repaired. When the repairs were done the owner requested the garage proprietor to deliver it at his premises, and the garage proprietor did so. The owner had an insurance policy which only afforded cover while the lorry was being driven by him or by any duly authorised person in his employ. The garage proprietor had no relevant policy. It was held that the garage proprietor was not in the employ of the owner of the lorry, that no policy was, therefore, effective during the journey, and that the owner by permitting the lorry so to be used, committed an offence. In the opinion of the Divisional Court, there were special reasons for not disqualifying the owner under section 35 (2) of the Road Traffic Act, 1930 (20 & 21 Geo. 5, c. 43), from holding a licence for twelve months. It has been laid down by the Divisional Court that to constitute a “special reason” within the meaning of section 35 (2) of the Road Traffic Act, 1930, so as to justify the justices in not imposing disqualification for holding or obtaining a driving licence after a conviction, the reason must be special to the facts which constitute the offence and not special to the offender: Reay v. Young [1949] W.N. 242. In Hammond v. O’Sullivan [1947] S.A.S.R. 1, the Supreme Court of New South Wales held that failure to renew a policy of insurance due to oversight did not amount to special reason. Mr. Gaisie argues that section 35 (2) of the United Kingdom Road Traffic Act, 1930, is analogous to section 3 (3) of Act No. 42 of 1958 and that the United Kingdom courts have in similar circumstances disallowed the disqualification. There is some force in this argument. There is nothing in our Act which suggests that the disqualification must be mandatory. In my view the court may disallow the disqualification or reduce the period of disqualification as the case may be, depending on the facts in each case. I have carefully considered the case of Hammond v. O’Sullivan (supra) and I do not think I should allow the decision of the Australian court to persuade me. I take consolation in the English cases above cited, but, in this case, instead of disallowing the disqualification, I shall reduce the period to three months with effect from 30 November 1967.

DECISION

Period of disqualification reduced to three months.

F. S. T.