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[1978] SLR (CA) 1Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1978

HANSON vs. THE REPUBLIC [1978] GLR 477

24 April 1978 · ARCHER JA · ≈ 26 min read

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OSCOLAHANSON v THE REPUBLIC [1978] GLR 477 [1978] SLR (CA) 1
APAHANSON v THE REPUBLIC [1978] GLR 477, [1978] SLR (CA) 1 (Ghana).
BluebookHANSON v THE REPUBLIC [1978] GLR 477, [1978] SLR (CA) 1 (Ghana Ct. App. 1978).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Gonja (ldrisu) v. The State [1964] G.L.R. 573, S.C.

(2) R. v. Ahenkora and Badu (1960) G.L.R. 160, C.A.

(3) Bediako v. The State [1963] 1 G.L.R. 48, S.C.

[p.479] of [1978] GLR 477

(4) Amoah v. The State [1966] G.L.R. 737, C.A.

(5) R. v. Clynes (1960) 44 Cr.App.R. 158, C.C.A.

(6) R. v. Lillyman [1896] 2 Q.B. 167; 65 L.J.M.C. 195; 74 L.T. 730; 60 J.P. 536; 44 W.R. 654; 12 T.L.R. 473; 40 S.J. 584; 18 Cox C.C. 346, C.C.R.

(7) R. v. Osborne [1905] 1 K.B. 551; 74 L.J.K.B. 311; 92 L.T. 393; 69 J.P. 189; 53 W.R. 494; 21 T.L.R. 288, C.C.R.

(8) R. v. Turnbull [1977] 1 Q.B. 224; [1976] 3 W.L.R. 445; [1976] 3 All E.R. 549; 63 Cr.App.R. 132, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from a conviction by a general court martial for conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline of the Armed Forces. The facts are set out in the judgment of Archer J.A.

COUNSEL

E. N. Moore for the appellant.

Major A. Johnson for the respondent.

JUDGMENT OF ARCHER J.A.

The appellant, a major in the Ghana Armed Forces, was tried by General Court Martial at Tamale on two alternative charges, namely, (1) That he behaved in a scandalous manner unbecoming of an officer contrary to section 32 (1) of the Armed Forces Act, 1962 (Act 105).

OR (2) His conduct was to the prejudice of good order and discipline contrary to section 54 (1) of the Armed Forces Act, 1962.

He was acquitted and discharged on the first alternative charge but was found guilty on the second alternative charge. Accordingly he was convicted and dismissed from the Army.

In this appeal, he has challenged the legality of the finding that led to his conviction and dismissal on the following grounds:

(1) That the learned judge advocate failed to deal adequately with the issue of corroboration. (2) That the learned judge advocate misdirected himself by non-direction on the question of identification which was crucial.

(3) That the conviction is unreasonable having regard to the evidence.

(4) That the learned judge advocate failed to deal adequately with the defence put up by the appellant. The facts of the case have been admirably condensed in the particulars in each alternative charge as follows: that he, the appellant, at Tamale on 20 December 1974, under the pretext of giving Madam Rahenatu Abu, wife of 154493 Private Sidi Amadu, a lift in his car to the OR Quarters did drive the said Madam Rahenatu to a secluded spot in the bush, and did seduce her. Since the word “seduce” has not only a legal meaning but also an ordinary meaning it would be better to rely on the facts as narrated by the complainant herself to understand what the prosecution meant by “did seduce her.” She testified that about 6.30 p.m. on 20 December 1974, she prepared food and took it to the Commanding [p.480] of [1978] GLR 477 Officer’s house where her husband Private Sidi Amadu was on guard duty. While returning home a car stopped and the driver offered her a lift after introducing himself as the B Company Officer Commanding. The complainant also mentioned her husband’s name and the driver of the car replied that he was the boss of the husband and that the complainant should not be afraid. Upon this assurance, the complainant sat in the car and the driver started to drive her home but when she realised that the vehicle had passed her home, she requested she should be dropped but the driver said he was going to the gate of the camp to collect something. However, the car drove past the gate and then the complainant realised that she was being driven to town. It is not necessary at this stage to go into further details but according to her, the driver of the car went off the main road into a bush path and there had sexual intercourse with her against her wishes. Thereafter she was driven back to the camp. She immediately afterwards went to her friend, the second prosecution witness, and requested her to accompany her to the main gate. At the gate she inquired from the third prosecution witness, a guard on duty, whether he had seen a small white car pass through the gate. She described to the third prosecution witness the features of her assailant and the third prosecution witness concluded that the appellant must have been her assailant because he had a small white car and he had seen the appellant drive his car through the gate that evening. Later the complainant accompanied by the second prosecution witness reported the incident to her husband who naturally became furious and asked her to pack her belongings and quit the matrimonial home. On their return, the complainant saw the small white car approaching and she identified the car to her companion. The car stopped and the appellant asked her why she was crying. She did not mind the appellant. A second time, the same appellant came near her and inquired why she was sobbing. She did not respond. During the same evening the complainant narrated her experience with the appellant in the bush to the company sergeant major. On the following day, she was taken by these three other ranks to an officer to whom she repeated her complaint. Thereafter the appellant was charged with the offence.

The General Court Martial acquitted and discharged the appellant on the first alternative charge perhaps because they found that his conduct was not scandalous. If that was the case, then nothing further should be said about this finding in this judgment. However, the General Court Martial found the appellant guilty of conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the Army. There is no doubt that it is highly reprehensible to permit unlawful sexual intercourse between a major in the Army, whether married or not, with the wife of another soldier of the lowest rank. This is the view that the ordinary man in the street will hold in such a situation. How can the major, a senior officer, expect respect and obedience from his junior officer whose wife has been ravished by the very person who expects that respect and obedience? The consequences are too obvious even to the layman who will harbour no sympathy for an officer who conducts himself in such a manner. Military officers cannot be likened unto paragons of virtue and morality but in order to

[p.481] of [1978] GLR 477 maintain and preserve good order and discipline in the Army one would expect senior officers to comport themselves and conduct their private lives in a way that will not court disrespect and disobedience from their subordinates. Moreover if senior officers expect their lower ranks to be disciplined one would also expect the senior officers to be self-disciplined. In this respect self-discipline in my view will relate not only to official duties but all other conduct including the suppression of indiscriminate sexual belligerency towards the wives of other members of the Army.

The appellant denied the charges and it was the duty of the prosecution to prove their case beyond reasonable doubt. The appellant admitted passing through the gate twice that evening to the town and back. His version was that if there was any female found in his car, it was his wife who accompanied him to town and back. His defence was alibi and the law on this point is settled. In Idrisu Gonja v. The State [1964] G.L.R. 573 at p. 576, Ollennu J.S.C. delivering the judgment of the then Supreme Court stated the law as follows:

“At the trial the appellant made complete denial of everything, and put up a defence of alibi. His said defence is most unconvincing. We would point out here, that the failure of the defence did not relieve the prosecution of the onus which lay upon them in view of the appellant’s plea of not guilty, to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. We would add that while a strong defence of alibi weakens a strong prosecution case, the failure of an alibi, however hopelessly, cannot strengthen a weak prosecution case. The case of the prosecution therefore has to stand upon its own strength, or fall by its own weight.”

See also R. v. Ahenkora and Badu [1960] G.L.R. 160, C.A.; Bediako v. The State [1963] 1 G.L.R. 48, S.C. and Amoah v. The State [1966] G.L.R. 737, C.A.

In fairness to the learned judge advocate it must be pointed out that in his summing-up he did draw the attention of the panel to this principle of law relating to alibi. Unfortunately, there is a glaring and fatal omission in the summing-up which must have led the trial court astray. When dealing with corroboration, the following appears to be all that was said:

“The evidence of the eleventh prosecution witness, the husband of the first prosecution witness, and the seventh, ninth and tenth prosecution witnesses was about the complaints made to them by the first prosecution witness. Such evidence, gentlemen, merely establishes the consistency of the first prosecution witness’s evidence. It did not amount to corroboration of the evidence of the first prosecution witness.

As a rule of practice it is held to be unsafe for a jury to act on the uncorroborated evidence of a prosecutrix since sexual complaints can easily be made.”

If the above extract represents all that was said on corroboration in the summing-up then there should be abundant justification for the first

[p.482] of [1978] GLR 477 ground of appeal argued by Mr. Moore. There is no doubt that the learned judge advocate did warn the trial court of the danger of convicting on the uncorroborated evidence of the complainant in a sexual offence. But is the mere warning enough? It is not. The word “corroboration” has a special legal signification and connotation and it should not be presumed that because the President of the trial court was a lieutenant colonel and all the other members were majors, they were so omniscient that they should have been left alone to grope in the dark alleys of legal terminology and to find out for themselves what corroboration meant.

Major Johnson for the Republic has strenuously argued that the offence in respect of which the appellant was charged does not require corroboration. I must say now that I do not agree with this submission. It seems to me that when a member of the Armed Forces has been charged with conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline in the Army, it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the overt acts that constitute the conduct in question. In the present appeal, the conduct complained of is a sexual act and in view of the propensity of some women and girls to blackmail men, the law has been very stringent as regards the type of evidence required to prove such offences. In the present appeal, the prosecution should have proved beyond reasonable doubt that the complainant had sexual intercourse in the bush with a certain man. If there was any evidence of sexual intercourse having taken place, then it was necessary to find out who was the assailant. It is only when the sexual act had been proved that it becomes necessary to find out the man responsible. There must be proof of penetration. Major Johnson’s submission that corroboration is not necessary is therefore untenable. In any case, section 75 of the Armed Forces Act, 1962 (Act 105), clearly provides.

“75. Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act and any regulations made thereunder, the rules of evidence and procedure to be observed in proceedings before a service tribunal shall as far as is practicable be the same as those observed in proceedings before a civil court.”

The rule of evidence in a civil court is that in sexual offences, corroboration is not essential in law, but in practice it is always looked for, and it is necessary to caution the jury that it is always dangerous to act on the evidence of the complainant alone against that of her assailant. There is nothing in the Armed Forces Act or the regulations made thereunder which suggests that this rule of evidence has been excepted or watered down under the saving clause in section 75 of Act 105.

As pointed out earlier, the warning was given in the summing-up but no attempt was made to explain what corroboration meant. In R. v. Clynes (1960) 44 Cr.App.R. 158, C.C.A. Streatfeild J. stressed the necessity for this explanation as follows at p. 161:

“The direction or warning which the learned Recorder gave on the need for corroboration, so far as it went, appears to be accurate enough. He stated that in sex cases it was the practice of judges to

[p.483] of [1978] GLR 477 warn juries that they ought not to accept the uncorroborated evidence of either men or women making the charge. He then referred in detail to the words of Sir Matthew Hale giving the reason for the desirability of corroboration in such cases, which included a statement that, even if there was no corroboration, the jury would be entitled to say that the accused was guilty if they believed the girl’s evidence. That warning the learned Recorder gave but, unfortunately, he never described what was meant in law by corroboration. It is quite true that in this court it has been laid down that a judge is not obliged to draw the jury’s attention to specific items of evidence which may or may not be corroboration, but it is, in our view, at least necessary, in order to make the warning intelligible, to tell the jury what is meant by corroboration. No particular language is necessary to describe it, but it is at least necessary to explain to the jury that what is required is some independent evidence of some material fact which implicates the accused person and tends to confirm that he is guilty of the offence. Any such description of corroboration is, unfortunately, completely absent from the learned Recorder’s summing-up.”

In the present appeal, then were no eyewitnesses to what happened in the bush, except what the complainant herself complained about. Almost all the prosecution witnesses narrated the complaints which the complainant made to them that evening. If the learned judge advocate had explained to the trial court what corroboration meant in law, there is no doubt that the trial court would have been in a better position to appreciate the legal relevance of the various complaints the complainant made. Referring to these complaints, the summing-up has the following direction: “Such evidence, gentlemen, merely establishes the consistency of the first prosecution witness’s evidence. It does not amount to corroboration of the evidence of the first prosecution witness.” I must confess that if I had not studied law and I had been a member of the panel, I would have been helplessly and hopelessly confused by such a direction. In one breath, I am told that the complaints establish the consistency of the evidence of the complainant whose evidence consists of two parts, firstly, that she was ravished in the bush and secondly, that she thereafter complained to other persons. In another breath I am told that the complaints do not amount to corroboration of the evidence of the complainant without being enlightened as to what is meant by corroboration.

In R. v. Lillyman [1896] 2 Q.B. 167 at p. 177, C.C.R. Hawkins J. settled the law as regards complaints as follows:

“The evidence is admissible only upon the ground that it was a complaint of that which is charged against the prisoner, and can be legitimately used only for the purpose of enabling the jury to judge for themselves whether the conduct of the woman was consistent with her testimony on oath given in the witness-box negativing her consent, and affirming that the acts complained of were against her

[p.484] of [1978] GLR 477 will, and in accordance with the conduct they would expect in a truthful woman under the circumstances detailed by her.”

Then in R. v. Osborne [1905] 1 K.B. 551 at p. 561, C.C.R. Ridley J. defined the bounds of this principle thus:

“It applies only where there is a complaint not elicited by questions of a leading and inducing or intimidating character, and only when it is made at the first opportunity after the offence which reasonably offers itself.

Within such bounds, we think the evidence should be put before the jury, the judge being careful to inform the jury that the statement is not evidence of the facts complained of, and must not be regarded by them, if believed, as other than corroborative of the complainant’s credibility, and, when consent is in issue, of the absence of consent.”

It seems to me that the summing-up on corroboration was patently inadequate and misleading and the trial court must have been confused, in the absence of any explanation of corroboration, as to the legal relevance of the various complaints made by the complainant. The learned judge advocate should have told the trial court that a complaint is not evidence of the facts complained of. This is very essential.

The next ground of appeal argued was the question of identity of the assailant. The complainant testified that she did not know the appellant before the incident. It was after he had had the sexual intercourse with her that she verified at the gate the identity of the appellant. She described the appellant as fair coloured and tough and with that description, the third prosecution witness who was on guard duty to whom she first narrated her complaint, concluded that the appellant must have been the assailant. However, there is one feature in the complainant’s evidence which calls for scrutiny. According to her, after she had complained to her husband, the appellant approached her twice and asked why she was crying. She told her friend the second prosecution witness, “This is the man who drove me to the bush and had sexual intercourse with me.” This is very strange indeed. Her evidence was to the effect that the appellant picked her up in a small white car and drove through the gate where the guards were on duty and drove back through the same gate. She further testified that in the bush, the appellant switched on the lights inside the car and so she was able to see the face of the appellant. I must confess that I find it odd that a criminal who has ravished a woman and wants to get away with it will thereafter approach the victim far away from the scene on two occasions and inquire why the victim is crying while the victim is being accompanied by another.

Another strange aspect appears from the evidence of the second prosecution witness who said that the complainant called at her residence crying but she did not say anything about the offence until they reached the gate and the complainant narrated what happened to the third prosecution witness. The first opportunity the complainant had for making a complaint was when she went to the second prosecution witness but she did not do so. The second prosecution witness asked her why she was

[p.485] of [1978] GLR 477 crying and she did not reply but rather requested the second prosecution witness to accompany her to the gate. Moreover, none of the guardsmen on duty at the gate testified as to her state of distress or the appearance of her clothes which she alleged were torn during the incident in the bush.

Some of the guardsmen said they were lying down and could not see properly. Others said they recognised the car as that of the appellant and that it was the appellant who was driving when the car passed. As there was evidence before the trial court that there are several of these white small cars in Tamale, it seems to me that in such case it was the duty of the prosecution, in proving its case beyond reasonable doubt, to establish that during the period in question, that is, around 6.30 p.m. (when the appellant admitted that he drove to the town accompanied by his wife) no other small white car similar to that of the appellant passed through the gates. The guardsmen have a log book at the gate in which they are supposed to record the movement of all vehicles going to and from the barracks. One guardsman, the fifth prosecution witness on sentry duty at the gate between 6 p.m. and 8 p.m., was emphatic that he saw the appellant driving his car back into barracks at about 7.40 p.m. What he failed to tell the court was the time he saw him driving out to town. If he was particular about the appellant’s coming in, why was he unconcerned about the time of his going out? Almost all the guards on duty at the gate said they saw this small white car pass and they recognised it as the appellant’s. Some said they actually saw the appellant driving the car but none of these witnesses could say that they saw the complainant sitting with the appellant in the car. If she had been seen by them, that piece of evidence would have constituted very strong circumstantial evidence in support of the prosecution’s case and the defence would have had a very high hurdle indeed to jump. The version of the appellant was that he drove to town and back that evening accompanied by his wife during the same period relied on by the prosecution. If therefore some of the guards on duty at the gate saw two people in the car, then the second person in the car could have been the appellant’s wife who gave evidence to confirm her husband’s story. It seems to me that this aspect of the case should have been stressed in the summing-up to enable the trial court to decide whether the defence had raised a reasonable doubt which should have been resolved in the appellant’s favour. This second ground of appeal has substance because throughout the summing-up there is no indication that the panel was given any guidance as to how identification of accused persons must be treated in a trial court. The appellant throughout has maintained his innocence and there is no doubt that his defence relied on mistaken identity.

In R. v. Turnbull [1976] 3 W.L.R. 445 Lord Widgery C.J. delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal (composed of five judges) laid down these rules of guidance which I have no hesitation in adopting. At p. 447 he stated as follows:

“First, whenever the case against an accused depends wholly or substantially on the correctness of one or more identifications of the accused which the defence alleges to be mistaken, the judge

[p.486] of [1978] GLR 477 should warn the jury of the special need for caution before convicting the accused in reliance on the correctness of the identification or identifications. In addition he should instruct them as to the reason for the need for such a warning and should make some reference to the possibility that a mistaken witness can be a convincing one and that a number of such witnesses can all be mistaken. Provided this is done in clear terms the judge need not use any particular form of words.

Secondly, the judge should direct the jury to examine closely the circumstances in which the identification by each witness came to be made. How long did the witness have the accused under observation? At what distance? In what light? Was the observation impeded in any way, as for example by passing traffic or a press of people? Had the witness ever seen the accused before? How often? If only occasionally, had he any special reason for remembering the accused? How long elapsed between the original observation and the subsequent identification to the police? Was there any material discrepancy between the description of the accused given to the police by the witness when first seen by them and his actual appearance ? . . .

Recognition may be more reliable than identification of a stranger; but even when the witness is purporting to recognise someone whom he knows, the jury should be reminded that mistakes in recognition of close relatives and friends are sometimes made.

All these matters go to the quality of the identification evidence. If the quality is good and remains good at the close of the accused’s case, the danger of a mistaken identification is lessened; but the poorer the quality, the greater the danger.”

Then at p. 449, the Lord Chief Justice continued:

“The trial judge should identify to the jury the evidence which he adjudges is capable of supporting the evidence of identification. If there is any evidence or circumstances which the jury might think was supporting when it did not have this quality, the judge should say so . . .

Care should be taken by the judge when directing the jury about the support for an identification which may be derived from the fact that they have rejected an alibi. False alibis may be put forward for many reasons: an accused, for example, who has only his own truthful evidence to rely on may stupidly fabricate an alibi and get lying witnesses to support it out of fear that his own evidence will not be enough. Further, alibi witnesses can make genuine mistakes about dates and occasions like any other witnesses can. It is only when the jury is satisfied that the sole reason for the fabrication was to deceive them and there is no other explanation for its being put forward can fabrication provide any support for identification evidence. The jury should be reminded that proving the accused has told lies about where he was at the material time does not by itself prove that he was where the identifying witness says he was.”

[p.487] of [1978] GLR 477

It is not sufficient to tell the trial court that it should form its own opinion as to whether or not the witnesses for the defence spoke the truth. It is also not safe to tell the trial court simply that it had heard the evidence of the appellant and his witnesses and if the trial court believed them then the defence of alibi has been established. The purpose of summing-up is to assist the panel to recapitulate the evidence adduced and to enlighten and guide the panel to understand the relevant law applicable to the case. In his opening remarks, the learned judge advocate said, “It is now my turn to sum up the evidence to you and advise you on the law in relation to this case.” Notwithstanding this disclosure of his obligation, the learned judge advocate devoted almost the whole of the summing-up to the prosecution’s case and dealt with the defence story in a few lines without inviting the panel to embark upon a critical analysis and appraisal of the defence put forward. In this respect too there is some justification for upholding Mr. Moore’s contention that the appellant’s defence was not adequately put to the panel. The relevant part of the summing-up is to follows:

“The accused in his defence denied the charges. His defence is alibi. He said that at 6.30 p.m. on 20 December 1974 he drove his wife to a shop called the Sarboa Enterprises and bought two bottles of schnapps. The defendant’s first witness was the shopkeeper who sold the two bottles of schnapps to him.

After purchasing the schnapps, the managing director of the Sarboa Enterprises served them with four bottles of beer and they drank in the shop. They were in the said shop for an hour. They left the shop at about 8.15 p.m. and got home about 8.30 p.m. Barely about ten minutes after they had got home one Mrs. Acheampong and her sister visited them . . .”

As already pointed out, the evidence of the wife of the appellant was to demonstrate that when the appellant went to town that evening she accompanied him and when he returned she was in the car with him. As Lord Widgery pointed out in the Turnbull case (supra) when dealing with the appeal of Roberts at p. 457:

“This is a situation which not infrequently arises. In such circumstances it will almost certainly be present in the jury’s mind that the witness is the defendant’s wife and they will no doubt make what they think is the proper allowance for this fact. They should, however, be warned in most, if not all, similar cases that the they should not necessarily regard the fact that the witness is the defendant’s wife as derogating from the worth of her evidence when the nature and content of the defence is such that anyone would expect her to be called as a witness in any event.”

In this appeal, the evidence of the appellant’s wife was crucial and the learned judge advocate should have directed the panel to consider her evidence seriously and not to reject it on the flimsy ground that she was the appellant’s wife who was prepared to tell lies to secure her husband’s acquittal. In other words, her evidence was to the effect that if some of the guardsmen said that they saw the appellant with another

[p.488] of [1978] GLR 477 person in the small white car that evening driving through the gates, she was the one in the car and nobody else. This was to negative any inference that the complainant was the one in the car. The guardsmen could not say that it was the complainant who was in the car with the appellant and as such that issue was in the air.

The complainant’s version was that the offence took place between 7 p.m. and 8 p.m. in the bush. The defence was that during that period the appellant and his wife were in a shop called Sarboa Enterprises drinking beer after buying two bottles schnapps to take home. The appellant, his wife and the shopkeeper gave evidence and were subjected to very lengthy cross-examination and even if some of their answers in cross-examination were conflicting on what one would describe as minor matters and not issues, it was still the duty of the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The panel should have been told this after analysing the evidence for the defence. For instance, in cross-examination the appellant gave certain answers which must have puzzled the trial court:

“Q. You told the court you passed out of the barracks and came in. You heard Abubakari, Emmanuel

Owusu and Japhet Jegede say they were on guard at the gate. Did you hear them ?

A. Yes.

Q. And you said earlier that you did not know them ?

A. I now remember they were at the gate.

Q. Was what they told the court that they were at the gate the truth ?

A. Yes. It could be correct.

Q. Do you agree with me that what you said at first was not correct ?

A. Somehow.”

Another perplexing dialogue followed thus:

“Q. It took you fifteen minutes to drive back ?

A. Yes.

Q. That will also be 8.00 p.m.?

A. Yes.

Q. So that what you are telling the court of reaching home at about 8.15 p.m. to 8.30 p.m. is not correct ?

A. It may not be correct.

Q. By the time calculations you got home at 8.p.m. Do you agree with me?

A. Yes. I agree with you.

Q. So all your indications as to time are just rough. It could be plus it could be minus ?

A. Yes.

Q. It is possible that you did not go out at 6.30 p.m. but could be you went out at 6.00 p.m.?

A. It could be so.

Q. One of the three who said they were at the gate said you went out at 7.40 p.m. Could that be correct ?

A. Yes. It could be.

[p.489] of [1978] GLR 477 Q. You are not specific about the time ?

A. I am not specific.”

These answers no doubt must have left the panel with sour mouths and it was the duty of the judge advocate to direct the jury that the inability of the appellant to state with precision the time of his movements in and out of the barracks that evening was not incriminating evidence. What was in issue was whether during that evening the appellant drove through the gate with the complainant as his companion and, after having had sexual intercourse with her in the bush, drove her back to the barracks through the gate. In any case, no witness at the gate said he saw the appellant driving out to town at 7.40 p.m. It was the fifth prosecution witness Lance Corporal Jegede who was on sentry duty between 6 p.m. and 8 p.m. who testified that at about 7.40 p.m. he saw the appellant drive his car into barracks and not out of barracks.

This court did not have the opportunity of watching the comportment of the appellant in the witness-box and therefore it is impossible to assess fully his credibility based solely upon his comportment in the witness-box. However a close scrutiny of his evidence in cross-examination warrants the award of very low marks for this performance but the law is that this performance did not relieve the prosecution of proving its case beyond reasonable doubt as the appellant was under no burden to establish his innocence. All that the appellant was required to do was to have raised a reasonable doubt in the minds of the panel.

Apart from what the complainant said, no prosecution witness was in a position to say that she was seen in the appellant’s car going through the gates twice that evening. It is not known what investigations were conducted before the appellant was charged. Apart from what the complainant said as regards the sexual act in the bush, there was no other evidence, medical or otherwise, to confirm that in fact she had been sexually seduced that evening by anybody.

Looking at the whole evidence and the serious omissions in the summing-up, it seems to me that if the panel had been properly and adequately directed on the question of corroboration, the identity of the assailant, and had been invited to consider the defence story critically, perhaps the trial court would have brought a different verdict after resolving any reasonable doubt in favour of the appellant.

I have considered very seriously section 91 of the Armed Forces Act, 1962 (Act 105), which provides:

“91. Notwithstanding anything in this Part, the Court-Martial Appeal Court may disallow an appeal, if, in the opinion of the Court, to be expressed in writing, there has been no substantial miscarriage of justice.”

My opinion is that the flaws in the summing-up are grave and must have confused and misled the trial court and as such there has been a substantial miscarriage of justice. I would therefore allow the appeal and set aside the finding and direct a finding of not guilty to be recorded in respect of the charge—Conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline.

[p.490] of [1978] GLR 477

By virtue of section 92 (2) of the Armed Forces Act, 1962, as the finding of guilty has been set aside and no other finding of guilty remains, it follows that the sentence of dismissal imposed by the trial court shall cease to have force and effect.

JUDGMENT OF ANIN J.A.

I agree.

JUDGMENT OF ANNAN J.A.

I also agree.

DECISION Appeal allowed. J. D.

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