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[1978] SLR (CA) 13Court of Appeal - GhanaGHANA LAW REPORTS 1979

BROWN vs. SALTPOND CERAMICS LTD. [1979] GLR 409

25 July 1978 · ANNAN JA · ≈ 15 min read

Cite as[1978] SLR (CA) 13
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OSCOLABROWN v SALTPOND CERAMICS LTD. [1979] GLR 409 [1978] SLR (CA) 13
APABROWN v SALTPOND CERAMICS LTD. [1979] GLR 409, [1978] SLR (CA) 13 (Ghana).
BluebookBROWN v SALTPOND CERAMICS LTD. [1979] GLR 409, [1978] SLR (CA) 13 (Ghana Ct. App. 1978).

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CASES REFERRED TO

(1) Wing V. London General Omnibus Co. [1909] 2 K. B. 652; [1900-3] All E.R. Rep. 347; 8 L.J.K.B.

1063; 101 L.T. 411 ; 25 T.L.R. 729; 73 J.P. 429-7 L.G.R. 1093; 53 S.J. 713, C.A.

(2) McGowan v. Stott (1930) 99 L.J.K.B. 357n; 143 L.T. 217, C.A.

(3) Ansah v. Busanga [1976] 2 G.L.R. 488, C.A.

(4) Ivanov v. Speedy Travel and Tour Ltd. [1974] 2 G.L.R. 227.

(5) Fowler v. Lanning [1959] 1 Q.B. 426; [1959] 2 W.L.R. 241; [1959] All E.R. 290; 103 S.J. 157.

(6) Gayler & Pope Ltd. v. Davies (B.) & Son Ltd. [1924] 2 K.B. 75; [1924] All E.R..94; 93 L.J.K.B.

702; 131 L.T. 507; 40 T.L.R. 591; 68 S.J. 685.

(7) Nelson v. Klutse, Court of Appeal (full bench), 8 September 1969, unreported; digested in (1969)

C.C. 142.

(8) Nyame v. Tarzan Transport [1973] 1 G.L.R. 8, C.A.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEAL from the judgment of the trial court in an action for damages founded on negligence arising from motor accident on the highway. The facts are fully set out in the judgment of Annan J.A.

COUNSEL de Graft Aidoo for the appellant.

J. B. Short for the respondents.

JUDGMENT OF ANNAN J.A.

This appeal concerns the application of the maxim res ipsa loquitur to an accident on the highway and the point that is to be determined is whether the plaintiff-appellant (hereinafter called the appellant) led any evidence to establish the negligence of the driver of a motor vehicle owned by the defendants-respondents (hereinafter called the respondents) and which knocked down his son on the road. The appellant was the only witness. He was, however, not present at the time of the accident. He went to the scene later. At the conclusion of the case for the appellant, counsel for the respondents called no evidence and submitted that there was no evidence of negligence before the court. The issue then is quite simple—whether the evidence of the appellant disclosed any negligence by the driver of the respondents’ vehicle.

[p.411] of [1979] GLR 409

These are the main points from the evidence. The deceased was about five years old. He lived in a house very close to a major road which crosses a busy market place always crowded with people. The accident occurred at about 12.30 p.m. The appellant heard a bang in the street, came out and saw his son “already knocked down by a motor vehicle.” He said the boy “was thrown away to a distance and was unconscious.” Immediately the driver of the vehicle saw the appellant he exclaimed, “Sorry it was not intentional.” The boy did not regain consciousness and was dead on arrival at the hospital. This in a nutshell is the evidence on record as to the circumstances surrounding the accident.

The pleading of the appellant state that his son was lawfully crossing the street when he was negligently knocked down by the respondents’ vehicle. Particulars of negligence pleaded were that the respondents’ vehicle was driven at excessive speed in a built-up area without due care and attention; that the driver failed to keep any or any proper look out and that he failed to stop or slow down so as to avoid the accidents.

In their statement of defence the respondents denied an negligence and all the particulars of negligence and pleaded on their part that the boy darted into the street into the path of their driver without ensuring tha t it was safe to cross the road and so hit himself against the vehicle. The accident was therefore caused by the boy’s own lack of care.

The appellant was in no position himself to give any evidence in proof of the facts pleaded as to how the accident happened. No other evidence was given as to the speed of the vehicle, whether the deceased was crossing the road, the part of the road or other place where he was knocked down, the distance to which he was thrown from that point, or the distance which the vehicle travelled to its final position after the collision. As counsel foi the appellant explained, they had hoped to call other evidence at the trial but this was not possible. The appellant therefore had to make the best of what was available to him. The issue is whether his best was good enough to discharge the burden on him to establish a breach of the duty of care owed by the respondents’ driver to pedestrians on the highway, and to the appellant’s son in particular.

A breakdown of the evidence discloses six primary areas of fact that may be urged in establishing negligence. These, not in order of value, are the ace of the boy, five; the locality: a busy crowded market area full of people; the place of collision: a major street crossing a busy market area; the distance to which the boy was thrown by the force of the impact: an unspecified distance; the statement of the driver: “Sorry it was not intentional.”

This evidence does not of course reflect the pleadings of the appellant and indeed it could not since he did not see how the accident happened. That apart, does the evidence, such as it is, speak with the voice of negligence where res ipsa loquitur? It is, I think, necessary to go back to first principles.

The question in every case is whether from the known facts it is reasonable to draw the inference that the other person acted without due care. Where the plaintiff proves a result and not any particular act

[p.412] of [1979] GLR 409 or omission on the part of the other person producing that result, then one looks at the circumstances in which he proves the result and if these make it more probable than not that the result was caused by the negligence of the other person then res ipsa loquitur. Where, however, the case for the plaintiff is consistent with the presence or absence of negligence in the other person the onus on the plaintiff to establish breach of’ the duty of care is not discharged and to succeed he must go further and show that on balance the probabilities are that the accident was caused by want of care on the part of the other person. For in a civil case, where the probabilities are equal, i.e. the case for the plaintiff is as probable as that for the defence, the plaintiff must fail. The plaintiff has to prove negligence in terms or prove facts which do of themselves constitute negligence

A breach of duty is constituted by conduct which falls short of the legal standard of reasonable behaviour. Breach of that standard is a matter of fact and although the prevailing view is that it would be undesirable to crystallise into rules of law what constitutes reasonableness, decisions in individual cases as to what amounts to reasonable or unreasonable conduct are useful as guides.

A passage from a well-known case states that” the fact that an accident has happened either to or through a particular vehicle is by itself no evidence that the fault, if any, which led to it was committed by those in in charge of that vehicle”: see Wing v. London General Omnibus Co. [1909] 2 K.B. 652 at p. 664, C.A. per Fletcher Moulton L.J. This passage was criticised in McGown v. Stott (1930) 143 L.T. 217 at p. 219, C.A. by Scrutton L.J. as not true in all cases of accidents and by this court in the recent case of Ansah v. Busaniga [1976] 2 G.L.R. 488 at pp. 498-499, C.A.

Criticisms of that dictum as being too broad or going too far or being untenable in practice seem to me to spring from the unqualified use of the generic term “accident” in the dictum, for that expression covers all kinds and manner of mishaps and occurrences on the road, some of which clearly would be evidence of negligence while others not. For “certain kinds of accidents, if unexplained, raise prima facie inference of negligence” per Anin J.A. in Ansah v. Busanga (supra) at pp. 498-499, a case where a vehicle went off the road into a ditch where it had no business to be. In such a case the fact that that accident has happened to or through a particular vehicle is by itself evidence that the fault which led to it was committed by those in charge of the vehicle.

In other cases, however, it may be necessary to establish facts other than the mere fact of the occurrence of the accident in order to raise the inference of negligence. In a case where a moving vehicle collides with an object it may be necessary, for instance, to establish not just the fact of collision but that, for instance, the object was stationary, or if a vehicle, that it was moving on its proper side of the road, or that it was run into from the rear, or during overtaking, or that it was parked off the road that is other facts additional to and supplementing the fact that the one body had hit the other body. In a case where the factual description of the accident shows nothing more than the simple fact that a moving

[p.413] of [1979] GLR 409 vehicle had knocked down someone on the highway, in such all example the factual content of the evidence of collision may well be insufficient to raise any inference of negligence. On the other hand, in an example like Ivanov v. Speedy Travel and Tour Ltd. [1974] 2 G.L.R. 227 specific findings of fact made by the trial judge showed that as a result of the pavement being crowded the injured person was forced to walk in the roadway some feet from the pavement and was hit from behind on a broad street in clear daylight by a driver who did not see him before the accident and who was guilty of driving at a terrific speed in a busy street thick with pedestrians and traffic.

In that case apart from the fact of the collision or knocking down, additional pieces of evidence were the speed of the vehicle and the failure of the driver to keep a proper lookout. That was evidence of personal acts or omissions on the part of the driver. Then there was evidence of circumstances surrounding those acts and omissions and in the context of which those acts or omissions had to be assessed: it was clear daylight, a broad street, a number of pedestrians were about, the volume of traffic and the position of the injured person and others oil the road-way itself some distance from the kerb.

The view may well be taken that in a running down action where the only facts prove are that a motor vehicle moving along the highway has come in contact with a person oil the highway, there is, in the absence of proof of other decisive facts, no evidence from which all reference of negligence in the driver may be made. For a person who receives injuries on the highway may not recover damages unless the person in charge of the vehicle involved was negligent in its management: see Fowler v. Lanning [1959] 1 Q.B. 426 and Gayler & Pope Ltd. v. B. Davies & Son Ltd. [1924] 2 K.B. 75 at pp. 82-84.

I turn again to the additional facts proved by the appellant. Firstly, there is no evidence as to any personal act or omission of the driver, in the course of his driving, before the collision. There is, however, the evidence of surrounding circumstances, namely that the collision took place in broad daylight on a major street crossing a busy crowded market area full of people. It goes without saying that a driver who takes a potentially dangerous thing like a motor vehicle on to the highway comes under a duty of care to other users of the highway who are likely to be affected by his management of the vehicle. The driver of the vehicle however has a right to take it on to the highway. That right generally remains whether the road is major or minor, broad or narrow, or whether or not it goes through a place full of people and whether by day or night and whether or not there are other users of the road, such as pedestrians whose user is likely to cut across that of the driver. The right to be on and to go along the road remains and the driver is not in breach of his duty of care to these others merely by moving his vehicle along the road in these circumstances. For as observed by Scrutton L.J. in McGowan v. Stott (supra) at p. 219 “Where both parties are moving and have a right to move, prima facie the mere fict that those moving bodies run into each other is not evidence of negligence.”

[p.414] of [1979] GLR 409

The case is, however, different if he moves too fast or drives off the road against or on to the kerb, the pavement or sidewalk. These would be instances, prima facie, of unreasonable behaviour amounting to carelessness. So also if the vehicle is so managed that it overturns on the highway or collides with another vehicle, or a pedestrian from behind or where the driver fails to observe a person or object so placed on the highway as to be plainly visible. It is on evidence of this kind that proof of negligence usually rests.

I do not see any evidence of such matters in this appeal. I do not see that the evidence of the position in which the appellant saw his child after the collision is any indication of the speed at which the vehicle was driven. Firstly, there is no evidence as to the point of impact. Secondly, the appellant did not say how far his son had been thrown by the force of the impact not only because he did not say where the impact had taken place, but also because he did not say where the boy was found lying, whether on or off the road. Such evidence as he gave cannot have any weight in assessing the speed of the vehicle. I see no other evidence of speed. In my view the evidence of surrounding circumstances advances the appellant’s case no further than did the evidence of the collision.

Next, I consider the evidence of the age of the boy and the statement made by the driver soon after the accident. I do not think the statement is any admission of negligence. A result that is said to be not intentional is not necessarily to be taken as negligent for an unintentional act may be negligent or accidental and to say that one is sorry for having been the cause of injury to another is an admission of causation not of breach of duty. Nothing should turn on that statement. Then there is the age of the boy. He was about five years old. That is a material factor for consideration. The presence of children or young person whether singly or in a group on or along the highway calls for the exercise of more care and caution on the part of drivers of motor vehicles since a measure of care that is reasonable in the case of adult pedestrians may be wholly or substantially inadequate in relation to a child. Whatever the degree of care. it is a question of doing what is reasonable in the particular situation created by the presence of the child.

In the present case there is very little evidence as to the particular situation created by the presence of the child and which should have put the driver specially on his guard and obliged him to take some such precaution as sounding the horn, slowing down, swerving or even stopping altogether. All that is known is that the child was knocked down on the highway by the vehicle in charge of the servant of the respondents.

Hard cases, it is said, make bad law. I think this is a hard case but father than extend the application of the maxim res ipsa loquitur to such a case as this, I would, I think., be justified in leaving the damage in this case where it fell.

Recovery of damages in cases arising from personal injury on the highway is still firmly based on proof of behaviour regarded as unreasonable and therefore putting the defendant at fault. The maxim res ipsa loquitur neither displaces this burden of proof nor lightens it. It merely

[p.415] of [1979] GLR 409 alters the method of discharging it. The basis of success by a plaintiff is still negligence and this must be established either expressly, by direct evidence of facts on omissions before the happening of the accident, or circumstantially by way of reasonable inference from the particular facts of the accident itself, provided such facts in themselves permit the inference of negligence to be drawn. It is not enough for the res to speak. It must speak with the voice of negligence. I think it is important for a realistic application of the maxim of res ipsa loquitur in cases of accidents that it be said that it is not proof of any accident on the highway, be it a case of collision or running down, that permits the inference of negligence to be drawn.

“According to our understanding of the doctrine [of res ipsa loquitur] it applies whenever it can be said at a given point of a trial that res or circumstances proved by the plaintiff are of themselves sufficient evidence from which negligence may reasonably be inferred. And the first decisive point of the trial is the close of the plaintiff’s case. For if the doctrine can then be invoked by him, he is enabled to avoid a non-suit or his action being dismissed on the ground that he had not discharged the onus which lay on him; see the illuminating judgment of Evatt J. in Davis v. Bunn ((1936) 56 C.L.R. 246). In effect what this boils down to is that in every case of negligence it is for the plaintiff to plead and prove facts from which the negligence of the defendant may be inferred by the court. Generally, proof of the act or omission which occasions damage is not by itself sufficient evidence from which the inference of negligence can be drawn . . . But there are cases where the proof of the act itself, let us say an accident, is sufficient to raise the inference of negligence because acts or omissions of that nature do not in the ordinary course of things occur without the negligence of the person responsible for its happening. These are the cases where it is said that the res speaks for itself.

Where the proof is given by the plaintiff of such an accident by itself and no more, the court is entitled to infer negligence.”

Per Amissah J.A. in Nelson v. Klutse, Court of Appeal (full bench), 8 September 1969, unreported; digested in (I 969) C. C. 142. (The emphasis is mine.)

Where an inference is a reasonable deduction fron the evidence it may be sufficient to discharge the burden of proof but there can be no inference unless there are objective facts from which the fact sought to be proved may be established and where there are no such “positive proved facts,” the method of inference fails and what remains is mere speculation or conjecture: see Nyame v. Tarzan Transport [1973] 1 G.L.R. 8 at p. 15, C.A. In my view, on the facts of this appeal, the only basis on which the maxim would apply is this, that in the ordinary course of experience a motor vehicle does not knock down a pedestrian on the highway without any negligence on the part of the person in control of the vehicle and so the mere occurrence of that kind of accident makes it more probable than not that it was caused by the negligence of the person in

[p.416] of [1979] GLR 409 control of the motor vehicle. That is a conclusion I do not feel able to come to and I am not persuaded that authority compels me to do otherwise. Accordingly, I would uphold the ruling of the trial judge in which he held that the appellant had not made out his case.

I would dismiss the appeal.

JUDGMENT OF JIAGGE J.A.

I agree.

JUDGMENT OF KINGSLEY-NYINAH J.A

I also agree.

DECISION

Appeal dismissed.

D. R. K. S.

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